

SECRET  
 AUTH: 25 33rd Inf Div  
 Int: 10 April 1945

From: 152400  
 To: 152300  
 34th Inf Div  
 152100 April 1945

NO. 269

Map: Germany 1/100,000. Sheet No. 6.

#### ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD:

- Enemy front line - The enemy front line extends along the E bank of the ELBE RIVER. Isolated elements are being encountered in our rear areas.
- Defensive organization - Enemy is entrenched in foxholes and VC positions E side of the earth dyke which parallels the E bank of the river.
- Units in contact - See ON Estimate of 14 April.
- Reserves and other forces capable of intervention - A column of troops was seen moving E at FRENCHLAND Y8036 and friendly artillery fire interrupted with its progress.

#### ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

- General Summary - Isolated elements of the enemy are being met in the rear areas. Considerable activity and movement of vehicles and personnel towards the E from vicinity Y8035 was observed during the period.
- Operations of component elements.
  - Artillery - A battery of 6 - 88s and 2 multiple barreled 20mm guns was located at Y82554161 and was fired upon. Three of the 88s were destroyed. Six rounds of 108mm fire fell vicinity Y845302 at 1445. Three rounds of 150mm fire were received vicinity Y867423 at 1800.
  - Airaction - Two VC-190s, flying NE to SE were seen vicinity Y825421 at 0753. No bombing or strafing was reported. Eleven VC 108s passed over TANGHEUNDE Y8045 from E to W at 0915.
  - Armor - One heavy and 3 light tanks were seen in vicinity of Y830400 at 1300. These tanks were abandoned.
  - Engineers - Bridge at Y895348 is out. Demolished railroad bridge at Y8953 can be crossed by foot troops. Enemy tank ditch is reported to be in vicinity Y9150.
  - Infantry - 150 to 200 soldiers on the W side of river vicinity of railroad bridge Y8953 are harassing our forward elements with small arms fire. Enemy patrols were encountered in area during the period, one in vicinity of Y8734 at 0150 and another vicinity Y810340 at 1000. Patrols were fired on and 4 enemy were captured. Friendly patrols received SP fire from vicinity Y906365.

#### MISCELLANEOUS:


- Prisoners - 1,394 PWs passed thru Div care since 152400. Total for this operation 2,466. Grand total 28,402. The 134th Inf Regt turned over 237 PWs to the 79th Inf Div while still in the RUHR POCKET. These figures are included in the grand total.
- Miscellaneous - 83 freight cars loaded with 24 - V-2s and 126 - V-1s are standing on railroad tracks at Y767395.  
 Location of airfield, which was reported to be at Y8327, should read Y8137.

Seven single-motor Junkers are dispersed in woods vicinity Y805381. Three bi-planes are dispersed vicinity Y8137.  
 Enemy radar station was found intact vicinity Y721305.  
 Railroad guns were captured at Y890324 and Y804425.

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3. MISCELLANEOUS (Continued)

- c. Weather - Continued fog with scattered clouds.
- d. Password - HAND reply HANDLE from 171200 to 181200 April 1945.


HOYNE  
G-2

DISTRIBUTION

VIII Corps	3	G-4	1	102nd Div	1
CIC	1	MO	1	134	4
OS	1	CNO-Ord	1	137	5
IPW SO	1	Surg-Chap	1	320	4
PI	1	Sig Off	1	QM Co	1
WII	1	Hq Comdt	1	Med Bn	2
Engr Off	1	Hq Co	1	Ord Co	2
Div Arty	5	PRO (Forward)	1	Sig Co	1
Div AT Off	1	War Room	1	654 TD	1
C/S	1	PRO (Rear)	1	448 AAA	1
G-1	1	Hon Tpt	1	AG	1
G-2	4	784 Tk Bn	1	PM	1
G-3	1	50th Div	1	Engr Bn	1

**SECRET**



SPECIAL G-2 ESTIMATE

## 1. GENERAL

The German Army in the West has been virtually destroyed. Over 700,000 PWs have been taken since the 1st of Feb. Immense stores of equipment and supplies have been captured. The RUHR and SAAR industrial areas have been lost to the enemy. His last natural defensive lines between the East and West fronts have been overrun or penetrated. While it is true that in many places the enemy still resists with discipline and tenacity, yet his task is hopeless and his continued existence as a territorial unity in Europe is only a matter of a few weeks.

Since 30 Mar, the XII Corps has penetrated 250 miles into GERMANY - crossing the RUHR, the NORTH RINE, the WESER and now the ELBE - capturing more than 80,000 PWs during this drive.

Today as our assault crossing of the ELBE - last natural barrier before BERLIN - proceeds, we are forced by the exigency of the situation to consider aspects of the entire European battle - for our front lines lie only 70 miles from BERLIN and 120 miles from the Russian front. The lack of recent, specific enemy information from the Russian front makes the possibility of error in an estimate greater.

## 2. BETWEEN THE ELBE AND THE EAST FRONT

Convinced that the units in the West can no longer stop us and that the miscellaneous elements from the various Wehrkreise we enter can cause little more than brief delay, the only remaining vital question - will the enemy shift a potent mobile force from the East front to try to halt us?

It does not seem probable that a strong mobile force will be shifted to combat our attack. Rather our contact with the main forces on the Eastern front will come probably only after we penetrate their rear areas and the proximity of that front. Identification of an individual unit, however, would not be a surprise.

The bases for the above conclusion are many:

(1) Although disaster has confronted him for three weeks, no shift of forces from the East has been made. He has had time, and the German leadership would have transferred forces while they still had a natural barrier from which to defend before they lost their Western armies - if the capability consistent with their intentions existed.


(2) Though it is not thought the German leaders are deliberately allowing Western occupation as a preference to Russian advances, yet it is probably that the great national hatred of the Russians would at least subconsciously affect any military decision involving relative risks with the resultant tendency to provide every insurance that the Eastern front held.

(3) The German losses on the Russian front have been very high. It is estimated that units on that front are at about 1/3 of T/O strength. The loss of VIENNA and large numbers of troops in that area calls for more - not less - troops. It therefore seems probable from a military standpoint, that to avoid disaster on this front from present and potential drives, the enemy cannot spare the depleted forces he still has available.

(4) While logically our approach to the Eastern front should reduce his logistic problems and make transfer of troops swift and easy, yet our entry into the rear areas of his front will cause unlimited confusion. Actually his freedom of action will decrease as we move forward further - making any large, coordinated counterattack more and more difficult.

(5) The German policy in the East and the West in recent weeks has been to defend in place with forces available. This shift from the tactics of movement





of the once great German army is perhaps suffered by fuel and transportation shortages. Armies, not to speak of thousands of smaller groups of soldiers, are lost today in the East and West through this policy of defense in place of many hopeless situations. Not stupidity, but necessity must be the answer.

(6) If the vital threat of the XIII Corps were an isolated penetration, there would be more reason to suspect a heavy blow. But threats equally disastrous are developing to the south and north. Particularly if he has hopes of making a last stand in the mountains to the south, would he not risk committing large mobile forces on our front to be isolated from his possible redoubt by a union of the Third Army and the Russians to his south. If he splits what must be a meager reserve in the East to contain several critical threats in the West, then the resulting opposition will be no grave danger to any of our divisions. If he does not meet all spearheads, he has ruined little.

(7) The German Ninth Army holds the front in the East in the zone of our advances. This army of fourteen infantry divisions, together with the defense divisions and miscellaneous units in the BERLIN area cannot offer a powerful striking force to be shifted against us. Of 21 known relatively intact German Pz Divs on the East front, 17 are S of DRESDEN, 2 just N of DRESDEN (21 Pz, 25 PG), and the other 2 north of BERLIN. There is no reason to believe that these divisions are in much better shape than Pz units in the West before the RUINE crossings. The last known dispositions therefore, offer additional difficulties to commitment against us.


If he cannot, or will not, send a potent force from the East against us - then what will we meet?

It is probable that in the establishment of the Corps bridgehead only miscellaneous units will be contacted with perhaps some defense divisions or units from the BERLIN area - this to be supplemented by substantial artillery fire and sporadic air attacks on the bridge sites. Fifteen to 20 tanks operating in groups with infantry are an enemy capability. The enemy will make strong attempts with troops available to limit or eliminate the bridgehead. The more time the enemy has to collect elements of units and scattered tanks and assault guns, the more difficult our task - here or in any phase of the drive to the East. No defensive line will be met.

Driving East from the bridgehead for the next 60 kms, the resistance is likely to be varied. On the north as we approach the perimeter of BERLIN heavy resistance is probable from a rather well organized group of miscellaneous units or defense divisions with probably a great amount of dual purpose 88mm fire and fire from heavy artillery pieces. The BERLIN defenses have been hastily and recently constructed and are not of a system anything like those around AACHEN, but better than the hasty road blocks seen in many towns. On the south in this zone the situation should be more fluid with moderate resistance coming from miscellaneous units plus elements of divisions in reserve or refitting areas from the East front.

Finally in the last 80 kms west of the Eastern front we may expect a variety of enemy reaction with increasing problems for us. A large scale rush to surrender to American forces in preference to Russian captivity is not entirely unlikely. Contact with many elements of divisions facing both fronts in part, or almost complete identification of some of these divisions, is probable. Resistance in places may be temporarily very heavy, but the enemy's ability to sustain or exploit any success will be lacking. The enemy's great confusion as we drive into his rear areas necessitating him to face two directions, eliminating his sources of essential supplies, and rendering control even more impossible, will facilitate our contact with the Russians.





In addition to the problems the above will create for us, we may expect added concern from the necessity of coordinating with the Russians all of the questions that are difficult enough to arrange satisfactorily even between two American Armies or Corps at any time.

### 3. AFTER THE JUNCTION OF THE EAST AND WEST FRONTS

The first meeting of the East and West fronts is most likely in the zone of advance of the Ninth or Third Armies, with the area between these two Armies rapidly becoming solidly Allied.

As these fronts approach, it is not probable that the enemy will attempt any extensive extrication of his forces either to the north or south. Those units in the zone of our advance are likely to fight and surrender in place.

But once the junction has been made, continued resistance to the south, north and in BERLIN itself is probable. For the same tenacity that continues, what looks like national suicide today will surely motivate him tomorrow.

#### To The North

To the north with relatively limited forces, he can be expected to defend stubbornly along the north and BALTIC SEA ports. Even after he is forced back to the port cities, and after this pocket is further divided, some last, hopeless holding out is foreseen to deny us use of the northern ports and to enable him to continue limited submarine activity. The 13 divisions still in NORWAY cannot possibly be moved in any substantial numbers to the south.

#### BERLIN

In BERLIN, an attempt to defend even after it is surrounded is visualized to maintain this symbol of national existence.


#### To the South

To the south, his forces and the terrain offer him most hope for continuation. A prepared national redoubt is not believed to exist, but the intention to use this area is likely. Here the natural line of the mountains around the perimeter of an area extending south to north ITALY includes some limited industrial capacity and land for the production of food. It is also true that the vast majority of his armor and SS personnel is conveniently located adjacent to his 'hold-out' as well as the 23 divisions now holding on the Italian front. However here he is already threatened from the East by a Russian drive through VIENNA up the DANUBE Valley which so far he has been unable to halt and which would destroy any hopes of long scale resistance on a practical scale.

The end is approaching too quickly to allow sufficient time for preparation of any effective area of continued resistance. This 'holding out' may postpone the conclusion of fighting, but at the most not more than a few months. The junction of the East and West fronts will greatly accelerate the growing enemy inclination to discontinue the struggle.

(SOURCE - G-2 XIX CORPS)





G-2 PERIOD. REF. F

SECRET

th. CG 35th Inf Div

Init: 17

Date: 17 April 1945

From: 162100

To : 172100

35th Inf Div

172100 April 1945

NO. 264

Maps: Germany 1/100,000. Sheet No. 6.

## 1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD:

- Enemy front line - Along the E bank of the ELBE RIVER, with bridgehead Y8934.
- Defensive organization - Enemy is dug in on the reverse slope of earth dyke at Y842255, Y860251 to Y868273 and at Y890410. Civilian reports OPs are in vicinity of Y886320 and Y889328, both armed with a MG each.
- Units in contact - KG Kley was identified today as an organized unit facing the Div.
- Artillery - SP gun was located at Y800300, 88mm gun located at Y897347, a 6-gun battery located at Y82592096. Two guns were located and fired on at Y886219 and Y896197. PW reports that 2 railroad AA guns are located at Y906327 and 3 artillery pieces, 105mm or 150mm, are in position along edge of woods at Y914323.
- Supply and administrative elements - Vehicles were observed moving in vicinity of Y910333. Artillery fire was put on them. Several gas dumps were hit and 2 tank cars filled with gasoline exploded after being hit. Civilian reports an oil barge in vicinity of Y896322.

## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:


- General summary - Enemy patrolling was active and aggressive during period. Medium and light artillery fire was received by forward units during the day. Isolated groups of enemy were encountered and captured by motorized patrols in the rear areas.
- Operations of component elements:
  - Artillery - Concentrations of artillery fell vicinity Y8735, Y881470, Y880355, Y82562151, Y881470, Y867427, Y3129, and Y875344.
  - Aviation - One unidentified plane flew over 137th CP E to W at 0130. One unidentified plane crashed NW of TANGERMUNDE at 162315H.
  - Infantry - Enemy, estimated 60 strong, attacked in 134th area vicinity of Y875345 at 0130 and gained some ground temporarily until forced to withdraw at 0200. A patrol crossed the river in vicinity of Y8326 at 0300 but withdrew when fired upon leaving three dead behind at Y819252. Five enemy in a boat were seen near the W bank of the ELBE in vicinity of Y884415 at 1115. Intermittent 20mm and mortar fire was received by 137th Regt at 1545. An enemy officer was killed and one enemy soldier captured in vicinity of Y857440 at 1440. Officer was identified as being from the Panzer Pioneer Repl Bn No. 5 whose mission was to build emplacements on E bank of ELBE.
- Miscellaneous - PW reports that a band of SS men armed and wearing uniforms is in vicinity of ACKENDORF Y4644. Three Poles were reported to have been killed by this band on 16 April. Displaced person states that another group, 100 to 150 strong, is operating from woods vicinity Y2122 to Y2536. This group is said to raid DOHREN Y2320 nightly for food and civilian clothing. An estimated platoon of enemy was reported to be in vicinity of WANNFELD Y5233 today. Recon and TD units picked up 3 PWs this vicinity late this afternoon.

A civilian who was challenged in vicinity of Y840305 early this morning opened fire killing one of our men and wounding another. Civilian escaped.

PW states that approximately 100 enemy have crossed ELBE RIVER and are established in a bridgehead at Y890355.

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## 3. MISCELLANEOUS:

- a. Prisoners - 683 PWs passed thru Div care since 162100. Total for this operation 3,171. Grand total 24,065.
- b. Estimated enemy casualties 100, 15 of which were killed and 85 long term wounded.
- c. Miscellaneous - All U. S. and British PWs will be carefully screened at camps where uncovered. Only those actually requiring hospitalization will be evacuated thru medical channels. The remainder will be evacuated thru normal channels. Malnutrition cases, except those requiring hospitalization, will be evacuated thru normal channels. Medical department facilities permit the evacuation of only those individuals requiring hospitalization thru medical channels.

One 1/4 ton truck, apparently abandoned by the enemy, was found in vicinity of Y464397.

PW reports that a narrow-gauge railroad has been laid thru the woods vicinity of Y9045 and that 4 to 6 railroad runs are operating on the tracks.

Looks at Y89722989 are protected by 6 MGs and 1 SP gun, according to PW.

- d. Weather - Generally fair with scattered to broken clouds during the day and scattered to clear at night.
- e. Password - WHAT reply NEXT from 181200 to 191200 April 1945.

HOYNE  
G-2

DISTRIBUTION

XIII Corps	3	G-2	1	102nd Div	1
CIC	1	IO	1	134	4
OB	1	CIO-Ord	1	137	5
IFW CO	1	Surf-Chap	1	320	4
PI	2	Sig Off	1	QM Co	1
WII	2	Hq Comdt	1	Med Bn	1
Engr Off	2	Inf Co	1	Ord Co	2
Div Arty	2	PRO (Forward)	1	Sig Co	1
Div AT Off	1	War Room	1	CS4 TD	1
C/S	1	MG (Rear)	1	448 AAA	1
G-1	1	Rec Trp	1	AG	1
G-2	4	784 Tk Bn	1	78	1
G-3	2	30th Div	1	EMR Bn	1

SECRET