134th Infantry Regiment"All Hell Can't Stop Us" |
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
735017
By IM NARA,
Date 4/1/06
HEADQUARTERS 320TH INFANTRY
APO 35 U S ARMY
3 December 1944
SUBJECT: Action
Against Enemy, Report After.
TO : The
Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Thru Channels)
1. Following
report covers the period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 inclusive.
At the
beginning of the period the 320th Infantry was in reserve occupying positions as
follows:
3rd Battalion
west of Brin sur Seille in the vicinity of 970205; 2nd Battalion west of Brin
sur Seille in the vicinity of 975215; and the 1st Battalion at Gremecey,
vicinity of 025235, as a potential reserve for the 134th Infantry. The
Regimental CP was at Brin sur Seille. The regiment remained in these positions
to 7 November 1944. Activities during this time included range firing, checking
of all clothing and equipment, ordnance inspection of vehicles and re-supply. On
6 November at 1000 the Regimental Commander issued to the appropriate commanders
in the unit, Field Order #29, in substance as follows: That the regiment would
move to a line of departure in the northwest portion of Foret de Gremecey and at
0600 on 8 November pass through the lines of the 134th Infantry to assault the
enemy positions along the western edge of the Chateau-Salins forest and in the
town of Fresnes. In accordance with this order the Regimental CP displaced to
Gremecey, a distance of 5-3/10 miles, on the evening of
7 November. The 3rd
Battalion began its displacement at 0030, 2nd Battalion at 0100, 1st Battalion
at 0200. All elements had closed into the new area by 0500 on
8 November. The
attack was carried out as planned, the 3rd Battalion attacking enemy positions
in the town of Fresnes while the 2nd Battalion attacked across the open area
from the eastern edge of Gremecey Forest towards the enemy positions in the
western edge of Chateau-Salins Forest. There was an artillery preparation of one
hour before the jump-off. During the day the 3rd Battalion was able to seize and
hold approximately 2/3 of the town of Fresnes. It was completely cleared and in
our hands by 1000 on 9 November. The 2nd Battalion managed to cross the open
area and enter the edge of the Chateau-Salins Forest with G Company entering on
the left and F Company on the right, followed by E Company, the Battalion
reserve. The enemy then opened up with heavy artillery and mortar fire and fire
from cannon in the forest plus enfilading machine gun and small arms fire
causing both F and E Companies to be thrown out of the woods with heavy losses.
Following a second unsuccessful assault in the afternoon, they took up positions
along the railroad cut and embankment in the open and held these positions for
the remainder of the day with G Company in position along the edge of the
forest. In the meantime the 1st Battalion moved up and some of its elements were
used to block the open space between the two attacking battalions. On the
morning of 9 November the attack was resumed on the enemy positions in the
forest, the 2nd Battalion continuing its attack on the southern half of the
western edge and the 1st Battalion committed to attack on the northern half.
After the completion of the mop-up in the town of Fresnes the 3rd Battalion
became regimental reserve. During the day, the 1st and 2nd Battalions during
heavy fighting advanced to phase line "Victor," a general line extending from
064305 to 070297, then southeast to 085288. On the morning of
10 November the
attack was continued with the 1st Battalion on the left; on the right the 3rd
Battalion passed through the lines of the 2nd Battalion, the latter reverting to
regimental reserve. They continued the attack through the day and by nightfall
the 3rd Battalion had reached a occupied a line extending from 083294 to 091297.
The 2nd Battalion after mopping up enemy pockets previously by passed was
occupying a blocking position along the edge of the woods from 067292 to 062288.
The 1st Battalion had secured positions along the edge of the woods from 066299
to 073298. The attack was resumed on the morning of 11 November by the 1st and
3rd Battalions which continued the advance. Shortly after nightfall they had
reached and occupied positions as follows: 1st Battalion from 080319 to 087317,
3rd Battalion from 092315 to 097312. The 2nd Battalion occupied a blocking
position generally from 084306 to 092302. On the morning of
12 November the same
two Battalions continued their attack and shortly after noon had reached and
occupied the regimental objective, the eastern edge of the Foret de
Chateau-Salins. On 13 November the regiment was moved from the forest positions
into nearby towns to give the troops opportunity to dry their clothing and rest.
Some of the troops had been wet for almost the entire period of the forest
fighting. The 2nd Battalion and the Regimental CP occupied the town of Vaxy; the
3rd Battalion at Vannecourt, and the 1st Battalion at Chateau-Brehain. The
regiment was placed in division reserve. On 14 November the 2nd Battalion moved
from Bellange to Pevange and was made available as a reserve force for the 134th
Infantry. During the period from 15 November to 17 November the regiment
remained in division reserve. At 1700 on 17 November the Regimental CP displaced
to Morhange, a distance of 13-5/10 miles. All elements of the regiment were
moved up to the immediate vicinity. On the morning of 18 November at 0800 the
320th Infantry resumed the attack in the sector of the 134th Infantry. In the
period that followed the regiment continued to attack daily, weather was
adverse, cold and wet, and lack of routes caused supply and evacuation to be
largely by hand carrying. On 25 November the regimental objective was reached
and occupied and the assigned mission of the 320th Infantry was completed. At
the end of the period the 320th Infantry occupied positions as follows: 3rd
Battalion was at Nelling with its Company L at Insming and one platoon of
Company I at Rening. The 2nd Battalion was at Petit-Tenquin with one platoon at
Zellen. The 1st Battalion was at Uberkinger and Kappelkinger, with Company B at
Hazembourg and Company C at Wentzviller. On 27 November at 1030 the Regimental
CP displaced to Pontpierre, a distance of 24-1/2 miles. All elements of the
regiment then assembled in the vicinity of Pontpierre.
2. Mission: The
mission of the 320th Infantry from 8 November to 12 November inclusive was to
seize, clear and secure from the enemy the Foret de Chateau-Salins. The mission
during the period from 18 November to 25 November, inclusive, was to seize,
clear and secure from the enemy all ground within its assigned sector.
3. Information
of the Enemy: In the attack on the Chateau-Salins Forest our troops encountered
thoroughly prepared enemy defensive positions. All roads and open spaces were
thoroughly strewn with mines. There were barbed wire entanglements and well
established fire lanes for automatic weapons, well supplemented with foxholes
and dug-outs. The enemy had good observation for the employment of its mortars
and artillery which were used very effectively. The enemy at all times during
this period had the use of armor with which he effectively supported his
infantry forces. The use of the enemy mortars and artillery was very effective
against our troops in the forest because of tree bursts. The efficiency and the
morale of the enemy troops were very good.
4. Decision on
Tactical Maneuver: In actions during the month tactical decisions were designed
to accomplish missions assigned in directives of higher headquarters. Local
tactical maneuver was in conformity with decisions of the Regimental or
appropriate subordinate commanders.
5. Units Used:
During the period the 1st Battalion was commanded by Major Frank Waring until he
was evacuated on 7 November 1944. Lt. Col. James T. Walker then assumed command
of the unit and directed its activities until he was wounded in action on 18
November 1944. Major Walton, Battalion Executive Officer, then assumed and
remained in command until the end of the period. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were
commanded by Lt. Col. Warren T. Hannum and Lt. Col. Joseph D. Alexander
respectively throughout the period. Special Unit commanders were Captain Edmund
R. Casey who commanded Headquarters Company until he was evacuated on 8 November
at which time Captain Dwight D. Bonham became the commander for the rest of the
period; Captain Paul H. Heil, Service Company; Captain A. D. Wilson, Anti-Tank
Company. Cannon Company was in command of First Lieutenant E. Cammack until 6
November when Captain Robert N. Ekstrum assumed command of the unit for the
remainder of the period. Major L. A. Smith, Regimental Surgeon, was in command
of the Medical Detachment. The regiment was commanded by Colonel B. A. Byrne.
Lt. Col. William F. Northam was Executive Officer. The Regimental Staff
consisted of First Lieutenant Milton Ginsburg, Major George W. Jamieson, Major
Thomas P. McElroy Jr., and Major Harold V. Hughes, S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4,
respectively.
6. Weapons
Used: Small arms, grenades, rockets, mortars, artillery, tanks and tank
destroyers.
7. Artillery,
Tank and Air Support: Artillery support during the entire period was excellent.
The regiment had the use of tank destroyers throughout the period, which was
excellent, although terrain conditions often made their use difficult or
impossible. In the first three days of the attack on the Foret de
Chateau-Salins, 8 November to 10 November inclusive, the regiment had the use of
tank support. However, this support was cut to a minimum as a result of losses
incurred by the tank company on the first day of the action, and by conditions
of terrain. After 11 November all tank support was withdrawn entirely and the
regiment had no tank support for the rest of the period. The unit had periodic
air support throughout the period.
8. Effects of
Weather: All operations during the entire period were hampered by rain, mud and
snow, which in many cases made conditions extremely difficult and uncomfortable.
9. Supply:
During the period the supply problem was mainly one of refitting and equipping
the men for winter warfare. Sleeping bags, sweaters, extra blankets, overshoes
and combat boots were issued with priority to line companies. A critical
shortage of tires, tubes and tube patching developed. This was due to tire
failures from shrapnel and nails picked up from the roads. During this period a
salvage crew was organized, comprised of men suffering from battle fatigue. The
objective of this crew was to salvage lost, dropped or discarded equipment by
following units through their zones of action. The recovery of considerable
amounts of salvageable equipment attests to the success of having such an
organization. (The following two lines are x-ed out and initialed MB) Ammunition
supply was limited in availability during this period but at no time did this
organization fire more than its prescribed amount.
10.
Communications: Communications were by wire and radio, with appropriate use of
messengers. The operations of the wire crews were very often made difficult by
the mud and the long dark nights. The lines were often cut by shell fire and
vehicles, and one wire crew was the victim of a mine explosion.
11. Honest
appraisal of troop morale and troop efficiency: Excellent throughout the
operations.
12. Casualties
for this period:
Officers |
Enlisted Men |
Total |
|
Killed
in Action |
5 |
40 |
45 |
Wounded in Action |
31 |
684 |
715 |
Missing in Action |
0 |
122 |
122 |
13.
Decorations: The following decorations have been recommended.
6 -
Distinguished Service Cross
31 - Silver
Star
83 - Bronze
Star
14. Prisoners
Taken: 300 prisoners were taken during this period.
15. Complete summary of accomplishments,
Remarks concerning mistakes, Incidents: All operations of the regiment during
this period were performed in an efficient and excellent manner. The ability of
the infantry and their attached units to endure the most unfavorable living and
fighting conditions and keep up a high state of morale and efficiency has been
demonstrated to the fullest extent. The living conditions and the fighting
positions were the most uncomfortable and unfavorable yet encountered by this
regiment. Rain, mud and snow were the rule and never the exception. In the
advance through the forest almost every round of enemy artillery and mortar fire
resu(lted in a) tree burst, equivalent to well placed time fire. From thi(s
action the ad)vancing troops had little or no protection, while the ene(my was
advancing to) defensive positions in dug-outs and pillboxes had very good
(protection) from our shellfire. Because of the short hours of daylight many
operations had to be concluded or carried out during the hours of darkness and
because of the rainy and cloudy weather there was very little light, if any at
all, in the forest after nightfall. Very often the units found themselves
subjected to enemy fire from the rear and the flanks as well as to their fronts.
At times their routes of supply and communication to the rear were cut by
by-passed or infiltrated enemy troops. At one time the command post of Company B
was attacked from the rear and Captain Frank Gardner, the company commander, was
killed. Only the swift fall of darkness enabled other members of the command
group to escape. Twice the reserve battalion had to be used to mop up bypassed
groups and to establish blocks against infiltration from the rear and the
flanks. In the second operation for the towns and villages in the open country,
the flooded low ground and enemy demolitions greatly hampered the supply of the
advanced troops. In the taking of one town by Company A under the command of
First Lieutenant Charles W. Bell the men had to swim a flooded area, or cross on
a rudely constructed foot bridge to reach their objective. The bridge was
constructed and most of the crossing made during the hours of darkness. Just
before daylight the last elements crossed and ran into the town as enemy tanks
charged down on them from high ground nearby. In the fight that followed, the
enemy tanks were knocked out by bazooka fire and their crews eliminated by the
use of hand grenades, Molotov cocktails and small arms fire. Lieutenant Bell
called for artillery fire on one section of the town while he and his men fought
in the other sections. After the barrage had lifted his company completed the
occupation of the town.
(Note: where
parentheses appear, original text was obscured.)
B. A. BYRNE
Colonel, 320th Infantry
Commanding
4 Incls
Incl 1. S-1
Journal (November 44)
Incl 2. S-2
Journal (November 44)
Incl 3. S-3
Journal (November 44)
Incl 4. S-4
Journal (November 44)
Download a copy of this report in Microsoft Word format
Return to After Action Report Index