LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING THE ARGONNE BATTLE

HEARINGS

BEFORE

THE COMMITTEE ON RULES

OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

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LOSSES OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING THE ARGONNE BATTLE.

COMMITTEE ON RULES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Monday, February 17, 1919.

The committee this day met the Hon. Edward W. Pou (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Mr. Campbell, will you present these gentlemen?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would like to be permitted to state that we have Gov. Allen here and I believe all the membership of the committee desire to hear the facts regarding the Thirty-fifth Division, regardless of who it helps or who it may hurt. We have no desire on the part of anybody to do anything but present the facts.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY J. ALLEN, GOVERNOR OF KANSAS.

Gov. ALLEN. On the afternoon following my inauguration as governor I was asked by the friends and next of kin of members of the Thirty-fifth Division if I would not address a public meeting, and in that public meeting in Topeka I described the conditions under which the Thirty-fifth Division was during its campaigns in France, and closed with a statement in relation to the shortage of war materials, including the declaration that we sufferered unnecessary losses in the Argonne through lack of protection in the air, through very grave lack of artillery support, which was due in the main to the shortage of horses, giving the statement of one of the remount officers of the division who explained that we went into the battle of the Argonne Forest 2,800 horses short. I set forth also the fact that the Germans had unquestionable domination of the air from the moment the battle opened, and that it was my opinion, gathered from conversations with officers whose duty it was to know the situation, that we did not have any American made fast fighting planes, that most of such planes as we had we had purchased from the French, and those we had were wholly inadequate to meet the situation; that the domination of the Germans in the air was so absolute that their airships had descended to an altitude so low that they could fire with frightful accuracy with their machine guns, dropping their bombs also from a low altitude. These planes attacked advancing columns before they deployed; they attacked wounded men as they lay upon the ground in the forest, and wounded men and wounded officers sought to protect themselves from the attacks of German planes by firing with their rifles and with their revolvers.

Occurrences of this sort were constantly in evidence, where wounded men would turn over and get hold of their guns to fire at some airplane that was sweeping above them. These planes were allowed to come so far back that they attacked our artillery batteries. I have in mind one of my secretaries who was at a field artillery post nearly 6 miles behind the lines, on the fourth day of the battle, a German airplane came so low that this secretary, as well as all the other noncombatants who were there, and the officers took rifles to fight him off. This secretary was Dr. Talmadge, a Presbyterian preacher of New York. He was shot through the head and through the thigh by the machine-gun fire of the German.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he killed?

Gov. ALLEN. No. He is living and may be summoned as a witness if you wish. You can get him by addressing the Overseas Service of the Y. M. C. A. in New York.

A printed memorandum provided that each battalion should take with it into combat French seventy-fives for the purpose of reducing the machine-gun nests and other small massed resistance. For some reason this plan was not carried out in any particular. During all of the six days and five nights of the battle the German avions did whatever they wished to do, practically without molestation on our part. We had some airplanes and it was apparent occasionally when they would fly over that they were doing the best they could, and I do not wish that any statement that I make to-day to be taken as a reflection on those splendid men we had, because they had a great spirit and a great capacity, but they did not have machines.

Mr. GARRETT. You are referring specifically to the situation of the Thirty-fifth Division?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; I am referring to the Thirty-fifth Division, because that was the Division with which I was acquainted. There is evidence that the same condition prevailed throughout all the divisions on the front line. I wish to say that I am making just a brief statement of which I can prove by the testimony I have here, of men and officers.

The artillery opened about 2 o'clock in the morning of September 26, with a heavy barrage, lasting four and a half hours—a barrage which proved the full capacity of our divisional and Army Artillery. Then our Infantry went forward and soon passed beyond the range of this divisional artillery, reaching a point where it was necessary to send Infantry arms forward to meet German machine guns, German artillery, German tanks, and to meet them with nothing but Infantry arms. The explanation of the failure of the Artillery to protect the Infantry most often given to me by officers who were there was that it was due to the lack of horses with which to move the guns forward.

I will be able to prove by official reports of the Inspector General of the Corps to which this Division belonged just what the shortage was. I will be able to prove by numerous letters and statements of men and officers that the air craft we had was not able to protect us or to direct Artillery fire. I will be able to prove by one of the intelligence officers whose business it was to send back every few moments reports from the front line to the P. C. that our Artillery barrage frequently fell in our own lines killing many men and

wounding others, because there was no air craft with which to direct Artillery fire.

I will be able to prove on the question of casualties from the American officer who had charge of the triage of the Thirty-fifth Division, the casualty-clearing station of the Division, just what the casualties were and the condition of the wounded; that they laid, some of them 48 hours in the forest before they could be given any attention; that they lacked litters and blankets; that they lacked ambulances; that many of them did not go to the casualty-clearing station but were taken directly from the field-dressing station to the evacuation hospital in trucks, many of which were borrowed from the French. That wounded could not be evacuated from the casualty-clearing station for hours because of lack of transportation and the blocking of the roads, because transportation could not move. I think, with this brief statement of what is contained in this evidence, I will present, if I may, by reading excerpts from various portions of this testimony, the statements of these men and officers, and as I read these statements, if anyone wishes to interrupt with questions, I will, of course, be very glad to answer.

Mr. SNELL. Were the conditions, as far as the Thirty-fifth Division was concerned, the same as to the other divisions in that locality, at that time?

Gov. ALLEN. I can not speak with accuracy, but I should judge, from the fact that the Thirty-fifth fought forward, leading the attack at this part of the line, that its condition was exactly the same, so far as the question of war material is concerned, as that of other divisions in the line.

Mr. SNELL. The same shortage of airplanes in the whole sector?

Gov. ALLEN. I have a great many statements from the officers and men of other divisions which would indicates the condition of the Thirty-fifth Division as typical of the entire line.

Here is a statement from two or three of these letters of men whose names I will have to give in confidence; I will be glad to give them to the committee in confidence as the men are still in service over there.

One is from a major of a machine-gun battalion, who says:

I think I am conservative when I say that the Infantry and the machine-gun units came out with at least 50 per cent casualties for the six days the division was in. I know my own losses were 40 per cent and they were far lower than the Infantry.

Here is a statement from a lieutenant colonel of one of our Infantry regiments, a man who was mentioned four times for splendid courage in the general orders of the divisional commander. He was finally promoted from major to lieutenant colonel for daring in the field. Writing a letter to friend, he says:

My command was always in the front and I know from bitter experience what that artillery fire meant. You see it had been reported that the divisions on our flanks were ahead of us, and we were told to "push on"; yet if one of the high command had asked me I could have told him that they were far behind us. As a result we were compelled to retire after capturing advanced ground. Again our Artillery failed us. It did not support us after the first few hours. No counter battery work; we were left to the mercy of the flank fire of German artillery without reply from our artillery. This was the chief failure. Then our special units, such as trench mortars, machine guns, and 37 mm. guns were not trained to work with the fighting battalions.

Here is another confidential statement from a top sergeant. He says:

I wish to state that I entered the Argonne battle on the 26th day of September, and was in this battle until October 1, when I was wounded and obliged to go to the hospital, and that my observations were that in regard to the Artillery that the support for the first four and a half hours was excellent and after that it was no use to the Infantry. The explanation I would give to this was the deficiency in the number of horses, also of the deplorable condition that our horseflesh were in; many were blinded or had been gassed, but the great proportion of these horses were horses that had been supposedly tested by the American Army from somewhere in the battle fields, and were not in condition to do the work put upon them, and it was impossible for them to carry the loads and burdens, and they were unfit for service expected of them, and many of these horses could be seen dropping by the wayside and dying along the roads.

The time that I was in this battle, my observation was that the Germans absolutely predominated the air.

I have here a statement which I must also give in confidence, from a colonel of the division belonging to the Regular Army, and I think I will read just a paragraph or two, which will give a description of the manner in which he suffered. He is describing the battle just south of Cheppy.

Here, it seems to me, every officer and man did things during a three hours' heroic stand under constant high-explosive shelling and a murderous, direct machine-gun hailstorm from the front and both flanks, that is deserving of the highest recognition. It was a horrible scene, men handless, legless, armless, others perforated through and through, strewn over the field, in the road, in the ditches. And, in spite of all this, the living held out gloriously for over three hours to conquer the enemy in the end with the aid of the tanks—after all had seemed lost. Oh, it was glorious, but so costly.

Here I have the official orders issued by Gen. Peter E. Traub, in commendation of the various officers. I will not detain you to read them all, but I will read various sentences in which he commended men, Infantrymen, for capturing with their infantry arms, German artillery. He is commending Col. Harry S. Howland, commanding the One hundred and thirty-eighth Infantry. He says:

For courage, skill, intrepidity, and steadfastness, resulting in the capture of the enemy's stronghold, Cheppy. With his left hand shattered by hostile shell fire, he continued in command of a mere handful of men and held his ground subjected to heavy artillery and machine-gun fire from front and both flanks until about noon, when the arrival of French and American tanks enabled him with his Infantry to attack and capture or destroy many machine-gun nests on both flanks, resulting in securing some 300 prisoners and the stronghold of Cheppy. He gave an example of courage under suffering and intrepidity and steadfastness of purpose in action, that will make the taking of Cheppy a never-to-be-forgotten exploit by our troops.

Here is another in which he commends Capt. Joe W. McQueen, of the One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry. He says:

Led his company on the front line in the attack on the enemy artillery and machine gun positions between Charpentry and Baulmy, resulting in the capture of prisoners, artillery, and machine guns; this, after the advance of other troops had been checked by the enemy fire. (Sept. 27.)

Led his company in the attack on Exermont, reaching that village and was there wounded while directing his company. This advance was made against artillery and machine-gun fire and after other troops had fallen back. (Sept. 29.)

He commends Sergt. Russel E. Strange, Company C, One hundred and tenth Field Signal Battalion. He says:

Realizing that every available man was needed during a counter attack by the enemy, he secured a rifle and went into the line and greatly assisted in repelling the attack.

Here is something from Gen. Traub, which is a side light on casualties:

Sergt. Stephen Lake, Company E, One hunderd and thirty-ninth Infantry: After all the officers of his company had been either killed or wounded, he assumed command of his company, advanced, and captured several German machine guns. (Sept. 28.) Commanded his company in the attack on Exermont and, while leading his company, he was severely wounded.

All throughout these general orders you will find repeated instances of where noncommissioned officers were commended because they led their men after all of the commissioned officers of their battalion or companies had become casualties.

In reading the report of one of the other hearings before this committee I noticed that the question as to whether the One hundred and tenth Engineers were in reality called upon to serve as Infantry, and here is a commendation of Col. T. C. Clarke, of the One hundred and tenth Engineers. It says:

At Baulmy, September 29, 1918, his regiment being division reserves, he executed the order to establish and construct a line of resistance and to hold same, which he did for several days, until released. He established his command post in the forward line of our posts and set an example of courage and fearlessness to his officers and men, who broke up two counter attacks and inflicted serious losses on the enemy.

Col. Clarke was in command of the One hundred and tenth Engineers, which was not supposed to be organized for Infantry reserves.

He commends Maj. Dwight F. Davis, adjutant, Sixty-ninth Infantry Brigade, and says:

Carried out the orders of his brigade commander in a manner utterly devoid of fear, under the most intense artillery and machine-gun fire. At Baulmy on September 29 and 30 he recklessly exposed himself to the enemy fire in order to obtain information of great value to his brigade and division commander.

This is the tone that runs through Gen. Traub's and many special orders—a tone commending men for going forward, and it is altogether devoted to infantry arms, to capture artillery with Infantry. He was the divisional commander of the Thirty-fifth Division.

Mr. GARRETT. By the capture of artillery, you do not mean the charge upon machine-gun nests, but upon heavier artillery?

Mr. ALLEN. Later we will get to that, in one instance where Gen. Traub refers to the capture of field artillery; not the artillery that was far back, belonging, if they had the same type of organization that we had, belonging to the army artillery, but the division artillery of the Germans. At all times when they refer to our men going forward against artillery they mean they were going forward against heavy artillery and light artillery and hand grenades and machine guns, because all of the German artillery was reaching the American fighters; none of it was falling short.

He commends Capt. John W. Armour, of the One hundred and fortieth Infantry. He says:

His company having been disorganized by enemy artillery and machine-gun fire, gathered together a portion of his men and resolutely pushed forward and

remained in position until ordered to retire. This advance was under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and required great courage and resolution to cause a forward movement.

He commends Sergt. John C. Gooch, Company G, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, Sergt. Irvin L. Cowger, Company G, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, and Corpl. Leon A. Thogmartin, saying:

Successfully, after three attempts, rescued under extremely heavy machine gun fire from both flanks and artillery fire from the left, a wounded comrade who was lying severely wounded in the open.

He also commends Corpl. Thomas A. Johnson, Company C, One hundred and tenth Field Signal Battalion, who, realizing that the manpower of the Infantry was dwindling rapidly, took a rifle and went into the front lines and ably assisted in the defense then being organized.

He commends First Lieut. A. R. Seamon, and he commends a great many others, but I am merely pointing to those cases which show the relation of Infantry to Artillery in this engagement. He says in regard to Lieut. Seamon:

Lieut. Seamon and his platoon was given the mission of pushing the combat patrol well to the front of the corps objective. In the face of a fierce machine gun barrage from the front and heavy artillery fire from the left rear, he fearlessly advanced upon his mission at the head of his men. The mission seemed to insure certain death to all, but with most admirable bravery he inspired his men to follow him and led them skilfully to the attack on the machine gun nests. It was while advancing toward a machine gun nest that he was killed by a high explosive shell.

He gives the instance of First Sergt. Fred L. West, machine gun company, One hundred and thirty-eighth Infantry. He says:

Attached himself and gun crew to an advancing Infantry battalion and advanced his gun to the foremost point of the line for the purpose of securing a field for direct fire. He was under direct observation from the air and the enemy lines, and although he was singled out by the enemy as an artillery target he refused to withdraw.

I have here the report of Capt. Ralph E. Truman, who was intelligence officer of the One hundred and fortieth Infantry Regiment. In justice to Capt. Truman I want to say that he did not send this home for the purpose of having it used in this fashion; he sent it to Mrs. Truman. It is the report of the messages he constantly sent back from the front lines to the P. C. in the rear.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What do you mean by the "P. C."?

Gov. ALLEN. The post commander. This relates the whole history of the battle, as stated by an officer whose duty it was to report the progress of his men. He sent it to his wife, and his wife thought it was a history of the Argonne battle, and when a friend called upon her she gave it out, and some portions of it got into the papers. I am merely saying this because I want it understood that Capt. Truman did not volunteer this statement. This reports the battle from hour to hour. We find that the first day was an easy one, and then he gets to September 27, and at 9.30 a. m. he says:

Both One hundred and fortieth and One hundred and thirty-nineth Infantry held up by enemy machine gun fire. Troops can not advance without artillery support. Tank commander has been notified. A few casualties in the One hundred and fortieth Infantry machine gun fire.

Then, at 10.30 a. m. he says:

Our line is still held up by M. G. fire. Three casualties in first battalion. Degree of wounds slight. M. G.'s positively located at —,

and then he gives some figures designating the locality. He says:

Enemy shelling hill north of regiment, P. C. About 50 H. E. 150's in the last 45 minutes. No casualties from shelling. Three casualties from M. G. fire in the First Battalion, One hundred and fortieth Infantry. Will advance as soon as M. G. nests are cleaned out.

Then, at 12.20 he says:

Am sending to you for your information maps and tracings that will be of value to you. After they have answered your purpose forward to G–2, 35th. Heavy shelling of our troops all along the flanks.

At 1.00 p. m. he says:

Am sending sketch of a point in front of our line. Three men killed by shell fire. Enemy still shelling our troops heavily and are not able to advance.

At 1.10 p. m. he sends another dispatch saying:

The attack began at 6 a. m. Our regiment passed through the One hundred and thirty-eighth Infantry, and is now occupying a line running east and west, and south of Charpentry, about 1,000 yards. Column halted by heavy machine-gun fire from works near Charpentry, and heavy artillery fire from the north of Charpentry. The right of our line is resting near the Charpentry-Very road. Tanks have been asked for to clear out machine-gun nests. Advance will start as soon as they arrive.

The next report is at 5 p. m. and says:

Boche are moving out of Charpentry in large bodies of what looks to be 75 or 80 men in each group. Also moving along road at points near.

And he gives some figures.

Men moving along road can be seen to be carrying machine guns. Our lines have advanced slightly.

At 5.50 p. m. he says:

The entire regiment is now advancing under barrage.

But makes no comments.

At 7. 30 a. m., of September 28, he says:

Our lines held up by M. G. fire. One hundred casualties in regiment during past 24 hours. Our front lines are about 200 meters in advance above point. Strong machine-gun fire from our front. Also some artillery fire, but not doing any damage. Enemy planes active. Advance started at 5 a. m.

Then, at 8.20 a. m.:

Our troops started the advance at 5 a. m. Have met with strong machine-gun fire, which is holding up the lines. Line about 200 meters in advance of this point. Tanks have arrived and are ready to go into action. One hundred casualties in regiment during the past 24 hours.

At 2.30 p. m., of September 28, he says:

Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated machine-gun fire. See drawing showing approximately our front line. There may be a little change made during the night. We are flanked by artillery fire on every side but our rear. Our own artillery has given no support during the attack. Enemy planes very active during the day. One squadron of enemy planes over our position at 1 p. m. They turned their m. g.'s on the men, causing some losses. Fifteen planes in the party. Also one enemy plane flew low over our troops all during the forenoon directing the fire of the artillery. We have suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded. Men are still at dressing stations that were wounded yesterday. Numbers of men who are wounded have had no attention and are still lying on the ground where they fell. We are short

of ammunition, which is very badly needed in case of a counterattack by the enemy. The adjutant of the regiment has been gassed and the C. O. has not been seen since the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him.

He refers to the fact that men were still lying upon the ground; that is at a time 24 hours after some of them had been wounded. He had sent that message by runner at 2.30 of the 28th of September, and he had repeatedly sent the same message for 24 hours before.

At 3 p. m. he made the following report:

Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated M. G. fire. See drawing forwarded by 70th Brig. We are finaked by artillery fire from every side but our rear. Our own artillery gave no support during the attack. Enemy planes over our lines during attack, flying low, directing artillery fire on our troops. At 1 p. m. 15 enemy planes flew over our lines firing on our troops with their M. G.'s, causing losses. We have suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded. Men are now in dressing stations that were wounded yesterday. Numbers of wounded men have not been carried off the field. We are short of ammunition, which is very badly needed in case of a counterattack by the enemy. The adjutant has been gassed and the C. O. has not been seen since the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him.

He then says, at 12.30 p. m., September 29:

Our troops started advance on time set. They had not the proper time to reorganize, with the result that the organizations were split up and confused. Our artillery fell short in many cases, causing losses to our troops. Enemy artillery very active as well as M. G. Numerous losses in the regiment in killed and wounded. Our troops now occupy Exermont.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What does he mean by saying "Our artillery fell short"?

Gov. ALLEN. That means that he had no way of signaling nor American planes to direct the fire of our artillery.

He also says in another message, sent at 12.30 p. m.:

Our troops now occupy Exermont. It was taken under a fierce artillery and M. G. fire. Our losses were heavy in killed and wounded. Our artillery gave little support, and on several occasions fired short as much as 1 kilometer, causing losses to our troops. Weather very bad. Muddy ground.

Then, at 9.15 a. m., of September 30, he says—and the last statement about the artillery falling short was on the 29th. At 9.15 he sent back by runner the message, on the 30th:

The enemy is coming over skirmish formation. Have reached hedge this side of Montrebeau woods. Unable to ascertain exact number. Our artillery and M. G. have opened fire. Our artillery falling short on our front and support trenches. Barrage should be raised from 3 to 500 yards.

Instead of being able to signal that very important information at the most poignant hour of the conflict he had to send it back by a runner, and a half hour later he sends back a runner in the same fashion, in the hope that he may get the barrage lifted.

Here are some of the miscellaneous comments in what he calls "Intelligence Summary, 140th Infantry, from noon September 29 to noon September 30, 1918."

Mr. SNELL. You mean that is what he sent to his commanding officer?

Gov. ALLEN. This is a copy of a summary of the reports he sent; this is what he submitted later, and it is signed finally by Lieut. Col. Delaplane, who was in command of the One hundrd and fortieth.

Mr. SNELL. This would be the same information that would eventually come to the War Depatrment in Washington in regard to that?

Gov. ALLEN. I see no reason why it should not have come to Washington.

Mr. HARRISON. These copies were sent by Capt. Truman to his wife; was he violating any rules of the department in doing that?

Gov. ALLEN. He may have been imprudent; I do not know whether he was violating any rule. I do not know as to the Army Regulations.

Mr. HARRISON. I understand part of it was printed in the papers?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. All of it?

Gov. ALLEN. Not all of it.

Mr. HARRISON. But you have all of it?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. She gave all of it to you?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Was Capt. Truman from Kansas City?

Gov. ALLEN. He was orginally from Missouri, I believe. He is a Regular Army officer.

Mr. RODENBERG. He is still in the service?

Gov. ALLEN. He is still in the service, and he was in the service when I met him. I only met him casually.

Mr. HARRISON. I understood you to say he gave permission for you to use this.

Gov. ALLEN. No; he does not know that I have it. He sent it to his wife. She told a friend of her husband that she had a history of the Argonne battle. This friend, who was a news reporter, submits an affidavit in order that she may be cleared of any intention of violating the rules. She thought it was merely a history of the engagement. She did not realize that it was the official report of the One hundred and fortieth Infantry.

Mr. HARRISON. You say this friend is a reporter.

Gov. ALLEN. He is a newspaper reporter, but was a former comrade of Capt. Truman in the Phillipine Islands.

Mr. HARRISON. What paper?

Gov. ALLEN. The Kansas City Star.

Mr. HARRISON. Did this information come to you recently?

Gov. ALLEN. It came to me recently.

Mr. HARRISON. How recently?

Gov. ALLEN. Since the article was published.

Mr. HARRISON. Did it come to you since this resolution was introduced or before?

Gov. ALLEN. Since the resolution was introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it considered proper to give the name of this officer and withhold the names of other officers?

Gov. ALLEN. The reason is that this information with his name attached had already been printed in the newspapers. If it had not, of course I would withhold it. The publication of the article I had nothing to do with. I read it in the newspapers, and I naturally sought the source of the report, got it, and brought it here, as it has an important place in this inquiry.

In the summary there are a number of paragraphs as to the distribution of troops, etc., and under "Enemy aeronautics" he says:

Enemy planes very active, continually flying over our lines during the entire day, firing at our troops with machine guns, and directing artillery fire on our front lines.

Capt. Truman says, under "Miscellaneous":

During the entire day our troops were continually pelted with fire of our own Artillery, as well as the fire of the enmy. The fire of our own guns was much more destructive of our troops than the fire of the Boche. That condition still exists to-day. Our Artillery laid down a heavy barrage on our front and rear lines at about 9.15 a. m. to-day. Repeated messengers and runners have been sent to notify the Artillery that their range was short. I myself going to see the major in command of one battalion of Artillery of the One hundred and twenty-ninth Field Artillery, and asked him to see that the word was passed to the other commanders. I also showed him where our lines are now located. Our airplanes have been of little use to us in combating enemy planes. So far as the good they have done in that respect, we had just as well not had them. In the subject of reports will state that I have done the best that I possibly could under the circumstances.

Further describing the engagement, he says:

As soon as they caught up with the men in front of the rush and stopped them we organized them in a line of trenches, as shown in the sketch submitted to you last night. We now have the situation well in hand and can withstand most any kind of an attack the enemy might put over, provided we can get the Artillery to put the barrage on the Boche and not on our own lines. I have sent five different messages to the Artillery this morning to lengthen their range, it being five separate occasions on which they have shelled our men. It is doing more to decrease the morale of our troops than if they knew the entire German Army was attacking them. The situation is simply this: There is not a telephone in any organization I know of. There are no signal rockets left, no flares to shoot in the Very pistols. What signal lights were in the organization are either lost or broken, and have practically no way of communicating with anyone except by runner. Our losses have been extremely heavy. Our regiment, the One hundred and fortieth Infantry, on going into action on the 29th, had not to exceed 1,000 men.

It had gone in with full strength, in the neighborhood of 3,000 men.

I have here also a memorandum of messages sent by Maj. Mabrey. I did not bring the actual messages with me, but in the newspaper report it says that at 11.15 a. m. of September 26 Maj. Mabrey sent a message asking for Artillery in which he says: "Can not advance without Artillery support."

Then, I have a chronological statement of the events made by Capt. Truman, and signed finally by Lieut. Col. Delaplane and all through this there are statements of lack of Artillery.

Touching on the shortage of horses I have a report of Lieut. Col. Arthur G. Peck, inspector general of the corps, to which the Thirty-fifth Division belonged, and this is the report to the commanding general Thirty-fifth Division. The subject is, "Irregularities and deficiencies noted at recent inspection." The report is dated October 18 and inspection was made on the 2d of October. I merely call this to your attention, as I have said, to show shortage in artillery brigade horses. He shows the following in two columns:

	On hand.	Shortage.
One hundred and twenty-eighth Field Artillery	583	641
One hundred and twenty-ninth Field Artillery	375	799
One hundred and thirtieth Field Artillery	611	977
One hundred and tenth Ammunition Train	328	286
Total shortage		2,703

He says under the heading of animals:

The animals of all units except the Artillery and 110th Ammunition Train were in fair condition considering the hard work they had performed during the recent operations.

Then in relation to equipment he says the company was well equipped prior to the recent operations, with the exception of transportation. He also says:

The division needs practically an entire reissue of clothing. There has been no issue of clothing in this division since it left the Vosges sector about September 1.

I am giving this because later in an official report of the triage officer it will be disclosed that these men went into combat with their summer underwear and with their shoes badly worn. This is October, just after battle. He also speaks of such deficiencies as this, that may be of interest: "There is practically no gun oil in the division. All units reported that they had been without it for some time. There is also great shortage of saddle soap," etc. Under "Ambulances" he says: "The division has only 12 mule ambulances, 8 motor ambulances, G. M. C., and 3 motor ambulances, Ford."

That was for a division of 27,000 and more men.

Mr. SNELL. How many ambulances would naturally be needed for a division of that size?

Gov. ALLEN. I do not know what would be a complement, but it is apparent upon the face of it that for 27,000 men these 20 ambulances, which carry from six to eight wounded men, were not sufficient to haul the casualties.

Mr. GARRETT. How close up did the ambulances get?

Gov. ALLEN. The ambulances went to the triage and field stations, and the men were brought from the first-aid stations. This report I have read is Col. Pack's official report as inspector general of the division.

Mr. SNELL. Is this a public report?

Gov. ALLEN. No. This report came to me from an officer.

Mr. HARRISON. May I ask who that officer was?

Gov. ALLEN. I think I had better not tell you what officer it was, because he may have been violating some Army rule in giving it to me.

Mr. HARRISON. The trouble I see about giving this in executive session is that it would be very difficult for us to connect it up with the records.

Gov. ALLEN. As I say, I will be very glad to give you the names of this officer or others in executive session, but I do not wish to have the names appear in open meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean we are expected to hold the names in confidence if they are given to us in executive session?

Gov. ALLEN. I am willing to give the names, if you are going to pursue an investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine that this is but the forerunner of a very comprehensive investigation that is sure to come. But what I wanted to observe was this: It is only fair that there should be opportunities for those who may have any explanation of these matters that are being discussed, that they may be put in possession of the facts so that they can, if possible, explain away these apparently

unfortunate things that occurred there. If these names are to be held in confidence, of course you can readily see that there can be no facilities for those who are in authority to answer the things that are stated by these, so far as the public is concerned, anonymous charges.

Gov. ALLEN. I think I have been unfortunate in not making myself clearly understood in reference to the limitations of confidence that I shall place upon these names. I am perfectly willing to give these names to on investigating committee; but I presumed, as you have just said, this was a forerunner of a general investigation and in this preliminary hearing I merely ask that I may be allowed to keep the names from publication, although I am willing to give them to you or to any committee that they may have this information; but I do not wish them published at this time. The officer who gave me this statement was in a position to know all about his regiment, which was the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, and he had, on the day he gave me this report, just summed up the entire casualties of his regiment. That was about the middle of October, so that by the middle of October he knew the entire casualties of his regiment, and he said, "My regiment went in with 2,645 men and 89 officers; it came out with 1,425 men and 16 officers.

Mr. SNELL. Is that the Argonne fight?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes. It might be a good place to explain that the Argonne battle was the only heavy engagement in which the Thirty-fifth Division participated. I noted in the statement issued some time ago by the Secretary that he had said the Thirty-fifth had not suffered any more than some of the other divisions and gave a comparative report. What should be added to this statement is that these divisions who had suffered as much as the Thirty-fifth had been engaged in a number of fights. The Thirty-fifth Division was engaged in the Argonne battle for five nights and six days, and that was the only heavy fight it engaged in. Up until we entered the Argonne battle our total losses during the months we had been in the Vosges Mountains would not exceed possibly 500.

Mr. GARRETT. Gen. March stated that the losses from the Thirty-fifth Division up to November 1 were 879 men—the number of men actually killed or died from wounds.

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. GARRETT. And subsequently he stated that the total number of replacements, "as far as we can learn, in that division for the whole time that it has been over there, will not exceed 10,000 men."

Gov. ALLEN. Of course, it is readily apparent that the replacements and casualties do not necessarily have a direct relation to each other. If a man leaves a division for any purpose there is a replacement. So I think we will get more nearly to the exact truth if we deal with the evidence I have touching who were killed and wounded.

Mr. SNELL. You have got definite evidence on the number of men killed and wounded?

Gov. ALLEN. I have. Before I go into that I merely wish to explain that 98 per cent of our casualties were in the Infantry Arm, and the best evidence that we had over there was our casualties were 7,000 and a trifle over, which meant a very large per cent of the Infantry Arm engaged.

Mr. GARRETT. That meant killed, wounded and gassed?

Gov. ALLEN. From every cause. Some of these men came back and were not replacements. If we took the replacements of the 10,000 and added to that the men who came back and were wounded, it would look as though the entire Infantry were wiped out.

Mr. HARRISON. This report from Lieut. Col. Peck came to you through some other officer?

Gov. ALLEN. It was handed to me by an officer of the division while I was in France, and I will be glad to give the officer's name in confidence.

Mr. HARRISON. Would you object to telling the committee the circumstances under which it was given to you—why he gave it to you?

Gov. ALLEN. I had called at the headquarters of this regiment, which was a regiment from my own State, to say good-by, and I found these officers swearing about this part of this report. These men had just come out of the Argonne Forest, in which they had been engaged in the battle for six days and five nights. The buttons were off their uniforms; they were muddy; their condition was not as presentable as the Inspector General thought it should be. So in writing his report he said:

> The division as a whole has none of the outward signs of a well-disciplined organization. Saluting throughout is very poor. Individuals and groups of men pay no attention to passing officers, and in many cases fail to get up when spoken to. It was very noticeable that the junior officers made no attempt to enforce discipline. Hundreds of men were noted out of billets on the street in improper uniform and with blouses unbuttoned and no attempt made to be neat or orderly. Passing officers paid no attention to them and made no effort to correct these irregularities. Most of the organizations inspected showed all the earmarks of National Guard units, which they are. Captains and lieutenants were continually noticed on most familiar terms with enlisted men.

And that is what angered the officer who gave me this report. The injustice of it was that the men had come back with the only clothes they had left after the battle was over. They went in with their feet badly shod, and they found their shoes had not improved during the six days and five nights they lived in shell holes and trenches. Many uniforms were bad when they went in; they were worse when they came out.

Mr. HARRISON. Who was the highest commanding officer?

Gov. ALLEN. Maj. Gen. Peter E. Traub. I want to say this: I am not seeking to reflect upon the management of this battle. I know nothing about that. I am not seeking to reflect upon Gen. Traub or upon the artillery or upon the aircraft. I am merely telling what any man not a military man might have known.

I am now going to read to you from the report of Capt. Harry R. Hoffman, of the Medical Corps of the United States Army, the division psychiatrist of the Thirty-fifth Division, being the ranking officer who was in charge of the triage of the Thirty-fifth Division. This is a copy of his official report. He sent me the report from Chicago not long ago, with this letter:

JANUARY 24, 1919.

> MY DEAR GOVERNOR: Probably you will not recall who I am so I will introduce myself. I am Dr. (ex-Capt.) Harry R. Hoffman, Division Psychiatrist, Thirty-fifth Division. I was with the Division from the time it was formed until November 13, 1918. I was mustered out a few days ago and am a private citizen again, so I am in a position to talk.

Since being back in the United States I have read with a great deal of interest and pleasure your true account of what our boys went through. After being with the Division so long I feel as though I am an adopted son of both Kansas and Missouri. It is with pleasure and honor that I recall the days at Cheppy, Very, and Charpentry. The newspapers may want to know how far a "Y" man got—send them to me, I will tell them. I am the first of the Thirty-fifth to arrive. Our mutual friend, Gen. Martin, whom I met in Orleans, France, will tell you.

Now, as to conditions and number of casualties, I will say you are absolutely correct. I wish I could tell the mothers of Kansas and Missouri the same as you have told them. They should feel proud, and justly so, every one of them.

I am inclosing two reports which may be of use to you; kindly return when you are through with them.

Kindest regards to Gen. Martin, and heartiest congratulations and good wishes in your new office, I am,

Very cordially, yours,

Dr. HARRY R. HOFFMAN,
550 Roscoe Street, Chicago, Ill.

This is the report which it was his duty to make to the division surgeon of the Thirty-fifth Division. He makes this report under date of October 11.

Mr. SNELL. What was the date of the Argonne battle?

Gov. ALLEN. The battle started on September 26, and the Division came out of it on October 2. Capt. Hoffman says:

The first day of the offensive the rest hospital, i. e., one of the field hospitals of the Division was not yet established. This was due to the intense congestion of traffic, the roads being blocked for over 24 hours, hence our sanitary troops, with tentage, could not reach the triage. So many cases came through the triage that it was necessary to evacuate all psychiatric cases, as the triage was filled to more than capacity. It was raining and cold, and it would be necessary to keep the men in the mud without litters or blankets if they remained at the triage.

He says:

A total of 6,301 cases of all kinds passed through the triage of the Thirty-fifth Division. These came from many divisions, as follows:

Thirty-fifth Division, 4,623; Thirty-seventh Division, 87; Twenty-eighth Division, 443; Ninety-first Division, 798; miscellaneous, 350; total, 6,301.

From the second day, only cases which I thought would not be fit for duty in a very short time, were evacuated, the others being sent to our rest hospital.

In the great rush of cases during the next few days the rest hospital was constantly filled to capacity, and it was absolutely necessary to evacuate everything; hence, many cases which would have cleared up in a few days were sent to the rear. At one time there were 1,400 cases in the triage, 800 in the advance dressing station, and all transportation at a standstill.

Many foreign trucks, i. e., trucks from corps, army and other divisions evacuated cases from the front. Many of these went direct from the truck to the avacuation hospitals, the cases not being triaged. No doubt many of these cases were of this division.

He also says:

It has come to my attention that the chief surgeon of the First Army rendered a complaint to the division surgeon of the Thirty-fifth Division, concerning the large amount of psychiatric cases evacuated to the rear. The foregoing is my explanation, i. e., the blocking of all transportation, the lack of transportation on the first day, the inclement weather, and the large amount of casualties.

He signs it, "Harry R. Hoffman, Captain, Medical Corps, United States Army, Division Psychiatrist."

On the 25th day of October it is forwarded, approved, and Lieut. Col. R. C. Turck says that Capt. Harry R. Hoffman did most excellent work, not only in the main triage, but in the main dressing sta-

tions, under fire, as well. In relation to Capt. Hoffman's departure for home, Col. Turck, the division surgeon of the Thirty-fifth Division, says:

The division surgeon regrets Capt. Hoffman's departure from the division, and desires to say that Capt. Hoffman's services have been at all times satisfactory and efficient, and that he has been recommended for a promotion to the grade of major, Medical Corps, for meritorious service, in action.

In commenting upon the report, Col. Turck says:

The difficulties of evacuation were great, on account of the blocked roads; therefore every possible means of transportation was utilized, including trucks belonging to the corps, other divisions, and to the French. I feel sure that some of these foreign trucks went straight through from the advanced dressing stations to the evacuation hospitals without passing through the Thirty-fifth Division triage. Of such trucks, it is reported that five loads of walking, wounded, slightly gassed, shell shock, and exhaustion, which were down in an ammunition train which was moving rapidly to the rear, to replenish, never arrived at the triage at Nauvilly to which they had been directed. It is probable that this accounts for some of the apparent faults in triaging.

Touching this report, Capt. Hoffman desired to give the following comments, and I will give his address in Chicago.

Mr. GARRETT. Did he receive his promotion to a majority?

Gov. ALLEN. No; his promotion died aborning, with the signing of the armistice. He was recommended for promotion to a majority. He explained to me the conditions on the 26th.

COMMENTS OF CAPT. HOFFMAN, IN CHARGE OF CASUALTY CLEARING STATION.

There were seven divisions on the line, seven in support, seven in reserve. On the morning of September 26, on account of congestion of traffic and lack of transportation, no triage was established.

Noon of September 26, one large tent of the One hundred and thirty-sixth Ambulance Company reached Neuvilly to open triage. Word was received that many wounded were coming. They did not reach us until night of the 26th. It was raining, cold. We could use no lights because the airplanes of the enemy were busy. The wounded came in trucks. There were no ambulances, no litters, no blankets. They were put on the muddy, sloppy ground. Our tent was packed, so many of the men laid outside with no shelter. Hospital personnel took off their coats to cover the wounded, so far as they could.

On the 27th, Maj. W. L. Gist, director of the Sanitary train, consisting of the ambulance companies, sent a runner to Col. Turck, the divisional surgeon, saying, "For God's sake send us something—blankets, litters, food." Col. Turck sent back word, "Received your report. Can't do anything; roads blocked."

Gist was going mad. He had 800 men at the dressing stations, with no accomodations. They were out of splints. The chief surgeons had ordered all divisions in the Argonne to use the Thomas hip splints for fracture. All cases were to be splinted where they fell, and external heat was to be applied. They might just as well have ordered a Turkish bath and a Swedish massage. There was no heat and no Thomas splints.

So the wounded piled up in the forest without litters. We did not have over 75 litters to an ambulance company, and we had only 4 ambulance companies for the entire division.

The fire from German planes became so severe in the dressing stations near Charpentry that Maj. Gist armed his sanitary troops with guns taken from the wounded soldiers to protect themselves against enemy airplanes. Capt. Hoffman states that he saw wounded men lying at the dressing stations killed by airplane fire. Maj. Gist armed himself with an automatic rifle which he took from the hands of a wounded man who had just been killed by fire from an airplane.

FOOD AND WATER.

A division order came out as we were going into battle that all enlisted personnel should carry not more than two canteens of water. This was soon exhausted. One 2-pound can of bully beef was taken for four men. The man

who carried it had the rations for three of his comrades, as well as for himself. When he became separated from his comrades, one man ate and three starved. Strewn over the field were these 2-pound cans, which had been opened by one man, who ate what he wished and left them partly filled on the ground because he was out of touch with the men who were to share the rations. The resistance of the wounded was reduced 50 per cent by lack of water, lack of food, inclement weather, summer underwear, no overcoats, no blankets. The mental cases were increased by this tremendous exposure. Some of our men lay in the forest unattended for 48 hours.

WOUNDED IN PLIGHT.

At his office, 1856 West North Avenue, to which he has just returned from France, Capt. Hoffman said:

"Imagine the plight of our wounded. There were 800 at the advanced dressing station; 1,400 more at the triage, just back of the fighting lines. Some were legless; others armless; many with sides torn out by shrapnel. All, practically, were in direst pain. It was bitter cold. The mud was knee-deep. A half sleet, half rain was beating down mercilessly. And for 36 hours those 2,400 men were compelled to lie there in the mud, unsheltered. We had neither litters on which to lay them, nor blankets to wrap around them.

"That was not all. Although winter practically had set in the men had not been issued their heavy clothing."

IN SUMMER CLOTHING.

"These wounded men lying unsheltered there in the mud and rain wore summer underwear and summer uniforms."

If his official report, incorporating substantially the above, is to be construed as criticism, Capt. Hoffman declared he presented it as constructive criticism. He added:

"It may be the means of avoiding another such blunder if this country is ever unfortunate enough to become involved in another war. For without doubt there was a blunder—a ghastly one.

"This drive had been planned many weeks. That there would be a tremendous casualty list could not be doubted. Yet when we went over the top we had but 75 stretchers. These were to bear in the wounded from the entire division of 30,000 men. This was impossible, of course. Our men carried in most of the wounded on their backs. Other wounded men, able to walk, assisted. Many more wounded probably laid on the battlefield much longer."

POWERLESS TO MOVE THEM.

"And having got them to the advanced dressing station, we found ourselves powerless to move them. We were equipped only to give the wounded first aid.

"They then were to be sent back to be sorted out. Those who had lost limbs were to be sent from there to hospitals especially prepared to handle their cases farther back. The shell shocked were to be segregated for other disposition, etc.

"But there were no transportation facilities either at my station or the sorting post. There was but one road to our sector of the action. That was already congested by movements of ammunition and food to the men in action.

"I saw Gen. Pershing in the middle of that road at Verennes directing the traffic—pushing it on forward."

RUNNER BEARS APPEAL.

"Realizing the impending calamity, I sent a runner back to Lieut. Col. Raymond C. Turck, division surgeon, with an appeal for transportation. He replied he could do nothing. And thus we lay for 36 hours after the division charged. I'll never forget the groans of those men and the pitiable picture they made.

"Toward the last few of those hours we were gassed. I again appealed to the division surgeon. He ordered all who were able to walk or crawl to move to the rear. Those unable to do either were placed in ammunition and food trucks and sent back, bumping over shell craters and ruts."

Many of these never reached the triage for further attention before their long and arduous trip to the rear, Capt. Hoffman said, and such additional hardship must have augmented the death rate.

The officer exhibited a paragraph from Col. Turck's official report to this effect. It read:

"The difficulties of evacuation were great on account of the blocked roads, therefore every possible means of transportation were utilized, including trucks.

"I feel sure some of these trucks—French—went straight through to the evacuation hospitals without passing through the Thirty-fifth Division triage."

Continuing, Capt. Hoffman said: "I am convinced there was a great blunder committed. I do not attribute it, however, to any individual. It was the system. The American Army was not prepared to cope with such tremendous casualties heaped up all at once."

Mr. GARRETT. Gen. March said before the committee that each man was supplied with emergency rations which he carried.

Gov. ALLEN. I read that. They did not have them in the Thirty-fifth Division. They had this one 2-pound can of bully beef for every four men, and at the front they had no rolling kitchens the first four days of the fight. It may be, of course, as one man who seeks to answer these charges said: "The men did not need food, they lived on excitement."

Mr. GARRETT. Were the conditions such that they could have gotten rolling kitchens up to the lines?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; if they had had transportation, they could. The roads were not shut off, though the Germans did their best to hit them; but only a small percentage of the big shells fell in the roads. I drove over the roads repeatedly, and on all the days of the combat you could get far enough forward so that the supply companies could have taken hot food to the men if they had had the transportation to take the rolling kitchens that far forward.

The CHAIRMAN. I think all these facts that you have been relating here should be known. Any man who is in possession of those facts is performing a public service by letting the world know. What I would like to inquire from you is, Do you care to go any further than make a mere recital of the facts? Do you care to submit any observations as to the responsibility for these conditions?

Gov. ALLEN. I thought I would recite the facts and they would speak for themselves. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that you do not care to have me go any further with the evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no, indeed. What I wanted to draw you out on was, Do you care to make any comments. It would be interesting, I think, in addition to the facts, to have your views as to the whys and wherefores and the responsibility for these conditions that you have been reciting here.

Gov. ALLEN. The responsibility for the lack of material, of course, was due to whatever source was under obligation to supply the raw material. The shortage of aeroplanes belongs to the mystery of the Aeroplane Service. We had thousands of men, great chaps, with a spirit sufficient to be the corps d'elite of the Army, waiting for aeroplanes and willing to go into the air to help out their comrades, and they had no planes. We had been reading for months over there of the tremendous production of aeroplanes and of the approaching domination of the air.

We knew that we had a few aeroplanes at Chateau Thierry and at Cantigny and at other places where we fought earlier. This was before the Thirty-fifth Division came. Those of us in France at that time excused it. Every American there said, "Wait until we get our own battle sector," and then the Argonne Forest battle was the battle

for which we had been preparing all the months, for which we had been spending our money all the months, and when we came to that battle we found that, although we were the most mechanical nation in the world, we fought with less machinery of war than the troops of Hindu China would have had had they been in the forest.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, knowing of the opportunity for preparation for this battle, having been planned for four or five months ahead, why was it that these conditions existed? Yet in spite of all that, it is said we won a victory that will go down through the ages as the most brilliant in the history of the world.

Gov. ALLEN. It seems to belong to that highly organized inefficiency that characterized every department of the Army activity over there. Everything you touched fell down somewhere, except one great thing, and that was the raw man power; that was all right every minute. It did things it was told to do, and if it were necessary that men go forward and fight artillery with their infantry, they did that; but it ought not to have been necessary, and the blame most certainly does attach to those whose duty is was to supply ordnance for the money we spent for ordnance; to supply aircraft for the money we spent for aircraft; and the gloomy thing was that the aircraft did not arrive and we fought with French ordnance. None of the elaborate plans we had been reading about were fulfilled at the hour when we needed this equipment. We all read of a controversy that has been going on for months to get a machine gun that would be specially adapted to the brilliancy of our soldiery—we fought with the machine guns of other nations.

Mr. HARRISON. How many planes were at the battle of Argonne?

Gov. ALLEN. I see Gen. March says 120 in all, bombing planes. I had accepted the general belief over there that there were of all kinds something like a thousand planes. A statement that came through rather confidential sources was that at the time of the Argonne we had something over a thousand planes, 850 of which were planes purchased from the French, not altogether the best planes. Naturally, they did not sell us their best planes, any more than they sold their best horses, and I doubt if there was any considerable number of the fast fighting planes, and if there were 120 used at the time of the battle of the Argonne Forest, along a battle line of 22 miles, half of them would be on the ground, and some would have to be used at night and some in the daytime, and at no particular time of the battle were there enough planes to render efficient service.

Mr. HARRISON. As a military expert, I understood from his testimony that he thought there were enough there.

Mr. SNELL. Gen. March said in his testimony that the statement was denied that they were without sufficient supplies of artillery.

Gov. ALLEN. My understanding of that remarkable statement was that he referred to the heavy artillery, which belonged to the Army and the corps, and as these men say, this artillery was at that time in touch with the division, very fatal touch with the division, when its shells fell within our own lines, but Gen. March surely could not have been referring to divisional artillery, because if he did, he is very much mistaken.

Mr. SNELL. The general artillery would be in support of the infantry.

Gov. ALLEN. That would be the corps and Army artillery, heavy ordnance capable of firing 1,800 yards; very heavy artillery, motorized, but not meant for front-line service. The artillery which failed us was the divisonal artillery, of which, in the Thirty-fifth Division, there was one brigade of three regiments.

Mr. FESS. Col. McKay said the other day that we lost one man in four that went in, while France lost one in seven. If that statement is correct, would there be an explanation of that in our lack of artillery service?

Gov. ALLEN. Exactly. All the French officers that were with us and who observed the manner in which we carried on this battle were open in their criticism of it, and one French officer said to me that if the French had fought like this they would have had no army left at the end of the first year.

Mr. CAMPBELL. They sacrificed men for want of materials?

Gov. ALLEN. It was the wastefulness of sending infantry forward to capture artillery.

Mr. SNELL. How many men do you think were killed in this division?

Gov. ALLEN. I think killed and missing there were something like 1,700. I know that some of our best officers were killed by German aeroplanes.

Maj. Murray Davis was a victim of machine-gun fire from an aviator who was flying so low that he could take deliberate aim.

Mr. KELLEY. Have you ever heard the number of our airplanes really at the front?

Gov. ALLEN. No.

Mr. KELLEY. I talked with an officer of a division and he said 641.

Gov. ALLEN. It was the impression of all in a position to know the actual situation that we never had of all kinds more than a thousand.

It was Capt. Hoffman's opinion that the resistance of the men who laid, many of them, for 48 hours without attention was reduced 50 per cent, and that the number of mental cases was very greatly increased because we had not transportation or ambulances to get men to a place where they could be given attention.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You mean those who became deranged?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; as a result of the exposure. It was raining all the time, and the men had their summer underwear on, and they went into the battle without their overcoats, and they had no blankets, and the terrible suffering which the wounded endured, lying without litters upon the muddy ground, reduced the resistance practically 50 per cent, and thereby increased the dead among the wounded.

Mr. SCHALL. It was a well-known fact in France that we had about one-third enough doctors and nurses. I talked with doctors when I was over there and they told me they had about one-third the number they should have had?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; that was well known.

Mr. SCHALL. That they had sought to get nurses and medicines, but that the commanding power had shoved them aside for fighting men, and they were not being brought up, and they were making no provision for them, and that the theory upon which the heads

were running things was to the effect that a wounded man was useless anyway, and to bring out a wounded man to care for him was not warfare to win.

Gov. ALLEN. Of course, that charge was made over there, but I would not wish to give my opinion on it, but I would say that this is the way it worked out.

Capt. Hoffman calls attention to the fact—we are speaking of the fact that had the ambulance trains been prepared, there would have been a reduction among the casualty lists, but he says that—

When we went over the top we had about 75 stretchers which were to bring in the wounded of the entire division of 30,000 men.

Mr. GARRETT. I was wondering how those men got gassed there. They were in the rear of their own lines. Were they being gassed by airplanes?

Gov. ALLEN. The Germans might have dropped gas shells, or fired on them with their long-distance artillery. We were constantly putting on and taking off the gas masks. The fields were full of gas, and the atmosphere was very heavy with it. That was not a thing which anyone could have prevented, of course; it was only a case where men were allowed to lie so many hours unattended, and that could have been prevented if we had had sufficient transport to meet the exigencies of the battle.

Mr. SNELL. Were you there all the time during the six days?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; I was in charge of the Y. M. C. A. activities in the Thirty-fifth Division. I had secretaries in the various units. We were doing what we could to get our stuff to the front, where they were keep the men. We had a secretary in forward dressing stations who made hot chocolate for wounded men, others worked on burial squads or drove trucks of supplies. It was my duty to watch those places and keep in touch as far as possible with the secretaries.

Mr. HARRISON. I understood you to say this condition would not have prevailed if we had had the necessary transportation there. Do you know whether we had it in France, or whether it had not been sent to France?

Gov. ALLEN. Men who visited the places where our stores were held at St. Lazaire and Bordeaux tell me that we had much automobile transportation that did not get to the front; that we had begun to receive airplanes that did not get to the front. I think we used possibly all the horses that were available, because we were constantly buying these broken-down horses from the French and paying $100 each for them and losing them the next day, because they were horses that had been gassed, that had been evacuated from the French and gone to an assembly corral and come back to us. Many of them died the day we started to use them.

Mr. HARRISON. You state that they were not at the battle of Argonne, though they maye have been in France?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Here is a letter from Capt. Odell. I am merely using it to show that the Thirty-fifth Division was a type more or less of all the divisions that went into the battle of the Argonne Forest. Capt. Odell is of the One hundred and forty-ninth Field Artillery. That is in the Rainbow Division.

Here is a letter from Lieut. C. B. Allen, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, giving a long, detailed account of the battle, and he continues to relate the fact that they were short of artillery and planes, just as Capt. Truman says. I will not take the time to read it.

Mr. SNELL. Is that an official report?

Gov. ALLEN. No. It says "A true account of the Kansas City, Kans., boys in the Argonne fight.

Mr. HARRISON. That was turned over to you?

Gov. ALLEN. That was turned over to me by his father, I believe.

Mr. HARRISON. That was since the resolution was introduced, or before?

Gov. ALLEN. I do not remember just what date. I think it was before the resolution was introduced, but after I made my original statement.

Here is a report of John P. Myers, of Company L, One hundred and fortieth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, which appeared in the Parsons Daily Sun on January 22, 1919. It is a newspaper account, and it says:

In describing the advance, Pvt. Myers supported everything Gov. Allen has said about the lack of equipment, but he hesitated to appear in a complaining attitude. He said it was a matter of common knowledge to the men in his battalion that they lacked equipment, but there was little complaint among them on account of it.

Although in the automatic squad, Pvt. John Myers didn't have a revolver. He asked for one just before going into the drive, he said, as did others, but was told that they were not to be had. Only a few were fortunate enough to get revolvers, he said.

"I saw one airplane and three observation balloons shot down," Pvt. Myers said, "but we did not have enough airplanes to help us through. We had white cloths to wave at them as signals, but the airplanes were not there to be waved at. As the result we advanced far ahead of our Artillery and the Germans mowed us down."

Pvt. Myers said the losses to the Thirty-fifth on the first and third days of the drive were far in excess of the German casualties. He was wounded on the third day, September 28, and said that out of his company of 239 or 249, only 30 were saved. The others were either killed or wounded. Other companies in the same battalion, occupying the front line as he did, suffered as heavily, he was told after the drive. He said the scarcity of revolvers was general throughout the battalion and he presumed it extended to the entire division.

"I am not sure," Pvt. Myers said, "but I think we may have had sufficient Artillery equipment when we started in aside from revolvers, but the lack of airplanes made it impossible for the Artillery to keep pace with us. We were told that the sooner we reached our objective the sooner we would be permitted to come back and rest."

Pvt. Myers continued: "The big drive began on the morning of September 26. We did not go far that day, being held up by Artillery and machine-gun fire, but by the third day, when I was hit, we had advanced some 20 or 30 kilometers. We were in the front line and on the third day we particularly noticed that the airplanes were shy and that we lacked Artillery aid. We had gone about 3 kilometers on that day, when about 10 a. m. I got hit. I lay on the field until about 1 o'clock the next day, when members of my company came back and saw me, picked me up in a raincoat and carried me to first aid."

I have a few extracts from a letter of Mr. Lee Love, of Brookfield, Mo., in which he says:

I have a son in the Thirty-fifth Division, Company I, One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry. He enlisted June 5, 1917, at Chillicothe, Mo., and has been promoted from the ranks, first to corporal, then to sergeant.

He gave us a description of the battle and it tallies exactly with your statement which we saw in the Kansas City Times of this date.

He states that the power to move the Artillery was not equal to the emergency to keep up with the Infantry and out of his platoon of 60 men there was only 12 returned.

He further states that the silver in his pockets was turned black from the gas * * *.

Here is a statement made by Lieut. Alfred T. Barr, of the Three hundred and forty-seventh Machine Gun Battalion of the Ninety-first Division. This statement appeared in a letter dated Mayer, France, December 11, 1918, appearing in the Belle Fourche (S. Dak.) Bee, on January 7, 1919. Lieut. Barr says:

* * * Our division was one of the nine that went over the top in the battle of the Argonne on September 25. * * *

We could see our observation balloons spaced about a half a kilometer or so apart, back of our lines. They didn't stay there long for the boche got busy, sent his planes over and managed to burn a number of them. Our planes didn't seem very active, in fact it was that way during the whole four days that I was in the fight; the boche seemed to have superiority of the air.

The first day we had very little resistance; met some machine gunners and snipers, but not much artillery firing. However, we captured a good number of prisoners that day. The second day, however, was different and we ran into a stiff resistance at Epenonville, which was in our brigade sector. There I lost one gunner killed and four wounded from snipers and machine-gun fire. It was foggy and rainy and the d——n boche had it on us. He was everywhere with his machine guns and snipers and we had lost touch with our Artillery, having gone so far the previous day. Our front line was in the village of Epenonville and his strong point was in an orchard just beyond and also in a thick wood stretching all along our front. We had to withdraw from the village and let what artillery we had shell the orchard and wood. However, we couldn't go ahead any that day and so consolidated our position this side of the town. The division on our right was held up back of us, so that we were sticking out like a sore thumb. I had my platoon on the right flank that night with nothing between my guns and Germany but the boche. * * *

The fourth day was the worst of all. We now ran up against the enemy artillery in force and they seemed determined to blast us out. * * *

I have here also a statement of Corp. Arthur Kennedy, of the Thirty-fifth Division, which appeared in the Atchison (Kans.) Globe, under date of February 6, 1919, in which he says:

It is a fact that we fought three days in the Argonne without the slightest artillery support. Those days were September 26, 27, and 28, and they were terrible days. Our boys were mowed down by Hun machine-gun fire, shrapnel, and airplanes, which operated above us with considerable freedom.

After I was wounded I laid for 30 hours on the field—30 hours before I was picked up by stretcher bearers. I don't remember much about my experiences in the field dressing station, as I came into an evacuation hospital. * * *

I don't know the reason for the failure of the Artillery to back us up, unless it was because we went too fast for them.

I have also a statement of LeRoy Anderson, of the One hundred and tenth Engineers, Thirty-fifth Division, in regard to the lack of artillery support in the battle of the Argonne Forest. This statement appeared in the Topeka State Journal, of Thursday, February 6, 1919. He says:

I saw only a few American airplanes while I was in France. The Hun planes would sweep down within 100 yards of us and open up with their machine guns, but I do not believe we lost many men this way. When an observation plane would come, however, it was only a short time until German shells would begin to light among us. Their air supremacy gave them great advantage, enabling them to get the range and the location of our men. * * *

We started from the town of Vauquois and went over the top in three waves, about 120 yards apart. I was in the second wave, and the smoke and mist

were so thick that we could hardly see the men ahead of us. We were preceded with a creeping barrage from our artillery and French tanks, which cleaned up the machine gun nests, but on the second day most of the tanks were crippled or stuck in the mud, and thereafter the Infantry cleaned up the nests alone. * * *

On the third day the One hundred and fortieth and One hundred and thirty-eigth Regiments ran into their own barrage. I do not know whether this was the fault of the Artillery or Infantry officers, but if we had had airplanes it probably never would have happened.

I have also a statement of Sergt. Maj. E. D. Harrison, of the One hundred and fortieth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, which appeared in the Topeka State Journal of February 8, 1919, under a New York date line, in which he says:

The Thirty-fifth Division opened the Argonne push on September 26, being one of the units heading the drive and one of the ones suffering the heaviest losses. * * *

When the Thirty-fifth went in it hit hard and quick and formed a salient of its own, being flanked therefore on two sides, as the divisions to the right and left were outdistanced.

Our Artillery support failed after the first. We started the drive behind a barrage, and a creeping barrage was kept up for about 12 hours, but after that the Artillery fell behind and we had no protection. When I was wounded on the 28th I understood that they were just getting their guns into position again. * * *

We didn't seem to have any air support, either. The men could look away up and behind and see big formations that looked like allied planes. but when our troops were ready to advance the Hun machines swept down without opposition, and we were met with the heavy artillery fire they directed.

At one time the men were in mass formation, sheltered from sight by a rise while waiting to go into action. The German planes flew low, spotted them, and the shelling that resulted was a disastrous affair. * * *

I have also an extract from a statement of Will Shaner, of Company C, One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division. This statement appeared in the Parsons Daily Sun of February 1, 1919. He says:

Gov. Allen is entirely correct about the heavy losses to the Thirty-fifth in that drive being due largely to lack of artillery and equipment. We started into the battle seemingly well equipped, but as day after day rolled by it was apparent that the Artillery lacked horses and other supplies sufficiently to keep up with the Infantry advance. I don't know much about the airplane equipment, except that the boys all talked about how scarce they seemed to be; when we wanted to signal a plane there was none around to take the signal.

I have here also an extract from a letter of Sergt. John R. Stratford, of Company F, One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, written to his father, Judge E. D. Stratford, of Eldorado, Kans. This letter was written before I came home. It says:

I will give you some idea of a part of the battle of the Argonne, where I was wounded on September 28. On the second day of the battle our company lay all day on the side of a hill where we had dug little holes to protect ourselves to some extent from machine-gun bullets. We could look across a little valley to the right and watch the advance of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Regiment. They were advancing behind tanks and the boche artillery was firing from our left and the shells just cleared the hill where we lay. As they whistled over our heads we could see the shells burst on the other hill were the One hundred and Thirty-eighth was advancing. They were out on the top of that hill with absolutely no protection and the Germans could not help hitting them. A shell would strike in the center of the squad or platoon and you could see the men blown to pieces in all directions. Those who were knocked down by the shock would get up, reform their squads, and go on as if nothing had happened.

I was wounded at the beginning of our first battle. That is where our company led the fight, and I never expected to see such bravery as they showed.

The machine-gun bullets were as thick as hailstones during a hailstorm and the fellows would just turn their heads sideways, as if they were facing a hard rainstorm, and go right into them.

I have also an extract from a letter of Corpl. J. W. Otterstatter, Company K, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, in which he says:

I was wounded the first day of the Argonne battle (Sept. 26) near the town of Cheppy. To fight machine-gun nests, you having been there realize the absolute necessity of hand grenades. We were without this protection entirely. I know for a positive fact that there wasn't one in the battalion, my position being at battalion headquarters as personnel clerk, so I would be familiar with the circumstances. This being the case the first day, I don't see how they could have been supplied any during the remainder of the battle.

As to artillery support, naturally the first day it was good, because we hadn't gotten out of range, but we experienced considerable difficulty in getting signals to aeroplanes on account of the weather conditions and fog. After being wounded the first day, I was out of the fighting, so am not familiar with conditions after that time—namely, whether the artillery advanced as they should or not. * * *

I have also some extracts from a statement of First Lieut. S. O. Slaughter, Company L, One hundred and fortieth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division. This statement appeared in the Kansas City Star of February 5, 1919. It says:

There can be no harm in telling some of the hardships under which our division fought, the lack of proper care of the wounded, the lack of protection in the air, and of the fighting qualities of the men who overcame these handicaps.

The first two days of the fight, when we took Viaqua Hill, we had few casualties, because we were under the protection of our artillery. But as we left them, when we got near Exermont, we found ourselves face to face with Boche artillery and machine-gun nests. I clearly saw two German batteries, one on either side of us, sending an enfilading fire across our position. They were outside our sector, but were in plain view and were decimating our ranks.

Saturday, the fourth day of the battle, was the worst. We were almost unprotected from the German artillery, and their airplanes played over us so low you could almost hit them with stones. We fought them off with automatic pistols and rifles. Our own observation balloons tried to go up, but were sunk as fast as they arse. Occasionally protecting airplanes showed up, but they were not sufficient to keep the Huns off our heads.

That night our wounded were all about us. We could get no litters, because transportation was nil. We improvised litters from overcoats and carried our wounded back to the triage, but the situation there was little better, as men were lying in the mud with no blankets to go over them.

I have also a statement in regard to Capt. Luther Tillotson, Company A, One hundred and tenth Engineers, Thirty-fifth Division. This is a newspaper statement, which appeared in the Topeka State Journal of January 18, 1919. This statement says:

Capt. Tillotson has received his honorable discharge from the Army and is now a civilian. He comes to Kansas with a message which will be given credence by the highest military authorities of the State, and his report substantiates the main statement made by Gov. Henry Allen.

Capt. Tillotson is bringing first-hand news, and he reiterates the statement of the horrible losses in the Infantry of the Thirty-fifth Division. The statement made by the War Department he brands as absolutely misleading, in that the losses as reported by them are based on replacements. He gives as his authority for the actual casualties suffered the official statement of the Paris edition of the New York Herald of October 1, which places the casualties among the Thirty-fifth Infantry at 42 per cent.

"The Artillery loss was barely 2 per cent," Capt. Tillotson explained. "We went into the fight behind a good barrage. After our first advance we had absolutely no Artillery protection for our men. The boys responded to their

orders to advance, and they were mowed down like wheat. Our orders were to go on. The artillery was there at first, but there were no horses, and it could not be moved to keep up with the men. There is some confusion between casualties and replacements in the layman's mind. If 100 of your men are hurt, you order, perhaps, 20 for replacement, because you know that perhaps two-thirds of the men hurt will be back for work in a few hours. The War Department bases the report of casualties on the replacements ordered, but this is not a fair showing, for many of those men come back to fight again who will go through the rest of their lives bearing the scars of those 'slight' casualties."

I have here also an extract from a letter of Mr. F. P. Hawthorne, of McPherson, Kans., in which he says:

My son Cal, who was with Company C, One hundred and thirtieth Machine Gun Battalion, in the Argonne Battle, in a letter of October 23, complains very seriously of poor support from the Artillery. Also complains of change of all the National Guard officers.

I have also a statement of Pvt. Reynolds, of the Infantry, of the Thirty-fifth Division. This statement appeared in the Warrensburg (Mo.) Herald of January 24, 1919. It says:

After a night of hard tramping, many of the men in a half starved condition, the order to go over the top came at daybreak of September 29, and under the command of Capt. Jack Armour, the successful attack was made, a success the more remarkable because at the critical moment auxiliary support failed. The airplanes, of immeasurable value at the time of attack, were absent, and the artillery was too far in the rear to give the protection of a barrage, according to Pvt. Reynolds.

I thought you might be interested, if you had not seen it in an article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post written by Elizabeth Frazer. I happen to know that Miss Frazer made a very careful investigation of the Argonne Forest Battle. She was making it when I left Paris. She was interviewing men and officers, and she is a writer of reliability. She says:

* * * For it is a fixed rule of warfare that if the rear fails the front must still carry on. * * * There was an acute shortage of horses. There were not enough to begin with, and those in use were second rate, broken down by the brutal strain. * * * And horses died by hundreds and thousands. The woods were filled with their carcasses.

* * * Again and again these vital necessities were missing at the outset of an attack, and the men went forward without them. They went forward with no artillery to prepare the way, with no ammunition, sometimes even with no rifles, * * * with no food for two and three days at a time, sleeping in the woods in a sodden downpour of rain * * *.

Thus passed five desperate nightmare weeks of unimaginable horror. But the chief point to remember is that, in spite of the agony and the handicaps, the men took their objectives, often without food, without artillery support, without air support. They took their objectives with nothing but their invincible courage and their bare hands. It cost like hell; but they took them—by maneuver on flank or rear, when they could, or by bold sanguinary frontal attack when they must * * *.

As a matter of fact, gentlemen, if you drove any place along the road 25 miles back, you could trace the advance of the Army by the dead horses that lay along the road, skinny old horses and worn out, who had died within a few hours after they had been put to work.

Mr. GARRETT. Do you remember how far the troops advanced from where they started until they reached their objective?

Gov. ALLEN. I believe I have a battle map which shows the distance. We started at Neuvilly and went to Exermont, and going on a line straight north the distance was perhaps 12 kilometers. The headquarters of the Germans at this point were in Cheppy, the

center of the Hindenburg line on the Verdun sector, and were off to one side a mile and a half, but the distance which we covered during the six days and five nights was, I believe something like to 12 kilometers which would be between eight and nine miles.

Mr. SNELL. It can not be very great distance?

Gov. ALLEN. It would be possible to haul artillery that far if you had horses.

Mr. SNELL. That would have been considered a slight advance?

Gov. ALLEN. That would have been considered a slight advance. There were advances after that, when the situation was better arranged where the Americans went 12 miles a day, frequently, and took all of our playthings with us.

Mr. HARRISON. You mean when they got the Infantry where it was?

Gov. After they got through with the Argonne Forest they were following the retreating Germans up in the Sedan drive, and were better organized, with more horses, and a line was more concentrated, and used less artillery.

Mr. GARRETT. That was advancing, following a retreating army of the enemy, and the other advance was an advance through one of the hardest fights the world had ever witnessed?

Gov. ALLEN. We must realize that these men of ours took the Hindenburg line at a point as well defended and as nearly impregnable as any part of the Hinderburg line on the western front, and they took it because they kept going on; they did not know how to go back. They had been taught no system of defensive. They found at Cheppy the Germans had dugouts reinforced with concrete, and they went 40 or 50 feet below the surface of the ground. Our men captured the dugouts and went forward. I talked with a general officer of the French Army, who witnessed this, and I was bragging about our men, and I asked him if he did not think they were good soldiers. This officer said, "I would not say they were good soldiers; but they were magnificent fighters." In the French mind there is quite a distinction in those terms. The good soldier, in the French mind, saves his life.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would not a basket full of hand grenades be a good thing to use in one of those deep holes?

Gov. ALLEN. They would be. Here is the opinion of Col. W. H. Carpenter, of Marion, Kans., who served with the American Red Cross in France. This is an extract from an article appearing in the Topeka State Journal on January 31, 1919. It says:

> Col. Carpenter's attention was called by Representative Little to the statement of Chief of Staff March, that at no time during the battle did any American troops get beyond range of artillery support. The Kansan said in the most emphatic way possible that the statement was not correct. He said that the Kansans had fought the last few days of the battle against the massed German artillery, machine guns, airplanes, gas, and with little artillery support. * * * He also told of the Kansans being forced to defend themselves by rifle and pistol fire against German airplanes swooping down on them, but he said he did not care to go into the air phase of the battle at all, as he was not a military man. He said the Kansas soldiers would give their folks the truth of the battle once they got home.

Here is an extract from Ivan Angell, of Company L, Three hundred and fifty-third (All-Kansas) Regiment. This appeared in the Tonganoxie (Kans.) Mirror, on January 23, 1919. It says:

The Germans were supreme in the air in the sector where he was and proved expert marksmen in their artillery * * *.

Ivan was in the hospital when the Eighty-ninth made its fight in the Argonne Forests, but he says Gov. Henry Allen is correct in his statements. The boys fought four days without artillery support.

This regiment was in the Eighty-ninth Division, which entered the battle of the Argonne Forest, at a place called Romaigne, in October, and then was in the battle on toward Sedan. I read it to show that the Eighty-ninth Division was also suffering from shortages of material.

I have here the statements of 25 or more other men and officers, all of which is corroborative testimony and, if the committee prefers, I will not read them all, but I will put them in the record.

Mr. HARRISON. After you made your speech in Kansas you received a great many letters from the boys who had been in the battle of the Argonne Forest?

Gov. ALLEN. Very many.

Mr. HARRISON. Agreeing with your conclusions?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you receive any letters from those boys who took issue with you on the proposition?

Gov. ALLEN. Not a letter. I have read five letters from boys who were in this division, printed in Democratic newspapers, which generally start with a statement that everything I am saying is, of course, absolutely false; that the reason why the artillery was not used was because the infantry outran it, and the artillery was not to blame. Statements of that kind, which conceded everything I have said, but which give an entirely different interpretation as to the causes.

Mr. RODENBERG. Would it not be a good idea for the governor to incorporate these statements which he has not read in the record?

Gov. ALLEN. These are merely repetitions, some stronger and some weaker. I would like to give you a list of the witnesses whom I know to be in possession of these facts. With the presentation of the names of the witnesses and with the incorporation of these other statements and letters in the record, that might well conclude the hearing. These are the witnesses I refer to:

Second Lieut. W. F. Manning. You will find him in the House of Representatives of the Missouri Legislature at Jefferson City, Mo. He was formerly of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry. I believe he is a member of the House of Representatives of the Missouri Legislature.

Col. Ristine, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry; Maj. Comfort, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry; Lieut. Col. Bennett Clark, son of Speaker Clark; First Lieut. Gardiner; Lieut. Col. Rieger.

Mr. SNELL. Was Lieut. Col. Bennett Clark in this division in the fight?

Gov. ALLEN. Not in the fight. He was with the division up to about the time of the fight, and then was sent to another division. But he knows about the fight. I would also like to submit the name of Lieut. Col. Frank M. Rumboldt. You will find him in Washington at the Militia Bureau in the War Department. Then I would also like to submit the name of Chaplain Edwards, of the One hun-

dred and fortieth Infantry, who can be found at Lawrence, Kans; Maj. Jones, of the One hundred and tenth Sanitary Train, who, if he is back, will be at Olathe, Kans.; Capt. Barr, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Supply Train, who, if he is back, can be found at Wichita, Kans.; Col. Rowan, who was the provost marshal of the division; Maj. Going, who was at the head of the military police of the division. There were officers in charge of the various activities who must necessarily have been acquainted with all these matters I am talking to you about.

I would like to give you also the name of a very important witness, Lieut. Col. Charles McCoy, whom you can find in New York. He was in command of one of the evacuation hospitals at Fluery. He would be a very important witness, and I think he is back in the country to-day.

Mr. GARRETT. May I ask, if you do not mind especially, as to the matter of policy in regard to the question of this investigation? Do you think it would be wise to have a congressional committee go abroad to investigate?

Gov. ALLEN. I do not think it would be necessary, since so many of the officers are coming home, and also so many of the men. I think you can get to-day a preponderance of evidence which would prove the case beyond a doubt from officers and men who are in this country now.

Mr. GARRETT. I assume, however, that in order to make a complete investigation any committee that might be appointed would necessarily have to have before it these high officers, such as Gen. Pershing, Gen. Liggett, and Gen. Traub?

Gov. ALLEN. Gen. Traub is now in this country.

Mr. GARRETT. Those officers constitute the responsible high officers according to the statement of Gen. March?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. GARRETT. And I should assume that a complete investigation would require their presence before such a committee?

Gov. ALLEN. I should think if you determined to make an investigation from the material in this country, at least there should be presented to those officers over there the testimony so that their statements might be added to the evidence you have.

Mr. RODENBERG. In your opening statement you said you had some statistics bearing on the actual casualties?

Gov. ALLEN. I gave that in Capt. Hoffman's report, in which he stated that there passed through his triage over 6,000. In addition to these you must remember the War Department has admitted 1,733 as dead and missing.

Mr. RODENBERG. Gen. March said the killed and lost were only 879 up to November 1?

Gov. ALLEN. These 17,333 were admitted in a subsequent statement, a very pettifogging document was issued from the War Department, a statement which, at first glance, would appear to be a report of casualities, stating that the casualities were 56,000, and some people immediately took that report to mean, as, no doubt, the War Department intended, the total number of casualities. As a matter of fact, it referred to the major casualities, to those who were dead and missing. The papers in my neighborhood took it to mean

that and said the casualities are not so bad, "only 56,000 dead and missing." As a matter of fact, that statement had relation to the dead and missing. Then, in addition to the 1,733 admitted to the dead and missing by the Secretary's statement, there must be added the statistics given by the man who had charge of the triage, who says he triaged 5,000, and he believed that in addition to these several hundred went through other triages or were evacuated directly from the field to the evacuation hospital.

Mr. RODENBERG. There is certainly a remarkable discrepancy between those figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you conclude your statement, Governor, I would like to inquire where the representatives of the Red Cross were during all this period of slaughter?

Gov. ALLEN. The Red Cross service was given mainly, as it was intended it should be given, in the base hospitals, and in the evacuation hospitals. Their personnel was reduced to about four men to a division, outside of the hospital service. They were doing the very best they could, but it was not the intent of the Army that the Red Cross should provide any very great service in the field, but that that service should be given very largely to the established hospitals.

Mr. HARRISON. You were in the Red Cross at this time?

Gov. ALLEN. In the Y. M. C. A.

Mr. HARRISON. How long had you been in the Y. M. C. A.?

Gov. ALLEN. I was in the Y. M. C. A. from the 1st of July until I left France.

Mr. HARRISON. How long were you in the Red Cross?

Gov. ALLEN. I was there over the greater part of six months in 1917, and then came home to accompany Mr. Davidson, the chairman of the War Council, on a speaking engagement, and went back in January, and was with the Red Cross from January until the 1st of July.

Mr. HARRISON. May I ask why did you change from the Red Cross to the Y. M. C. A.?

Gov. ALLEN. I changed because the Thirty-fifth Division, having arrived in France, had no Y. M. C. A. organization with it. It was going into the Vosges Mountains, where it was to become a combat division, and the Y. M. C. A. asked if I would organize that division. I wanted to be with the boys from home, and I had completed the organization of the Home Communication Service of the Red Cross, and that had become very largely an office job, and I wanted to go to the field.

Mr. HARRISON. Do you know where Gen. McClure is now?

Gov. ALLEN. I do not know.

Mr. HARRISON. Is he in this country?

Gov. ALLEN. I do not think he is.

Mr. HARRISON. Gen. McClure and Gen. Martin were turned out just before this battle?

Gov. ALLEN. Just before this battle.

Mr. HARRISON. Gen. Martin is here now?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. I think we ought to hear Gen. Martin, if he is going to be here to-morrow.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Gen. Martin is at the service of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure we will be glad to hear anything Gen. Martin may care to say, to-morrow morning.

Gov. ALLEN. In accordance with the suggestion of the committee, I will insert in the record the remainder of the letters and statements I have in regard to this matter.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF EVENTS, ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH INFANTRY, FROM SEPTEMBER 26 TO OCTOBER 2, 1918.

September 26, 1918.—The 140th Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Delapiane, commanding, "jumped off" from along Neuvilly-Aubreville Road, 06.2–64.8, Vauquois 1/10000, at 5.45 a. m.

The regiment was deployed in column of battalions in order first, second, and third battalions. The battalions were in platoon columns, staggered. The Stokes mortars and one-pounders followed the third battalion. The regimental headquarters' command group went with the second battalion. The route was about geographical north to right of Hill 263, through valley to Vauquois Hill, crossing at 05.5–70.7, Vauquois 1/10.

In the fog and smoke screen encountered within 30 minutes of leaving some confusion was caused by loss of contact between organizations. With a little delay as possible contact was reestablished, and with the exception of a few platoons the organizations were in proper place after passing Vauquois Hill.

At noon the regiment halted. Commanding officer of 1st battalion of 138th Infantry, directly in our front, sent message he was held up by machine-gun nest in woods south of Cheppy at 05.9–72.5, Vauquois 1/10000. After a reconnoissance the 2d and 3d battalions were deployed to attack this strong point when it was evacuated.

At about 1 p. m. liaison was established for the first time with 364th Infantry (91st Division) on our right.

At 05.9–71.7, Vauquois 1/10000, direction was changed from north to northwest, passing to the north of Varennes-Avocourt Road, through La Forge Min, crossing trench "du Scorpion" to west of Cheppy and crossing Cheppy-Varennes to road at 04.5–73.5, Verdun A, 1/20, where a halt was made because of the 69th Brigade being stopped.

Late in the afternoon 1st and 2d battalions crossed Buanthe Rau at 04.8–74.3. At 6.30 p. m. the regiment stopped with our 1st battalion deployed behind the 138th Infantry, with left resting at 04.3–75.3 and right resting on Charpentry-Very Road at 05.3–75.7, Verdun A, 1/20000. The 2d battalion left resting on 04.7–74.7 and right at 05.3–75.2, Verdun A, 1/20000. The 3d battalion acting as divisional reserve remained on slope west of stream, with reserve and regimental headquarters at Vieux Moulin.

September 27, 1918.—At about 5.05 a. m. orders were received to advance at 5.30 a. m. after a five-minute barrage on machine-gun nests. The artillery failed to give barrage at appointed time and the 1st and 2d battalions could make but short gains. The most of the day was spent under a very heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. About the middle of the afternoon nine tanks reported along the Very-Charpentry Road and were disposed of along our front for an attack on the machine-gun nests and Boche artillery. The attack was launched at 5.30 p. m. The enemy machine guns were abandoned and the artillery captured.

Contact with the 1st battalion was lost and not regained until next morning. It advanced beyond Chapentry and dug in for the night. The 2nd Battalion stopped for night with left at 03.4–77.2, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20, right at 04.2–77.4, Verdun A 1/20; Third Battalion left at 03.9–76.9, right at 04.9–77.5, Verdun A 1/20.

September 28, 1918.—At about 3.30 a. m. orders were received from brigade adjutant to push forward with all speed and protect the right flank of the troops on our left. We advanced at 5.30 a. m. in order, 2nd Battalion, with M. G. Co. from 130th M. G. Bn. 3rd Battalion, with M. F. Co. from 130th M. G. Bn. Hq. Command Group with 3d Battalion.

At about 8 a. m. the movement was stopped on a line northwest from Baulny by machine-gun fire from Montrebeau Wood and artillery fire from the direction of Apremont, Exermont, and Les Fontaine.

A patrol of American Cavalry reported regimental P. C. (02.9–78.7, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20) at about 8.20 a. m.

Unable to advance further because of artillery fire. A captain of tanks reported at 8.30 a. m., stating he was starting into action with 20 tanks, but did not know how many would arrive. He was ordered to divide the tanks between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, which were ordered to follow the tanks at about 150 meters, with Exermont as the objective. Attack was launched at 9.45 a. m. under terrific artillery and machine-gun fire. The advance was made over rolling terrain and casualties were heavy. Our lines advanced to crest of hill east of Montrebeau Wood at a point 02.1–79.5 (Foret d'Argonne, 1/20), extending in semicircle to 02.9–79.6 (Foret d'Argonne 1/20). The 1st and 3rd Battalion intrenched along this line; 2nd Battalion held in reserve back of center of line.

September 29, 1918.—Orders from brigade were received at 5.25 a. m. to attack at 5.30 a. m. The order stated that the 138th Infantry, which was in support, would pass through us and continue the attack on Exermont, the 140th forming the support. Orders were issued to form in columns of battalions—3d, 2nd, and 1st with staggered columns—scouts and connecting files to be in front of leading columns of 3d Battalion. While this formation was being taken up peremptory orders were received from Colonel Nutman and Colonel Hawkins to advance. The brigade commander, Colonel Walker was approached by the commanding officer of the 140th Infantry at this time and informed that the 138th was then moving up and asked if if it was the intention for the 140th to go ahead or allow the 138th to comply with the original order. Reply was to go ahead, and the orders were issued to complete the formation and advance at once. Before the formation and deployment of the 3d Battalion was completed either Colonel Nutman or Colonel Hawkins ordered the battalion commander to advance without delay, which he did, in column. The advance was under heavy artillery fire from three directions and machine-gun fire from all ravines and woods. The 1st Battalion was immediately deployed in rear and instructed to bear to the west. In this formation we proceeded on Exermont, where parts of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were consolidated in the line; road on the south edge of road running through the northern extremity of Exermont. This consolidation was accomplished at 9.30 a. m., troops were seen to the west of Exermont but owing to the severity of the action no contact was made.

Major Rieger, of the 139th, with a few men arrived about 10 o'clock and extended the Exermont line slightly to the east. This position was maintained under heavy fire until 1 p. m., when an order was received from the Brigade Commander to retire. This retirement took place immediately, with instructions to hold on the ridge in rear. As the forward detached returned it was observed that men were drifting to the rear from the Montrebeau Woods, and vicinity. This prevented the forward detachment holding on the ridge immediately to the south of Exermont, and they continued the retirement until the outpost position of the morning was reached. Information was then received that the Engineers had intrenched the position running northeast from Baulny to the Les Fontaine-Apremont road to the south and east of Chaudron farm, to which line they were ordered to retire. This retirement was far from satisfactory, and the commanding officer, 140th Infantry, ordered Capt. Truman, with a headquarters organization, to hold men at any cost on the position that the Engineers were then constructing. This he succeeded in doing, in some cases at the point of a gun. Upon arrival of the commanding officer of the 140th it was found that these lines were organized in a position to hold, though the trenches were manned by men from all organizations of the division. Carrying parties had been organized by Capt. Truman, and ammunition was being carried up and supplied to the men in both front and rear reserve trenches. At this time there were very few officers and noncommissioned officers present. Among those present were: First Lieutenant John Pleasant, Lieutenant Keefner, Lieutenant George Smith, Lieutenant Han, Captain Ralph Campbell.

The above officers were the ones that were put in charge and maintained this line. This line was then reinforced by others who had retreated further to the south. A portion of the 138th Infantry connected to this position on the right and some on the left intermingled with a portion of the 137th Infantry, commanded by Major O'Connor and Major Kalloch. This position was strengthened by collecting stragglers from the rear who were sent forward to the line.

MESSAGES WRITTEN BY CAPT. E. TRUMAN, R. I. O., ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH INFANTRY, DURING THE ARGONNE DRIVE, FROM SEPTEMBER 25 TO OCTOBER 1, 1918.

From RIO, 140.
At—
Date, Sept. 26, 1918. Hour, 5.30 a. m. No. 1. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
Regt. started into action on time, 5.30 a. m. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140 Inf.
At 05.7–71.4, Vauquois, 1/10000.
Date, Sept. 26th. Hour 6 a. m. No. 2. How sent—By runner.
To Brig. Adj. 70th Brig.
At Mame len Blanc, Hill 267.
Regt. moving forward from the above point. No casualties reported. No opposition met with up to this hour. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 05.7–71.4, Vauquois, 1/10000.
Date Sept. 26/18. Hour 10 a. m. No. 3. How sent—By runner.
To Div. Intelligence Officer, 25th Div.
Regt. moving forward from the above point. No casualities reported up to this hour. We have met with no oppostion so far. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 05.9–71.7, Vauquois 1/10000.
Date Sept. 26th. Hour 1.10 p. m. No. 4. How sent—By runner.
To Brigade Adj. 70th Brig.
We are close behind 69th Brig. Strong machine gun N.E. of this point. Evacuated when we deployed to attack. Move north continued. No casualties reported. M. G. position was at 0%.9–71.8. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 05.9–71.7 Vauquois 1/10000.
Date Sept. 26. Hour 1.10 p. m. No. 5. How sent—By runner.
To Division Intelligence Officer, 35th Div.
Have gained contact with 69th Brigade, are following closely. No casualties reported to this hour in 140th Inf. Moving in N.W. direction from this point. 30 boche surrendered to Lt. Otto Hine, 139th Inf. Lt. Hine reported to C. O. 140th Inf., having lost his way. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140.
At 04.8–75.1 Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date Sept. 26. Hour 6.30 p. m. No. 6. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
Regimental P. C. temporarily established at the above point. 138 Inf, not to exceed 30 meters in advance of this Ret5. Where will your next P. C. be established. No casualties up to this hour. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 26. Hour 6.30 p. m. No. 7. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Div.
Regt. advancing in good order, keeping close contact with 138th Inf. No casualties reported up to this hour in this regt. Temporary P. C. of regt. established at the above point. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour 7 a. m. No. 8. How sent—By runner.
To Brig. Adj. 70th Brig.
140th Inf. Began the advance at time set. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A. 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 7 a. m. How sent—By runner No. 9.
To G–2, 35th Division.
140th Inf. began the advance to-day at 6.30 a. m., passing through the 138th, now in support. No casualties on the 26th in the 140th Inf. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th.
At 200 yards north of P. G. of the 26th.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 9.30 a. m. No. 10. How sent—By runner.
To Brig. Adj. 70th Brig.
Both 140th and 139th Inf. held up by enemy M. G. fire. Troops can not advance without artillery support. Tank commander has been notified. A few casualties in the 140th Inf. M. G. fire. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At point as given in last message.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 10.30 a. m. No. 11. How sent—By runner.
To Brigade Adj. 70th Brigade.
Our line is still held up by M. G. fire. Three casualties in 1st Battalion. Degree of wounds, slight. M. G.'s positively located on 03.8–76.6. One at 04.6–76.7. Very map. Enemy shelling hill north of regt. P. C. possibly 50 HE in the last 45 minutes. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 10.50 a. m. No. 12. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Division.
Our advance lines held up by M. G. fire from the direction of 03.8–76.6, one at 04.6–76.6. Very map. The location given is correctly reported so my I. O. of the 1st Battalion reports. Enemy shelling hill north of regt. P. C.—about 50 HE 105's in last 45 minutes. No casualties from shelling. Three casualties from M. G. fire in the 1st Bn. 140th Inf. Will advance as soon as M. G. nests are cleaned out. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 12.20 p. m. No. 13. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
Am sending to you, for your information, maps and tracings that will be of value to you. After they have answered your purpose, forward to G–2, 35th. Heavy shelling of our troops all along our flanks. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th Inf.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour 1.10 p. m. No. 14. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
Am sending sketch of a point in front of our line. Three men killed by shell fire. Enemy still shelling our troops heavily and are not able to advance. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th Inf.
At 04.8–75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 1.10 p. m. No. 15. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Div.
The attack began at 6 p. m. Our regiment passed through the 138th Infantry and is now occupying a line running east and west, and south of Charpentry, about 1,000 yards. Column halted by heavy machine-gun fire from woods near Charpentry, and heavy artillery fire from the north of Charpentry. The right of our line is resting near the Charpentry-Very road. Tanks have been asked for to clear out machine-gun nests. Advance will start as soon as they arrive. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th Inf.
At 04.8–76.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 5 p. m. No. 16. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Div.
Boche are moving out of Charpentry in large bodies of what looks to be 75 or 80 men in each group. Also moving along road at point near 04.2–77–2, Verdun A, 1/20000. Men moving along road can be seen to be carrying machine guns. Our lines have advanced slightly. See map of our line at 3 p. m. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th Infantry.
At 04.5–76.1, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 5.50 p. m. No. 17. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.

Letters taken from wounded Boche. 2nd Bn. 140 has advanced one kilometer, with assistance of French tanks. Entire regiment now advancing under barrage. Forward papers to G-2, 35th Division. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140.
At 02.9-78.7, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 28. Hour 7.30 a. m. No. 18. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70 Brig.
Our lines held up by M. G. fire. 100 casualties in regiment during past 24 hours. Our front lines are about 200 meters in advance of above point. Strong M. G. fire from our front. Also some artillery fire but not doing any damage. Enemy planes active. Advance started at 5 a. m. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th.
At 02.9-78.7, Foret d'Argonne 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 28. Hour, 8.20 a. m. No. 19. How sent—By runner.
To G-2, 35th Div.
Our troops started the advance at 5 a. m. Have met with strong M. G. fire, which is holding up the lines. Line about 200 meters in advance of this point. Tanks have arrived and are ready to go into action; 100 casualties in regiment during the past 24 hours. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140 Inf.
At 02.3-78.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 28. Hour, 2.30 p. m. No. 20. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated machine-gun fire. See drawing showing approximately our front line. There may be a little change made during the night. We are flanked by artillery fire on every side but our rear. Our own artillery has given no support during the attack. Enemy planes very active during the day. One squadron of enemy planes over our position at 1 p. m. They trained their M. G.'s on the men, causing some losses; 15 planes in the party. Also, one enemy plane flew low over our troops all during the forenoon directing the fire of artillery. We have suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded. Men are now at dressing stations that were wounded yesterday. Numbers of men who are wounded have had no attention and are still laying on the ground where they fell. We are short of ammunition, which is very badly needed in case of a counterattack by the enemy. The adjutant of the regiment has been gassed and the C. O. has not been seen since the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140 Inf.
At 02.3-78.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 28. Hour, 3 p. m. No. 21. How sent—By runner.
To G-2, 35th Div.
Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated M. G. fire. See drawing forwarded by 70th Brig. We are flanked by artillery fire from every side but our rear. Our own artillery gave no support during the attack. Enemy planes over our lines during attack, flying low, directing artillery fire on our troops. At 1 p. m. 15 enemy planes flew over our lines, firing on our troops with their M. G.'s, causing losses. We have suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded. Men are now in dressing stations that were wounded yesterday. Numbers of wounded men have not been carried off the field. We are short of ammunition, which is very badly needed in case of a counterattack by the enemy. The adjutant has been gassed and the C. O. has not been seen since the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him. Truman, RIO.

From Rio 140 Inf.
At kilometer north of 02.3-78.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 29. Hour, 12.30 p. m. No. 22. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
Our troops started the advance on time set. They had not the proper time to reorganize, with the result that the organizations were split up and confused. Our artillery fell short in many cases, causing losses to our troops. Enemy artillery very active, as well as M. G. Numerous losses in the regiment in killed and wounded. Our troops now occupy Exermont. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140 Inf.
At 1 kilometer north of 02.3–78–9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 29. Hour, 12.30 p. m. No. 23. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Division.
Our troops now occupy Exermont. It was taken under a fierce artillery and m. g. fire. Our losses were heavy in killed and wounded. Our artillery gave little support and on several occasions fired short as much as 1 kilometer, causing losses to our troops. Weather very bad. Muddy ground. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th Inf.
At trenches shown in sketch submitted.
Date, Sept. 29. Hour, 4.30 p. m. No. 24. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Div.
Our troops started to fall back in accordance with orders received from the brigade commander to retire back to the position, gradually, that was held last night. Instead of doing as ordered—the officers and nco's ordered—they started to break and run, it almost turning into a stampede. Men of all regiments, officers and nco's, were headed to the rear. It being a critical moment, I gathered a few of my nco's and observers about me and stopped about 300 at the point of the gun. We are organized now in a line of trenches as shown by drawing. Everything is quiet at present, with the exception of heavy shelling and machine-gun fire during the day. Full report will be made as soon as time can be found to do so. Truman.

From RIO 140th Inf.
At 02.8–77.8. Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, 9/30/18. Hour 9.15 a. m. No. 25. How sent—By runner.
To Adj. 70th Brig.
The enemy is coming over in skirmish formation. Have reached hedge this side of Montrebeau Woods. Unable to ascertain exact number. Our artillery and m. g. have opened fire. Our artillery falling short on our front and support line trenches. Barrage should be raised from 3 to 500 yards. RIO 140th Inf.

From RIO 140.
At 02.8–77.8, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 30. Hour, 9.15 a. m. No. 26. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Div.
Enemy forming for an attack. Is coming over in wave formation. Have reached hedge this side of the Montrebeau Woods. Unable to determine strength of enemy at this time. Our artillery and m. g. have opened fire. Truman, RIO.

From RIO 140th Inf.
At 02.9–77.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 30/18. Hour, 4.30 p. m. No. 27. How sent—By runner.
To Brigade Adj. 70 Brig.
Enemy has been quiet during the day since 9:15 a. m., except heavy artillery fire at intervals during the day. Our troops are digging in and strengthening the line in every way possible, and we feel that we are able to hold the line in event the enemy should attack. Rations have been issued to the men in the lines and a good supply of ammunition carried up. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140 Inf.
At 02.9–77.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000.
Date, Sept. 30/18. Hour, 4.30 p. m. No. 28. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Division.
Enemy did not attack. Evidently driven away by our Artillery and M. G. fire. Our troops are digging in as well as strengthening the line in every way possible, to hold it against an attack. We feel that the line can now be held in case he should attack. Rations have been issued to all troops. Also a plentiful supply of ammunition. A great deal of discomfort from the wet cold weather. Truman, RIO.

From RIO, 140th Inf.
At 06.2–72.9, Verdun A, 1/20000.
Date, Oct. 1. Hour, 1.45 p. m. No. 29. How sent—By runner.
To G–2, 35th Div.
The 140th Inf. was relieved in the line at 3 a. m. Regt. proceeded to march to camp at above map reference. An unusually heavy shelling took place while

the relief was being made. Also about 1,000 gas shells were put over on our Regt. lines. This was followed by a barrage which lasted until our Regt. was out of the area. The probably cause of the gas shelling and unusual barrage at the hour it happened was on account of the incoming troops making such a great amount of noise. Am sending to you a map and photos taken from a German captain killed by one of the battalion intelligence patrols. Truman, RIO.

From C. O., 140th Inf.
At 06.2–72.9, Verdun Am 1/20000.
Date, Oct. 1, 1918. Hour, 4 p. m. No. 30. How sent—By runner.
To Adj., 70th Brig.
Location of regt. P. C. 06.2–72.9. Verdun A, 1/20. Truman, RIO.
(Signed) Deleplane.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH INFANTRY, FROM NOON SEPTEMBER 29 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1918.

1. *General impressions of the day.*—Enemy activity growing much stronger. Violent artillery action by enmy. Also machine-gun activity to a great degree.

2. *Enemy front line.*—Enemy line extends at present from 01.2–79.0 to 01.4–79–9 and east to 02.8–79–4.

3. *Enemy order of battle.*—No additional identification.

4. *Enemy activity.*—Infantry: Very active. Machine gun: Very active. Trench mortar: Nil.

5. *Enemy movement.*—Visibility: Poor.

6. *Enemy aeronautics.*—Enemy planes very atcive, continually flying over our lines with machine guns and directing artillery fire on our front lines.

7. *Miscellaneous.*—During the entire day our troops were continually pelted with fire of our own Artillery as well as the fire of the enemy. The fire of our own guns was much more destructive to our troops than the fire of the Boche. That condition still exists to-day. Our Artillery laid down a heavy barrage on our front and rear lines at about 9. 15 a. m. to-day. Repeated messengers and runners have been sent to notify the Artillery that their range was short. I myself going to see the major in command of one battalion of Artillery of the 129th F. A. and asked him to see that the word was passed to the other commanders. I also showed him where our lines are now located. Our airplanes have been of little use to us in combating enemy planes. So far as the good they have done in that respect we had just as well not had them. In the subject of reports will state that I have done the best that I possibly could under the circumstances.

8. *Our own activity.*—The advance on Exermont was begun at 5.30 a. m., Sept. 29th, with two battalions of the 140th Inf. in the line and one battalion in support. The town of Exermont was taken at 9.15 a. m., and our troops passed through the town about 300 yards beyond. They were compelled to retire on order from brigade commander, which stated that the 70th Brigade should withdraw gradually to the line held the night previous. The men, on the order to withdraw, began to retire gradually, passed the placed designated, started on their way to Charpentray, the organizations being mixed, most of the officers gone, and few noncommissioned officers left. Things began to look serious, and had it not been for the prompt action and force used by the few officers who could be gathered together and stop the rush, it is hard to tell what would have happened, as a full-fledged stampede would have been on in a very few minutes that could not have been stopped. As soon as they caught up with the men in front of the rush and stopped them we organized them in a line of trenches as shown in sketch submitted to you last night. We now have the situation well in hand and can withstand most any kind of an attack the enemy might put over, provided we can get the Artillery to put the barrage on the boche and not on our own lines. I have sent five different messages to the Artillery this morning to lengthen their range, it being five separate occasions on which they have shelled our men. It is doing more to decrease the morale of our troops than if they knew the entire German Army was attacking them. The situation is simply this: There is not a telephone in any organization I know of. There are no signal rockets left, no flares to shoot in the Very pistols. What signal lights were in the organization are either lost or broken, and have practically no way of communicating with anyone except by runner. Our

losses have been extremely heavy. Our regiment, the 140th Inf., on going into action on the 29th had not to exceed 1,000 men. The other regiments of the division are in about the same shape as ours. We lost yesterday in officers killed and wounded: Maj. Murray Davis, Capt. Kennedy, and Lieut. Compton, bn. intelligence officer for the 1st Battalion, killed; wounded, Capt. Redmond, Lt. Gardner, Lt. Wise, Lt. Spicer, Lt. Thorpe, Lt. Keefner. Nature of wounds not known.

H. E. TRUMAN,
Captain 140th Inf., Regimental Intelligence Officer.

[Extract from letter of Mrs. F. M. Barns, of Burlington, Iowa, to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 18, 1919.]

I have a boy who was a private in Company C, One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, in the Thirty-fifth Division, and fought in that Argonne Forest four days and then was gassed and wounded and was in base hospital 9 for six weeks and now is at Bourges in the personnel department of the general records office. He told of the fighting without Artillery support and of his division being cut to pieces there. * * *

[Extract from letter of Cleo C. Hobbs, Battery E, One hundred and thirtieth Field Artillery, dated France, Dec. 26, published in the Trenton (Mo.) Republican.]

We left the St. Mihiel front with just as small an amount of equipment as possible, for we had lost many horses in action and on account of the bitter exposure, hard work, and poor food. So every man that was able carried all personal equipment on his back and hiked all the way. From 20 to 30 miles per night looks impossible, but we did it. * * * Well, we had 22 days of this kind of life before we went into action, without rest, on the Argonne. * * *

I was sure glad that I could back up Company D in this way, for I knew they were fighting bravely without proper Artillery support, because it could not get into action on account of the mines, wire, and torn-up bridges. * * * We knew our Infantry were having a hard time of it. If we could only have gotten ammunition and blown up the Hun machine-gun nests, but we could not.

* * * Soon a bunch of Hun planes came over and bombed us and turned machine guns loose on us. * * * We slept at our peace that night, and still we had nothing to eat, but we made a cup of coffee apiece, and it made us feel better anyhow. We fired all day and night this time.

* * * The next day we got some rations of corned beef and hard-tack, and we ate a hearty meal, for we were almost starved. * * *

That night they gassed us and aeroplanes bombed us. They knocked off several of the boys. We fired at them with rifles and machine guns; so did they, and got some of gun crew. * * * That night we fired for about three hours of heavy fire, then jerked our guns and beat it. We didn't know where we were going. * * * We were sorry, for we still wanted to get at the Huns.

Our clothes were torn and our socks worn in holes, so that they blistered our feet, and after such a drive we could hardly tote our packs. We traveled for several days and nights and finally stopped at a little town for four days' rest, and were called to the front. Again we traveled for days and nights. * * *

[Statement of Thirty-fifth Division soldier, contained in letter of Osborne (Kans.) soldier appearing in The Osborne Farmer, Feb. 6, 1919.]

I have talked to a couple of wounded men here who were in the Thirty-fifth Division—not Kansas or Missouri men, but men who were in a replacement unit and put in the Thirty-fifth after the Thirty-fifth heavy casualty—and they say it was exactly as Allen said and a damn sight worse. * * *

[Extract from letter of Mr. Orlando Preston, Denver, Colo., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 21, 1919.]

My son, First Lieut. Percy R. Preston, was attached to Company A, One hundred and thirty-eighth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division. * * *

On the 26th of September he, with many of the men of the Thirty-fifth Division, made the supreme sacrifice in the Argonne Forest. Whilst he was not a young man to complain, nevertheless, by reading between the lines of his correspondence, I drew my own conclusions as to the treatment of this division, who saw, I believe, more active fighting on the western front than any other unit. A few days ago a private, now located at the recuperation camp near Denver, dropped in to see me. He happened to be in the same platoon that my son led over the top on the 26th of September. He had nothing but praise for the Thirty-fifth Division, but bitterly complained that they were badly supported on account of the lack of Artillery, which was the cause of a large list of unnecessary casualties. He further complained bitterly to me of the way the boys were fed on the fighting line, and stated that it was a very difficult matter for men to go into action on empty stomachs. It seems to me that four or five months on the active firing line, with very little food or rest, was rather rubbing it into the Thirty-fifth Division. * * *

Naturally it brings to me a very bitter feeling for the loss of my son, who might have been spared to me, with many others, had they been supported by the Artillery.

[Extract from letter of Mr. J. W. Thomas, Olathe, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Feb. 1, 1919.]

I am in full accord with you as to your statements about the things not done for the Thirty-fifth Division. I have met a good many of those boys who have returned from France. They substantiate your statements every time. Two of my family entered the battle line June, 1917, and ended when the armistice was signed. They were in Argonne Woods battle. The first letter I received from one of my boys after that battle he said: "I am alive and untouched—only slightly gassed; but 50 per cent of our men and 70 per cent of our officers fell wounded or dead because we had no Artillery or airplanes to protect us. We walked straight into the cannon's mouth and the machine-gun nests and cut the barbed wires with our knives." That is the substances of all letters that I have seen or heard read.

[Extract from letter of J. W. Tucker, Cawker City, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 31, 1919.]

From other boys in the Argonne battle reports have come that Sutton was wounded and was in the hospital, but this was only hearsay and reports only. On the 13th the mother received official notice that the soldier had been severely wounded in action on September 27, 1918. Letters written to him by the mother and relatives last September and since, are coming back, returned to writer, with notation on corner of envelope: "Wounded September 28."

[Extract from letter of Capt. C. L. Van Den Haerk, St. Louis, Mo., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 31, 1919.]

I have followed with no little concern your statements and criticisms pertinent to the losses of the Thirty-fifth Division.

I was there seven and one-half long months, and can vouch for all you say, but I will say, Governor, that your criticisms, if anything, are far too mild to do justice to the thing.

[Extract from letter of Mr. L. W. Knotts, Yates Center, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Feb. 7, 1919.]

Our soldier son, Elias L., is a member of L Company, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, and his letter written a few days after the battle, which corroborates your views in regard to the lack of artillery support * * *

[From letter of Dr. Joseph M. Gray, Grand Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, Kansas City, Mo., to Rev. Frank Neff, Hitchinson, Kans., Jan. 31, 1919.]

I happen to know also, of the existence of a private letter not intended for Gov. Allen at all, but in which, in the most natural and confidential way, Gov.

Allen's knowledge of the situation is given the most thorough indorsement by one of the highest officers in command in that same action of the Thirty-fifth. Besides which there are others, and there is a body of officers ready when they secure their discharge from the Army, to substantiate all that Gov. Allen is saying.

[Extract from letter of Edward L. Scott, 1016 Walnut Street, Kansas City, Mo., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 21, 1919.]

Shortly after the 1st of last October I received notice from the War Department that my son, First Lieut. William E. Scott, Company E, One hundred and fortieth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, had been reported missing in action since September 30. This is the only information that I have been able to get from the War Department covering a period of nearly four months. The last letters we had from my son were dated September 22 and 24, two days before he went into the battle of the Argonne forest.

[Extract from letter of Joe Simpich, Thirty-fifth Division, appearing in New Franklin (Mo.) News, Jan. 24, 1919.]

I was wounded September 28; fell by a small river. A machine-gun bullet broke my right leg just above the knee. By my side was my lieutenant, who was shot through the lung. We lay there for five days before we were picked up, and both of us suffered greatly. On the fifth day the German first-aid men found us and took us to a dressing station.

[From letter of Sergt. Frank Stapleton, Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, to C. O. Troutwine, Gallatin, Mo.]

Saturday, September 28, my regiment held the front line. At 8:10 a. m. a German sniper shot me through my right hand. At 11.20 I was hit in the neck and right shoulder. I tried to crawl back and in doing so I was hit in the back and side. Then I laid out on the battle field for 36 hours without any treatment. October 4 I had pneumonia and later on another operation. I was not expected to live from then on until late in November, when I began to recover.

I supposed you read of the Argonne Forest. That was the place I was wounded after fighting continuously for three days and nights. Only 6 men out of 250 in Company K got out without being hit.

[Extract from letter of W. E. Wallace, Moline, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Feb. 2, 1919.]

I have two boys in Company 1, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, that you have told about; one of them is 21 years old to-day, and I think that they are two of the finest soldiers in the Army, and I have a letter one of them wrote me telling me about the battle and how far they were ahead of the Artillery. I know that the statements that you make are true, although the Secretary of War denies them. I do not understand how this letter got by the censors, as it was wrtten before the war closed. But I have it just the same, and they were 5 or 6 kilos ahead of Artillery for days at a time, and they faced machine-gun nests and had to fall back and reorganize three or four times and advance and go after them again without any artillery protection at all.

[Extract from letter of Mr. W. A. Richmond, Aurora Retreat, Wythe County, Va., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 14, 1919.]

My boy was killed in this great sacrificial battle, as were thousands of other brave boys, and I feel that it is only justice to them that have laid down their lives for democracy that an investigation be made.

We, here at home, were told that our boys would have the protection of powerful artillery and thousands of airplanes and were told the Infantry

would move before a protecting barrage; and then in this awful battle they were ordered out to face enemy artillery and machine guns without any protection.

First Lieut. Will P. Nye, Company M, One hundred and sixteenth Infantry, Twenty-ninth Division, wrote back that his men were plunged into hell, and that he lost 39 in four minutes by artillery fire.

[Extract from letter of Mrs. Leroy Baker, 311 West Third Street, Oklahoma City., Okla., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, under date of Feb. 6, 1919.]

I am going to tell you of conditions equally as terrible existing in this same division which should be investigated.

Those boys are yet sleeping in dugouts stationed at a little place styled Mudville, on account of the mud, and Millionaire Hill, on account of the rats and "cooties."

[Statement of N. D. Welty, editor Bartlesville Examiner, Bartlesville, Okla., who served as Y. M. C. A. secretary with the Thirty-fifth Division in France, appearing in Oklahoma City Oklahoman Feb. 2, 1919.]

The first news we received was the same as you heard in this country when the Kansas and Missouri troops fought through the Argonne Forest. This was followed by rumors of the great catastrophe to the division, due to the lack of coordination between the Artillery and the Infantry, or the lack of Artillery support at a critical juncture in the operations, and also statements that the Infantry went ahead of its objective and sustained terrific losses in so doing. The losses were reported in Army circles at the time to have been between 50 and 60 per cent of all the troops of the division engaged.

In talking with an officer of the Thirty-fifth Division after the armistice was declared, he told me the losses in the division were largely the result of the failure of proper Artillery support, but that written orders had been received to take certain objectives beyond those attributed to have been taken through excessive zeal. It was in the taking of these objectives that the heaviest losses of the division were sustained. The officer stated that this order, sending Infantry ahead of its Artillery support, was evidently due to an error on the part of the high command.

[Extract from letter of a chaplain of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry Regiment, Thirty-fifth Division, to Rev. Wm. R. Weaver, concerning death of Sergt. Wm. Weaver, of same regiment, appearing in Wichita Beacon Feb. 7, 1919.]

Our main position jutted out like a sore thumb and was easily open to attack. On Monday night following our arrival in this sector the Germans planned a raid. They laid down a heavy barrage and we called for a counter barrage, but received none. Our men stuck to their posts and managed to instill bravery into the new men. Your son went from post to post encouraging his men. While making one of his visits a shell struck immediately in front of him and killed him instantly and wounded six others.

(Thereupon the committee adjourned to meet to-morrow, Tuesday, February 18, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)

COMMITTEE ON RULES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Tuesday, February 18, 1919.

The committee met at 10.30 a. m., Hon. Edward W. Pou (chairman) presiding.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY J. ALLEN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

Gov. ALLEN. Gentlemen, I will start in where I left off yesterday. The first thing which is current is a letter from Col. Ristine, the

commanding officer of the One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, from which I will read this extract:

Some one ought to tell them about things over here: how we were stripped of blankets and had summer underwear and no overcoats for the Argonne fight, during which wounded men almost froze to death. No ambulances for 36 hours, and then only six to nine small ones to haul 6,300 wounded men in six days. These ambulances frequently took as long as 36 hours to get to the field hospital and many died on the way. We finally evacuated stretcher cases by the hundreds in trucks. We were ordered to leave our kitchens behind and they sent us to the firing line fresh beaf, cabbage, egg plant, and toilet paper as food, and for a long period after we came out of the fight they sent us bully beaf in tins and other field rations, which we should have had in the fight.

Col. Ristine is mentioned in Gen. Traub's general orders for special acts of bravery and was through the fight and in command of the One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry of the Thirty-fifth Division.

Mr. HARRISON. That is in a special report?

Gov. ALLEN. No; that is a personal letter written by this colonel to a friend.

Mr. HARRISON. Would you mind telling us to whom it is written?

Gov. ALLEN. The letter is written to Gen. Clark, of Missouri, and he says you may show this letter to Senator Reed and have it read in Congress if you wish. I have read the letter and the only thing that refers to that part of the Argonne battle with which I am dealing I have read to you just now. It has other matters in it, but they do not relate to the Argonne battle.

I have a telegram here which I have just received from my secretary. He says that Pvt. O. H. Turner, Battery E, One hundred and thirty-fifth Field Artillery (that is one of the divisions of field artillery acting with the Thirty-sixth Division), says after first day little assistance was rendered to the Infantry because they could not move their guns, this being on account of a shortage of horses. He says his battery lost 100 horses on the road and they went into action with only 52, 12 of which were killed by the veterinarian on the first day after they had been injured. He says the second barrage was to start 15 minutes to 5 on the evening of the 26th but actually took place at the same hour on the evening of September 27.

The telegram also says that Pvt. R. D. Carter, Battery D, of this same Infantry, confirms above statement and says horses were weak and worn out and in some places they were taken from the supply trains and had no power to move the guns forward. Carter says any man in the regiment will confirm the facts. Then he says the following will give information concerning the lack of support after the first day and the lack of aeroplanes: Sergt. Theirry, Pvt. Buttram, Pvts. J. W. Vinancon, Frank Ryan, George T. Nicholson, all of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry. N. D. Wells, of Fort Scott, Company G, same regiment, says he laid 30 hours after being wounded and he says he believes some men died that could have been saved if they had had medical attention when they were wounded.

I am not going to give you all of this, gentlemen, out of regard for your time and patience. It is such a dreary repetition of the same thing. So that with your permission I will just leave this for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to have you incorporate those statements in the record.

Gov. ALLEN. Very well; I will give them to the clerk, and I will run through the rest of these hurriedly. These are statements from letters written to me personally, or published in the newspapers since these men have come home, or written to friends, and in each case I have the original.

Here is a letter from Harold L. Perkins. I thought I might give this to you because Perkins had some connection with the remount situation and knew about the horses and he was a man trained in veterinary matters. He says:

I wish to state I was in the Argonne battle until the 26th day of September and I was in this battle until I was wounded and compelled to go to the hospital. The support for the first four days from the Artillery was excellent, but after that it was of no use to the Infantry. The explanation I would give as to this deficiency was the deficiency in the number of horses; also of the deplorable conditions that our horseflesh was in. Many were blinded or had been gassed. A great proportion of those horses were horses that were supposed to have been purchased by the American Army in France. They were not in condition to do the work put upon them and it was impossible for them to carry the heavy burdens, and they were unfit for the service expected of them. They could be seen dropping by the wayside and they dropped along the road. During the long time I was connected with the battle, my observation showed the Germans absolutely dominated the activities.

Here is a letter from Capt. C. L. Vanderhark, of St. Louis, who belonged to another division, I think the Eighty-ninth Division. He says:

I have followed with no little concern your statements and criticisms pertraining to the losses of the Thirty-fifth Division in the Argonne battle. I was there seven and a half months and can vouch for all you say, and I will also say that your criticisms, if anything, are far too mild to do justice to this thing. I was in the Argonne battle.

I thought you might be interested also in some envelopes I have here, to show the inexplicable condition of handling the mail. For a good many weeks my mail has been filled with letters from mothers who wish to know why the letters they sent to their sons are being returned to them from the Central Post Office at Tours, with the French address of their sons noted upon the envelop—a thing I have not been able to explain. But I have here an envelop that was addressed by his mother to Sergt. G. W. Gibson, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, and which was returned with this notation: "Wounded. Central Post Office, 11.20," and then the name of the clerk. This envelop was returned to the mother with that notation. Here is another one——

Mr. HARRISON. Was the word "wounded" on the envelop?

Gov. ALLEN. The word wounded was on the envelop, and it gives the post-office address of the lad; that he is wounded at Barges, and then the name of the clerk who makes the notation on the envelop and sends the letter back to the mother.

Here is a letter by his father to Corp. Brown, of the Three hundred and fifty-third Infantry. It was returned to the father with this notation: "Sick in general hospital; American Post Office 117. Returned from Tours." That happens to be the number of the post office in the very town in which the lad was ill, and instead of delivering the letter to him in that town they send it back to his parents with this notation upon it.

Mr. RODENBERG. Were the postal arrangements there in charge of the Americans?

Gov. ALLEN. Oh, yes. These letters came back to the parents from the Central Post Office at Tours.

Mr. RODENBERG. Which is conducted by Americans?

Gov. ALLEN. Which is conducted by the Army post office.

Mr. RODENBERG. The Army post office?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. FOSTER. Do you know who is at the head of that in France?

Gov. ALLEN. I do not; no.

Mr. SIEGEL. It is Col. D. Howe.

Mr. FOSTER. Do you know where he comes from?

Mr. SIEGEL. Yes; from Boston.

Mr. FOSTER. What was he before he went in there?

Mr. SIEGEL. He was a shoe manufacturer originally, and then later he went over with the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment from there. He was picked out to take charge, and for a while there was a big improvement over there, because he helped organize the postal regiment we suggested while over there. But since the armistice came things have gone topsy-turvy.

Mr. FOSTER. I had heard he was from Rhode Island——

Mr. SIEGEL. No; he was from Boston.

Mr. FOSTER (continuing). And that he was formerly a jeweler?

Mr. SIEGEL. No; he was a shoe manufacturer.

Gov. ALLEN. Here is a letter sent by his mother to Pvt. Otto S. Mulligan, Company C, Thirtieth Infantry, and she gets it back with this notation. She mailed the letter on September 16. It does not state here on what date the letter arrived in France, but it has this notation on the letter returned to her: "Sick in hospital, September 18, 1918. Central Post Office at Vosges." They knew where the man was, but instead of sending the letter to him, they sent it back to the mother, who immediately jumped at the conclusion her boy was dead.

Mr. SNELL. Do you know if they really did know where the boy was?

Gov. ALLEN. They state he was sick at the hospital.

Mr. RODENBERG. The fact was given and his location.

Mr. FOSTER. The fact of the matter was they had a man in charge who knew nothing about it. They took an incompetent official of the Post Office Department, and when he got back to the United States he never got a chance to return. That may account for the first improvement over there.

Gov. ALLEN. Here is another letter, which is illegible, but it has had the same treatment. They state, wounded in section so and so, but they have not even taken the pains to make the handwriting upon the envelope, on which they send back the information to the mother, legible.

Mr. SIEGEL. There are many more such instances which we could present to the committee if we were given the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it must be borne in mind (I simply say this by way of answer to the suggestion of our colleague, Mr. Siegel), I wish you did have more time, but as a matter of fact we have not the time and I do not think it is out of place to make this observa-

tion: These hearings we have are simply preliminary; this is not an investigating committee. All we do is to invite a hearing in order that what might be termed a prima facie case is made out on which to have the information to determine whether or not to recommend an investigation.

Gov. ALLEN. I will just give one more instance of this kind, because they are all alike, but this is the prize of them all. Here is a letter written by his mother to Pvt. Harry Hoover, of the American Expeditionary Forces, written to him on September 30. She gets back the letter from the Central Post Office with this very clear information: "Sick in Base Hospital No. 36, Ward D, October 23." They did not want the mother to have any doubt as to the condition of the boy.

Then, of course, I have here simply some letters touching conditions of the hospitals at Brest, St. Aignan, and those matters the Congressman spoke of this morning.

Mr. RODENBERG. I hope you will incorporate all of those in the record.

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; and unless you wish to ask me some questions, I think I have covered the field by turning over to the secretary of your committee yesterday all of this material, that I might save your time this morning.

If there are any other questions——

Mr. KELLY. Did you come in contact with the Twenty-eighth Division of the Pennsylvania troops while you were over there?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; I came in contact with the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania troops and I saw a good many of them. They held in the opening of the Battle of Argonne Forest a position on our left.

Mr. KELLY. They were near the Thirty-fifth?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; the Thirty-fifth was the center and the Twenty-eighth was on our right and the Seventy-seventh on our left.

Mr. FESS. Did you return before the armistice was signed?

Gov. ALLEN. No; I came back about the 1st of December.

Mr. FESS. I was told the other night by a group of officers that they had word the armistice would be signed at noon on the 11th, and they were ordered on the 9th to make an advance along a line 20 miles wide to take up advance positions and one of the officers said 46 of his men fell dead during that advance.

Gov. ALLEN. Of course it is well known that they continued fighting right along up to the last moment, although the Germans were in retreat, and although nobody had any doubt after the time when the 72 hours had been given to the Germans that the armistice would be signed. But somebody seemed to be eager to get as near to Germany as possible.

Mr. FESS. That is the point I want to know——

Gov. ALLEN. So that from the standpoint of military necessity all the men sacrificed in those last hours were needlessly sacrificed.

Mr. FESS. That is the point; he said 46 of his men dropped or were wounded, although the rumor was that the armistice would be signed on the 11th.

Mr. FOSTER. Did the Germans make an attack during those last hours?

Gov. ALLEN. The Germans were retreating under fire and covering their retreat, of course, in a very effective and deadly fashion.

Mr. FOSTER. But they had been retreating right along for some days before that?

Gov. ALLEN. They had been retreating right along from the time they were driven out of Argonne Forest.

Mr. GARRETT. There were portions of the line, I suppose (they had a very long line there), where the Germans were attacking? I do not mean at that particular point, but at some point along the line, and it may have been necesesary to advance in order to protect that portion of the line.

Gov. ALLEN. I think there was no portion of the line at this hour where the Germans were attacking any more than the character of attack necessary to cover their retreat. They were not trying to retake.

Mr. GARRETT. On any part of the line?

Gov. ALLEN. No.

Mr. FESS. The comment to me was it was not a case of defense, but they had been ordered to take up advance positions when they knew the battle had been entirely decisive.

Gov. ALLEN. They were ordered to advance.

Mr. GARRETT. I understand it was an advance, but what I meant was whether some other part of the line 50 or 100 miles away which was under attack made it necessary for the military authorities to press the advantage which they had there.

Gov. ALLEN. The whole line was going forward. We held the sections already. We held the sections from Grandpre to Verdun; the French and British, farther west, were all hammering the Germans at a lively rate.

Mr. GARRETT. All the allied armies were attacking?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; they were going forward.

Mr. FOSTER. And our Army was doing no more attacking that the French and British?

Gov. ALLEN. The accusation is ours made a larger advance than the others. I do not know whether that is true.

Mr. FOSTER. But the others were attacking?

Gov. ALLEN. Yes; and the Germans were hitting back, and of course they had to keep the line of the allies intact in going forward.

COMMITTEE ON RULES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Thursday, February 20, 1919.

The committee met at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Edward W. Pou (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Traub, a resolution introduced into the House of Representatives provides for the appointment of a committee to investigate certain occurrences at the battle of the Argonne. Gov. Allen, of Kansas, upon his return to America made some criticisms as to the things he had seen and heard. I am sorry we are not able to furnish you with a copy of Gov. Allen's statement made before this committee, but for the time being he has it in his possession, revising the transcript. As best I could I have summarized the general criticisms that were made, and furnished you with a copy thereof. The committee will be glad to hear any statement you may desire to make with respect to those criticisms.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. PETER E. TRAUB, COMMANDING GENERAL FORTY-FIRST DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY.

Gen. TRAUB. Thank you, Mr. Pou; that is very generous, and I shall try to put before you gentlemen a statement of what the situation was over there.

As you know, at the time of the Battle of the Argonne, I was the commanding general of the Thirty-fifth Division, which was made up mainly of troops from Kansas and Missouri. And before I go any further I want to say right now that there never was a finer body of men anywhere furnished by any country, and there was not a finer body of men from America that went to France and fought on that western front than those same troops that I had the honor to command from Kansas and Missouri. They were a wonderful lot of men and a wonderful lot of soldiers who asked for nothing more than to know what we wanted them to do and how we wanted it done. Their spirit was right there to do anything that was demanded of them, and they did it and they did it well.

The main criticism, as I understand it, is that the losses in the Thirty-fifth Division were unnecessarily high. Now, gentlemen, in my opinion, they were marvelously low, and I can not understand why they were so low.

Remember, that for five days and nights, we fought continually in battle against the very best that the Boches had, because they knew the importance of holding the American troops where they were, or throwing them back for a loss. For five days and nights we fought there, subjected to a hellish fire of all descriptions. Yet, at the end of that time we had penetrated the powerful Boche lines to a depth of 12½ kilometers. We had taken over 1,000 prisoners, officers and men, and we captured 24 pieces of artillery, a number of which we worked with our own hands and fired the Boche ammunition against themselves. We took machine-gun nests and captured 85 machine guns, 100 antitank guns, and a large quantity of matériel.

This attack, 5 kilometers in width, was over on open, exposed country; it was not in the Argonne Forest, it was to the right of it. My left flank was the River Aire, to my west. Beyond that is the Argonne Forest, at a distance of probably half a kilometer. There is where the batteries of the Boche were located, up in the timber, on the crest, where they had a most wonderful and perfect observation over everything my division was doing.

For five days and nights, gentlemen, we kept at it, and we accomplished the results that were accommplished with a division that had never been in battle before, and we suffered losses. The figures given me at the time, and they were the best that could be obtaianed, showed that there were approximately 500 killed and about 4,500 wounded, that had passed through our tirage. The figures may be less than that, as far as the wounded were concerned; in fact, I think there were about 4,350 wounded, or something like that.

The great majority of those reported wounded were slightly wounded, slightly gassed, ill, or exhausted. The slightly wounded equaled all the other casualties put together—that is, the killed, the died of wounds, the severely wounded, and those whose diagnosis had not been definitely determined upon by the doctors.

In connection with that supposed unnecessarily great loss, I just want to call your attention to one little thing in the Civil War to give you a means of comparison. The Argonne battle has been made an unusual case. Take an unusual case in the Civil War.

When Gen. Grant attacked the Confederate works at Cold Harbor he lost 10,000 men within about 10 minutes, and he accomplished nothing. We fought five days and nights, constant fighting, with a loss, as I say, of about 500 killed and 4,350 wounded, the great majority of whom were slightly wounded and who afterwards by the hundreds came back and rejoined the colors. We penetrated to a depth of 12½ kilometers, and accomplished the other details I have already given you. So much for the unnecessarily great losses.

The American soldier is at his very best when he is fighting in the open. Outside of the Philippines and the Sulu Archipelago, where I saw service, he has not had any experience in forest fighting.

But we were in the open. I will tell you it was a wonderful fight. If you could have been there, from now on you would be taking off your hats and cheering the American soldier for the way he conducted himself in battle.

We had individual trenches; we would dig in to save ourselves from this horrible fire they were concentrating upon the troops. But in the daytime when there was not an attack on, you would look over the field of battle, and you would not see anything, as far as men were concerned, except with a glass; you might see them trickling here and there, but the moment a man got in sight anywhere the Boche never hesitated to waste hundreds of shells on a single individual. He knew his business, and he did it well.

There has been some criticism about the wounded. Every commander in the world, after the success of the operation is assured—and that always, of course, must receive first consideration—but after that, every commander's very first care is for his wounded men, and I assure you that in the A. E. F. the wounded and the sick absolutely received the first and highest consideration, and the greatest care that was at all possible under the difficult circumstances.

We have been criticized for the wounded lying out on the ground anywhere, I think it is said, from 12 to 24 or 48 hours without any care, and without any attention. The wounded never could be moved except at night, gentlemen. During the daytime the best that could be done was to look after them under the very best possible circumstances, in the woods, or wherever we were.

Talk about woods! We did have little patches of timber, the most important being the Montrebeau Woods. I probably did a lot of unusual things as a major general. You usually picture a major general well back in his P. C., where he has a sort of piano, and when he wants to do anything he simply touches a button and the thing is done. Well, it was different in the Battle of the Argonne. Our instructions were from our commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces that the general in command should be where his presence is deemed most necessary to get the maximum effort and the maximum results out of his troops. And that was done.

When the time came, and whenever I deemed it necessary, I was always up in the front lines with my soldiers, absolutely going through what they went through, subjected to the same hellish fire, subjected to the same gassing. It made no difference; that is what we were there for—to do the very best we could in our fight for the cause. So that led me constantly into my front lines, and on the morning of September 29 I myself went up forward to size up the situation. This, gentlemen, all bears on the question of bringing out the wounded. I went up to the front lines to size up the situation and I got up to these very same Montrebeau Woods that I spoke of. The Boche saw me stringing across this open space.

I myself had personally taken charge of my reserve, which consisted of the Engineer regiment, in order to make dead sure if anything happened at the front I would have a force always in hand for any emergency; and all six of those companies were wonderful companies, under Col. Clark, of the Engineers. I posted them and then went forward a kilometer farther to size up the situation, which I did, and gave my orders and instructions, after making my decision, and had sent all of my staff in different directions to get what I wanted done. Even my orderly sergeant went back with a message. The writing of that message required me to make six different changes of place because of the shell firing that was going on. We had a Boche plane overhead at a height of anywhere from 600 to 1,000 feet, and they spotted me and my officers and kept circling around and sprinkling machine-gun bullets upon us all the time and by wireless directing the fire of the batteries of the Argonne Hills at those places where I was, and it required six changes of place before I could write a six-line message simply because the staff insisted upon my moving when the Boche got the exact location.

I sent my sergeant back, who had remained for further instructions, and then I wanted to get back to my P. C., 2 kilometers to the rear.

I had my gas mask on and my field glasses over my gas mask, wore a mackintosh, and carried my trench stick. I started back to my advanced P. C. and left the Montrebeau Woods. The chap passing overhead again whirled, and every time he whirled he gave me a big dose of machine-gun bullets. I seemed to bear a charmed life; everything fell at my feet. But it was soft ground and they stuck. If it had been hard ground they would have ricocheted, and would have gotten me a hundred times. The chap overhead directed the fire of the Argonne batteries at me. I simply want to show you what one individual in that whole field of battle got, and then you will see the utter impossibility during the daytime of removing the wounded to the triage, which was 3 kilometers in the rear of these Montrebeau Woods. If one individual got what I got you can imagine what our stretcher bearers would have gotten—two stretcher bearers for each wounded man. You would have lost not only the wounded man but the two stretcher bearers. You know the Boche never respects anything like a litter or anything like a Red Cross flag or anything of that kind. In the matter of bringing in the wounded we were up against an enemy who respected no rules of civilized warfare. You, of course, know that was true with respect to the enemy we were up against.

I started back for the advanced P. C., and the first thing these batteries in the Argonne Hills commenced to bracket on me, as I moved to the rear. The Boche is a very regular individual. We could always count on his regularity. He was stupid; he did the same thing at the same time every day, and wherever we had him in a sector we would take the necessary precautions. So that commenced, and they sent a shell here, 15 yards to my right, and they sent a shell here, 15 yards to my left; then the next shell 15 yards on my right, and the next 15 yards to my left. Then I said if I do not look out the next one will land on me. That is what we mean by bracketing. At first they send one on this side, on the right side, and then they send one on the left side, and this chap in the air sent signals all the time, and I had to look out for the high-explosive shells.

As soon as they commenced bracketing I sized up the situation. You have to do some quick thinking under those conditions; even a major general has to think once in a while. I at once zigzagged, and I had not gotten more than 10 yards away when a shell came down where I had been. Then they commenced again to try to bracket me on the new zigzagging, this chap in the air at the same time sprinkling me with machine-gun bullets. They sent a shell 15 yards to the left, and then they sent one 15 yards to the right, and then they sent another 15 yards to the left, and then another 15 yards to the right. I said, "Old sport, get busy." I zigzagged to the left, and I had no more than done that when a high explosive shell came down.

I made one mistake. The Boche was not as stupid as I thought he was, or they may have missed the count, because they did the bracketing only once that time, and the third time caught me unprepared. The shell landed within 2½ feet of me, to my left rear, and out of the 300 shells they wasted on me, that was the only dud, and it never exploded. That is the reason I am here talking to you right now.

That thing continued for 2 kilometers. When I got into the Baulny Ravine they threw gas shells at me. That is where I got gassed. It was pretty tough work to climb up a muddy slope with a gas mask on and those people pestering you with shells. There was not a thing in sight, except some of my Engineers in individual rifle pits. I had stationed this Engineer outfit there and they were in their individual trenches to the right and left, and as that dud struck they were watching my progress—they did not know I was the commanding general—and when that thing struck and they saw me walking on afterwards all those men got up out of the trenches and commenced to yell and to cheer.

When I reached my P. C. the Boche bombarded it. I went over those Montrebeau Woods that morning, and I am sure I exaggerate greatly when I say there were 200 wounded there. As a matter of fact, I never saw more than half a dozen myself, but I have no doubt there were more than that there. Although I went all over that place pretty thoroughly, I could not see very much on either side of my line of progress, but I will put it at that figure and say there were 200 wounded there.

You can see from what I say, gentlemen, that those wounded men had to stay there. They had their comrades with them, and my orders were that during the daytime, wherever possible, they were

to move the wounded up to the southern edge of the woods. Of course, they were being taken care of by their own men, and as soon as darkness came we went up there and every one of them was brought out. There were also some wounded at a place to the right, Chaudron farm, and that place being a farm and naturally being assumed by the Boche to be a P. C. of some kind, the Boche would blaze away at that place, and one or two of the sheels struck in there where we had some wounded. One of the sad results in a battle is that that happens all the time. So much for the wounded, as far as their lying exposed is concerned. They had to stay where they were during the daytime, because to have brought them back would have meant the death not only of the wounded but also of the men who were carrying them.

Now, there is no man who, from a medical viewpoint, has done finer work in the American Expeditionary Force than my division surgeon, Col. Turck. He was a marvel, and, although gassed, he stayed right on his job.

We established near Cheppy, near my P. C., this triage. The triage is the place where they sort out, so to speak, the different cases. They will say "This man has so and so; he should go to this place." We soon found we could not have a triage at Cheppy, because the Boche would shell it. So the point was to get the wounded man back as quickly as possible, and not try to determine where he should go, where he should be sent for the proper treatment, but to get him to the rear, to a place of safety, and there establish a triage, and that is what we did at a place called Neuvilly. That was simply plain, common sense.

In order to get the wounded back to Neuvilly we had to use everything. You must realize that there was only one main road, and that road served both the Army and the corps, and at times the division, especially the division sick and wounded. You can imagine the congestion with a main road of that kind, and you may rest assured that the Boche left no stone unturned to get at that road.

He had been in possession of that place for four years. He had the Frenchman's goat. The Frenchman would not tackle that job; they tried it on several occasions, but they were badly beaten with great losses. So the place my division had to take—you ask the Frenchmen what they think about the place, and they will tell you it could not be taken, because they could not take it. Through that place where my P. C. had been established, in five days and nights 7,000 wounded passed—wounded, sick, gassed, and exhausted men—all cases handled by Col. Turck.

There is no medical department in the world which could have had at that place a sufficient number of ambulances. There were not enough ambulances in the corps to have served the one point, because we got the wounded from the division on my right and on my left: we handled 2,500 wounded men from these adjoining divisions. When you get a strain like that put upon one single point, the idea is to get those fellows to the rear as quickly as possible.

So, by my direction, that division surgeon impressed everything absolutely. It did not make any difference what it was, it was put to use. A French truck was coming by; the wounded were put in it. An ammunition truck was coming by; the wounded were put in that;

a ration truck or anything that came along was used to put the wounded in. Why? Because we were in a place where the wounded were first collected, and we had to get them back to the rear, and we sent them back to Neuvilly, about 5 kilometers to the rear, where we established our triage from which our wounded, gassed, etc., were sent to the different places where the different kinds of illnesses and wounds had to be treated.

No organization in the world can handle all the unforeseen problems that come up in a battle. If you want to look forward to handling everything that arises you would have to have an organization ten times the size of the organization we have now back of the lines to handle for a few days what takes place in front. So it is utterly impossible.

The best that could possibly have been done was done. Men who from gassing should have been on the sick list stayed there and did their duty, when, at any moment they might have dropped over like that, dead from cardiac dilation. Those are the chances that I and my division surgeons took; those are the chances we had to take. But that is what we were expected to do, and that is what those men did, and they did it fully, thoroughly, and well.

Another of the main things that has been talked about has been the artillery. I will give you a little idea of the Battle of the Argonne, and then you will understand better my remarks with reference to the artillery.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I want to ask you some questions about each of these matters. Would you prefer going ahead with your statement and then having a review of it?

Gen. TRAUB. No; I would prefer that you ask me any questions whenever you want to.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I want to do exactly as you would prefer. If you would rather go on now and take up the artillery I will wait and submit some questions on the subject of the wounded later, when you conclude.

Gen. TRAUB. I would prefer to have you ask your questions right now.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The matter of getting the wounded back has been talked about a great deal in this connection. You say they were brought back at night?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The men who were wounded in the daytime would be brought back at night?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The statement has been made that many of the wounded were on the field from 36 to 48 hours?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That they were without their blankets, without necessary cover; that these had been ordered for each man; that these were not there, had not been provided. What have you to say about the failure in that particular?

Gen. TRAUB. Mr. Campbell, when we go into a battle we drop all unnecessary paraphanalia that impedes a man in his fighting. The blankets are always considered a part of that unnecessary paraphanalia. So we take the packs off and leave the men, the fighters,

simply with the ammunition, the grenades, and whatever constitutes the fighting equipment, and these packs are deposited where the men can get them, or where they can be sent up to the men. So, of course, a man who is fighting has not got his blankets with him, has not got his extra pair of shoes; he has not got what makes up his kit which he carries when you see him on march or on parade.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Concede that. Why could not these men have been provided with these comforts and blankets at night?

Gen. TRAUB. They were, wherever possible.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The charge is that they were not.

Gen. TRAUB. Who makes that charge?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Men who say they know; Gov. Allen, who was there.

Gen. TRAUB. He was not there.

Mr. CAMPBELL. With the Y. M. C. A.

Gen. TRAUB. He was not there.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Was not with the Thirty-fifth Division?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is a very pointed denial of Gov. Allen's claim that he was there.

Gen. TRAUB. I will explain that statement, Mr. Campbell.

Mr. Allen, secretary of the Y. M. C. A. attached to the Thirty-fifth Division, was not there during the fight, because I myself, and with Mr. Allen's consent, had sent Mr. Allen and all his 22 Y. M. C. A. helpers, back to the rear before the St. Mihiel fight of September 12, with instructions to Mr. Allen that at the first opportunity when I could use his services he would be up there with me.

Now, Mr. Allen came up to the place where we advanced—I have forgotten what the name of the place is—and he came to see me, and I told him he might establish a storehouse. He came to this particular place, which was, I should judge, about 5 or 6 kilometers back of the lines. Back there, what he came in contact with I do not know; but right up where these things were taking place, Mr. Allen was not there, nor was there a single Y. M. C. A. worker.

Mr. CAMPBELL. They had been sent back after that conference between yourself and Mr. Allen?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Why were they sent back?

Gen. TRAUB. They were sent back for this reason, Mr. Campbell. There is nobody who has appreciated the work of the Y. M. C. A., especially under Mr. Allen with my division, more than I, and he knows it; and when Mr. Allen left me he got a letter he was proud of and I was glad to give it to him.

But he and his workers were sent back for this reason: When we were going into the St. Mihiel salient fight it was of the utmost importance that there be absolutely no leak in information, that the strictest secrecy be observed. As a division commander, for the good of the cause, I took no chances whatever.

So I called Mr. Allen before me and I said in a private conversation between us: "Mr. Allen, the cause demands the strictest of secrecy, and that there shall be absolutely no leak, and it is my decision that you and your Y. M. C. A. workers quit the division for the present and go back and establish your base at such and such a

point." He thought that was back too far, and I allowed him to come up closer, but I said, "The point is that I do not want these men with the division, so that there shall be no chance of their finding out anything and then go back and talk about it and give things away." You know how men are prone to talk. They have been up at the front and they have seen the boys, and they will say that such and such a thing is going to be pulled off.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What was the date of this conversation with Mr. Allen?

Gen. TRAUB. I have no records here, of course, and I can not tell you the exact date. The St. Mihiel fight was about the 12th of September, and we left the Vosges on the 2d of September, so I should say I will not be very far wrong if I say it was about the 6th or 7th of September.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That was two or three weeks before the Argonne fight began?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Had you any reason to believe there would be a leak through the Y. M. C. A.?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, Mr. Campbell, I did. I will tell you why. This is the reason: While we were in the Vosges we had to pull off a number of coups de mains against the enemy. A coup de main has to be prepared with the utmost secrecy. We had a great many boche sympathizers in the Vosges, which was in Alsace. There were a lot of them favorable to the German cause, and they had means of communicating information to the other side, and we were constantly afraid that anything we might undertake against the enemy might get to him before we delivered the stroke we had planned against him.

Now, then, on the morning of the day when one of the coup de main was to be pulled off—which was successful—I was addressing the troops and telling them what I wanted them to do, and how I wanted it done, discussing the whole matter with them, all the officers and men, just with the officers and men alone together, which I always did whenever we pulled off any stunt. That day they came to me and said, "General, they are talking about this coup de main out here." I said, "Where?" One of the men said, "I just came up from below, and somebody said you are going to pull it off to-night." I said, "Good God"—pardon me—"how can that be possible, after all these plans had been made and all the arrangement had been made." They said, "This is the way it was." I think there was a Y. M. C. A. man who had been talking in an offhand way. He had been off getting supplies, and he had been talking to the people back there. He did not mean anything by it. He is just as good an American citizen as I am. But going back there they would say to him, "What is the news up forward; how is everything going?" And he would say, "They are going to pull off a stunt."

Mr. RODENBERG. How did the Y. M. C. A. man get in possession of the facts?

Gen. TRAUB. He was serving with the battalion.

Mr. CAMPBELL. We were told by Gen. March that orders with respect to what was intended to be done were not even communicated to me holding as high rank as brigadier general before the battle.

Gen. TRAUB. That is so.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That the whole thing was a profound secret to everybody except those in high command.

Gen. TRAUB. Just what episode are you referring to?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am wondering how these matters could be of rumor and so come as matters of information that even a Y. M. C. A. secretary would know about them 6 kilometers in the rear?

Gen. TRAUB. That is very simple of explanation. A battle is a different proposition. A battle which you are pulling off, which extends along a 50-kilometer front is a different proposition. Everything is planned by higher authority, by Gen. Pershing and his staff, that is all prepared by the higher command. Then it comes to me. I am called for consultation, and I am shown exactly what is to be done. Then I go to work and make my plans of battle, and cover my front, which will be anywhere from 2 to 5 kilometers. When I have determined upon my plan of battle, what to do, then I get my brigadiers together. Usually I got not only the brigadiers, but all the officers together. But a coup de main is an entirely different proposition.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Explain what you mean by a coup de main?

Gen. TRAUB. That is a raid made on the enemy line to take prisoners. We want to know what the Boche is doing, and we want to know whether he has made any changes opposite us, changes in divisions, or whether he has changed his position. It is very important for us to know that, because if he takes out a third-class division and puts in a first-class division opposite us, we expect to be pounded there.

So, when we have gone on for three or four days or a week without any information we project a coup de main, or a raid to get prisoners, and then the prisoners will always give the thing away. That has very seldom been known to fail.

A coup de main, you may imagine, is made against very well-organized works, things which the enemy has been preparing for years. So we start with our airplane service and we get maps and pictures of the whole thing. We send out scouts and patrols for weeks to determine the exact lay of the land. Then when we have all the information we prepare the plan for the coup de main. Then we select the troops we are going to use and we send them back sometimes 5 kilometers to the rear. We rehearse the thing for weeks. We lay out our airplane pictures on the ground with tape and everything of that sort and we trace out the whole enemy position. We dig a trench to a depth of about 6 inches so that the men will be able to know absolutely in the dark where the positions are. We pull the coup de main off in the dark. We lay out all these plans so that the men will be able to practically see and know just what they are doing and where they are going in the dark, and we go through this thing in great detail so that they may be successful.

Now, you can see when we do a thing of that kind we hedge the thing around in every possible way with the utmost secrecy. In this particular case I refer to we did not send them far back, did not send them very far to the rear simply because the Boche sympathizers were back there. We could not afford to have the rehearsal taking place back there because they would know something was up.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You refer to the Boche sympathizers. Do you mean those men were within our lines?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Soldiers?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir; Alsace civilians. In Alsace those people were not disturbed; they were living there. They had probably friends and relatives along there on the other side. They could not depopulate Alsace, and there were people back there we were constantly afraid of, sometimes even officials, and there we had to be most careful. So these things would take place as near the front lines as possible so that nobody would see them. Every precaution had to be taken. Had they known what was going on, and what was going to be pulled off, they would signal it to the other side, and not a single one of our men would get back alive, and that is what we were guarding against.

Now then, gentlemen, it is simply a question of those men doing a lot of talking that might be picked up back of the lines by somebody listening, and that somebody might be an enemy sympathizer, and he might get the information across the lines and not a single one of those things must take place.

Mr. RODENBERG. You would always exercise great precautions in reference to your conferences?

Gen. TRAUB. Absolutely.

Mr. RODENBERG. I do not see how there would be any civilian who could get that information, first hand.

Gen. TRAUB. You miss my point. A Y. M. C. A. man working with a battalion could easily find out and did know what was going on.

Mr. RODENBERG. It certainly would not be discussed in his presence.

Gen. TRAUB. No; but all these men—you take 500 soldiers, and naturally they talk amongst themselves, when they are out buying a plug of tobacco, or anything of that kind. One fellow might say, "Well, are you all fixed for to-morrow night"? or something like that. That is absolutely natural. We will assume the Y. M. C. A. worker does know. He has to go way back to the town for supplies, and when he is back there, in a perfectly innocent way he says, "Well, we are going to pull off a stunt to-morrow night." When he is in the town getting supplies somebody might overhear what he said. It so happened that they did not, because this coup de main was successful. But it is taking a chance, gentlemen, and we never ought to take a chance against the Boche.

Mr. CAMPBELL. But the Y. M. C. A. was there serving the wounded who were brought in from the battle, were they not?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. We have been contributing on the theory that the Y. M. C. A. and the Red Cross were to render first aid and give all such help as that at the time it was most needed, when the stress was on, when the organization of the Army could not have prepared, as you stated, for an eventuality, and that we were furnishing this extra organization. You say that it is not true, that the place where they could be of service was not at the battle of the Argonne?

Gen. TRAUB. The division of labor amongst those different helpful organizations was that the Red Cross would look after the hospitals, the sick, and the wounded, attending to their wants, etc., and that the Y. M. C. A. would attend to the wants of the others in every way. The Y. M. C. A. time and again helped the sick and the wounded; they gave them everything they had, but it was not the primary part of their functions. If it came their way, such as men going to the front line, they would throw open their hot chocolate booths and when they came back they would give them the same thing, but the primary function of the Y. M. C. A. was not to help immediately the sick and the wounded up forward. When you got back to the hospitals, of course, they had their help.

Mr. CAMPBELL. In any event, you say the Y. M. C. A. had been sent back two or three weeks before the Battle of the Argonne and were not within 5 or 6 kilometers of the battle when it was on?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. We had some very graphic descriptions and information with regard to those things, and I regret very much that Gov. Allen has taken his statement with him and that it is not before us. His description of the wounded on the field and the statements that they had been there for from 24 to 36 hours, and some of them as long as 48 hours, without aid of any kind, made a good deal of an impression on me, and I think on others who heard him, and I think it has called for an explanation from those in command.

Gen. TRAUB. Let me tell you, Mr. Campbell. Of course, as I tell you, that was the final, official action; they were sent back. Now, at this place, 5 or 6 kilometers in the rear, Mr. Allen came to me and I told him to establish there his depot of supplies. In the course of that battle, lasting five or six days, it is very possible that they did come up. I could not see that. I did not know whether any of them did come forward or not, but officially they had no business with the troops, and it is very possible that Mr. Allen or some of his Y. M. C. A workers were up there and saw those things.

The CHAIRMAN. He stated that he himself had seen wounded men who had been killed from airplane fire, where the airplane would swoop down so low that the aviators would take deliberate aim and kill the wounded men on the ground. He stated he had seen that, as I remember, several times.

Gen. TRAUB. If Mr. Allen said that, Mr. Allen saw it; because I know Mr. Allen, and there is no doubt about that.

Mr. GARRETT. The point he was making in connection with that was, if I remember correctly, that it was possible by reason of the fact that we did not have sufficient airplanes to protect the men against the incoming of the enemy airplanes; that they were able to come down and fire upon the wounded men as they lay upon the ground, because of the fact that we did not have sufficient airplanes to protect our men against raids of that sort. That was the impression I got.

Mr. RODENBERG. That the enemy was supreme in the air?

Gen. TRAUB. Of course you realize what a battle front is. A battle front is a terrific proposition, and you can not absolutely have planes to protect every part of your battle front at all times. You take an individual plane, such as this one Mr. Allen speaks of, and, of

course, it can get through your lines. It gets up so high you can not see it; and then, almost before you know it, there is an enemy airplane down near the ground attacking your wounded men. There is no power on God's earth that can give protection against an individual plane; but as soon as an individual plane appears, and if there is not anything that goes out from our own side, we telephone back and say there is a plane there and ask them to have somebody come out and drive it away. Of course, in the course of time, if they have a plane available, they come out and go against this fellow and bring him down or drive him off.

The CHAIRMAN. Gov. Allen made this specific criticism. He stated that the German planes came and went practically at will and without molestation.

Mr. RODENBERG. That they dominated the air—were absolutely supreme in that battle.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I fear I have disturbed, by interposing my questions, the line the general had outlined to pursue. I had intended to review the condition of the wounded, the artillery, and the airplanes after you had made your statement, General.

Mr. FESS. How long did the condition continue which you quite graphically described, when the airplanes were circling about trying to spot you? Did we have any protection against that plane?

Gen. TRAUB. No; that plane was up there; and afterwards, when we got the word back about this plane, our planes came out, but then the chap had disappeared—probably left because he spotted our planes coming. I should say he was out there about half an hour, but he did not do much damage. They were trying to get me.

Mr. FESS. He was doing what you say he was trying to do, trying to get you, and at the same time he was signaling to the artillery?

Gen. TRAUB. That is what they do.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Speaking of the airplanes, if we are on that subject, if there had been a sufficient number of airplanes at the battle of the Argonne, which had been looked forward to, I take it, by those in command as one of the great battles that would be fought on the western front by the American soldiers——

Gen. TRAUB (interposing). Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. If we had had a sufficient number of airplanes you would not have been subjected to the dangers you were subjected to in the performance of your duties, and the wounded men whom Gov. Allen described as having been shot by machine gun fire from the airplanes that were flying so low that the wounded men could use their revolvers to protect themselves—that would not have happened if we had had a sufficient number of airplanes at that point?

Gen. TRAUB. I do not know about that. It is almost impossible to get complete protection.

Mr. CAMPBELL. But the Germans controlled the air. We appropriated a billion and a third of dollars so that we might control the air.

Gen. TRAUB. I do not think one plane controls the air. They had their planes elsewhere. Here was this one plane that came there.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Did the Germans have only one plane at the battle of the Argonne?

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, no. I am talking about this particular incident.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am speaking in general, with this particular incident in view.

Gen. TRAUB. To tell you the trtuh, I did not see many German planes.

Mr. RODENBERG. In your opinion as the commanding officer of a division, did we have sufficient airplane protection?

Gen. TRAUB. The only thing I can answer for is the Thirty-fifth Division. You realize that a division commander has no control over the airplane work. One plane is assigned to him for observation to report, and the rest are controlled by higher authority. There was nothing doing in the Thirty-fifth Division sector because, as I told you, everybody was in the shell holes; that was broad daylight, and then one plane was overhead. While we were in that sector and under those circumstances other points on the front might require a hundred planes and they might be battling with immense Boche fleets. But of that, I know nothing at all.

The only thing I say is that after we signaled back about this plane being overhead, directing the fire of the artillery and sprinkling machine gun bullets, as soon as we got that back, and they could get a plane out, a plane came overhead and went back of the German lines to see what that one plane was doing. This one plane was going back and forth all the time, and you can not contend that there was a lack of air protection on our side simply because you had one Boche plane in the air doing this thing.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What the Boche planes were doing in that instance they were doing in the case of the wounded man who lay on the ground, perppering them, and at the same time indicating to the artillery where they should fire a shell to hit the wounded on the ground?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. If we had had a sufficient number of airplanes over that sector, the Boche could not have directed that fire and peppered those wounded men in that division, could they?

Gen. TRAUB. Mr. Campbell, it is a question of only a few minutes before a Boche plane comes around, circles around, fires, and scoots.

Mr. CAMPBELL. But it was described here that they came with deliberation and circled around, just as you described what happened in your particular incident, where the machine circled around apparently at leisure and kept peppering you as it saw fit, and with deliberation gave the signals to the artillery, signaling whether they should fire to the right or to the left, and they were doing the same thing as was described to us in regard to the wounded men.

My question is if we had had a sufficient number of airplanes to have kept the Boche planes out of the way there, we would not have suffered in the loss of wounded men as we did, and we could have taken them off the field?

Gen. TRAUB. If we had had a sufficient number of airplanes to do that over there in my sector, there might have been other sectors that would have suffered in the same way.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Was there a more important sector than this, during the six days from the 26th of September until the 1st of October, during the battle of the Argonne.

Gen. TRAUB. They were all equally important. Probably my sector was the most exposed.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Was there a more intense sector on the western front during any battle than what was known as the battle of the Argonne, from the 26th of September to the 1st of October?

Gen. TRAUB. No; that was the most important thing the American Army tackled.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And it had been looked forward to as one of the most important things you would have to tackle for months?

Gen. TRAUB. I do not know about that. I was not in touch with Gen. Pershing about that.

Mr. RODENBERG. General, I would like to have an expression from you as to your opinion, as a military man, as to whether you had adequate airplane protection under the circumstances?

Gen. TRAUB. As a military man, and as the commander there, I should say that at times we did and at times we did not, in my particular division, undoubtedly depending upon the rest of the battle front, in the opinion of the higher command. That is my opinion about this thing. At times we did, and at times we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the criticism can be properly made and sustained that the Germans dominated the air at all times and came and went at will, practically without molestation?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir. At times whole squadrons of our battle planes would be going toward the Boche. It all depended upon where the higher command deemed the superiority of the air——

Mr. RODENBERG (interposing). What was the length of the battle front, approximately?

Gen. TRAUB. I should say about 50 kilometers.

Mr. RODENBERG. That is about how many miles?

Gen. TRAUB. About 35 miles.

Mr. HARRISON. How many airplanes did we have available for action?

Gen. TRAUB. I do not know. Those things are not communicated to division commanders.

Mr. HARRISON. Gen. March stated there were 120.

Gen. TRAUB. If Gen. March stated that, he knows. We do not know those things. What I concentrate on is my front, and the chap to my right and to my left, as to what they expect me to do. I pay no attention to anything else.

Mr. HARRISON. When you called for airplanes, they were forthcoming?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir. It may not have been immediately, as I told you. In a fight like that, you get them down. They are shot down. A man can not be in the air forever. At the end of two hours those chaps are like that, and at the end of 30 minutes they are like that. An airman is more human than anybody else. You have got to give him a chance.

Mr. HARRISON. You found no palpable negligence in the furnishing of airplanes when you requested them?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. FESS. Would 122 airplanes be a sufficient number?

Gen. TRAUB. I am not an aviation expert. I would not be able to answer that question, and I really do not know.

Mr. GARRETT. Do you happen to know the number of killed and wounded of the enemy, in order to compare their losses with our losses?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. GARRETT. I mean in your immediate front.

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir; I do not. All I know is that I was up against three first-class boche divisions with my one division, and we penetrated their lines to a depth of 12½ kilometers and held about 10½ kilometers for good.

Mr. RODENBERG. How many men were there in your divisions?

Gen. TRAUB. My division had about 24,000 men. I have no records here.

The CHAIRMAN. With your permission, General, I believe in order to summarize this matter I will ask you a few questions in order to bring out some matters.

As I understand it, Gov. Allen officially was in the rear during this battle?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was there by his consent?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, of course, in accordance with your command?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The criticism has been made that there was a shortage of horses, that those in use were mostly old and broken down, that after a horse would work for a day or two the rule was that he would fall down, usually fall dead. What have you to say in respect to the shortage of horses?

Gen. TRAUB. I have this to say, Mr. Chairman. We did not have a full complement of animals. It was impossible to have a full complement of animals that went with 41 divisions. The animals which lasted best of all were the older animals. It was the youngsters that dropped, if any dropped at all.

We have always had the greatest trouble with our men in looking after stock properly. I say that about a division that was made up of Kansas and Missouri men, and there is nobody who knows more about horses than they do, and yet we had to pound, and pound, and pound, and by force of example, by frequent writing, by lecture, by expostulation, by every means possible, try to get them to take proper care of the horses, and yet we had the greatest difficulty in having the stock properly looked after. The fact is that they never died by hundreds. We had a shortage of stock due to hard work.

We came out of the Vosges and we had to travel by night and rest by day, and it was the hardest kind of work for 10 days to get to this forest, where we had to lie until the Argonne stunt was pulled off. You could not show yourself in the daytime. Everything had to be done in the dark. After that stunt was pulled off we had to move by night again, in order to have secrecy to our new place, and lie there again all day long. It was hard work under those trying conditions, and after the battle it was exactly the same way. We had to come back by night.

We were naturally short of animals. The whole American Expeditionary Force was short of animals. A horse was almost worth his weight in gold in November. We had no way of replacing them. They finally made arrangements to get stock, to buy stock from the French and the Spanish and the English. An Army without transportation is almost down and out.

We were short of transportation and short of animals of course. The last animals we got were purchased in the south of France. Every care in the world was taken of them. They would come up with the Mallain certificate test. We had the mange, but not very badly. In other divisions they had the mange very badly, and it was very hard on the stock. In the first place, the stock could not be put over fast enough to supply all of the 41 divisions. Then after we got them it was hard work—and your stock peters out.

The CHAIRMAN. This criticism was also made, that American soldiers were killed by our own barrage, that they either went forward too rapidly or were led in such a way that our own barrage killed our own men.

Mr. FESS. That is, after the first four hours.

Gen. TRAUB. Gentlemen, a fight, especially one started in the morning is usually started with a very heavy barrage, wherever the enemy occupies a strong defensive position. Now, we had an immense quantity of Artillery. We attacked in a fog; we had these works of the Germans which the Germans had been preparing for years.

I want to give you a picture of this thing. We had the Vauquois Hill, which was a very serious proposition. The boche had craters 50 feet deep all across the middle ridge. In the rear they had very strong woods known as the Nightingale Woods. On both flanks they had extremely strong positions, everything fixed up with wire and man traps and every conceivable sort of defensive device which they had been able to construct during four years. That is the thing we were going to shove flesh and blood up against to take from those devils along a front, to start with, of over 3 kilometers.

This will go back to the subject of looking after the wounded. In forming my plan of battle, had I butted straight forward, then you could very well have me here under investigation, because that would have meant the death of thousands of our men, if I had not executed the plan according to the form devised. My plan was to attack in column of brigades, each regiment in column of battalions, and to outflank absolutely on both sides this tough proposition of the Vauquois Hill. In order to do that we had to squelch the Vauquois Hill, and squelch the strong defense on both sides in the rear. That was planned for the artillery, and they did it, and they did it wonderfully well.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What day was that?

Gen. TRAUB. This was the beginning of the battle. They actually squelched the whole business. We had American manned and French manned tanks. Everything was prepared, everything was arranged, and the signal was given, and then hell broke loose. Those battalions on both sides advanced in phalanx and it was a marvelous thing. They had orders to absolutely disregard this Vauquois Hill and Nightingale Woods on their right and left, so it became very important to kill off the boche in those two places. So I formed a mopping-up battalion, attached to the three battalions on the left, and as these troops swung forward under the protection of a barrage, two companies of this mopping-up battalion, as soon as they got opposite the Vauquois Hill, these troops were sweeping up here [illustrating], and as soon as they got opposite the two companies

turned down and hooked up there, and they had it out hand to hand with the boche, with the result that in almost every case the boche came out and were taken. Then the next two companies of the mopping-up battalion, as soon as they got opposite the Nightingale Woods, swept in, and it was the same hand to hand business.

So when I came along to renew the attack, which was temporarily stalled, the situation had been solved. We had taken in three hours what the French had been up against for four straight years, that the Boche by every means in their power had tried to render impregnable, and at the end of three hours the whole business was in our hands, with very small losses—ridiculously small.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That was very fine. If you could have brought up your artillery to have followed that up, all the criticism which has been made with respect to the want of artillery probably would not have been made?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Explain why the artillery was not brought up to follow up that splendid victory there?

Gen. TRAUB. You realize we had divisions on the right and left, that the whole front, as far as supplies were concerned, had to be divided; that is, if there was a road you had to be very careful that nothing else got on that road. If that road was assigned to one division, nothing else could cross it, because it was a continuous thing, back and forth.

On the left flank, along the valley of the Aire, we had a main road devoted to the Army artillery, carrying up the Army supplies and the corps artillery, and the engineers had to be continually building this road. The Boche had put it in an impassable condition. The only thing left open to us was to go across the country. My artillery brigadier at once commenced to make his arrangements for going around the right of Vauquois Hill, by working like a dog in getting the ground fairly well fixed up, and on the right-hand side a battalion of artillery was sent over that day and that night, but as far as the troops were concerned, my artillery was able to reach beyond my troops. There never was a time in the Argonne battle that the whole bunch was not within touch and within reach of all the corps and all the Army artillery. They were pounding miles beyond all the time; wherever we could locate anything of the Boche, by our airplanes, we were pounding constantly.

So, of course, as the attack progressed what we wanted to do was to put our artillery forward. The orders were given and our artillery worked like dogs to get across the ravine. You realize this whole place was filled with man traps, and with wires, and it was extremely dangerous to touch anything. We had to prepare very carefully to get over that ground with our artillery. We finally reached this ravine. We got down there.

The boche Argonne batteries, with their telescopes, could see everything that was taking place. They commenced to pound things with their artillery, and we were pounding back as well as we could. We tried to get the artillery across and worked all night long trying to get it over there.

I went to the front about noon of that day to put more ginger into the attack.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What day was that?

Gen. TRAUB. That was the 26th.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The first day?

Gen. TRAUB. The first day of the battle. I came back and had to pass through the whole thing, where they were shelling, and they had to hunt cover. You can not get men out there under those circumstances, with high explosive shells and gas being fired at them in this ravine.

They could not get the thing forward. The thing was stuck in the mud. The engineers were trying to get them forward, but they did not get them forward until early the next morning, so that the next morning we had a battalion of 75s and they were helping me, and I always had the corps artillery, and I had my own heavy artillery helping, too. But you can see, when you talk about the lack of artillery, it is not so.

Mr. CAMPBELL. An officer who was in charge of a squad of men—I do not know how large—sent back by courier, because there was no other way of signaling, and asked that an order be given to raise the barrage, that the artillery was killing his men and destroying the morale of his fighters. Have you any information in regard to that?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes; I was there and was in that same barrage myself as division commander.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What was the reason the artillery fell so short at that particular point?

Gen. TRAUB. The boche was counter attacking us. That was on the 29th of September, on the Baulny Ridge. I myself had taken charge of all the troops in that immediate vicinity to repel this counter attack, and posted them, and was right there, and sent word back to the artillery. The lines were laid down in accordance with the information given. Our artillery fired about a thousand meters short. There were about, I should say, half a dozen shells from our side that fell on the Baulny Ridge where our men were. We at once had the range lengthened. I afterward spoke to my artillery brigadier about it. From our side—but I will say not necessarily from the American artillery—half a dozen shells exploded in our lines.

Mr. CAMPBELL. How far were the French from you at that time?

Gen. TRAUB. It was French artillery.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That you had purchased from the French?

Gen. TRAUB. No; it was a French battery that was assigned to our Artillery to assist us in our sector. We had lots of artillery. It was simply a case of horrible circumstances.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The question was to get it up to where you needed it?

Gen. TRAUB. Especially over the horrible little road called the Bienville. There was this swampy place, and we were subjected to this fire, and you could not go through the woods because the Boche had all these man traps there.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you wounded yourself, or gassed, during this engagement?

Gen. TRAUB. I have been gassed about five times, three times moderately severely, once as a brigadier general, and the rest of the times as a major general, while I was up with my own troops.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that during the Battle of the Argonne?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes; I was gassed twice during the battle. They tried to make me quit, but that was when my services were needed.

The CHAIRMAN. The next criticism is that it is charged that the American Infantry was compelled to attack artillery positions with infantry weapons. It is charged that it should have been material against material, and it is charged here that the infantry were compelled to attack strong artillery positions with their infantry arms. What have you to say in regard to that?

Gen. TRAUB. We have what are called forward observation posts that are always established by the artillery. It does not make any difference where the Infantry may have reached, the artilleryman always sends up his forward observation post with a fine telescope to determine where the enemy's batteries are.

You realize, gentlemen, we do not always attack with a barrage in front of our troops that explodes a shell every 5 yards. If you do that you are simply shooting up the country. The point is that that artillery fire is artillery support and this is what support means. You find out where the enemy's artillery is. You find out where the enemy has his support, where the enemy is next going to locate and make an attack against your troops. You find out where his strong points are, and that is done by means of the observation squadrons in the air, and by means of forward observation posts in the artillery. The artillery had it right at the start all the time.

Now, a general, like myself, in command, is always in touch with the situation, and I always try to be. These reports come in, the observation reports from the artillery, and they will go to my artillery brigadier. He comes to me and he says, "General, here is what I get." Then it is up to me to size up the situation, because I know what the points are, or am supposed to know everything along that line of battle in order to give proper orders, and where we got reports, in every case, in any way, shape, or manner, either the airplane service, from my own service, or from the artillery service, wherever I got definiae information that the artillery was located, we always soaked them absolutely, and the support was there. That is artillery support—when we go to knock out the enemy's batteries. Up in the Argonne Hills we knew the Boche batteries were there, although in the art of camouflage the Boche had no superior. There is where we tried to soak the Boche with our artillery.

It was on another sector. I ought not to have done it. But I got the authority of the commander in chief to fire outside of my own sector, where I knew the enemy was.

We frequently get reports, which, if acted upon, would make us kill our own troops. For instance, we hear sometimes from an airplane that there are enemy batteries at such a place firing on our men. In a case of that kind a division commander has the mighty serious responsibility of doing or not doing a certain thing, namely, to try to demolish those batteries. If I ever open up with our guns on a position that I am not dead-sure is an enemy position, I am going to destroy my own outfit—then, where is the responsibility? So I have to be mighty careful.

I get the information from all possible sources, and I have to size it up and do it quick, because time flies, and there I sit, with all these

different things coming in, trying to determine what to do in giving my orders to my artillery brigadier.

Never once, gentlemen, did a report come in that asked for artillery support or told us that the Boche were anywhere where they had to be hit that I did not give that order and did not get the support every time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. During the entire five days and nights during the Battle of the Argonne there was not a time when there was not all the artillery support that was asked for?

Gen. TRAUB. The Army moved forward. There was only the one particular time when I could not get the artillery across this ravine.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Why was it necessary for the infantrymen to attack artillery with infantry arms? We had many letters read here from commanding officers in regard to that. Why was it necessary to do that, if they had plenty of artillery support?

Gen. TRAUB. Now, as I have told you, we might have been able definitely to locate the place where the Artillery was, but i fso we could not open with artillery and knock it out if the Infantry——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). The Infantry did know where it was and went after it and got it.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Why was it that the Artillery could not go after it?

Gen. TRAUB. You say the Infantry would know, of course, if we got back word about the Infantry we would know, but we had to be careful about the Infantry, and sometimes when information would get back through a runner we had to be very careful, as it might change. The Infantry was given orders to attack. If you took the Artillery in front that is what it should do. But the Infantry was given arms to attack the machine-gun nests; and we had our trench mortars, and we had our 37-mm guns, and we had our rifle grenades, and we had all those things, and were trained in their use.

Now, then, the Infantry got up against a proposition of that kind. We were supposed to have weapons to handle a particular situation, of course, but the machine guns can not knock out enemy artillery. You must absolutely leave that to the artillery in the rear, quite naturally, as a rule. You have to locate these batteries, and it is a pretty difficult thing in the French timber where they usually were, or behind a hill where they were, where there was not direct fire, quite a difficult thing to locate those batteries.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would not airplanes have been able to help you materially?

Gen. TRAUB. No. Those things were easily camouflaged so that they never discovered our battery, for instance. They can tell by a sound-ranging apparatus, but if the thing is under cover a flash at night usually gives information, or they can even protect a flash, sometimes, from being seen. But an airplane could not fly over the woods and locate the guns in the woods. What they attempted to work out, and did work out, was a plan to leave absolutely undisturbed the trees overhead, by means of wire netting in the branches and an airplane flying overhead a thousand times could never see anything.

The CHAIRMAN. The next criticism is——

Mr. FESS (interposing). Did you have to depend entirely upon runners to communicate between infantry and artillery?

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, no; we had wire service.

Mr. FESS. Some one spoke the other day of the fact that the wire service was not effective.

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, the artillery always had its wire service, but, as you can imagine, under the horrible circumstances existing, and with the shelling, everything would go out at times.

Mr. RODENBERG. Would be put out of commission once in a while?

Gen. TRAUB. Certainly. You realize that over that field things were tearing loose. If they would locate anything they would send it in. But if they fired 300 shells at one point you may imagine how things were tearing loose all over that field.

The CHAIRMAN. Criticism is made that infantry was made to attack artillery, but criticism was not made of not getting artillery.

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, they got 24 pieces of artillery, and some of them mighty big pieces, with all the dumps of ammunition and other things. Everything, as I told you before, was turned against the Boche.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That was done by the infantry?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir; the only thing to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Traub, the criticism has been made that certain high officers were removed from the Thirty-fifth Division shortly before the battle of the Argonne, and that those men were replaced by other men. The criticism has also been made that these men who were removed, or transferred, had been with the Thirty-fifth Division a long time and that they were probably better informed than the men who took their places.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, sir——

Mr. RODENBERG (interposing). Two generals are specially mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; one was Gen. Martin, and the other Gen. McClure. What do you care to say about that, if anything?

Gen. TRAUB. Mr. Pou, I am the man that made that recommendation. Now, both those men are friends of mine. That is, I flatter myself that Gen. Martin is a friend of mine, because we always got along beautifully together. He was my brigadier. Gen. McClure is a very warm personal friend of mine. I have known him for 35 years. We were cadets together, and served together, and everything. So that you can see that there was only one thing that prompted me, and that was my very best judgment, for the success of our arms, that caused me to recommend relieving my two brigadiers.

Now, gentlemen of the committee, it is important to note this; that my recommendation was made a couple of weeks before the Argonne battle. At the same time it is most important to recollect that I not only recommended but I actually did relieve three Regular Army colonels of my division. So that what I actually did do was to recommend the relief of my two brigadier generals, and three colonels of the Regular Army. And the only thing, positively, that actuated me in doing what I did was my very best judgment, having in mind only the success of the cause.

There was no man in France that had a better opportunity than I to know what a brigadier general should be in battle, because for 10 months I had commanded a combat brigade in France, and I knew exactly what the requirements were. In addition to that, I had from

six weeks to two months' observation to back my judgment while I was holding 35 kilometers of front in the Vosges. On the strength of everything, and, as I say, having in mind the end to be obtained, I made my recommendation.

I would not relieve the brigadiers; I recommended that they be relieved. My judgment is on paper. That was forwarded to general headquarters and received the approval of my corps commander in his own estimate of those same officers. That was acted upon by general headquarters, and the telegram for their relief did not reach me until, I think, two days before the battle. I am not dead sure about that, gentlemen of the committee, but it was two days, I think, before the battle.

Mr. RODENBERG. Of course, that was the first intimation they had?

Gen. TRAUB. That was the first intimation they had; yes, sir.

Mr. HARRISON. You know that Gen. Martin has been made adjutant general of the State of Kansas by Gov. Allen, do you not?

Gen. TRAUB. I am very glad to hear it, because I have no doubt that Gen. Martin will make a fine adjutant general. I esteem him very highly indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in a position where you could not, of course, consider your personal relationship, and where you were forced to base your recommendation upon your sense of duty?

Gen. TRAUB. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Gen. Traub, criticism has been made that there was a shortage of stretchers; that overcoats were used in place of stretchers. And I think that Gov. Allen stated that he saw very few stretchers during his observations on the battlefields.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to invite any comment you may care to make on that.

Gen. TRAUB. There is no question about it; it is true. You could not get enough stretchers in the whole American Expeditionary Force to handle 7,000 wounded men at one time in one place. We had to make use of every possible means. We carried them in blankets; we carried them in overcoats; we carried them in our arms; we carried them in any way to get them to the point desired and to give them treatment. This was not a case like our maneuvers, where you fall a man out and say, "You lie there until I go and get a stretcher and we will carry you out." We looked out for our wounded and did everything in our power to give them the very best care, and I say they got absolutely the very first consideration.

Mr. RODENBERG. How long before the Battle of the Argonne Forest was fought had it been planned?

Gen. TRAUB. Well, sir, you will have to ask Gen. Pershing about that.

Mr. RODENBERG. I understand that Gen. March said it had been planned for five months.

Mr. FOSTER. I understood him to say that battles were planned.

Mr. RODENBERG. I understood him to say that this battle was planned.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, I have no idea about that.

Mr. RODENBERG. The reason I asked was, if it had been planned that far in advance, they ought to have been able to make adequate provision for stretchers.

Gen. TRAUB. Pardon me, but you could not plan a battle that far in advance. You do not know what the situation is going to be four or five months later. You may have an idea that this, that, or the other is what you will do, but as for planning a battle four or five months in advance, that can not be done with any definiteness.

Mr. RODENBERG. If casualties, as you say, are unusually small, it seems that they might have had enough stretchers to take care of the wounded in anticipation of a great battle.

Gen. TRAUB. I tell you we had 7,000 wounded from our own and adjoining divisions, and how are you going to get stretchers enough for them?

Mr. RODENBERG. Well, I do not know.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, that is it. You can not do it. In a great battle you can not provide for every contingency. Take the gas cases. Here is a man with his eyes bulging and he is told "Stay there and do not move." That is the way we treated our men. Sometimes we had to let them walk back, but it was taking chances with those men we could not litter back at the time. They simply had to remain unless we had a road there, or somebody said, "Get on my back and I will take you back so that you will not have to walk and expose yourself to dilatation of the heart and death." You can not provide for those things. Sometimes 200 men will be gassed in two minutes. What are you going to do about it? How are you going to get them back? It may take hours to get them back. If that takes place in broad daylight with the enemy able to shoot you up, they will lie there until you can get them back, which will be at night. That is battle. Nothing can be planned about a thing of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any shortage of stretchers in the rear, in the place where stretchers should have been?

Gen. TRAUB. According to Col. Turck he made use of everything available. Serious cases were always stretchered and taken out. There was an immense number that did not have to be stretchered. There was an immense number that did not have to have that, as I have told you, they were slightly wounded. But we wouldn't take any chances with a slightly wounded man; he would go back as if seriously wounded, so that we could look after him promptly and properly.

The CHAIRMAN. Criticism has also been made that American soldiers went into this battle with their summer underclothes on; that they were not provided with heavy winter underclothing, as was proper, as had been suggested should have been done at that period of the year, and under that severe climate. We will be glad to have you make any comment you desire on that statement.

Gen. TRAUB. Do you realize that when we left the Vosges it was the 2d of September, with the most beautiful climate in the world? You could not get the men to wear winter underclothing; they did not want it. At the same time as soon as August came my G-1—and there isn't a better G-1 than W. R. Gibson——

Mr. RODENBERG (interposing). What do you mean by "G-1"?

Gen. TRAUB. He is the man who looks after administration and supplies, of the General Staff Corps. G-1 is the one that has administration and supplies; G-2 is the one that gives you all the information about the enemy; G-3 is the operations sections, that puts the whole business into play against the enemy.

Now, under G–1 you have all this staff corps you have in the Army. You have the Adjutant's office, the Ordnance, and the pay and the Judge Advocate, and that is all administration and supply. That is the new staff arrangement we adopted in France about a year ago.

Now, then, what was I talking about?

Mr. RODENBERG. Summer clothing complaints.

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, yes. We had our requisitions in immediately. But, as I say, we had a beautiful time, beautiful weather, and you can not go to work for 30,000 men and as soon as you come out to commence to march, you can not go to work and get 30,000 suits of underclothing inside of a day or inside of a week. Those are in immense storehouses many miles to the rear. You send in your requisition and they go to work and have the stuff prepared and started, and by the time the stuff comes up to your railhead you are gone, you are gone some place else. Then it is changed and goes forward to the next railhead and when it arrives there we are gone again, and so on to the next railhead. The things were sent forward in accordance with our requisition, and the people back behind were doing their darndest to help us, but how could such a situation be remedied? I want to say that the service of supplies was marvelously run; everything was finely run; but, good Lord, we could not control the Boche! We could not control conditions. We could not control our enemy. The result was that we did our best and yet we would get started and be shunted off somewhere else. Here is a sensitive place, and there is a sensitive point, and we would keep going on, and the supplies would keep coming on after us. We would arrive at a railhead and the supplies were coming along behind us, then we would go on to another railhead, and they would still be behind us, and then on to another railhead; and so we went through the battle of the Argonne.

But I never heard of any suffering on account of lack of underclothes. The men were supposed to have a change of underclothing in their packs. It is true that those packs were left behind when we went into battle, but we got those things up to the men afterwards. Of course, some men were without suitable underclothing; we hadn't got through the summer yet. I believe the autumn solstice is the 22d of September, and we had a beautiful climate, and, of course, they were in their summer underclothing. All of us were. Overcoats were requisitioned in August so as to have them. That is the way it worked.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You had on summer underclothing yourself?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You say there were supplies brought up in sufficient quantities, does that include supplies of food?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Now, Gen. Traub, complaint has been made that men went without sufficient food.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, sir?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I had a letter only yesterday from a sergeant who was in the Argonne fight who says he went eight days without a bite of anything warm to eat.

Gen. TRAUB. Well?

Mr. CAMPBELL. During that time.

Gen. TRAUB. Well?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would that indicate that there had been sufficient food brought up? And I think he said that at the same time the French, wherever they fought, brought up their kitchens and had them there to feed the men.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes?

Mr. CAMPBELL. And he went on to describe that they took a German trench, and that they found warm food there.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Brought up right against our lines for their men.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Why wasn't that done for our men?

Gen. TRAUB. You see we were attacking and advancing, and the boche was retreating, and he was retreating on supplies while we were leaving ours. Before we went into that battle every man carried two days' emergency rations on his person. We told them, "You may not get anything for two days, look out for your supplies for two days." We could not get it up, because those roads were packed and jammed with Artillery and with everything going up and wounded going back, and everything of the kind. So we told them, "You can not be furnished with any food for two days." If they got to a place where they could do any cooking at night that was done. But you can imagine what a serious thing it was, as we were out there exposed in the open. If you light a fire you are going to get a shell. In the day time——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). Didn't you have small kitchens that could be brought up?

Gen. TRAUB. We had what we called rolling kitchens, and we had various places——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). Couldn't they have been brought up at night?

Gen. TRAUB. They were.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, that is the complaint, that they were not.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, all of them were not, on account of these roads. Good Lord, for the moment it was the last thing we thought of bringing in on account of supplies being needed; the first thing being ammunition, then food, and the first thing back was the wounded, because we had but the one road. And, as I have told you, the boche raised Cain with that road. They blew a crater into that road that took us 48 hours to do anything with, and we had to go to work and build a new road around it, and we had to bridge the thing, and it was 10 days afterwards that that was finished. Those were the conditions that we were up against. So that you can see that the bringing up of rolling kitchens is a difficult proposition. Of course, it is a pretty serious thing not to have these things with troops, but it is a thing in battle that troops must get along without if their presence is going to bring shell fire upon them. There was no question that after this second day along at some points of the line that could not be reached and that had to be held there was a shortage of food. But I had my G–1 and all his assistants constantly out among the troops to find out the situation, and my G–1 reported to me officially that while the men did not always have all they wanted to eat, they always had something to eat.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Gen. Traub, that is in direct contravention of the charge made, the specific charge being that each man should have been provided with an individual kit, whereas as a matter of fact, only one man in four was provided with a kit, but that the kit he was supplied with was supposed to be sufficient for four men; and that the result of that arrangement or distribution was that when this fourth man who had the kit that was sufficient to feed four men, when he dropped out, or was killed or wounded, or after he opened it he himself might have thrown it away; that by reason of this manner of providing food there was great suffering among the soldiers for want of food. What comment have you to make?

Gen. TRAUB. If that happened they violated orders. Every man had to carry on his person two days' rations. And we had to depend upon the lieutenants and the captains to do their work, their duty, and see that these instructions were complied with. Those were the orders. If they did not go and break open the packages and give each man his food for two days, then those orders were not carried out and those officers failed in their duty.

Mr. CAMPBELL. The complaint was that packages were put up, I think cans of billy beef, for four men, and one man would take a can, and probably be separated from his buddies at mealtime, or at any time when they could eat, and would open it and eat what he wanted of the billy beef and throw the rest away, and the others would have nothing, and that that was the only food supplied for the men.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, sir, these were the orders, and in order to comply with the orders, of course, they had to open up and each man has a mess kit and he is supposed to put that in his mess kit. As a rule we had bacon and hard bread. There is one thing that I have always been contending for, and evidently they did get to eat something of the kind, namely, tins that contained a day's ration, so that these tins could be given to men, and he would find in them everything he needed for his day's ration, too, so that there would be a reserve ration that the soldiers would carry into battle and have with them all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you in the concluding questions I have to submit two or three general questions.

Gen. TRAUB. All right.

Mr. GARRETT. Gen. Traub, from your knowledge of military history, I take it there never was a long battle fought where the men did not suffer for food?

Gen. TRAUB. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. GARRETT. There was nothing unusual about the condition that existed there?

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, no.

Mr. GARRETT. And nothing occurred that was avoidable, if I understand you correctly, in so far as physical conditions would possibly admit of being done.

Gen. TRAUB. In a general way, everything in the world that was humanly possible was done, and the great thing that everybody did, from Gen. Pershing down to the lowest man in the ranks, the one great thing we all had to do, was the accomplishment of our mission: our country had sent us over there to win the war, and we did it, gentlemen of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Gen. Traub, you were the commander of the Thirty-fifth?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did the job, and your division has won a victory which must take its place with the great victories of history. It has developed in this hearing that you were on the battlefield there, on constantly, here and yonder, wherever you thought your presence might help. I want to ask you if any of these criticisms ever came to your ears while you were in France? Did you hear it from the men? Did you hear any of this talk among the officers or the men of your division? That is, that there was a fatal shortage of airplanes, that the men did not have food, that they did not have winter underclothing, that men were needlessly sacrificed in going up against artillery, and all these things discussed during this hearing?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir; practically never at all. Of course at times the chap who was exposed to this sprinkling of machine-gun bullets might look around and exclaim, "By gosh, where are our airplanes?" Somebody might say, "Why don't they send some here to protect us?" And then the airplanes would circulate around and do a little more sprinkling, and some fellow would look around on the other side, and then there would be a little more sprinkling, and some fellow might say, "They have the supremacy of the air and we are doing nothing, and our outfit is not worth a whoop." When that occurred that fellow was getting a little bit nervous, which was not a bit unnatural under the circumstances.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Gen. Traub, didn't the American soldier have a perfect right, when he knew his country had appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars for airplanes, to expect that he would have protection therefrom? At the battle of the Argone, did he not have the right to expect that his Government that had sent him over there, which Government had been freely and fully furnished with money by the people of the country at home, would protect him with a fleet of airplanes?

Gen. TRAUB. Wouldn't he have a perfect right to think what?

Mr. CAMPBELL. That he had a perfect right to expect that he would be protected in that battle by airplanes?

Gen. TRAUB. One man?

Mr. CAMPBELL. All of the men engaged in that battle.

Gen. TRAUB. I did not think that.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You had a perfect right to think that. You were not responsible for there not being a sufficient fleet of airplanes.

Gen. TRAUB. That is your point of view. My point of view is I did not have a right to expect it. You may think that I did, but, good Lord, if you may realize what a battle is where a million men are engaged on both sides and then think that because one devil is shooting at me I have the right to expect protection because my country back home is doing everything in God's world to protect us and I haven't got an individual airplane there to drive that fellow away I will find fault with my country, you are wrong.

Mr. CAMPBELL. It would not and need not reduce itself to that.

Gen. TRAUB. That is because it is the view of the individual; that is the case with the individual.

Mr. CAMPBELL. There ought to have been airplanes to protect the companies, the brigades, and the Army. There should have been airplanes for the battle of the Argonne.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir; but——

Mr. CAMPBELL. Even civilians would know that an airplane circling around over them for half an hour should have been driven away by other protecting airplanes.

Gen. TRAUB. As soon as we got word back and as soon as they could make the necessary distributions——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). It was their business to be there, was it not?

Gen. TRAUB. Why, no. How can you make it your business to be everywhere a Boche appears? You can not do it. You must wait until he makes an appearance and get to him.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Why wait for him? Why not be on the job first? We were appropriating large sums of money for airplanes that our Army might have them when and where needed.

Gen. TRAUB. Undoubtedly.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Those appropriations were not made with which to buy swamps over in Ohio or in other States in the country. We were appropriating money to have airplanes to protect our soldiers at the battle of the Argonne and at other places.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, Mr. Campbell, when you talk about Ohio and these swamps and other places you have got me, because I don't know about that.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And to see that everything was over there?

Gen. TRAUB. Absolutely.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is where the airplanes should have been.

The CHAIRMAN. There is just one criticism I was about to overlook, and which I think ought to be called to your attention.

Gen. TRAUB. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was suggested, I believe by Gov. Allen, that men were needlessly sacrificed because the American attack continued up to the very minute when the armistice went into effect, whereas it was generally known that the armistice would probably be signed and had been agreed to; that our men were so bloodthirsty, or their commanders were so bloodthirsty, that the attack was continued up to the very minute of the signing of the armistice. And gentlemen have graphically and dramatically thrown up their hands here and said that ever since, I believe, the 28th of September every American soldier who lost his life was practically murdered. What comment have you to make on that?

Gen. TRAUB. Is that what they say, Mr. Pou?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what they say.

Gen. TRAUB. All from the 28th of September to the attacking of——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Perhaps I gave the wrong date. I will say during the few days immediately preceding the signing of the armistice.

Mr. CAMPBELL. A few days preceding the 11th of November.

Mr. GARRETT. The specific language in the letter was about the 28th of October.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant the 28th of October when I said the 28th of September. I beg your pardon, gentlemen.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, sir, I do not know anything about that, but it did not apply to the Thirty-fifth Division, of which I was in command. The Thirty-fifth Division up to the 2d of November was east of Fresnes-en-Woevre. We were occupying a 24-meter front, holding against the Boche. From Fort-de-Vaux, where I got my final gassing——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Where was that?

Gen. TRAUB. At Fresnes-en-Woevre we occupied a 24-meter front, and on the 2d of November we were pulled out. We made a sort of concentric march, and they did not know whether the armistice was going to be signed or not by the Boches. And if they did not sign it we were going to be constituted into the Third Army, of which the Thirty-fifth Division was to be one of six divisions, I think, and with a lot of French troops were to go over and hit the Boches where there would have been no question about the probability of a disaster to the Boche arms. But that other I do not know anything about.

Mr. RODENBERG. Then that you could not take for granted?

Gen. TRAUB. No, sir. I do not know anything about what the chairman asked me. We were reorganizing and getting into shape for this great offensive against the enemy. That is all I knew.

Mr. GARRETT. I did not understand whether Gov. Allen was intending to make the charge upon his personal responsibility, but I rather got the impression he was not.

Mr. CAMPBELL. He read a letter.

Mr. GARRETT. Yes; he read a letter, I believe from an officer, in which the officer stated that they knew on the 9th of November or that they heard on the 9th of November, that the armistice was to be signed, and probably what Gov. Allen meant was that he drew the conclusion that the officer was of opinion that all lives sacrificed after that time were uselessly lost.

In that connection, inasmuch as we are proceeding on a good many newspaper reports, I think it is not improper to refer to an article which appeared in this morning's papers, contained in an Associated Press dispatch, as I understood it, in which the German commissioner, Erzberger, in a speech before the general legislative body on yesterday, said that on the night of the 10th he received instructions from the general high command asking for nine modifications, but that if he should fail to get those modifications to sign anyway.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARRETT. I would naturally assume that if he himself did not know, if the German commission seeking the terms of the armistice did not themselves know on the night of the 10th that they were going to sign, it would be impossible for anybody else to have known on the 9th that they were going to be signed.

The CHAIRMAN. That would seem to be the inevitable conclusion.

Now, Gen. Traub, I believe we have about covered the criticisms that have been made. Do you care to submit any further remarks of your own?

Gen. TRAUB. Well, I will tell you, Mr. Pou, that being over there and seeing the wonderful work that has been done by our wonderful

men, the men that the country sent over to accomplish its mission, I can not fail to let you gentlemen realize that, as you must already know, it was a most stupendous task, and a task for which our country was not prepared. Everything in the world was done to shove the men over. That was the main thing, to get the men over there to support those British and French armies in the wonderful work they were doing, to brace them up, and then when go got over there in sufficient strength, to just go to it and accomplish the purpose.

The way that work has been handled by Gen. Pershing and his staff will be the marvel of civilized nations during all future time. The way he has done his work, the farsightedness, the breadth of view, the scope of his plans, and everything is something that will bear the study of all men, more especially of fighters, for a great many years to come. He has done his work in a most marvelous manner. It is not for me, a junior office to either praise or criticize a senior, but when I consider the magnitude of the undertaking, his great responsibilities, the way he prepared for the training of officers and men, with millions being shoved over to him practically untrained in great part, and who had to be prepared for battle amidst unusual surroundings and to compete with extraordinary conditions, against veterans; that in order to do that he had to have this wonderful staff, and had to inaugurate those wonderful schools and everything had to be thought out, and everything had to be looked forward to and prepared for on an immense scale; when I look back upon all those things accomplished it would seem impossible if it had not been done. He did not prepare to handle a few hundred thousand men, but four or five million men, and that accounts for the great scale upon which everything that was done had to be done over there in the A. E. F.

Gentlemen of the committee, do you know what in my opinion the American public ought to be doing, after the work that has been accomplished in France? In my humble opinion it ought to be singing pæans of praise to the great American soldier and the wonderful work that he did over there under the circumstances in bringing the Boche power to the dust. And I tell you, gentlemen of the committee, the American soldier is responsible for the result.

Mr. CANTRILL. Yes; they ought to be doing that instead of having this committee here now listening to a lot of civilians criticizing the military forces of the Nation.

Mr. HARRISON. Gen. Traub, you mentioned Col. Clark. What Col. Clark was that?

Gen. TRAUB. Indeed, I did, and I think his initials are P. C. Clark, who managed my regiment of engineers.

There is another thing, Mr. Pou, and I happen to notice where here something was said about the engineers even having to fight. Of course, everything that goes to make up a division, a compact unit, is for the division commander to handle in accordance with the circumstances of the case. He does employ them, and must employ them, the various units, for the best interest of the cause.

Now, as to many of these criticisms, take the subject of food, and take the subject of hot food; take the subject of care of the wounded; take any and every subject, and a man in my position considers them all, and I want to say that is one of the reasons why the Engineers

fought. They fought in order that those who had not had the benefit or advantages of position, of food, of rest, of everything of that kind, might get the benefits thereof.

So I myself, on the morning of the 29th, took that regiment of Engineers of mine and put them in position, and after an examination of everything I pulled back those advanced outfits and brought them back in the rear of my Engineers, who then held the line for 36 to 48 hours, so that these other outfits might have the advantage of getting back to the rear and getting food, and getting rest, and getting fitted up with supplies and everything. That is why, gentlemen of the committee, the Engineers fought.

And let me tell you this, that Kansas and Missouri has got reason to be proud of its men. That is why those Engineers fought, and you may bet your sweet life that they were worthy representatives of the American Army.

When the Boche counterattacked I was right there in advance with Col. Clark at his P. C. P. C. is post of command. That is where he was supposed to be. I was there with him, in a thing that we call a pill box, a little concrete affair that the Boches had built. We were in there. Here were our lines back here, where we could look along that front and everything else that was in possession of the enemy. There is where we made our observations.

And that is where I got a most remarkable message: a message which shows how things coming from the front, from people who are excited but trying to do their darndest for the cause may see things in a different way, as men do sometimes in the stress of battle and the heat of circumstances. I got a remarkable note in writing from a captain, a machine-gun officer, which stated: "On our left flank the Infantry is withdrawing. Hurry up reserves or the only two remaining machine guns in the whole division will be lost." Think of it, the only two machine guns left in the whole division! Well, now, here I was repelling the counterattack of a whole Boche regiment, and from different directions. Here I was in advance of my line, in battle, in a P. C. with the commanding officer, and I said "What do you know about that?" He said, "I know nothing." I inquired, "Does anybody know anything about it?" He said, "Nothing." We had no telephone lines that ran parallel to the front. The point was, the left flank was a ticklish position, because the division on our left was not driving the Boche, so that my left flank was exposed more or less, and it became very necessary to go and find out.

Now, then, what I did was to go there myself with my sergeant, and I walked along that line of battle until I got to my left flank. And what did I find? Why, gentlemen, there wasn't any more danger there than there is in this room so far as that left flank and the loss of those machine guns was concerned. They were peppering, of course, as they pepper all along the line. I said, "How in the devil did this thing happen?" Nobody had any explanation to make. I went farther to the rear and saw my echeloned machine guns there, and also the antiaircraft guns, and they did not know anything about it.

Now, what was the matter? That officer was a reliable and trustworthy man, but he just thought that that thing was so, and he sent

the message, and I, the division commander, myself went over there and verified that it was not so. That shows you how things happen in battle. On the other hand, suppose, for instance, after getting that report I had gotten flabergasted; suppose when I got that message I had ordered the Artillery to turn loose over on my left, what would have happened? There is where I assumed responsibility. I didn't do it. Before I took action I went over in person to verify. Then if the thing had been so I had a means of communication and could bring down whatever fire I wanted.

Gentlemen of the committee, I recite that simply to show you how a thing like that can happen when a man gets nervous. It must be that way sometimes, and we must take all those things into account. If we did not various consequences might result.

For five days and nights, gentlemen, let me tell you I got scarcely a wink of sleep. I scarcely ate anything. You talk about men going hungry. What do you think their major general had? If got a piece of bread with a little jam on it and a cup of coffee that is all I got for five days and nights. My aid de camps would bring things and say, "General, for God's sake eat." I would reply, "I don't want it." I smoked cigarettes all the time. I never washed my hands and face for five days and nights. I could not spare the time, because I wanted to do the right thing by my country, and to do that wanted to be on my job all of the time. I was there with my men, where I needed to be and where I wanted to be, and that is what the major general in command had to do. I do not want to toot my own horn, but I want to show you that when men talk about these things just to remember their major general. He lived on a piece of bread and a little jam and a cup of coffee and smoked cigarettes for five days and nights almost constantly. That is what I did.

Now, that is what most officers did. Good Lord, do you suppose we slept in feather beds? Do you suppose that the officers of high rank had a dandy time of it? Not on your sweet life. They were all there right with the men, working with them, and suffering with them. Gentlemen of the committee, I went over as brigadier of the Twenty-sixth Division, and stayed with them 10 months in France. I then was promoted to the Thirty-fifth Division, which was made up of Central States troops, and now I bring home the Forty-first Division, which is made up of Rocky Mountain and Pacific coast troops, so that there is no general officer in the A. E. F. or anywhere else who has had the experience with American soldiers from all over our fair land, no other general who has had more experience than I have had in France, and I tell you that they are wonderful. They are marvelous. Never once in inspecting my troops, either in battle, in the front line, in sector, or in the rear, or anywhere else—in the hospital, or wherever I have gone to look after them—have I failed to be impressed by the wonderful American soldier.

I have never had them march by me in any review or inspection, whenever I have tried to be with them and was with them and tried to size them up to see exactly what the officers had been doing with the different outfits, after my criticisms, suggestions, and recommendations, and everything of that kind—gentlemen, I never once saw those wonderful men with their "eyes right" toward me, and they looked me in the eye, every man down that rank after rank for

30,000 of men, and each individual looked me in eye and said, "General," practically by his expression, "here we are, and we are with you and for the country," that I did not feel my eyes well up and take an added pride in being one of such an Army and a citizen of such a country. [Applause.]

There never was a time, gentlemen of the committee, that I saw those men that tears were not in my eyes, and they frequently fell down my cheeks, as I realized what the spirit of America is and the wonderful boys called over there to uphold their country's cause. [Applause.]

Mr. CAMPBELL. Gen. Traub, I want you to know that, so far as criticisms have been made, they have not attacked the officers or the men in France of our Army, but——

Gen. TRAUB (interposing). No.

Mr. CAMPBELL (continuing). Every man's heart swells with pride to think of these soldiers and what they have accomplished, and he wants them to have the best protection and the best conditions that the means of his country can provide. And the criticisms that have been made have been made because those officers and men were not supplied with the munitions of war that they were entitled to—food, clothing, airplanes, tanks, Artillery support, guns, ammunition of all kinds, everything needful for offensive and defensive fighting.

Gen. TRAUB. I can assure you that the criticism is not well founded.

Mr. HARRISON. There is the criticism of the removal of those two officers, Gen. Martin and Gen. McClure.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think the inquiry was: Why they were removed.

Gen. TRAUB. You have gotten that.

Mr. CANTRELL. As a matter of fact, in all of these criticisms, there has been no criticism by any military man or by any military authority who knew anything about military affairs. The criticisms have come from civilians, who were not on the ground and did not know anything about military affairs; and, in my opinion, they were not in a position to criticize.

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is hardly a proper designation of the criticism made by officers whose letters and official reports were read to the committee on day before yesterday.

Mr. CANTRELL. I meant the men who had appeared before the committee.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Those letters were written by officers that were read before the committee.

Gen. TRAUB. Do you mean to say that you have official reports from officers in the battle?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes.

Gen. TRAUB. I am surprised, I must say, because they never came before me. It seems impossible.

Mr. CANTRELL. They are not here.

Gen. TRAUB. They have not come through the War Department, and I do not see how they could be here.

Mr. FOSTER. They were copies of official reports, sent to his wife, by a man named Truman, I think.

Mr. CAMPBELL. He made a report every 5 or 10 minutes, and copies of that were sent to his wife.

Gen. TRAUB. That is a very grave error on Capt. Truman's part. That is the gravest violation of A. E. F. regulations. Think of an

officer sending through the mail communications that might give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Mr. CAMPBELL. These were sent after the armistice was signed.

Mr. FOSTER. Of what took place during the battle.

Mr. HARRISON. And the most of these things have come to Gov. Allen since he made his speech to the Legislature of Kansas.

Gen. TRAUB. My, what a grave violation of the A. E. F. regulations.

But I will tell you, gentlemen of the committee, you will get many more of them after the A. E. F. comes marching home. There is many a man who has had his individual experiences, who will go to work and make the world center about them; experiences which are to him the most important things in the world, the individual experiences he has had. When he comes back he will say, "You bet your life, I will never forget that first night we had there. It was one of the most awful things I ever experienced, was that night. I had to drink water that was not fit for a dog to drink. I did not have anything but crackers and cheese and a few other things, and I lay on the wet ground. I will never forget it!" And anybody who listens to that fellow will say, "That man had a terrible amount of suffering, and there must have been others like that." He then says, "My God, there must have been a horrible state of affairs." You will get that all along.

You must remember that a man who means well will oftentimes make a good deal of these things, and that it may grow with age. . . You know we Americans have a terrible habit of shooting off our mouths. We do it all the time. We had it all the time over there. A man likes to get things off his chest, and in getting them off he is not going to belittle the part he took.

The CHAIRMAN. But we must not forget that you went over there and won the war very much sooner than anybody dreamed was possible; much sooner, probably, than anybody on this committee ever expected.

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, yes; much sooner than you had a right to expect. It has been a marvelous piece of work, marvelously well done by all concerned, I assure you.

Mr. HARRISON. When was the first time you knew that speeches were being made over here criticizing the Battle of the Argonne?

Gen. TRAUB. Criticizing what?

Mr. HARRISON. Criticizing the Battle of the Argonne.

Gen. TRAUB. I think about a month ago some papers came to France that had Mr. Campbell's or Mr. Allen's statements in them. I think that was the first I knew about it.

Mr. HARRISON. It did not make you feel very good, being over there?

Gen. TRAUB. Well, you know I do not like to say anything to hurt Mr. Campbell's feelings, nothing whatever.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Do not regard my feelings at all. Go ahead.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, I do.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I offered the resolution on the criticisms that had been made by Gov. Allen and friends and relative of the boys of the Thirty-fifth Division.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes. Now, let me tell you——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). And I want to say that I have no apologies to make. I have given you an opportunity to tell the committee some very interesting things, and I am very glad, indeed, to hear your side of it. Every Member of Congress had thousands of constitutents in the Army, many of them in France, and is most deeply interested in their welfare and in the welfare of every man in the American Army, from private to general. And you have been given an opportunity to relate some very interesting experiences and to present your view of the situation.

Gen. TRAUB. You certainly have given me that opportunity, and you have treated me fair and square.

And let me tell you one thing. For myself I do not care. Everything that I have done is absolutely open to examination and criticism. But I tell you one thing, Mr. Campbell, it must make the poor mothers and fathers and the families of the dead and wounded and the sick feel pretty badly to think that there is a possibility that the suffering their dear ones underwent was needless. That was the only thing that struck me over in France, and the only thing I think over here——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). May I call attention in that connection to the fact that the criticism did not attach to the officers or the men, but to the fact that they were not supplied with the necessary protection and munitions and other things needful.

Gen. TRAUB. But they were, Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. When the emergency arose we were called upon to authorize the calling of these boys from their firesides to the Army and then to vote billions of dollars that they might be supplied with everything necessary in the dangerous work in which they were called upon to engage. And we want to be very sure that they were provided with everything possible and necessary.

Gen. TRAUB. Everything in God's world that was possible was done, as I have told you, and as you can see from my picturing it is true. When you get 7,000 men dumped upon a little bit of a place, no bigger than this room to handle them, and the only place that they could be handled and the wounded man drifts where he can be taken care of. That was the situation we were up against. Everything was open country and the Argonne guns were shooting everything and everything flying upon you. The point was to get these poor, suffering fellows back quickly where they could receive the necessary help and assistance; and when Col. Turck comes back, and he was my division surgeon and handled the situation, I want you to get him to talk and tell you what they did and where they handled our poor wounded youngsters and our sick and everything, and you will see that the impossible was absolutely accomplished.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Gen. Traub, I can not help saying, in conclusion, if you had had sufficient artillery, sufficient animals to have brought up your artillery, to have made it equal on the second, third, fourth, and fifth days to what it was on the first day, and you had had sufficient airplanes to have kept the sky clear of the boche, there would be a different situation to-day?

Gen. TRAUB. Mr. Campbell, I believe that I have answered all that, haven't I. Does anybody want to ask further questions?

Mr. FOSTER. I think, General, you have answered about that.

Gen. TRAUB. I think I have but if you want me to go over that again I will be very glad to do it, to show you that there have been, unforunately, mistakes made as far as the information is con erned that you all have been supplied with.

Mr. CANTRILL. A man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still.

Gen. TRAUB. I can tell by Mr. Campbell's face that he is fair and square, and a straightforward American. But, of course, he can be misled, the same as other men. I have been misled when in the battle line, thinking the information I got was all right when it was not. We are all liable to be misled.

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I am misled as to the artillery—and artillery is of no use without horses—I have been misled by one of your men.

Gen. TRAUB. You are mistaken when you say that artillery is no good without horses. Good God, we only used them to get it in place.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Of course, but if your artillery is not where you want it you can not move it without horses.

Gen. TRAUB. We do it with men.

Mr. CAMPBELL. It is pretty hard to make the men do the work of horses.

Gen. TRAUB. Men will do any work to win victory over the Boches. Good Lord, I put my own shoulders to the wheel and helped to move the artillery.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Wouldn't it have been better if you had had horses?

Gen. TRAUB. Mr. Campbell, we had horses there, but——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). I think it was stated that you were about 55 per cent short of horses.

Gen. TRAUB. At the start that is a mistake. It is not true.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, that is the report made by a man in charge of your animals.

Gen. TRAUB. Oh, no.

Mr. CAMPBELL. In the Thirty-fifth Division.

Gen. TRAUB. That is not true.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, we have had that information.

Gen. TRAUB. We were short 1,500 animals out of about 6,400, and after the battle was over we got to about—oh I think about the middle of October, we were then short about 2,500 animals out of some 6,371.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I have forgotten the report made on the shortage of animals, and I regret that we have not here the stenographic transcript of Gov. Allen's testimony.

Gen. TRAUB. Well, I will tell you, and you can see what the A. E. F. was up against, Mr. Campbell. With 41 combat divisions and 6,000 plugs, or we will say 6,500 animals to a division; if you multiply that, and that is not considering any other service in France where hundreds of thousands of animals were needed; and after you get the animals to a strange country, and amidst all these rotten conditions of living and caring for stock; and you get rafts of green men, such as our men were, to look after stock, and stock that needed the most careful and delicate handling, what might you expect? You are bound to have losses, and lots of them; and then came the casualties besides.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What about the fact that is charged that we purchased horses that were used in the Argonne fighting; that is, that had been used by the French until they were worn out, and many of them sick, and many of them that had been gassed, and simply could not move the artillery, and dropped dead in their tracks?

Gen. TRAUB. I know absolutely nothing about it, but I do not believe it is true. You will never get an American officer to buy a head horse from a Frenchman for a live horse; and don't you forget that. Such a thing is not true, and I do not care who the officer is, I know he never did a foul thing like that. There is no doubt about that. Why, those men over there were just as good as you or I, and had the best interests of their country at heart.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Of course.

Gen. TRAUB. Do you suppose they were going out to do things like that in cold blood?

Mr. CAMPBELL. It was stated that you were going anywhere you could get a horse—English, Spanish, and French—and buying anything you could get.

Gen. TRAUB. Not until proper inspection had been made, always.

Mr. RODENBERG. Would you have time for an inspection of the horses?

Gen. TRAUB. Certainly.

Mr. RODENBERG. I would imagine that in the circumstances perhaps you would have to take any horse you could get.

Gen. TRAUB. We had our service in the rear to do that—that were not fighting—they were back in the rear where those animals, thousands of animals, were being sent in every day, and they shoved them to the front to be used. We got the pick of selected stock; of the thousands sent in there would be, possibly, only 50 selected.

Mr. RODENBERG. I wouldn't think it would be a matter of criticism if some did drop dead in their tracks, that you might have to take them.

Gen. TRAUB. Certainly; but they were not purchased that way. We had dozens of remount stations all through France, where these animals went in and where they underwent acceptance and training and were sent up to us at the front. Gentlemen, we had a marvelous service for that. This thing you speak of is not true.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I am not charging that it is true, but am telling you about the official reports. You must realize that such reports are very disquieting, and must be sifted and a satisfactory explanation, if possible, made.

Gen. TRAUB. My dear sir, you will get anything. You must not be surprised at anything that comes up before you gentlemen. You will get everything. And I will tell you that the best intentioned chaps in the world will hear something, and, by the 9-horn spoons, he gets to repeating those things, and then he gets to seeing them, and then he gets to thinking he heard it from that chap, as if it was an official report or somebody makes a report based upon that information, and that is the way it goes.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I do not recall at the moment the name of the officer making this report, but it was some official whose duty it was to inspect the animals, and the inspections showed a shortage in the animals in the Thirty-fifth Division.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes; of course, as I have told you, it is bound to be that way in the work that we were doing, marching all night long under those horrible conditions, when the boche——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). But this was before the battle.

Gen. TRAUB. Of course, before the battle, but after September 2, when we left the Vosges. The battle did not commence until September 26, but we were continuing to go a long time, and we had that San Mihiel salient to fight. It was raining all the time and you may bet your sweet life that our stock suffered. When you think of keeping in the wet, muddy woods all day long so that you might not be observed and the battle given away, of course, stock is going to die and cause losses. My head veterinarian, I think a man named Davis, but I can not give you his first name because I am not clear about it, will tell you that all the animals that were received were received in good condition. They came as I say with this mallein certificate against glanders, then they were given these various things to prepare them against the various maladies prevalent in that country. His report always showed the stock was in good shape. And in this connection I would say that the care of animals was one difficulty with the American soldier, and I would say even in the case of men from Kansas and Missouri in some cases, men who know about stock, I say, if there is in one shortcoming it was to do just what was right to take care of stock. We had great difficulty in that connection. Now, then, all over the A. E. F., especially where they did not have men from Kansas and Missouri, we had to train the whole A. E. F. into an understanding of the immense value of caring for stock, because the moment your stock is down and out you are on your back as far as transportation is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions anyone desires to ask Gen. Traub? If not, we are very much obliged to you.

Gen. TRAUB. Let me tell you one thing; I happen to think about this now, and there is one thing I want to mention.

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). Gen. Traub, I am called to the phone; will you excuse me for a moment?

Gen. TRAUB. Certainly. I had overlooked this thing for the moment, and things will fleet from one's mind, but there comes back to me something now that I want to tell, and in Mr. Campbell's presence as he brought up this thing.

Mr. RODENBERG. He will be back in a minute.

Mr. FOSTER. There have been mentioned here reports from the Argonne battle from day to day by Capt. Truman, I believe.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes; Capt. Truman.

Mr. FOSTER. That is made up as a sort of history of the regiment, is it?

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir. I know nothing about it, gentlemen, but I would say—but Mr. Campbell has come back now and I did not want to make a certain statement until he got back.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I thank you, as I will be glad to hear it.

Gen. TRAUB. I had just prefaced my remark, Mr. Campbell, by certain statements to this effect; it just happens to come to my mind, and is an important fact that I would like to record, and it is this: You know I have just a sort of sneaking idea that Mr. Allen, the present governor, did come up to my P. C. at Cheppy.

There were so many people coming there from all over the French and American Army corps, this corps of the Army and adjoining divisions, and just flooded the place. It seems to me now that Mr. Allen came up there to Cheppy, and if Mr. Allen came up there to Cheppy he saw this triage, where those thousands of wounded came through, and undoubtedly came in contact with the wounded. And I have just a sneaking idea that he did come there, so I would like to have this inserted in the record because my impression was that he did not come forward farther than that back place.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Gov. Allen spoke frequently of triage during his testimony and graphically described the men he saw lying on the ground, headless, armless, legless, and described others that had been protecting themselves with their revolvers, and one man I think had to turn over a time or two to get a rifle or a gun from a dead man who had been killed by an airplane, and had protected himself.

Gen. TRAUB. Of course, those things sound horrible; and you take an individual case like that and it is horrible. But it was not in contrast with everybody there, because we were all exposed. It was battle. You could not pick out a situation to suit yourself; the Boche determined that.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Of course, I understand that it was war and that war is hell.

Gen. TRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. CAMPBELL. But we want to know if there were unnecessarily severe conditions connected with the inferno.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were exposed yourself right there, as I understand, General?

Gen. TRAUB. You bet your sweet life I was right there. On my front, and over the field. Ask Col. Clark about his major general when he comes here. Ask Davis about his major general. Ask all those people who served with me. But, gentlemen, that is nothing. Good Lord, that is what we were there for. My life is no more precious——

Mr. CAMPBELL (interposing). Gen. Traub, we have heard nothing but commendation of you.

Gen. TRAUB. My life is no more precious to me than the life of any private soldier is precious to him. That is the way I considered the situation, and both of us and all of us were in the service of our country. I am proud of those men. I am proud of those men who proved themselves certainly the equal of any men in the world, equal in spirit, equal in enthusiasm, equal in pluck, and equal in everything else that goes to make a good soldier. That is my estimate of the American private soldier; and take it from me, gentlemen of the committee, he is all that.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Traub, we thank you for your appearance here and appreciate the very interesting and illuminating statement which you have made to this committee.

Gen. TRAUB. I thank you, gentlemen, very sincerely for this opportunity to appear before you and to give credit, even in my weak way, but in some measure at least, for the great work done by the American soldier.

(And at 12 o'clock and 50 minutes p. m. the committee adjourned.)

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