The 134th Infantry

Preface

Dedication

The Heritage of "Nebraska's Own"

Into World War II

P.O.M.

Normandy

Counter-Counterattacks at Mortain

Across France

Gremecey Defensive

Through Lorraine to Germany

The Ardennes Buldge

The Roer to the Rhine

East of the Rhine

The War's End

134th Infantry Regiment

"All Hell Can't Stop Us"

Combat History of World War II

Major General Butler B. Miltonberger
Former Commanding Officer
134th Infantry Regiment

Major James A. Huston
Assistant Professor of History
Purdue University

http://www.coulthart.com
Transcribed by Roberta V. Russo, Palatine, Illinois

eBook Conversion by Terrence E. Zavecz, Pennsylvania
http://www.GraviDynamics.net

PREFACE

A complete history of the 134th Infantry Regiment in World War II would consume many volumes the size of this. Nevertheless we hope that there can be presented here a summary of its action with sufficient detail to give and accurate picture of modern battle and of the Regiment's role in winning the victory in Europe - that it will explain for a man what happened in other parts of the Regiment while he was fighting his personal war, or what happened to his outfit after he was wounded, or will refresh his memory for events in which he participated; and that it will be a guide for the host of friends who maintain a keen interest in the Regiment's activities.

A letter from a brave mother of Independence, Missouri, whose son was killed in action on 31 July 1944, tells of her deep interest in the 134th Infantry, and she asks for information to fill in certain gaps in the big scrap book which she has kept of the Regiment's action. The date of departure from New York, madam, was 11 May 1944, and the name of the vessel, a Navy transport, was U.S.S. General A. E. Anderson. Beyond that, the Regiment disembarked on 25 May 1944 at Avonmouth, England. It moved to France 4 - 7 July, and the 2nd Battalion went into the lines 8 July - to return to the Regiment two days later - and the 3rd Battalion moved into the lines in the hedgegrows of St. Lo on the night of 13th July. The Regiment launched its first attack - aimed for Lt. Lo - on 15 July. Ahead there lay the confusion of counterattack at Mortain, the great race through France, the local attacks and hard defenses in the mud of the Gremecey Forest and Fossieux, the attack through Lorraine in cold rains and early snow, the bitter winter fighting in the Ardennes, the treacherous mines along the Roer and closing to the Rhine, attacks through the Ruhr Pocket and the dash to the Elbe River.

Unfortunately this story will not always serve as a reference guide to place a man, a platoon, and event at exact places at exact times. It does, however, attempt to adhere with complete accuracy to the facts with which it deals. Toward this end reference has been made to the regimental unit journal, S-3 journal, operations reports, intelligence reports, the "Daily Log," battalion journals (where available), general and special orders, field orders and operation memos, after action reports, newspaper accounts, personal notebooks, personal correspondence, and interviews. It has been found that these sources do not always agree on particular points, and in those cases it has been necessary to pass judgment according to the merits of the conflicting sources and according to personal knowledge.

It is a history which needed no addition of color to add to its glory.

B.B.M.

Dedication

Dedicated to the Gold Star Mothers of the 134th Infantry and to those who shared with them the deep loss of a man who did not come back. Theirs is a courage of the order to be found on the field of battle itself. Theirs is a faith which can recognize the truth of the old saying that "old soldiers never die."

134th Infantry Regiment

"All Hell Can't Stop Us"

Combat History of World War II

By Major General Butler B. Miltonberger, Former Commanding Officer, 134th Infantry Regiment and Major James A. Huston, Assistant Professor of History, Purdue University

Transcribed by Roberta V. Russo, Palatine, Illinois

In 1917 the Regiment trained at Camp Cody, New Mexico

Chapter 1

The Heritage of "Nebraska's Own"

Honor has come back, as a king to earth,
And paid his subjects with a royal wage;
And Nobleness walks in our ways again;
And we have come into our heritage.
-Rupert Brooke

America's reaction to the surpassing swiftness of the Nazi blitzkrieg in 1940 was one of immediate concern for her own defenses. Military preparation in time of peace was something foreign to the American mentality, but the lessons of Germany's war in the West were lessons which suggested that delay might mean catastrophe. Even William Jennings Bryan's "A million men shall spring to arms overnight" would be insufficient in the face of totalitarian war. Allied defeats in Europe successively brought further steps toward military preparedness in the United States. Industry began converting to war production; military appropriations leaped to record figures. Then late in August, 1940 Congress authorized the President to mobilize the National Guard, and less than a month later it passed the first peace-time conscription act.

For members of Nebraska's 134th Infantry Regiment, this legislation took on a very personal meaning when the Regiment was called into Federal service just two days before Christmas that same year. Mobilization was a procedure familiar to the men concerned. They were familiar with their organizations and equipment and ways of doing things through the training of weekly drill periods, the annual summer camps or maneuvers, service in times of domestic disturbance.

It was no surprise to a man of the 134th that his regiment had been called, and yet when the order came it demanded a response of anticipation, of expectation, of wonder at the future. As he donned his O. D. uniform - complete with service cap or campaign hat, breeches with wrapped leggings, and of course, the inevitable black necktie, perhaps he paused momentarily to inspect the one item of insignia which he wore in common with every other member of the 134th Infantry, officer or enlisted man - the regimental "crest". Perhaps first to arrest his glance would be the scroll beneath the shield, a scroll whose inscription would imply a connection with the Indian country, for the words - LAH WE LAH HIS - had come from the Pawnee.

"The Strong, The Brave" was the English translation for those Indian words, and they were appropriate for a regiment proud of its military tradition. The motto suggested a description of the regiment of the past, but it was a challenge for the regiment of the future. Its bravery would increase with its strength, and its strength would grow with its bravery.

The 134th Infantry claimed as its own tradition of the First Nebraska, which traced its beginnings back to 1854 and 1855. There had been Indian troubles associated with the opening of the West, and it had been necessary for Nebraskans to depend upon their volunteer militia for protection. Full military operations had been soon to come with President Lincoln's call for volunteers at the outbreak of the Civil War. The First Nebraska had been with Grant at Fort Donelson and Pittsburgh Landing, and then with Freemont in Missouri. Mounted as cavalry in 1863, the unit had finished its Civil War service in Arkansas. Already travel had become a part of the Regiments tradition, for I t had moved by marching, by rail, and by steamboat, some 15,000 miles in the course of the war.

Vaguely, but prominently in that tradition of the 134th Infantry which associated it with the Indian Wars loomed the figure of W. F. ("Buffalo Bill") Cody. Whether as scout, or aide-de-camp on the Governor's staff, or with the regimental commander, Buffalo Bill Cody's renown for daring and skill and selflessness grew as a model to be emulated by succeeding members of Nebraska's militia. A feature of the Indian disturbances had been the development of friendship between the Pawnee and the Nebraska troops. They had shared a common enmity with the Sioux, and when the Pawnee Scouts had been organized in 1865 they had very soon proved their value. Indian troubles had persisted until the Sioux were defeated for the final engagement with Indians in the Battle of Wounded Knee, December 29, 1890. It was a tribute to the assistance of the Pawnee that their words had been chosen for the regimental motto - LAH WE LAH HS.

Looking immediately above the scroll - that is to say at the base of the shield - the soldier would notice the figure of a palm tree. Here was an apparent connection between the regiment and the tropics. Yes, it had been tropical service in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. May 16, 1898 - just 20 days after the order for mobilization, the First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry had entrained for California. It had been a rail movement over three routes - the Burlington and Missouri River, the Union Pacific, and the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific. It had been a movement characterized by gay welcomes at the station en route: sandwiches, coffee, cigars, fruit, flags, bunting, flowers - and admirers' addresses. It had been the first regiment to arrive at San Francisco's Camp Merritt from outside the state, and on June 15, it had sailed for Manila. There had been a pause off Wake Island on July 4, while "a party went ashore, hoisted the Stars and Stripes and took possession in the name of the United States of America". The First Nebraska had arrived at Manila Bay on July 17 - amidst the wrecks of the Spanish fleet which Dewey had left ten weeks earlier - and went into Camp Dewey (five miles south of Manila) where they had pitched their shelter tents in a peanut patch. It had been the rainy season, and the traditional rain and mud of warfare had engulfed them. After a minor defensive action on August 2, the First Nebraska had participated in the big attack against Manila - a joint operation involving the VII Corps and Admiral Dewey's naval support. "The sight that morning with thousands of armed men moving forward in battle formation, the shrill calls of bugles, and the boom of naval guns as Dewey opened fire, battle flags floating in the breeze, black smoke belching from the ships' funnels and everything combined to make a scene of military splendor that will not soon be forgotten by those who witnessed it". But already the Spanish War had ended, and the total casualties of the expeditionary forces around Manila had been 17 killed and 106 wounded.

Higher on the shield of his regimental insignia (technically in dexter chief), the soldier of the 134th would see represented the Katipunan sun - a symbol taken from that new and worse conflict which had awaited the First Nebraska at the termination of the Spanish-American War. A secret military organization of the Filipinos, the Katipunan society, under the leadership of Aguinaldo, had been quick to transfer its hostility from the defeated Spaniard to the newly-arrived American. Dedicated to the expulsion of all foreigners from the Philippines, the society insured fidelity by requiring each of its members to sign an oath in blood. Aguinaldo then had sought to extend the society's regulations to include all male Filipinos. Such was the nature of the enemy which had faced the Regiment when the Insurrection broke out on February 4, 1899, in response to the challenge and shot of a First Nebraska bridge guard. If Manila had been an easy victory, it had been made up in the warfare against the Filipinos. This action had reached its climax in the battle at Quinqua where the First Nebraska had found itself in something of a trap when Colonel John Stotsenburg, the regimental commander, had arrived on the scene to order a charge. The response had been such as to cause General Hale, an eye-witness to the action, to exclaim. "There goes the First Nebraska, and all hell can't stop them!" And hell had not stopped them that day as the Nebraskans had overrun the insurrectionist trenches, but it had been a costly victory; the leader who had inspired the charge had fallen as a bullet pierced his heart. Colonel Stotsenburg, formerly professor of military science and tactics at the University of Nebraska, had won high honor in American military tradition; his name endured in Fort Stotsenburg, Philippine Islands. Brigaded with the First Nebraska in that grim warfare had been the Twentieth Kansas - the regiment later to be associated with the Nebraskans again as the 137th Infantry.

As his glance paused over the palm tree, the 134th soldier undoubtedly would notice the snake entwined thereon. This might recall to him stories of the regiment's service on the Mexican border on 1916 - 17 - of the mobilization at the state fair grounds at Lincoln (the Regiment was called the 5th Nebraska then), of the not-too-complimentary remarks of the inspector general for the Central Military Department prior to the muster of the Regiment into Federal service, of the training and field experience at Llano Grande, Texas, of the return to Nebraska and the state bonus of $25 per man. And a very personal association stems from the service on the Mexican border, for in those days, it was "Corporal" Miltonberger, and later, "Sergeant" Miltonberger.

In those days (1917) it was "Sergeant Miltonberger."

pposite the Katipunan sun on his regimental insignia (i.e., in sinister chief), the 134th soldier would see the olla (a more picturesque way of saying "water jug"), which, with its red steer skull, he might recognize as the insignia of the 34th Division , the division with which the Regiment had been associated during World War I. The Nebraska National Guard had been called to Federal service July 15, 1917, and the Regiment had arrived at Camp Cody, New Mexico, where (now designated the 134th Infantry) it had joined with the National Guard units from Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota to form the new 34th Division. During October and November 5,000 draftees had arrived for the division from Camp Dodge and Camp Funston, but losses - from orders for replacements, sickness, and transfers - had totaled about 4,000. Then in June, 1918, the division - and of course the 134th Infantry with it - had lost practically all of its trained personnel to meet the requirements of the A. E. F. automatic replacement system. (And in the process your Sergeant Miltonberger, 134th Infantry, had found himself headed for combat with the 4th Division.) Once again, however, the unit had been filled with new men, and within two months it had moved to Camp Dix preparatory to overseas shipment from New York. The 134th Infantry, with division headquarters, had sailed in September and disembarked in Liverpool after a 13-day voyage (while the remainder of the division remained quarantined at Fort Dix until October 12). After a short stay in rest camps, then, the Regiment had moved to France via Cherbourg and LeHavre. It had gone to the Labrede Area to begin the training program on which General Pershing had insisted for all newly-arrived divisions. But once again the division had fallen prey to demands for replacements, and with less than two weeks of the training program completed, orders had come to skeletonize the division. These orders had indicated that the division was to be subject to reconstitution, but a few days later (October 29), word had come that reconstitution no longer was contemplated, and it had been reduced to a record cadre. The 134th Infantry, as such, therefore, had not seen action in World War I, but in its tradition it remembered the service of those original Nebraskans and their successors who had gone out to other units for their full share of combat service.

But as our National Guardsmen of the 134th Infantry adjusted his uniform and made his way through the streets of his home town to the local armory, his thoughts probably were not focused on the significance of his regimental badge or the traditions of his Regiment - though undoubtedly there was a deep awareness of all these influences in the background of his thought; probably his thoughts were running to anticipation of the future and reflection on his own experience with the Regiment. If he had not participated in the reorganization of the Guard after World War I, he certainly had heard about it, and the early difficulties of training. As an "old timer' now, he probably had been on hand during the troubles of 1935 - the first flood duty on the Republican River - then the trouble in Omaha growing out of a two-month old street car strike, when the best of tact and consideration was required in that tense situation - and then there had been the "water rights" dispute in Scotts Bluff County.

More prominent in the thoughts of the soldier of the 134th would be recollections of summer camps and maneuvers. Now that he was participating in the mobilization of the division, perhaps he would recall the first assembly of the 35th Division - made up of National Guard units from Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri - at Fort Riley, Kansas in 1937, to participate in Fourth Army Maneuvers. There he had first become fully conscious of the magnitude of a division, and its Santa Fe cross insignia and taken on new significance. Again there had been the Army maneuvers in Minnesota in 1940 - only a few months before mobilization - and still the men of the company were telling tales of the size and abundance of Minnesota mosquitoes.

Maneuvers in Minnesota (1940): Maj. Stoll, Capt. Thomsen, Col. McCormick.

But probably the fondest memories of the National Guard experiences centered around the summer camps at Ashland, the site for all summer encampments - except those special occasions in 1937 and 1940 - since 1923. There, chow lines in the hot sun, before small, trim, white mess halls, quarters in pyramidal tents supported by wooden frames, assemblies in the horseshoe stadium, refreshments in the attractive masonry National Guard Canteen, sick call in the neat little frame hospital, field exercises out on those lands which once had been the bed of the Platte River - all these would be such as to demand a nostalgic recollection in the repetition of similar experiences in the days to come. Best of all, those new experiences would be in the company of those same men who had become familiar at Ashland.

No doubt the soldier of the 134th would be looking forward to renewing those acquaintances, and he would remember those who had impressed him during that last camp at Ashland. Trying to recall some of their names, he might have thought of some of the boys from Nebraska City - Company A - Sergeant Gerald Felthauser, Corporal Leslie Gump, and Privates First Class Ed Parish and Jack Stewart, and the McGinnis boys, Bill and Clarence, and Privates Herb Rawlings, and Joe Simms, and Melvin Van Winkle.

With Company B, from Falls City, he might remember First Sergeant Harper Marsh, and Sergeant Woodrow Mosiman, and Corporal Joe Pool, and Private First Class Tom Harmon, and Privates Gilbert Simmons, and the younger Pool, and the two Kirkendalls, and he would remember the two Nanomantubes, even if he could not recall their names.

Several names no doubt would stand out as he thought of Company C, from Beatrice, the company claiming distinction as the regiment's leader in rifle marksmanship. There would be, for example, First Sergeant John Pope, and Sergeants Paul Carstens and Garold Gormley, Joe Van Lieu, and, of course, Sergeants Francis Mason and Lorin McCown, and then there was Corporal Harlan Heffelfinger, and his younger brother, Hugo (a private), and Corporals Kenneth McRae and John Conley, and Privates Starkey and Jim Faris and Orval Black and Don Naumann.

Of course there would be a number of names of Company D, North Platte, which must have impressed the soldier during the camp. Proud of its record of winning the award for the best National Guard company in the state four years in a row, the machine gunners had boasted of such representatives as First Sergeant Dan E. Craig, Sergeants Claude Faulkner and Raymond Plaugher, Corporals Byron Mudge and Jim Kovanta, Privates First Class Don Barraclough, Bob Faulkner, and Vic Janecke, and Privates Charlie Hake, Jim Jeffers, Willie Ellis, and Ray Gillespie.

From out in Western Nebraska there would be Scotts Bluff's Company E, with Corporal L. D. Asher and the other two Ashers, Harry and Ward, and Francis Ginther and Cliff Keiser, and Roy Houser, and Fred Knaub.

There would be First Sergeant Clinton Nagle of Company F coming from Hartington, and Sergeants Walter Carstens and Don Jones, and Corporals Fred Buckman, Lou Hirschman, Cliff Livermore and Joe Peitz, and Privates First Class Bob Martenson and Art McClain.

Prominent among the men of Company G, from Hastings, would be Sergeants Carlyle McDannel and Sylvester Ryan, and Corporals Don Kresbach and Virgil Keith, and Privates First Class Jim Bassett and Bob Howell, and Privates Dick Arnold and Jim Hiatt.

Company H, from the railroad town of Grand Island, would include such names as First Sergeant Clifford Sanderson, Sergeants Francis Swartz and Francis Callihan, Corporal Jack Clark, Private First Class Milton Stonebarger, Private Earl J. Ruby.

From the state capital, Lincoln, would come Company I, and certain to be remembered among that military company would be its "old soldier", First Sergeant Frank Conner, a man who wore two wound stripes from World War I, and already carried five hash marks on his sleeve to indicate a service of at least 15 years. Others with Company I would include Sergeant Bob Failing, Corporal Bill Harris, Pfc. Ernest Heinz, Privates Elmer Dunbar and Don Hansen.

Acquaintances in Omaha's Company K might include Sergeants George Buchanan, Willard Cole and Chris Jensen, Privates First Class Bill Brodbeck, Evon Redman and Ted Mezger, Privates Lawrence Langdon, David O'Keefe and Andrew Siedelman.

Omaha's other rifle company, Company L, had included such men as First Sergeant Dick Melcher, Sergeants Pete Larson, Art Hursh and Jacob Redl, Corporals Dick McDermott and Ed Moe - a man who had missed neither an armory drill nor a summer camp in eight years - Privates Sam Basso. Don DeVoe, Tom Lawless.

The Third Battalion's machine gun company - Company M of Seward - would bring with it, among others, Sergeants Paul Wiehenkamp and Paul Jones, Corporal Leron Stromer, Pfc. Earl Noxon, Privates Bill Baumbach, Albert Detmer, Charles Foster, Lloyd Whitmore.

There would be other units from Omaha: Regimental Headquarters Company, with Corporal Byron O'Keefe and Private First Class Vincent Nehe; 2nd Battalion Headquarters, with Sergeants Leslie Wilson and Leroy Littell, Corporals Lysle Abbott and Earl Sorenson, Pfc. Dick Reed, and Privates Rodney Brown and Robert and William Hill. First Battalion Headquarters, with Sergeants Leslie Wilson and Leroy Littell, Corporals Lyle Abbott and Earl Sorenson, Pfc. Dick Reed , and Privates Rodney Brown and Robert and William Hill. First Battalion Headquarters Company, then of Nebraska City, had included Sergeants Herb Bueler and Cliff Persell, Corporal John Preston, and Privates First Class Bob Belcher and Frank Erwin; 3rd Battalion Headquarters Company, at Lincoln in those early days, had included Sergeants Hans Schnitter and Frank Scott, Privates First Class Herbert Hill and George Thacker, Privates Arnold Nelson and Alfred Schwartz.

Again from out on the western fringes, at Gering, would be the Antitank Company - which just recently had exchanged its short-barreled 37mm guns, the ones with the wooden-wheeled carriages, of a howitzer company for the new 37mm antitank guns. Its ranks had included Sergeants Everette Boggs and John Reavis, Corporals Don and Townsend Rubottom, Privates First Class Victor Flohr and Hearly Tanner, Privates John Hoover and Oliver Stuckey.

There remained on other - one of the so-called "spare parts" units - whose members were likely to be more familiar to the soldier of the 134th through their association with administrative functions of the Regiment: Service Company, at York. Here was the company with the stripes - Master Sergeants Robert Moline, John Pfenning and John Roth, and First Sergeant Worth Downer, and Staff Sergeant Del Kuntzelman, Michael Luxford and Paul Voss; then Sergeant Milton Maurer (younger brother of one of the first lieutenants) and Sergeant Virgil Hyde, and Corporals Dean Grass and Ronald Thorpe, and Pfc. Robert Barth and Private Homer F. Barth. Even more familiar would be the Regimental Band under the direction of Warrant officer George McCall. And not to be forgotten were the medics - the "attached medics" - of the medical detachment at Omaha; Staff Sergeant Luther Thompson, Sergeants Herman Kortright, Norman Mannweiler, Fred Schultz, Corporal Clare Sherrets.

Though it might be require a roster for the 134th soldier to name all of the officers of the Regiment, most of them would have become familiar by now. Of course everyone would remember the regimental commander, Colonel Clyde E. McCormick, and members of his staff: Major Fred H. Stoll, Captain Harold L. Collier, Captain Howard R. Turner, Captain Lee W. Heaton, and Captain Alfred Thomsen, recently commander of Company L. Among the officers of the special units the soldier probably would remember Capt. Albert L. McGill and 2nd Lt. Holton R. Adamson, Headquarters Company; Capt. Harry Beckley, 1st Lt. Raymond J. Anderson, 1st Lt. Arnold I. Maurer, and 2nd Lt. Clark E. Valentine, Service Company; Capt. J. Ned Allison, 1st Lt. Leslie J. Laughlin, and 2nd Lt. Warren C. Wood, Antitank Company, and the medical officers: Major Rolland R. Ensor, Capt. Norman H. Attwood, Capt. Floyd L. Paynter (the dentist), 1st Lt. Leo V. Hughes, and 1st Lt. Clinton C. Millett.

Officers of the 1st Battalion had included, in addition to the commander (it was now Major Miltonberger, lately captain of Company D), 1st Lt. Leslie Yager and 2nd Lt. John Pitzer of Headquarters Company; Capt. Ray A. Thurman, 1st Lt. Thomas S. Morton, and 2nd Lt. Robert R. Wilson, Company A; Capt. Merven F. Myers, 1st Lt. Leo L. Smith, and 2nd Lt. Dewey E. Jackson, Company B; Capt. Dean E. Coonley, 1st Lt. Alford C. Boatsman, and 2nd Lt. Harrison F. Scott, Company C; Capt. Fred C. Petersen, 1st Lt. Denver W. Wilson, and 2nd Lt. Dale M. Godwin, Company D.

In the 2nd Battalion it had been Major Louis R. Eby commanding, and 1st Lt. James A. Bradley and 2nd Lt. Thurston J. Palmer, Headquarters Company; Capt. Ora A. Eatwell, 1st Lt. Harold M. Runyon, and 2nd Lt. Kenneth E. Eckland, Company E; Capt. Lloyd R. Hardy, 1st Lt. Julius Stejskal, and 2nd Lt. George E. Ready, Company F.

And in the 3rd Battalion: Major Edward J. Geesen, commanding, and 1st Lt. Clifford L. Dier and 2nd Lt. Keith K. Turner, Headquarters Company; Capt. Rolla C. Van Kirk, 1st Lt. Clarence J. Stewart, and 2nd Lt. Foster H. Weyand, Company I; Capt. Edwin C. Gatz, 1st Lt. Harry B. Jacobsen, and 2nd Lt. Emil C. Wagner, Company K; Capt. Earl H. Kelso, 1st Lt. Wallace B. Hall, and 2nd Lt. Albert B. Osborne, Company L; Capt. Erwin A. Jones, 1st Lt. Paul C. Hauck, and 2nd Lt. Harold J. Firnhaber, Company M.

Change, no doubt, had brought new faces and promotions since the last encampment at Ashland, but it would be interesting to see what they had been.

And so as the soldier of the 134th Infantry made his way to the local armory, wherever it might have been, there mingled within him the rich traditions of his regiment, of his state, of his nation. Out of that heritage of the 134th Infantry, and esprit de corps had planted itself, and he was a part of it. Commanders and comrades had come and gone, but each had contributed a bit of his own personality to the larger personality of the Regiment, and it seemed that the Regiment - and indeed each company - had developed a soul of its own. The soldier of the 134th Infantry, a volunteer now answering the call of his country, represented that great common denominator of America - the Middle West, and he breathed the spirit of the heartland. His state was the state where the corn belt of the Midwest met the Great Plains of the Far West, where the improvements of the 20th Century touched most intimately with the pioneer days of the 19th. He shared the common burden of soldiers everywhere - he carried with him the hopes and the fears of all which he held dear.

Chapter II

Into World War II

General Truman Inspects the Regiment at Camp Robinson

War has been declared on this Country by the AXIS POWERS.

The 35th Infantry Division stationed at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Arkansas will move by rail, destination unknown.

This Regimental combat team will move at once by rail with all personnel, equipment, and transportation, except as indicated below, destination unknown, and duration of movement unknown.

- Field Order No. 1

Christmas week, 1940, meant mobilization for the 134th Infantry. While people sang of peace on earth and good will toward men, National Guardsmen began assembling to prepare for war. War itself had no attraction for those men, and they held no enthusiasm for it. But they did hold an enthusiasm - not often expressed - for the things which they associated with freedom - the things which they regarded as "America". Now each new success of Nazism in Europe and of Japanese expansion in Asia made more apparent the impending danger to those things which the American held dear.

The men were glad, however, that mobilization was not so rapid as to take them from their communities before Christmas Day. In Christmas celebrations that year there was something of a mingling of over-played enthusiasm and of melancholy - the over enthusiasm for the holiday growing out of a determination to make every moment count in what might be the last Christmas with families for a long time, and the melancholy growing out of the irrepressible awareness that separation, perhaps of long duration, possibly of permanence, lay ahead.

While National Guard units in some states had become seized with a growing peace-time lethargy, interest and morale in the 134th had been maintained to such an extent that it was - and had been for some time - at authorized strength, with a waiting list of applicants, when the President's call came on December 23. By now, numbers of the outstanding enlisted men who had been at Ashland a year and a half earlier held commissions - Second Lieutenants Dan E. Craig, Dale M. Godwin, Harlan B. Heffelfinger, Carlyle F. McDannel, Richard D. Melcher, Robert E. Moline, Albert B. Osborne, Paul H. Weihenkamp were some of those who had been wearing their gold bars for some time; some of the others were brand new - Garold A. Gormley, Virgil E. Hyde, Peter Larson, Leroy O. Littell, Francis C. Mason, Milton H. Maurer. . . .

Initially men of the 134th Infantry gathered at their local armories. Perhaps it was the attractive two-story brick Memorial Building which Company A shared with the American Legion and other organizations in Nebraska City; perhaps it was the low silhouetted stone building of Company B at Falls City; maybe it was the trim, one-story brick armory of Company G - and Company F, 110th Medical Regiment - at Hastings. In any case, it was the place which had been home to the particular unit concerned during the years of weekly drill and domestic duty. Here it took several days to perfect the organization and complete preparation for movement. Here the soldier of the 134th encountered the first of a long series of inoculations, the first of repeated lectures on the Article of War, the first of many preparations for movement and change of stations.

It was hardly more than two weeks after the President's call for mobilization that the 134th Infantry closed in at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Arkansas, on January 8, 1941. The newly-constructed camp was not yet finished to the satisfaction of its newly-arrived occupants, however, and the first days were taken up largely in building walks, in developing facilities which would make the stay - it looked like it would be a long one - more comfortable, in introducing measures of traditional Army "eye-wash." Then came the weeks of training. It was progressive training, which began with several weeks of basic training of the individual soldier - military courtesy and discipline, first aid and hygiene, physical training, Articles of War, weapons. There were squad problems and combat field firing - with such weapons as the 60mm mortar and the light machine guns usually simulated. Rapid-fire exercises involved some time and effort at mastering the bolt manipulation of the Springfield rifle. Then followed platoon and company problems with blackout conditions prevailing. Finally there were regimental problems - some of the most interesting being against and "enemy" made up of the 137th Infantry, sister regiment to the 134th in Colonel Per Ramee's 69th Brigade. Colonel Miltonberger became regimental commander on 6 May. But this was only the beginning. More serious tests of ingenuity and physical endurance lay ahead - in the direction of Louisiana.

During the weeks at Camp Robinson, the 134th Infantry had been finding its place as a part of the team of Major General Ralph E. Truman's 35th ("Santa Fe") Division. Organized then as a "square" division, the Santa Fe - made up of National Guardsmen of Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri, - included four infantry regiments, the 134th, 137th, 138th and 140th. On their shoulders, men of the 134th wore the blue and white Santa Fe insignia. The division insignia represented a white Santa Fe cross upon a wagon wheel with four quadrant projections, the whole on a blue field. The cross was taken from the crosses used to mark the Santa Fe Trail on dusty plains in the West. The men who wore it carried a symbol of the courage, hardiness, self-reliance, and pioneering spirit which characterized their forbears who opened up the lands west of the Mississippi.

With the other units of the 35th Division, the 134th Infantry moved in August to the vicinity of Prescott, Arkansas, to join the concentration of Lt. Gen. Ben Lear's Second Army. It was preliminary to participation in the biggest peace-time maneuvers scheduled in the country. The very evening of arrival, an 11-piece band, made up of musicians from the Regimental Band, played for a downtown street dance in Prescott given in honor of the 134th Infantry. Twenty men from each company of the Regiment rode the motor convoy into town for the affair, and Miss Verna Marie Porter, Chamber of Commerce representative in charge of arrangements - particularly of arrangements for a corps of southern belles to be on hand - became first of "Sweethearts of the 134th."

There were a few days for adjusting mosquito nets, shelter tents, and hammocks, and for reconnoitering the dense timberland - and of course, for additional company and regimental training - prior to the opening of the official exercises on Monday, August 18. There was particular interest during this preliminary training - and marksmanship was a favored and well-developed subject with Colonel Per Ramee - in becoming aquatinted with the new Garand M-1 rifle, the semi-automatic successor to the old Springfield which had replaced the bolt-operated weapon in the regiment just prior to the departure to Camp Robinson.

Maneuvers extended through the "Corps Phase," "Army Phase," and "GHQ," in which the headquarters concerned directed the exercises, but it made little difference to a regiment and its individual soldiers whether they were participating in division or corps or army exercises. The marches were as difficult, the mosquitoes as persistent, the chiggers as itch-worthy , the darkness as complete. A squad's problems or a company's frontage did not vary necessarily with the number of such units involved.

In the "Corps Phase," the 35th Division was joined with the 27th and 33rd Divisions in the VII Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., whose chief of staff was Col. J. Lawton Collins. After eight days of make-believe war between the "states" of "Almat" and "Kotmk," this phase came to a close with a final success of the 134th Infantry at the end of a 60-mile night move of the 69th Brigade. A Second Army press release noted:

The last problem in the "Corps Phase" of the Arkansas-Louisiana maneuvers came to a close at 8:00 A. M. Thursday after the invading Kotmk forces had accomplished their mission, that of destroying the Missouri-Pacific Railroad between Camden and the Little Missouri River. The unit that did the job was the 134th Infantry, composed entirely of Nebraskans and led by Lieut. Col. Butler B. Miltonberger, of North Platte, Nebr.

In these and succeeding exercises the men of the 134th learned to apply field expedients and to improvise in every kind of situation. Supply personnel encountered the difficulties of moving up chow in blackout - of difficult roads and tactical conditions, of timing to get supper up after darkness and breakfast, and prepared dinners, before daylight. Men learned to maintain contact at night through the dark timberland by forming columns of files in which each man grasped the belt of the man ahead. There were the skirmishes and rapid movements and night withdrawals which became a part of training and a parcel of memory. There were the rapid thrusts of the supporting dust-swirling tanks of Maj. Gen. George S. Patton JR's 2nd Armored Division; the 2nd Cavalry Division's crossing of the Ouachita River two days sooner than the Second Army staff thought possible, and its attack straight into the 134th Infantry; rest days and the quest for relief from the sultry heat of summer in the South in the old swimming holes.

In the main event, the operations in which General Lear's Second Army of 130,000 men faced Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's Third Army of 330,000 men, it was more of the same for the 134th Infantry. But the men had something to look forward to on completion of maneuvers when they heard that members of the 35th Division had been adopted as "foster sons of Arkansas" in a proclamation by Governor Homer M. Adkins, and a big "Military Mardi Gras" was being planned to welcome them back to Little Rock.

Attached to the 5th Division, a unit which carried the tradition of the Regular Army, for a particular operation, the 134th Infantry was able to demonstrate a versatility and cooperativeness which won for it a commendation from that division:

HEADQUARTERS 5TH INF. DIVISION
APO #5
Camp Robinson, Arkansas

21 September, 1941

SUBJECT: Services of the 134th Inf. Reg. With the 5th Inf. Div.
TO: Commanding General, 35th Infantry Division

1.

I desire to express my appreciation of the highly effective services of the 134th Infantry Regiment of the 35th Infantry Division during the period of its attachment to the 5th Infantry Division, September 16 to 18, 1941.

2.

Sent as a temporary reinforcement to the 5th Division, the 134th Infantry, Lt. Col. Butler B. Miltonberger, commanding, arrived promptly in the area of the 5th Division. Its elements then participated most effectively in the assault on and encirclement and capture of 150 officers and 2,200 men of the Blue Forces. The spirit of co-operation, readiness for action, and the aggressive performance of this fine Regiment are greatly appreciated.

CORTLANDT PARKER,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

While, from the soldier's point of view, maneuvers had their points - an escape from camp routine and Saturday morning inspections and the monotony of drill, most hard-bitten (i.e., chigger-bitten) veterans of the 134th Infantry were ready to exchange the long quack grass and hammocks of Louisiana for the tents and cots of Camp Robinson, the dust and mud for refreshing showers, the irregular meals in blackout for chow lines, the constant moving about in the vast timberland for the visits with friends in Little Rock.

It was a royal welcome which greeted these "adopted sons of Arkansas" on their return. A full-dress parade before the governor touched off the two-day festivities of the Military Mardis Gras. Under the slogan, "A Chicken Dinner for Every Soldier," men by two, threes, fours, and scores were invited into private homes for southern fried chicken. Closed to traffic, Fifth Street became one long dance pavilion - and there was a dance partner for every man.

Whether this tour of duty in the Federal service for the 134th Infantry would be limited to the one year's duration anticipated in the original act had been made clear to the contrary. Not so clear, however, was how world events were moving to sweep up the Regiment. The Regiment was ready, however, to meet whatever tasks might confront it. On return from maneuvers, the regimental commander was well pleased with the state of training demonstrated by his command. According to the recorder of the Daily Log, his comment was, "This regiment is now ready for war."

Another interlude in the routine of life in Camp Robinson came with orders for the Regiment's participation in a great Armistice Day parade in Memphis. The 134th executed its role, in the rather quaint uniform combination of blouses and leggings and World War I type steel helmets, but, with bayonets fixed and smart alignments, the massed battalions presented a striking appearance and won the plaudits of the enthusiastic crowd which gathered to watch. More than that, it won for the Regiment the personal commendation of Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, a second commendation from the Second Army Headquarters for the police of the buildings and the area which the 134th occupied at the Memphis Fairgrounds, and the additional commendation of Maj. Gen. William H. Simpson, who had just recently succeeded General Truman as 35th Division commander, "for the progress shown in . . .training for combat efficiency, and for the splendid appearance and conduct of the troops who participated in the Memphis Armistice celebration."

Duty of a more serious nature loomed as a definite possibility when, on November 13, all leaves were canceled, and orders came to prepare for immediate movement with full equipment and to maintain an alert status, ready to move on two-hour notice. There was no general answer for the big question in all men's minds - WHERE? Naturally such an order generated a series of rumors and speculation. Was the Regiment destined for Africa, or Iceland, or strike duty. Actually, the last possibility was the real reason for the alert. Training in aid to civil authorities during domestic disturbances began the next day. The alert for possible movement to the coal fields - growing out of disturbances brought to a head by the efforts of John L. Lewis . chief of the United Mine Workers, to extend the closed shop to certain additional mines, and by his ignoring of three requests from President Roosevelt for a return to work - remained for two weeks. Finally the mine workers' dispute was settled by an arbital board, and men of the 134th once more could concentrate their attention on preparing to repel external enemies of the Republic.

It was not many days afterward that it appeared that this too might be an immediate possibility. Just a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Regiment was completing its packing for movement. (On Saturday the marriage licenses in Pulaski County hit a new high.) The latest development had caught the regimental commander (it had been Colonel Miltonberger for four weeks now) on leave, but he was hurrying to rejoin the Regiment as it moved out - "destination unknown." Lt. Col. Edward J. Geesen issued the movement order - Field Order No. 1 - that Sunday (it became a tradition to move on Sunday) in December, 1941:

HEADQUARTERS 134TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
Camp Joseph T. Robinson
Little Rock, Arkansas

14 December, 1941

Field Order

No. 1

Maps: None available

1.

a.

War has been declared on this country by the AXIS POWERS.

b.

The 35th Infantry Division stationed at Camp Joseph T. Arkansas, will move by rail, destination unknown.

2.

This regimental combat team will move at once by rail with all personnel, equipment, and transportation, except as indicated below, destination unknown, and duration of movement unknown.

3.

Troops: Commander, Lt. Col. Edward J. Geesen.

a.

All officers except those over age, all enlisted men except sick in hospital and on D-S., will move with this RCT.

b.

Organization: The Personnel Adjutant will make a special strength report showing effective strength of all officers and men and will forward same to the G-1, 35th Infantry Division, at once. Strength returns will be forwarded by train commanders immediately upon arrival at destination.

c.

Equipment: Full Field with gas masks. All units will take WD T/BA (War Department, Table of Basic Allowances) Col. 2, Mobilization Tables, except add one trunk locker. Individual equipment for all those present and all organizational equipment will be taken based on strength as per existing T/O (Table of Organization). Helmets in barracks bags.

d.

Uniform: Field Service, overcoat, field jacket, field cap, woolen shirt, woolen O. D. trousers, leggings, belt, pack, arms, gas masks.

e.

For time of entraining, composition of trains and groupings, and time of departure, see Entraining Table attached hereto. Trains will be spotted in camp area as indicated in table.

f.

Battalion commanders, surgeon, commanding officer of Hq. Co., Ser. Co, AT Co., will notify the Regimental S-3 when their respective organizations are ready for inspection, and then again when organizations are ready for loading.

g.

Records: Strength Return: Company commanders will immediately report the number of officers and enlisted men present and absent through the Pers. Adj., and individual records, service records, allied papers of enlisted men not moving out with the Regiment will be left behind. The records will be kept on forms provided by this Hqs. and on the original AGO Form 33. Temporary mimeographed forms will be prepared anticipating the changes to be made. If a man will remain behind, a return of his records will be forwarded to his unit, and the mimeographed form destroyed. The following records will be immediately brought up to date if not already in such conditions: Service records of individuals, extract from AGO Form 25, individual equipment records, AGO Form 33.

h.

Property will be disposed of as follows: camp, post, and station property will be placed on memo receipts and submitted to Major Wm. G. Utterback who is in command of the area. All personal equipment and furniture will be crated, boxed, and inventoried, and tagged. Such property will be left in day rooms, packed for shipping. Individual property of men who are expected to join their organizations en route or after arrival at destination will be taken with the units.

i.

Police of buildings and areas: All mess halls, latrines, day rooms, and store houses will be thoroughly policed and when given a clearance by the inspector in charge, the buildings will be locked and keys delivered to the officer in charge of the area. Officers in charge of the areas are: Major Wm. G. Utterback, entire regimental area; Capt. Myers, 1st Bn.; Capt. Peterson, 2nd Bn.; Capt. Yager, 3rd Bn.; Capt. Thurman, Sp. Troops; Capt. Kimmell, Brigade Hq. and Brigade area.

j.

Ammunition: The ammunition officer will immediately draw one day's mobilization supply of ammunition and same will be issued as follows: 10 rds. to each rifleman, and one clip of .45 Am. for each pistolman. Balance to be equally distributed within the Regiment according to the firepower of the weapons.

3.

a.

All leaves, furloughs, and passes are canceled and officers and men are directed to report to their units.

b.

Laundry now at laundries will be secured if possible and returned to units.

c.

Steel cots will be left in tents or in mess halls, Sheets, pillow cases, mattresses , pillows, will be piled and stored neatly either in mess halls or in tents. Memo receipts will be prepared in triplicate for same.

d.

Personnel in stockade will be returned to their units.

e.

Tentage: All heavy tentage will be taken.

f.

No public address systems will be taken.

g.

Transportation: Canvas on vehicles will be down and securely lashed.

h.

Trains must be loaded within four hours from time spotted in yards. The S-4 will cause consolidated shipping tickets for all baggage and vehicles by type and amount that are to go on trains.

i.

Train commanders will order periodic halts for exercise.

j.

Safety precautions: Extreme precautions will be taken in the handling of gasoline in the kitchen cars.

k.

Train commanders will appoint water details ahead of detraining time, who will be ready to expedite its collection.

l.

Troops on the train will not detrain without specific authority and will not ride on platform or steps of cars. Commanders of trains will take such other necessary measures including the establishment and maintenance of guards as may be necessary to prevent such practices.

m.

Detraining en route will be permitted only by details or individuals under proper orders.

4.

a.

Supply: 7 days rations will be drawn and issued. Two weeks supply of staples, soap, toilet paper, will be drawn and issued. For further details, see Administrative Order, 35th Infantry Division.

b.

White gasoline will be drawn for entire movement.

5.

a.

Regt. CP closes at this address H hour 14 December, 1941. Opened on train H hour 14 December, 1941.

b.

Axis of signal communications, route of march.

By order of LT. COL. GEESSEN:
ROLLA C. VAN KIRK,
Major, 134th Inf.,
S3

OFFICIAL:

THOMAS S. MORTON,

Capt. 134th Inf,.

Adjutant.

The direction of movement was west. The itinerary of Train No. 1 assumed this form:

1.

Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Arkansas, entrained 5:55 P. M. , 14 December, 1941. Train made up and pulled out at 6:50 P. M.

2.

Uneventful night, 14 December and 15 December.

3.

Stopped at Coffeyville, Kans., 9 A. M. , 15 December. Troops detrained and exercised for 30 minutes. Train pulled at 9:35 A. M.

4.

Officers' meeting, 11:25 A. M. Capt. Bradley discussing train discipline.

5.

Arrived at Kansas City, Mo., 4:35 P. M., 15 December. Detrained for exercise 25 minutes, switched from Missouri Pacific to Santa Fe Road. Pulled at 7:45 P. M. Delayed at Kansas City due to light failure in two troop cars and poor brake shoes on two cars. Also some time lost on switch over from M. P. to Santa Fe, and remaking of train.

6.

Emporia, Kans., 11:35 P. M., 15 December All cars serviced, lanterns placed in two cars without lights.

7.

Arrived Higgins, Tex., 9:30 A. M. 16th December. First town in Texas.

8.

10:30 A. M., 16 December, train commander gives conductor telegram to be dropped at Miami, Tex.

9.

Arrived Amarillo, Tex., 1:25 P. M. Mess kits were washed and troops had some leg stretching in the warm Texas sunshine.

10.

Pulled at 2:12 P. M., 16 December.

11.

Officers' meeting, 2:21 p. m.

12.

Lost 45 minutes, Clovis, New Mexico.

13.

Arrived at Belden, New Mexico, 11:59 P. M. Left 12:30 A. M. , 17 December, Service Stop.

14.

Arrived Holbrook, Ariz., 8:40 A. M., left 8:50 A. M., Service and water.

15.

Arrived at Winslow, Ariz., 9:35 A. M., 17 December. Troops were exercised in warm sunshine. Pulled at 10:05 A. M.

16.

Arrived Needles, California, 9:00 P. M. Troops exercised. Warm. Pulled 9:40 P. M., 17 December, 1941.

17.

Arrived San Beradino, California, 9:10 A. M., 18 December, 1941. Warm, clear weather, pulled at 10:58 A. M.

18.

Arrived Los Angeles, 1:20 P. M., 18 December, 1941. Clear, hot weather. Pulled at 3:30 P. M.

19.

Officers' meeting 3:35 P. M.

20.

Struck a truck, 7:40 P. M., 18 December, driver possible skull fracture. Simple fracture upper leg. Pulled 8:10 P. M.

21.

7:00 A. M., 19 December, 1941, uneventful night. Weather fair with some fog.

22.

Arrived at Fort Ord, California, at 11:55 A. M., 19 December, detrained and made camp.

As a matter of fact there had been a corps forming earlier that year, a corps to include the 35th and 30th Divisions, among other troops, to reinforce American forces in the Philippines. This was a part of that movement. Upon arrival at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, however, there was found to be an acute shortage of shipping. Pending the availability of suitable vessels, then, men of the Regiment and the Division were assigned to temporary duty on nearby installations while Fort Ord remained the "home station." Christmas Day was spent in pup tents in the cold rain.

The appearance of a Japanese submarine near Santa Barbara, and its shelling of the coast, emphasized the possible danger to the California coast. There was a real need for well-trained organizations to take over responsibility for the defense of California. There was need for the discipline and efficiency which would restore confidence to a disturbed civil population, and for the skill and self-confidence which would be effective in the face of a real threat. Fresh from Louisiana maneuvers, and already in the area, the 35th Division was one assigned to the task, relieving local units of the National Guard which had been distributed initially along the coast. The only unit of the 134th to walk up a gangplank during this time was Company E which boarded the liner Aquatania in order to settle a strike among crewmen which threatened to delay her sailing.

The result was that by the time ships were available, the 35th Division was on other duty, and the 32nd Division, then awaiting ships at the New York Port of Embarkation for movement to England, was brought all the way across the continent to take over the transports which had been intended for the 35th; thus it was the 32nd Division which was destined for the long fight against Japanese from the Southwest Pacific to the Philippines.

While at Fort Ord the 35th Division went through the "streamlining" process of reorganizing as a triangular division. This meant that one of the four infantry regiments - the 138th - was lost, brigades were abolished, and there was considerable reorganization of the division artillery and special troops. Most of the excess units then were ear-marked for eventual movement to Alaska.

Successive moves took the Regiment to Camp San Luis Obispo - where a big beach defense problem and demonstration was the feature of the training, back up to the Presidio of San Francisco, then down to Centinela Park, in Inglewood, just outside Los Angeles. The concentration at Inglewood was temporary, however, pending the location of a suitable headquarters and training area farther north. Assigned to the Southern California Sector of the Western Defense Command, the 35th Division had deployed to carry out its defensive mission. May 21 Regimental Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion moved to scenic Ojai Valley Country Club, while the 1st Battalion remained in Inglewood with an anti-sabotage mission, and the 3rd was deployed along the coast on either side of Ventura. This was the beginning of the war's golden era for the self-styled "Hollywood Commandos" of the 134th Infantry.

For some time now, additional officers had been joining the Regiment to replace those being transferred from time to time to fill vacancies created in the adoption of new tables of organization. At this particular period, most of these were reserve officers who had just finished the basic course in The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Undoubtedly one of the great institutions of the war, The Infantry School provided a common background for every infantry officer commissioned in the United States. National Guard and Reserve officers followed the basic course, and the Officer Candidates' course, for men working toward a commission, was of similar content. A fresh group of officers arrived now in May. They were second lieutenants all - Ray Carroll went to Company K, Robert Lio went to Company B, Romer went to Regimental Headquarters, Malowney went to Company D. . . . One of the group had undertaken to keep a diary of his days as a member of Basic Class 28, Company N, 1st Student Training Regiment:

February 22 - Sunday - The war takes a new turn as men report for Basic Class 28 in the Infantry School. Lines form for processing. Equipment is drawn, including haversacks, cleaning rods, combination tools, and 27 Field Manuals.
February 23 - Monday - Free time to purchase uniforms and equipment. Those days are gone forever.
February 24 - Tuesday -

And then one officer who had been left behind as over-age in grade rejoined the Regiment, much to the satisfaction of all concerned. Major William G. Utterback - he was Lt. Col. very shortly thereafter - arrived and took command of the 3rd Battalion at Ventura.

The approach of a Japanese fleet toward Midway Island brought alerts and dawn and dusk "stand-to's" and more patrolling for the 134th Infantry.

Patrols covered the waterfront: Malibu . . . Point Magu . . . Oxnard . . . Elwood Oil Fields . . . Carpenteria . . . Santa Barbara . . . Gaviota . . . Surf. Those were days of bulky S-2 journals filled with notes on alleged submarines (which frequently turned out to be sea lions) and on mysterious lights which were observed along the blacked-out coast. Those were nights of "pounding the sands" as two-man patrols tramped up and down the beaches in a darkness broken only by the phosphorescent glow of breakers and by the signals of blue-covered flashlights which they carried so that their officers could find them. Later, mounted and foot patrols from the Coast Guard had taken over much of the sector and sometimes their untrained recruits were accused of shooting horses and cows when they failed to heed the challenge, "Halt!"

Lt. Col. Dean E. Coonley's 1st Battalion, remaining in the Los Angeles area, had local readjustments to make from time to time. Battalion Headquarters moved to Mines Field, and there men posted to guard the North American aircraft factory watched the new B-25 "Mitchells" and P-51 "Mustangs" go through their tests. One reinforced company moved into newly-constructed barracks at Hawthorne, and it had the responsibility of operating motor patrols through the Torrance oil fields and of maintaining guards around the Northrop Aircraft plant. There they admired the new XP-61 night fighter, the "Black Widow," and the curious little experimental plane, the "Flying Wing."

For Lt. Col.Frank Dunkley's 2nd Battalion, it was training during these first few weeks at "Camp Lah Wee Lah His" - otherwise known as the Sun Valley or Ojai Country Club. Here, there were squad problems and rifle and machine gun field firing with 60mm and 81mm mortars, (which frequently amounted to a few minutes of firing the weapon and then spending the remainder of the day in fighting brush and grass fires).

And Ojai was the scene of the inevitable formal guard mounts, and battalion and regimental parades. The Regimental Band, in white leggings and cross belts and shiny helmets, always put on a good show for those dress occasions. At guard mount the spic and span members of the guard would execute their movements in precision; the commander of the guard would inspect the guard and arouse the admiration of numerous spectators with his skillful spinning of the rifles as he stepped from one man to another while the band carried on with the "Missouri Waltz." Regimental parades on Sunday afternoon always were an attraction for hundreds of California friends and wives and sweethearts. It was a thrilling sight to stand on a hill in front of the clubhouse and watch the companies march onto the golf course; to see the platoons simultaneously break out of the column as the company commander shouted "Company mass, left, march!" - and the band would play the "Viking March" or "Washington Post" - officers would march smartly to the front and center with company guidons following the commanders - and the band would change to a pepped-up version of "There Is No Place Like Nebraska" while out-of-state (Nebraska, that is) spectators would mutter a good-natured "Thank God," and Cornhusker sympathizers would cheer - and then the band would lead off the "march in review" with "El Captain," and would execute its tricky, unorthodox column left at each turn.

Loss of the Regimental Band by a revision of the tables of organization subsequently was a real blow to unit morale. In the 134th skilled musicians became company buglers, and eventually were reassembled in a "drum and bugle corps" to furnish music for special occasions.

Rotation of the battalions permitted a few weeks at each type of duty - beach patrol out of Ventura, anti-sabotage in Los Angeles area, and training in Ojai.

There was an interruption to the planned rotation, however, before it could complete one round. The Regiment had been called upon to furnish on battalion for a special mission - a mission to Alaska. There had been a high command decision to retake the islands of the Aleutian chain which the Japanese had occupied, and the first necessity was to acquire an advance base. For this task the commanding general of the Fourth Army was given the mission to organize a task force around an infantry battalion. The size was given as that of a battalion because it was considered that no larger force would be required, and because the shortage of shipping continued. When Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, Fourth Army Commander, called upon Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray, now commanding the 35th Division, to name a regiment to furnish such a battalion, General Murray named the 134th Infantry Regiment. Time was short, but choosing a battalion was not as difficult a decision as it might have been under different circumstances. The choice fell upon the 2nd Battalion because that unit had completed its period of training at Ojai. The prospect of losing a battalion, of impairing the regimental team, was a little disappointing. At the same time, however, there was a justified pride to be felt in having the 134th Infantry singled out to furnish the battalion. Moreover, the higher commanders had intimated that the battalion, once its mission were accomplished, would be returned to the Regiment.

Nearly all the junior officers and numbers of enlisted men were transferred from the 1st and 3rd Battalions to bring the 2nd up to full strength. In addition there were attached a cannon platoon, and anti-tank platoon, a mine squad, a chaplain and Service Company personnel. There was a rapid exchange of stations as the 1st Battalion, then at Ojai, moved on about four hours notice to relieve the 3rd along the coast, the 3rd moved to Los Angeles to relieve the 2nd, and the 2nd returned to Ojai to begin processing for its special expedition. Most of its supplying, its record checking, its inoculations were accomplished there before moving to the port at San Francisco. On August 13, the first of the units of the 134th Infantry to leave for an overseas station sailed through the Golden Gate. Combat loaded in San Francisco, the task force arrived at Kodiak a week later, and, after five days of practice beach landings, set sail for Adak, a small island of the Andreanoff Group which was the objective. The 2nd Battalion hit the beaches of Adak at 0630 on August 30. There was all the tenseness and wonder that goes with uncertainty, and it was a great relief when the landings were completed without opposition. The job at hand then was the building of an Army post to support the bigger attacks to come. It required an organization, a discipline, a leadership of the highest order to make effective the difficult tasks involved in unloading the ships, constructing the airfield, erecting quarters, on that bleak, northern island. Its accomplishments brought a commendation from General DeWitt. Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri obtained unanimous consent to have the correspondence concerning the commendation inserted in the Congressional Record. It contained the information:

That Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding general, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, had informed (General Murray) that the operation participated in by the 2nd Battalion, One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Infantry, in the north had been highly successful and was carried out in a most excellent manner and that the 2nd Battalion of the One Hundred and Thirty-fourth Infantry was to be highly commended for it exemplary action in this operation.

Already a number of former soldiers of the 134th Infantry had been in action in various operations against the enemy, and several received individual commendations. Noteworthy among these were the anti-tank gun crews who were transferred from the Anti-tank Company for duty aboard armed transports. Second Lieutenant Donald C. Sherrets and each of the eleven enlisted men who had gone with him for service on U. S. Army Transport President Johnson received individual commendations for their attention to duty, their appreciation of the importance of their mission and their actions in hostile waters.

Late that autumn it became clear that the old 2nd Battalion was lost to the Regiment for the duration, and orders came to organize a new battalion to take its place. The replacements arrived at Ojai during Christmas week. It was a tremendous job to build a new battalion from scratch. Cadres from the old battalion, of course, were transferred to the new unit, but it took time for such a large group of replacements to be assimilated, for the new 2nd Battalion to feel its place in the tradition of the 134th Infantry. The difficult job of building the new unit proceeded under the command of Lt. Col. A. D. Sheppard, regimental executive officer. Later, Major Denver W. Wilson returned from the assignment as assistant division G-3 to take command of the new battalion.

In January, 1943, the 35th Division reverted to the direct control of the Army Ground Forces, and, less the 140th Infantry, left the Southern California Sector to re-assemble at Camp St. Luis Obispo. General Murray remained in control of the Southern California Sector, and Brig. Gen. Paul Baade, assistant division commander, succeeded to the command of the division.

At San Luis there had been the California winter rains and marches and range-firing of all weapons and field exercises for squads and platoons. The primary mission now had become training again rather than security. Emphasis on discipline always had to be maintained. In the course of one of his talks the regimental commander was quoted as saying words to the effect that Any member of the Regiment found dead in battle will be found properly dressed.

But there were more changes, and more training, coming. Shortly after trainloads of men had arrived from Fort Dix, New Jersey, and from Georgia to fill newly-activated regiment - the 320th - the whole division moved back to Camp Rucker, Alabama. (Previously the 134th's new battalion had become officially the 2nd Battalion when the 2nd Battalion, 134th Infantry was transferred from the Alaska command to Camp San Luis Obispo, "less personnel and equipment," and the old 2nd was redesigned the 2nd Battalion, 197th Infantry per letter AGO 320.2 [I-15-43] OB-I-GN-M.)

This move involved almost a transcontinental rail movement. As always with troop trains there were incidents on each which would become indelible in the memories of the soldiers: the train which, stopping for a period of exercise, pulled out before one of the platoons got back, and then had to back up a mile or so to pick up the lost platoon - Major Thompsen, energetic executive officer of the 1st Battalion, and one time Union Pacific employee, riding in the cab - the pathetic chase of the lovable little black dog which had been the mascot of Company C when the train pulled out after a rest stop before he could get back on, and then his running down the track after the train until it was out of sight.

Camp Rucker meant excessive heat and rigorous physical tests; it was intensive training all the way, from April to November 1943. In order to equalize the state of training of the three regiments of the division, the commanding general ordered a sweeping exchange of personnel between the old regiments, on one hand, and the newly-activated 320th on the other. Obviously such a move was necessary to make the division a well-balanced team. But the order hit the 134th especially hard because of the very similar problem which it had in its own organization in building up the new 2nd Battalion. The regimental commander, in view of the difficulties, was able to save the original old members - the Nebraskans who had been with the 134th when it was called into Federal Service. Those men - those 2072 men (from the first four digits of their serial numbers) - were men who had volunteered for this particular regiment, and they, more than anyone else, carried its tradition. The need for this core around which to build up an esprit de corps was more urgent now than ever.

At first it was basic training all over again at Camp Rucker. It was necessary to stress the necessity of making full use of this training opportunity; to an assembled meeting of regimental officers, the commander could say, I can tell you frankly that I think this is the last time we will train a regiment before going overseas. There was training in scouting and patrolling, first aid, military courtesy and discipline, there were Saturday morning inspections, and reviews of weapons training. Ranger training and realistic combat training were the fashion, and that had meant many a weary mile over dusty roads in the extreme heat of the Alabama sun when each mile thinned the ranks of marching columns. There were obstacle courses . . . platoon proficiency tests . . . battalion proficiency tests . . . regimental combat problems . . . the infiltration course . . . the combat reaction course . . . the attack of a Nazi village . . . the attack of a fortified position . . . a week s exacting regimental combat team exercises in the Conecuh National Forest, south of Andalusia, on the Alabama-Florida state line. Men were able to find some relief from the exertions of training in week-end passes to Dothan and in occasional furloughs - or in going over to the hot, crowded PX to sit and drink beer (3.2) or soda pop, or to get paper cups filled with ice cream and then push their way out through the banging screen door while the juke box blared out Rosalita or Pistol Packin Mamma. One of the most severe tests was the required march of 25 miles in eight hours with full field equipment, a march which the battalion made at night in order to escape some of the punishing heat.

During a meeting of the entire Regiment in the Camp Rucker Bowl, it was suggested that the famous remarks of General Hale during the Philippine Insurrection - "There goes the First Nebraska, and all hell can't stop them!" - might furnish a battle cry for the present-day Regiment. Within a month there appeared the legend "All Hell Can't Stop Us" - white on blue - over the door of every orderly room in the regimental area.

All of those weeks at Camp Rucker had been leading up to the next phase of training: maneuvers in Tennessee. There, over battlefields made famous in engagements of the Civil War, modern troops participated in war games as nearly like the real thing as could be devised. Foxholes and pup tents afforded little comfort in that cold and wet winter from mid-November to mid-January. This had led to the authorization of small fires ("no higher than six inches") during combat problems; arrival of the ice cream and doughnut man would herald the end of a problem, and then the fires would grow to a height of nearer six feet (in any kind of weather) and then some men could get showers at some schoolhouse or in some improvised arrangement, and some could go on pass and help to swell the throngs in Nashville; and sometimes there would be a great vocal outburst when a cottontail rabbit happened to jump up form the brush and men would take up the chase as cries of "Get that rabbit" carried quickly down the line in the direction the animal was running.

Again there had been river crossings (it was the deep Cumberland this time) and night withdrawals and attacks.

Throughout the maneuver period groups of replacements - both officers and enlisted men - were being received to maintain the Regiment at near its full authorized strength. Many of the replacements were of the highest caliber and soon made themselves highly valued assets of the 134th. There was for example, the group of "brand new" second lieutenants which reported on November 29 and 30, which proved to be a peculiarly significant group of officers: Michael Hanna, Company C; Constant J. Kjems, Company A; James B. Curran, Company G; Clarence L. Evans, Company H; Chauncey M. Erickson, Company M; Halley K. Dickey, Jr., Company M; Clarence C. Bartsch, 1st Battalion (soon to Company A); John Campbell Jr., 1st Battalion (soon to Company L); Kenneth W. Bush, 2nd Battalion, and Charles N. Cummins, 3rd Battalion.

After maneuvers such as those in Tennessee, the prospect of clean barracks and camp routine - to say nothing of furloughs for everybody - loomed more attractive than ever for the soldiers of the 134th Infantry.

List of Illustrations:

"There were hikes and field training at Robinson"

"Camp Robinson: champions at baseball too"

Col. Per Ramee (seated left) was commanding the 69th Brigade during the Louisiana maneuvers

Brig. Gen. Benjamin Lockwood (left foreground) with Col. Miltonberger while a motor convoy prepares at Camp Robinson

The Colonel and his staff (left to right: Capt. Morton, Lt. Col. Geesen, Maj. VanKirk, Maj. Dunkley, Capt. McGill, Capt. Wilson)

and the Regimental Band

led the great Armistice Day parade at Memphis

On the anti-tank range at Ojai

Preparing to leave Seaside Park, Ventura

The 2nd Battalion hit the beaches of Adak at 0630 on 30 August

Officers of the 2nd Battalion in the Aleutians

Bandsmen re-appeared as drummers and buglers (Ozark, Alabama)

ChapterIII

P. O. M.

THIS CERTIFIES THAT
I AM POM QUALIFIED
FIT TO FIGHT
AND READY TO GO
ALL HELL
CAN'T STOP US
- 134th Inf. P.O.M. Qualification Card.

The "final examination" Tennessee Maneuvers - passed, there was little question but that the 134th Infantry was ear-marked for movement overseas before many weeks. The time at Camp Butner, North Carolina, was the time to complete preparations for that movement.

After the mud and ice of Tennessee, however, it was clear that the catch-all of training schedules, "care and cleaning of equipment" would take on a real meaning during those first days back in garrison. Preparation, in fact, did not get very much beyond that for a while, for soon there was an interlude - maneuvers again, and this time more rigorous than ever.

The 134th Infantry and its combat team-mates (161st Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 110th Medical Battalion, 1st Platoon, Company A, 60th Engineers, and a team from the 35th Signal Company) had had the fortune (good or ill, depending upon your point of view) to be one of the few regimental combat teams chosen for the specialized training of mountain maneuvers in West Virginia. (Probably for possible use in the contemplated invasion of Southern France.)

There, with the rucksacks made heavy with sleeping bags, rubberized mountain tents and aluminum pins, gasoline cooking stoves, and C, D, and K rations, the trainees marched over rough terrain, climbed rocks (with the aid of pitons and hammers and karabiners and nylon ropes) and participated in a series of tactical exercises. Dressed in herringbone mountain jackets, pants, and caps, and shoepacs (footgear with rubber feet and leather uppers), worn with heavy wool socks and felt insoles, the men were able to endure the sudden blizzards and deep snows without suffering from frostbite or exposure.

Once in Camp Butner again, there was little further distraction from the central objectives of completing preparations from movement overseas. This was a much more complex task than it had been back in December, 1941, when the Regiment had been scheduled for a Pacific voyage, and it was much more detailed than it had been back in July and August, 1941, when the 2nd Battalion moved to Alaska. Previous experience had shown too many deficiencies, and now every item - of training, of supply, of personal affairs - was being checked closely. In order to make this check effective, charts went up in the day room of each company, and every officer and man received a "P.O.M. Qualification Card." These cards listed 23 items, each of which was to be initialed by an appropriate authority as evidence that the individual had met the respective requirements. The items:

- Identification Tags O.K.

- Identification Card O.K. (officers)

- Immunization Register complete

- Has extra glasses (if applicable)

- Teeth O.K.

- Infiltration course

- Fired own weapon for record

- Familiarization firing

- Has proper clothing and equipment

- Pay Data Card or record O.K.

- Emergency address card O.K.

- Will, power of attorney

- Medical officers' certificate

- Insignia removed

- Clothing and equipment marked

- Baggage marked

- Section VIII, AR 380-5 (on safeguarding military information)

- Article of War 28 (on soldier's shirking hazardous duty guilty of desertion)

- Allotments, insurance

- Malaria control

- Furloughs and leaves

- Dependants allowance

- Military censorship

Chiefly responsible for close supervision of the charts, and so the check on P.O.M., was the regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. Albert D. Sheppard. A lieutenant with overseas service in World War I, Colonel Sheppard had risen in succeeding years to the executive officer in Missouri's 140th Infantry. Peace-time pursuits as journalist and as commander of the Missouri State Police had equipped the officer well for his military duties. He had come to the 134th Infantry in May, 1941, to take command of the 3rd Battalion, and in January, 1942, his assignment as regimental executive officer had become effective. As such, he was second-in-command of the 134th Infantry; his was the duty of co-ordinating the staff; his would be the duty of supervising activities at the command post in the absence of the regimental commander. An affable "son of the middle border," and a gentleman of the old south, Colonel Sheppard now could apply his congenial manner but seriousness of purpose to a highly detailed and urgent task.

Members of the regimental staff, then, were being kept busy, not only with the usual functions appertaining to their assignments, but with more frequent and more detailed - and more important - inspections, and with greater details surrounding final preparations. The officer primarily concerned with matters of personnel and administration was young, dapper, Capt. Lysle I. Abbott of Omaha, adjutant and S-1. In the more specialized assignment of personnel officer - the one who supervised all company personnel records - was Captain Raymond J. Anderson of York, Nebraska. He was one of those officers who seemed to have been made to order for his job. Captain Anderson, a charter member of the Service Company, had held the same job for some length of time. Captain Abbott, on the other hand, got his start as an enlisted man in the old 2nd Battalion Headquarters Company, but more recently had served successively as regimental communications officer and then as 2nd Battalion adjutant before coming to regimental headquarters.

Concerned about security of military information and with the training of intelligence personnel, including members of the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon and the intelligence sections of the battalions, was Major Dale M. Goodwin, regimental S-2, who had come up from Company D, North Platte.

All military, efficiency personified, Capt. (soon to be Major) Dan E. Craig, also of North Platte, as operations and training officer, had the headaches of getting 100 per cent qualification in training requirements. This meant repeated "clean-ups" of every kind in the tremendous tasks involved in keeping up with absences, replacements, furloughs, and passes in getting every man through every required training activity. Captain Craig's more recent previous assignments had been commanding officer of Company M, and then S-3 of the 2nd Battalion.

A recent change in supply officers after the physical incapacity of Major Edward C. Gatz of Omaha, brought Major Thomas S. Morton, of Nebraska City to the staff S-4. Formerly commander of Company A, then regimental adjutant, acting executive officer of the 1st Battalion, and finally 2nd Battalion executive officer, Judge Morton (or "Sim," depending upon the circumstances) brought an easy-going diplomacy, and a business-like effectiveness which made themselves indispensable in heading the regimental supply. The S-4 had a dry humor which could penetrate any situation; it was born of intellectual insight, and the slow-moving, fast-thinking major conveyed the impression of always having the situation in hand.

Directing the 2nd Battalion in its preparation for overseas movement - and for combat - was Major (soon to be Col.) - Alford C. Boatsman of Beatrice, Nebraska, who had replaced Lt. Col. Dean E. Cooney when the later was called for a special mission to China. A deliberate, but decisive officer, Major Boatsman ("Jimmy" to his fellow-officers) had come up through Company C, and then commanded Company D; just prior to his joining the 1st Battalion as commander, he had been regimental S-3. Most of the Regiment's long training programs had been executed under his general supervision.

Commanding the 2nd Battalion still was Lt. Col. Denver W. Wilson who had taken command when the "new" 2nd Battalion was organized. Diminutive in stature, but a cool, thorough thinker in all situations, Colonel Wilson was another product of North Platte and Company D.

Lt. Col. Alfred Thomsen of Omaha had succeeded Lt. Col. William G. Utterback of Nebraska, as commander of the 3rd Battalion. An old 3rd Battalion officer, Colonel Thompsen had been regimental adjutant upon mobilization, but if there ever was a field soldier, this was he, and he had gone to the 1st Battalion as executive officer where he remained until his return to the 3rd. He had a personality which breathed vigor into anything which he undertook, and he had a tremendous physique to back up his thoroughness. He was jocular, but serious-minded; kind-hearted, but a stern disciplinarian; comprehensive in outlook, but thorough in details.

Staff, battalion commander, the warrant officers (God bless them), the company commanders, the 1st Sergeants, the junior officers, and all the rest, were working with a thoroughness characteristic of their Regiment in making themselves ready for the supreme test which even now could be felt to be drawing closer and closer.

Repeated training programs and cries of "wolf!" - that the Division was about to move overseas - had led to some impatience on the part of some men. It was not that any of them ever was really enthusiastic about finding himself in the midst of combat - they knew too well what it would be like; much of the romance surrounding World War I had failed to make a reappearance - but after so many months, many wished to get overseas and get on with the task at hand. "This outfit never is going to fight," they would say. It was time for another talk with the officers of the Regiment; they assembled one afternoon in the small building which served as an officers' club, "I know that some of you have been getting impatient to get over there and get into action; well, you'll get your bellies full of fighting soon enough - after the first day you'll wish to God you were back here going through basic training again. Now it looks like we'll be on our way within four to six weeks, and it looks like England. Now let's do everything we can possibly do to get these troops into perfect shape to get this job done."

Everyone knew that this was no cry of "wolf!" Already, April 3, 1944, a confidential letter had arrived alerting the unit for movement. An advanced detachment was to be ready for movement April 10, and the remainder of the Division was given a readiness date of May 1.

The pace quickened as April drew to a close. There was a division review, and Major General Paul W. Baade addressed his whole command, "You have a record through training and maneuvers of which to be proud . . . this is a good division . . . in the days to come I shall at times probably call upon you to do what seems humanly impossible . . . "

Two days before departure from Camp Butner, the entire Regiment assembled in the Field House. There were preliminary remarks from staff officers, some on-the-spot entertainment, and then a hush fell over the 3,000 men as they gave to their regimental commander the attention which they always gave.

"We shall be moving overseas very soon now, and within a few weeks we shall be in the thick of combat. When we land over there, I intend for this to be the best regiment in the United States Army, and it will be the best - the best dressed, the best disciplined, the best fighting. I intend for as many to come back as possible. The only way that we can get the job done and bring back the maximum number is to have discipline that is superior. That is why you have heard me constantly harping on little things like shoe shines and haircuts and keeping helmet chin straps fastened and saluting and all the rest of it. I have heard you singing that song around the barracks, Old Soldiers Never Die; there is more truth in that than we can realize now. And let me tell you why 'old soldiers' get along in combat - it's because they have learned how to take care of themselves, to move forward out of artillery fire, to take advantage of cover and concealment, to work as a team, and to fight back."

There followed the final check-ups, the "dry runs" for boarding trains while carrying the heavy duffel bags and equipment . . . then the move by rail (May 1) to Camp Kilmer, and the rush through final clothing and equipment checks, orientation on what to expect overseas, issue of new type gas masks, more physical examinations, practice in the use of cargo nets for abandoning ship, more "dry runs" on entraining, and finally chalk-marking the steel helmets and marching off in roster order (the discipline of the Regiment was such that, in spite of passes to New York City, not a single A.W.O.L. was left behind) to the "canned" music of Stars and Stripes Forever to board the trains - it was the evening of May 11 - then the ferry across the Upper Bay to Staten Island . . . and there a band playing and Red Cross girls passing out coffee and doughnuts, and someone shouting, "There's the gang plank we have been looking for so long" . . . and the heavily-laden men marching aboard the naval transport, A. E .Anderson - a vessel of 26,000 tons which also carried Division Artillery Headquarters, the Division MP Platoon, the Band (fortunately for the Regiment's music entertainment), the 60th Engineer Battalion, and the 161st Field Artillery Battalion - and then the great convoy, guiding on the famed cruiser U.S.S. Marblehead, with a baby flattop near, destroyer escorts zigzagging out in front, and a blimp hovering overhead . . . and the life aboard ship, those agonizing hours for the seasick, the almost endless chow lines for the two meals a day, the police and inspections, the hours at reading the Guide to the U. K., playing cards, at small talk . . . and then, the welcome sight of the Irish coast, the pause in the harbor at Belfast where the appearance of the Battleships Texas and Nevada suggested that something big was up, for the only good reason for a dreadnought in European waters was for support of an invasion . . . and then, the break-up of the convoy, and the movement down through the Irish Sea to Avonmouth at the Port of Bristol . . . and there a Home Guard band from a Bristol aircraft factory out in a light English rain to greet the Americans with such tunes as Over There, Yankee Doodle, and Ole Man River while the Mayor (complete with topper), and a British Army officer came aboard to make a welcoming speeches . . . then debarkation and loading into compartments of English trains as dusk fell for the all-night trip down to the western end on Cornwall. Men grasped at a rumor, "We are going to be held as counter-invasion troops along the coast until after the big show is well on the way."

"Sure, we are old hands at beach defenses."

Units were distributed (troops were assigned to billets in houses, small hotels, and other buildings set aside for the purpose) according to the following station list:

- Hq. & Hq. Co.; Med. Det., less Bn. sections - Camborne

- 1st Battalion - Penzance

- 2nd Battalion (less Company H) - St. Ives

- Company H - Hayle

- 3rd Battalion (less Company I, Company K, Company L, and I Platoon, Company M) - Prah Sands

- Company I, plus 1 Platoon, Company M - Lizard Point

- Company K - Marazion

- Company L. - Portleven

- Anti-tank Company - Lands' End

- Service Company - Clowance Estate

- Cannon Company - Redruth

The days in Cornwall - the "Riviera" or the "California" of Britain - where members of the Regiment made friends as they had done wherever they had been, where strands of barbed wire ran along the beaches to remind visitors of the very real threat of invasion of Britain itself only a few years earlier - those days again were days for more training and for more perpetration for eventual movement. The 35th Division had been assigned to the Third Army, and its commander was found to be none other than the redoubtable Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., who had disappeared from the Mediterranean some months earlier with the explanation that he was going to "command another army."

Soon directives and letters of instruction were coming from the colorful commander. Some excerpts from a letter of April 3, 1944, suggest some of his patterns of thought:

I. General
1. You will not simply mimeograph this and call it a day. You are responsible that these usages become habitual in your command.

II. Discipline
1. There is only one sort of discipline - perfect discipline. Men cannot have a good battle discipline and poor administrative discipline.

* * * *

6. One of the primary purposes of discipline is to produce alertness. A man who is so lethargic that he fails to salute will fall an easy victim to any enemy.

7. Combat experience has proven that ceremonies, such as formal guard mounts, formal retreat formations, and regular and supervised reveille formations are a great help and, in some cases, essential to prepare men and officers for battle, to give them perfect discipline, that smartness of appearance, that alertness without which battles cannot be won.

* * * *

9. Officers are always on duty and their duty extends to every individual, junior to themselves, in the U. S. Army - not only to members of their own organization.

* * * *

III. Tactical Usages
1. a. (1) . . .
(2) There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is: "To use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum time."

* * * *

(8) The larger the force and the more violence you use in an attack, whether it be men, tanks, or ammunition, the smaller will be your proportional losses.
(10) Our mortars and our artillery are superb weapons when they are firing. When silent, they are junk - see that they fire!

b. (1) Use roads to march on, fields to fight on.

* * * *

(6) The effect of mines is largely mental. Not over 10 per cent of our casualties come from them. When they are encountered they must be passed through or around. There are not enough mines in the world to cover the whole country. It is cheaper to make a detour than to search; however, the engineers should start clearing the straight road while the advance elements continue to detour. See that all types of troops have mine detectors and know how to use them. You must - repeat - must get through!
(7) Never permit a unit to dig in until the final objective is reached, then dig, wire, and mine.

* * * *

(10) In battle, small forces - platoons, companies, and even battalions, can do one of three things - go forward, halt, or run. If they halt or run, they will be an even easier target. Therefore, they must go forward . . .

2. Infantry

a. Infantry must move in order to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move. When physical targets are not visible, the fire of all infantry weapons must search the area probably occupied by the enemy. Us marching fire. It reduces the accuracy of his fire and increases our confidence. Shoot short. Ricochets make nastier sounds and wounds. To halt under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward out of fire. Officers must set the example.

The "marching fire" to which General Patton referred was a tactical concept of his which ran completely counter to traditional infantry doctrine. Now instead of movement from cover to cover by short rushes, and cover by fire from men in prone position, he proposed the movement forward of the entire platoon or company or battalion - moving forward steadily with every weapon blazing. The theory was the sound one that the flood of cracking bullets would tend to keep enemy heads down constantly, while the attacker could continue his advance without (relatively) too much difficulty.

There were special schools for selected officers and men of the Regiment, there were visitors to the unit for special instruction, there were special courses within the Regiment. Lt. Eldephonse C. Reischel, 3rd Battalion motor officer, Chief Warrant Officer Harry Dahlgren, assistant regimental maintenance officer; T/5 Willard Gambill, and T/5 Otto Ribben, went to Bideford for a school on the waterproofing of vehicles. Lt. Thomas F. Murray of the 1st Battalion, and Lt. Charles D. Hall of the 3rd Battalion went to Bristol for a week's bomb reconnaissance school. Major Godwin was ordered to a 10-day intelligence school in London, and Captain Elbert B. O"Keefe, assistant regimental S-2, and the battalion S-2's attended a longer combat intelligence course in the American School Center at Shrivenham. Captain Edward P. McGehee, of the Medical Detachment, a three weeks' field medical school. Lt. Col. Sheppard and the battalion executive officers attended a Transportation Quartermaster Conference and School. There were others - towed weapons waterproofing for cannon company and the anti-tankers, waterproofing of signal equipment for communication officer, a course in London on street fighting for two enlisted men.

Perhaps there was a sigh of relief on the part of men of the 134th when some of the suspense of awaiting impending developments was broken with the announcement of landings on the Normandy coast June 6. Perhaps there was some thanksgiving that they were yet in Cornwall, but at the same time there was the anticipation which sprang from the knowledge that soon the 134th Infantry surely would be called upon, and there was confidence in the conviction that training had been thorough, that esprit was real, that discipline was superior.

Instruction teams arrived from the 28th Division to conduct an amphibious school and an enemy weapons school. Captain Lumley of the 737th Tank Battalion conducted a conference with battalion commanders and S-3's and special units commanders and regimental staff on the organization of the medium tank battalion and of its employment with infantry.

Lt. Arthur Gertz, assistant personnel officer, conducted a school on morning report summaries and battle casualty reports for all company commanders, executive officers, first sergeants, next highest ranking N.C.O.'s, and assistant company clerks. There were further courses of instruction on amphibious operations, on firing German weapons; officers' schools on radio procedure and use of the slidex given by Captain Karlovich, communications officer; a class on civil affairs by Captain Martin of Third Army Headquarters, and Lt. Keltner, assistant regimental S-3; classes on mapping and the British grid system by Lieutenant Haugen; night scouting and patrolling exercises under the supervision of Major Godwin and Captain O'Keefe.

In addition to all of this - and more - specialized training, there were more of the normal training pursuits in the units - weapons firing, small unit tactical problems, marches. And still there was a time for a softball tournament, a volleyball tournament, Red Cross clubmobiles, movies, U.S.O shows, dances.

The Regiment found itself on the spot June 26 when General Eisenhower and General Patton elected to make a visit of inspection. But those distinguished officers found the 134th Infantry on its mettle. Captain Abbott took a guide party to meet the visitors, accompanied by the division commander and his staff, at Redruth in the late afternoon. They went directly to Hayle Range where they watched members of Company L running squad problems in a manner very much to their satisfaction. Then they moved over to Penzance where they watched the 1st Battalion in a retreat parade, and again there was reason for a favorable impression. In a short address to the troops at Penzance after the ceremony, General Eisenhower welcomed them to England and the ETO, and he spoke of the high state of training which the Regiment had achieved; he recognized the important role of the infantry and he called for its vigorous actions in the use of marching fire. Finally, he expressed his confidence in the ability of the Regiment to do whatever job might be assigned to it, and he looked to the future with the promise of a "party on the Rhine."

That the reaction of General Eisenhower and General Patton to what they had seen on their visit to the Regiment was a good one became clear in a conference in which the regimental commander talked with those two high officers and General Baade. It seems likely now that it was then that the thought to move the 35th Division up to an earlier sailing date for movement to France took root. In any case, a warning order came just five days later - 1 July - for movement to the marshalling area the next day. Moved up ahead of such divisions as the 28th and the 5th which had been overseas for some months, the 35th was to be the tenth infantry division to land in Normandy.

The earlier movement order did not, however, find the 134th Infantry and the 35th Division unprepared. In fact the "top secret" alert order had been received the evening before the original landings in Normandy. This was concerned primarily with security measures (i.e., denying the leak of any military information which might be useful to the enemy) and with directing the fulfilling of all instructions given in the "bible" covering such preparations: ETO - POM - SSV - (European Theater of Operations - Preparation for Overseas Movement - Short Sea Voyage).Subsequent administrative instructions (confidential) contained detailed instructions concerning the handling and carrying of all classes of supplies in moving to the marshalling areas and in embarking for the "short sea voyage" across the English Channel.

Movement orders were not issued to battalion and special unit commanders until shortly before midnight that same 1 July. A light rain was falling again as men of the 134th Infantry marched out early that Sunday morning (Lah We Lah His - "We Move on Sunday!") to the railway stations designated for the respective units. The Regiment was divided into two groups, one to go to Plymouth, the other to Falmouth. In one of the few mix-ups which members of the Transportation Corps made in all their dealings with the Regiment, Company M proceeded to Plymouth instead of Falmouth, but soon matters were set right.

Processing in the marshalling area was short; for the individuals, it consisted mainly of changing English pounds into French invasion francs.

The next day, 3 July, the troops moved by truck down to the hards, and then boarded ship. Some went directly aboard the Liberty ship and the British transport, HMS Javelin, while others, boarding and LSI (landing ship, infantry) were shuttled from the hard to the anchorage in smaller craft. By regimental order, all troops were dressed in long underwear and oily, smelly, protective clothing (herringbone twill treated to protect the wearer against mustard); this had been ordered to insure warmth on the channel and to keep the woolens free of dirt and salt water so that they would be usable on the other side. That evening the men watched the vehicles hoisted aboard and secured in the hold, and then gathered in groups around boxes of 10 to 1 rations to make their meals - some resorted to the expedient of cooking strips of canned bacon by laying it on steam pipes of the ship. Then they unrolled their blankets for an attempt at sleep on the decks, but they watched bomb reflections against the southern sky and streams of colored tracer bullets which made a beautiful, if disquieting, display during the night as though it were a planned prelude to the celebration of the Fourth of July.

When the vessels carrying the 134th Infantry pushed out through the choppy seas of the English Channel that Independence Day, they were found to be but a few of the scores of ships plying between the coasts of Britain and Normandy. Debarkation (by landing craft) at the beach - the beach called "Omaha," much to the satisfaction and nostalgic sentiments of the members of "Nebraska's Own" 134th - proceeded during 5 July (the 3rd Battalion had to wait till the next day to go ashore).

Omaha beach was a busy place. Ships were anchored everywhere, with lighters, and rafts, and landing craft, and DUKW's (2 1/2-ton amphibious trucks) carrying cargo to shore (an audible sigh swept over the Liberty ship when the men saw a mail pouch dropped into the water from a neighboring vessel as it was being unloaded). Silver barrage balloons floated over the beach and C-47 transport planes took off every few minutes from the air strip. All this activity was striking commentary on the relative impotence of the Luftwaffe.

The 134th Infantry, first element of the 35th Division, had landed in Normandy on D + 30. As the soldiers of the Regiment marched up that familiar path, up the hill past the knocked-out German pill box, and later, as they passed a new American cemetery near Colleville-sur-Mer, everyone seemed to sense the deep debt which he owed to the men who had hit the beach to prepare the way.

List of Illustrations:

Omaha Beach on D + 30

Miltonberger, Lt. Col. Sheppard, Lt. Col. Wilson (2nd Bn), Lt. Col. Thomsen (3rd Bn), Maj. Boatsman (1st Bn)

Assembled regimental regular and special staffs at Camp Butner - P.O.M. Qualified!

C.O., Ex., and Capt. Abbott, Capt. Craig, Maj. Morton

Capt. Melcher supervises the beach-combing activities of K Company at Marazion

The 2nd Battalion . . .

. . . went to St. Ives

Gen. Eisenhower, Gen. Baade, Col. Miltonberger, Gen. Patton, Col. Solomon: they were favorably impressed

General Ike watched the retreat parade at Penzance . . . and promised a party on the Rhine

Chapter IV

Normandy

The battle for France was decided among the bloody orchards and hedgerows of Normandy.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

REPORT OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER . . .

Hour after hour, day after day – and now week after week – the grim, tired soldiers fight bloody close-in battles for 100 yards of shell-packed meadow. Each hedgerow conquered is a minor campaign won, each pasture and orchard a bitter epic of valor and death.

Someone once said that wars are won by the souls of men. Some day, when the full story of this phase of the French campaign can be written, some day when the Norman names of St. Lo and Pont Herbert and the forest of Mont Castre are inscribed in gold on the battle streamers and the plaques, due tribute can be paid to the men who struggled and died in the hedgerows and orchards and woods of western France.

- Hanson W. Baldwin in The New York Times,

July 19, 1944

Regimental Headquarters established its first command post in France – in Transit Area 3 – at 1545 on 5 July, but the C.P. moved to an area near Mercey that night, while other units of the Regiment continued to come ashore and make their way to the assigned assembly area. That night marching columns and motor convoys moved through the light of the near-full moon. Overhead an occasional Nazi plane would set off a tremendous – and beautiful – anti-aircraft barrage. The white moonlight lent a ghastly appearance to the crumbled stone and mortar houses of a destroyed village through which the columns moved. "It looks exactly like some of those old movies of the World War," someone observed.

First element of the Santa Fe Division to get to the front was the 134th Infantry’s 2nd Battalion. Orders came at 0315 on 8 July for a battalion to move up to the sector near Deville to relieve a battalion of the 120th Infantry. Hardly more than two hours later Lt. Col. Denver W. Wilson and his 2nd Battalion were on their way. It was a defensive mission, and the assignment was to be temporary, but men of the 134th went into it with all the enthusiasm of a major engagement. The 2nd Battalion arrived at its new area by 0800, and before 1300 it had completed the relief – by infiltration – and assumed responsibility for the sector. Within another hour, 81mm mortars of Captain Charles C. Hake’s Company H opened fire, and Staff Sergeant Dale Steckel’s mortar squad claimed the destruction of a German machine gun position.

Shortly after the departure of the 2nd Battalion for its special mission, the Regiment itself was alerted for movement. The 35th Division was about to be committed, but the 134th Infantry (less the 2nd Battalion) was being held out for the time being as corps reserve in Major General Charles H. Corlett’s XIX Corps. The two sister regiments, the 137th, under Colonel Grant Layng, and the 320th, under Colonel Bernard A. Byrne, were to make a limited attack in a zone to the left (east) of the Vire River between La Meuffe and La Nicollerie. (The Division was going in between the 30th – "Old Hickory" – Division, on the right, and the 29th – "Blue and Grey" – on the left.) The 134th now was moving up to an assembly area where it would be available for action on short notice.

In the new assembly area (the C.P. was near Les Essarts) all companies immediately set themselves to preparation for the problems ahead. For some unexplained reason (it might be explained on the basis of security prior to 6 June, but certainly not after that date) there had been no instruction or suggestions during the period of training in England concerning the tactical implications of a terrain characterized by such a system as hedgerows as was to be found in Normandy. Although the Cornish countryside was broken into small fields by systems of hedgerows, thinking had not gone much beyond the stage of speculation. But now the problem was real. It could be seen that the defender was going to have some advantages.

The hedgerows were similar – banks of dirt, sometimes with stones in them, as much as three to five feet thick at the base and tapering gradually to a thickness of two or three feet. This embankment usually was four to five feet high and surmounted by shrubs or trees. The sides were covered with grass and shrubs. The origin of hedgerows remains rather obscure, though it is likely that the scarcity of building materials (many of the houses are made with wooden beams and earth), and the rich soil and climate (which makes plants grow rapidly and thickens the hedges) contributed to their development. There are said to be two kinds of hedges there, the quickset and the dry hedges; the first were by far the most important, and they, in turn, were divided into hedges of defense, shelter, orchard, and fodder. Built for the protection of property, the defense hedges usually were made up with thorny shrubs; shelter hedges also were defensive, but had the further purpose of serving as windbreaks, and their timber yielded wood for building or heating. If the trees were for producing fruit, then the hedgerows were "orchard," and the fodder hedges contained any number of varieties of shrubs and trees. The hedgerow system seems to have dated at least from the time of the Romans. Now the main purpose of the hedgerows, whatever their origin, came to be protection against shellfire and bullets. In any case those earth and plant fences enclosed fields – usually meadows or orchards – of irregular shapes and sizes which seemed to average toward a rectangle about 100 yards long and 50 yards wide. "An aerial photograph of a typical section of Normandy shows more than 3,900 hedged enclosures in an area of less than eight square miles."

By digging down a deep foxhole – a covered one – behind these hedgerows, the defender could make himself almost immune from all kinds of small arms or shellfire. But that was not his only, nor his greatest advantage. There was the observation which he had denied his attackers but enjoyed himself. He could have his guns zeroed in, put an observer up in a tree and wait. The attacker, on the other hand, usually could not see more than one hedgerow ahead, and could almost never see any enemy activity, and when he discovered the enemy’s presence, by suddenly finding himself pinned down by enemy fire, he was too close to employ his artillery. At the same time, the enemy found that these hedgerows provided him with covered routes for supply and evacuation and withdrawal. There were numerous roads and lanes – always running between hedgerows – leading away in all directions. Frequently these would be considerably below the level of the adjacent fields, while the walls formed by the hedgerows would be just that much higher. Often the rows of trees would bend toward each other overhead and thus completely conceal the route from air observation.

Rifle platoons, during those last days of training, practiced at making attacks in which the squads used their Browning automatic rifles to "spray" the hedgerow running parallel to the front while a few men with grenades worked their way up the lateral hedgerows. Sometimes a squad would remain at the base of fire while the other squads worked forward on either side of the hedgerow toward the front, or sometimes smaller groups would work forward, always with support of machine guns.

It was evident that tanks were going to have a difficult time moving across that kind of terrain – the hedgerows were too strong for an ordinary medium tank to force, and unquestionably all the roads would be mined and covered by anti-tank guns. Battalion ammunition and pioneer officers experimented to see what kind of a charge of TNT it would take to blast a hole for the "iron horses." They found that it could be done, though it took a big explosion and sometimes a second; but it seemed that this might be a solution.

Other final preparations included the disposal of excess baggage. All clothing and equipment that was not going to be used was put into duffel bags, and all these were collected and placed in the custody of Captain Albert B. Osborne of Service Company. All gas masks were collected and stored there. Whenever a piece of extra or superfluous equipment appeared, the supply officers would call out immediately, "Send it back to the duffel bag area!"

There was a twinkle in the eyes of some when they heard of the instructions which had come from First Army concerning helmet chin-straps; they were to be put up over the back of the helmet and never worn fastened under the chin. (In this Regiment it had been one of those unpardonable breeches of discipline to be seen with chinstraps not properly fastened). Theoretically this order had been originated in order to avoid broken necks resulting from the sudden upward jerk of helmets when the concussion of near bomb or shell hit it. Actually, no such case has ever been authenticated, and it is quite likely that more serious casualties resulted from loss of the helmet at a critical moment than would have from any such effects of the chinstrap.

More annoying to the officers and non-commissioned officers was the required identification markings – officers were to have a vertical white stripe on the back of the helmet, and non-coms a horizontal stripe. In addition, officers were instructed to wear their insignia on the front of their helmets. Nets dulled the shine of helmets and insignia considerably, but most leaders were afraid that they were asking for trouble from snipers. Many complied by putting on a strip of adhesive tape for the stripe, and then taking care to smear it with mud; another bit of mud, or a leaf in the net, accomplished similar results for the bars. After hearing some of the stories which were drifting back on sniper activity, some of the officers took their bars off their collars and wore them underneath, and several of the non-coms tore off their chevrons. Some officers began looking around for different weapons, a Tommy gun, or an M-1 rifle. Actually the carbine was not such an unsatisfactory weapon for an officer. It was not intended that an officer should engage normally in a fire fight; his weapon was for personal protection, or other emergencies; if he were off firing at the enemy it frequently meant that his men were being neglected; his responsibility was to direct the fire of many weapons.

Men of the 134th knew that their days of grace were running short. Up to this time they had not heard any enemy fire in the area, but one morning before daylight they were awakened by a series of strange but not totally unfamiliar noises. The sound, part shrieking, part whining, part whistling, would be at a relatively high pitch as it broke the silence, and then as it descended to a lower tone it would stop altogether; after a momentary pause a fairly distant explosion would make itself heard, and then reverberate for added emphasis. And then would come another, and another; but they were falling too far away to cause any real concern. Then from the direction of the front came the sharp staccato of machine gun fire. Yes, it was a German machine gun all right, just as it had been described back in England; it was firing too rapidly to be an American weapon. (The German machine gun, M.G. 34, fired at a cycle rate of 900 rounds a minute, while the newer M.G. 42 fired at the terrific rate of 1,200 to 1,500 a minute.) It sounded as though someone might be having a counterattack; but the noises of battle died away with the coming of daylight.

"By God, Sir, I’m not sure how we are going to work our 81’s and heavy machine guns through this hedgerow country." A heavy weapons commander was standing under an apple tree addressing his battalion commander. "I think we may have to throw away the machine gun tripods and just set the guns on top of the hedgerows," he continued, "I think we’ll try to have a mortar observer run this light wire for our sound-powered phones right along the leading companies; I’m afraid to depend too much on our 300 radios; I’m not sure how good they will carry in this country, and there are lots of stories coming back from the 29th and 30th that the minute you start using them you draw artillery right in on you; they claim the Krauts have the best radio locator equipment there is." He turned to the intelligence officer and said, "Say, see how they are working that when you go up and visit the 30th this afternoon."

When the Division made its initial attack on 11 July, each of the battalions of the 134th was permitted to send a limited number of officers – limited so that they would not interfere with the operations of the units – to observe the action. It was that day that Major Warren C. Wood, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, remained overdue for several hours. "I hear that Major Wood may beat us all to Berlin," someone said, "They think that he may be a prisoner already." Major Wood, however, had been safe looking after Lt. John Mullin of Company C who had been injured by a near shell burst.

Now the next afternoon, parties from Regimental Headquarters and from the battalions – usually intelligence and operations officers – were going forward to visit units of the 29th and 30th Divisions. One group climbed into its assigned jeep and drove out of the meadow onto a gravel road, then took a broken, dusty asphalt road across the Vire River and through the nearly-destroyed village of Pont de St. Fromond. A turn down a narrow, muddy road – here the driver had to shift into four-wheel drive – brought them presently to the battalion C.P. of the 30th Division. Coming upon a non-commissioned officer at a mortar position, one of the officers asked where he might find the S-3.

"Sorry sir, but he was killed last night; shell got him in that foxhole right over there."

The officer tried to swallow, but his throat was dry. He asked some questions about the mortar platoon, and then walked over to an adjoining field to see some machine gun positions. There in a corner of the hedgerows, he saw for the first time a group of dead Yanks. The bodies were covered with canvas, but their neatly laced leggings and shoes protruded. "Yeh," one of the soldiers said, "they got it last night; some get it every night."

The officer talked to some of the other soldiers as they lay in their foxholes – found out for the heavy weapons commander that this battalion was using light machine gun tripods for its heavy machine guns – and was ready to go back. The chatter of machine gun fire over to the left did not make him regret this decision.

After four days in the assembly area, there still was no official word on how long the Regiment could be expected to remain. The 2nd Battalion had returned to the Regiment early on the 11th, but a two-hour visit of the regimental commander at Division headquarters the next night disclosed no further change in the situation.

The 13th went by much the same as its predecessors; much the same, that is, until 2030 that night. It was then that orders came relieving the 134th Infantry from corps reserve, and less than an hour later the regimental commander and his S-3 were on their way to the Division C.P. where an order awaited calling for the 134th Infantry to relieve elements of the 115th Infantry (29th Division) at once with one battalion, and to prepare to attack on the 15th!

The 3rd Battalion received the assignment to execute that nocturnal relief without benefit of daylight reconnaissance. The companies began breaking camp even while the company commanders were on their way up to receive orders.

Colonel Thomsen issued his order promptly, and then, leaving Major Foster H. Weyand, executive officer, to take charge of marching the troops down to the new area, he took his adjutant, S-2, S-3, and communications officer with him, and set out by jeep to contact the units to be relieved and to be prepared to guide his own battalion into position. "This is a hell of a time to be moving up," someone said, "it’s the 13th."

Minutes later four blacked-out jeeps were purring down the road – through the ruins of Moon-sur-Elle, and on down to a position east of a village called Villiers-Fossard. The colonel stopped first at the 115th regimental command post to check and get further directions, and then he went on down to the C.P. of the 2nd Battalion. (Inasmuch as the relief concerned parts of two battalions, Captain Ray Carroll, 3rd Battalion S-3, went over to the C.P. of the adjacent battalion on the left to co-ordinate the relief in that sector.)

After some searching about, Colonel Thomsen found the C.P. in a deep, well-covered dugout at the edge of a field. He called down, and then his party followed him down some narrow dirt steps and crowded into the hole. The light from a gasoline lamp hanging in one corner had grown dim from want of air. This made even more dismal the heavy atmosphere. A pair of dark, tired eyes, set in a gaunt face which was covered with beard and dust, looked up to inquire the mission. The eyes belonged to a major who sat on the floor. He ran his hand through a head of dark hair which evidently had been clipped but now had grown out. He remained silent; his face did not change its blank, tired expression until Colonel Thomsen spoke.

"I understand we are to relieve you folks," the colonel said.

"Relieve us? Relieve us?" The major shook a captain who was sleeping beside him, "Did you hear that? They are going to relieve us!" It was not a very reassuring thing for the newcomers to hear this announcement greeted with such enthusiasm; it sounded too much like they were inheriting a difficult assignment. Later they learned that it was common practice not to notify a unit that it was going to be relieved until reconnaissance or advance parties from the relieving unit contacted it. This doubtless so that such a unit would not be tempted to let up its pressure while awaiting relief. This particular unit had been going, with almost no relief, since "D-Day." The battalion commander had become a casualty, and the major had taken over.

Lt. Floris M. Garner, battalion communications officer, asked someone if he could see the communications officer.

"Sorry, but he was killed; we can get the sergeant for you."

It was getting to the point that one hesitated ever to ask for any particular individual, for it seemed that so frequently that one had been killed.

Men of the Third Battalion began moving into the position as soon as they arrived, but it was a slow, cautious process, and was not completed until about 1030 the next morning.

Shortly after dawn the battalion S-2 of the 115th came into the dugout to give what information he could. After questioning some prisoners which had just been brought it, the one intelligence officer took the other on a tour of the area. "Now keep your head down," he warned, "the Germans are behind the next hedgerow." With a stiff, stubby beard, and dust in his ears and eyebrows, he had the same "beaten-up" appearance at the others. He was too tired to be nervous or excited about anything. But he was a worker, and he did everything he could to help.

He continued talking. "We have made attacks on three separate days, and each time wound up in these same foxholes. It’s a rough go, but with your fresh troops you may be able to do it. The men get so they freeze to their foxholes and you can’t make them go. The only way the platoon leader can make them get up and go is for him to jump over the hedgerow first and be scout and point and everything; then he gets himself knocked off and there you are."

They walked over to the right. The lieutenant pointed over to the right front. "You see those trees and hedgerows running toward the front? Well, that’s the damned sunken road. A Heinie self-propelled 88 pulls up that road and just raises hell in here, and before we can do anything about it he pulls back again. We can’t advance down the road because he’s got it zeroed in, and that leaves our flank open."

They moved, crouching below hedgerows, back to the rear in order to find a covered approach over to the left part of the sector. The lieutenant described what a difficult time they had had in capturing Villiers-Fossard. In the corner of the field behind the C.P. they passed a pile of equipment that included practically everything GI in a battalion. It had come off casualties or had been damaged. There were packs and belts and canteens and mess kits and raincoats and clothing and helmets and weapons. There were some more dead Yanks there – "They got it in yesterday’s shelling."

On return to the C.P., the lieutenant borrowed a canteen of water and poured some of it into his steel helmet. He tried to wash off some of the accumulated dirt and dust. As he pulled a dirty handkerchief from his pocket to dry his face, Lt. Col. Boatsman, commander of the 1st Battalion, and Lt. Col. Wilson, commander of the 2nd Battalion arrived. They had their operations officers and company commanders with them to make a reconnaissance of the ground over which they were to attack on the morrow. The lieutenant, tired as he was, at once went over to offer his services. Soon he was touring the front again, helping them orient their maps, pointing out terrain features and indicating probable enemy positions.

"Be careful of that damned sunken road," he always would say.

St. Lo was a key to the Normandy defenses. The town was not a very large one (peacetime population: about 12,000), but it was the most important road center in the area. It was the anchor of the German defenses in Normandy. Not only did the main defense line of the Cotentin Peninsula, along the St. Lo – Periers - Lessay highway hinge there, but so did the secondary line, along the St. Lo – Coutances highway as well. About 47 miles southeast of Cherbourg, it lay to the west of a horseshoe bend in the Vire River at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. It was the capital of the French department of Manche (the name which the French applied to the English Channel).

American pushes toward St. Lo from both the north and the east had come practically to a standstill at distances of two and three miles from the city. The British were meeting the same kind of resistance in the Caen area – the Nazis were holding furiously all along the front. A Vichy radio broadcast on 12 July had announced that Von Kluge, German commander in Normandy, we expecting "an all-out American drive for St. Lo." Another German source added that a new panzer division had been thrown into battle in the St. Lo area. The German apprehensiveness was well-founded.

The only fresh troops remaining to influence the situation of the XIX Corps in its battle for St. Lo with the 134th Infantry Regiment, and now General Corlett had determined to commit this Regiment in an effort to break the stubborn German defenses. It was the feeling of the regimental commander that what had come to be a "normal" pattern of attack ought to be changed if the attack were to be effective. Therefore he proposed that the normal artillery preparation be omitted to avoid "telegraphing the punch," but that then a very heavy artillery concentration ought to accompany the jump-off itself, and then that a rolling barrage be laid down in front of the advancing troops. Such procedure was, of course, not new. Sometimes commanders in World War I, as in launching the great attack known as the Second Battle of Marne in 1918, had achieved initial surprise by abandoning the usual long and heavy artillery preparation; and the rolling barrage, while common in World War I, practically was unknown in World War II. The corps commander readily agreed to the desirability of the suggested procedure, and thus it was to be.

During the afternoon of 14 July (it seemed appropriate to be preparing to attack for the liberation of France on Bastille Day) all platoon sergeants of the 1st and 2nd Battalions were assemble for a meeting with the regimental commander. It was a "skull practice" in which the problems which would face the platoons during the next day’s attack were discussed. The purpose was made clear in every man’s mind exactly what he was to do, and the importance of the part which these key men were to play in making the coming action decisive was impressed upon them.

Final attack orders arrived from the Division at 1645, and at 1900 the battalion and special unit commanders gathered in the blacked-out tent and the operations and intelligence sections at the regimental C.P. near LaChiteliere. There to receive the order that evening were Lt. Col. Alford C. Boatsman, commander of the 1st Battalion, and his S-3, Capt. Harlan B. Heffelfinger; Lt. Col. Denver W. Wilson and Capt. Frederick C. Roecker, Jr., of the 2nd Battalion; Lt. Col. Alford Thomsen and Capt. Merle R. Carroll of the 3rd Battalion; and there were the special units commanders, Capt. Thurston J. Palmer of Headquarters Company; Capt. Rodney D. Brown of Service Company; Capt. L. D. Asher of Cannon Company, Capt. J. E. Magruder of Anti-Tank Company; there were numbers of regimental staff – Lt. Col. Sheppard, Captain Abbott, Major Godwin, Major Craig, Major Morton, and Major Robert B. Townley, regimental surgeon; finally, there were the commanders of the units which had been attached to the Regiment for this operation – the 737th Tank Battalion; 1st Platoon, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A, 60th Engineer Battalion; Company A, 110th Medical Battalion – and Lt. Col. Douglas Dwyer, commander of the supporting 161st Field Artillery Battalion, and the commander of the attached 4.2 mortar company of the 82nd Chemical Battalion. The assembled group listened intently as the regimental commander spoke; then they studied closely their overlays and maps and Field Order No. 18:

MAPS: 1/25,000, France, ST LO Sheet.

1. a. Enemy forces entrenched along (503663) (510658) (515658) (517660) (523661) (525657), occupies high ground N of ST LO (hill #122 – 504652). Elmts of the 14th Prcht Regt reported vic ST LO; elmts of 897th, 898, 899 Panzer Grenadier Regts (motorized Inf) have been identified in Div. Z.

b. XIX Corps continues atk to SW 150515 July 44; Div abreast 30th on right, 29th on left.

2. The 134th Inf (w/737th Tk Bn (less Co B); 1st Plat. Co A, 60th Engr Bn; one plat 654 TD Bn; Co A, 110th Med Bn attchd), supported by 161 FA Bn amd atched 4.2 Chemical mortar Co and supported by 35th Inf Div Arty, attacks in Z, 0515, 15 July 44. Obj – to destroy enemy forces in Z N of ST LO and to seize and occupy ST LO. Bndrys, LD, objectives, formation, direction of atk – see overlay.

3. a. 1st Bn. 134th Inf passes through 3rd Bn in Z. atks 0515, 15 July 44 to seize and occupy obj in Z.

b. 2nd Bn, 134th Inf (w/one squad AT Co Mine plat, one 57mm plat AT Co, 737th Tk Bn (-) atched) atks 0515, 15 July 44 to seize and occupy obj in Z.

c. 3rd Bn, 134th Inf when passed through reverts to Regtl res; to remain on present location prepared to assemble on order. (sic.)

- Cn Co, 134th Inf direct support 161 FA Bn.

- AT Co, 134th Inf (-) protect Regtl Flanks and rear; special attention to Regtl left flank.

- I & R plat responsible for contact w/115th Inf on left and 320th Inf on right.

- 616 FA Bn (w/1 Co 82nd Chemical Bn be prepared support atk. Smoke enemy installations fr H Hr to H plus 15; prepare rolling barrage beg at H hr to cover adv of 1st Bn 134th Inf to be lifted on call.

- One plat, 764 TD, adv behind 737th

- E.E.I.

- Are the prepared MG positions reported at 518672 occupied?

- What is the strength and extent of defensive preparations on the enemy M.L.I.

- What is the location of automatic wpn emplacements and AT guns in or near Z?

- What is the enemy strength and disposition

- a. Full K ration issued for 15 July 44.

- ASP #1901 – 527801 – 1/50,000 Isigny Sheet. K&B Train & Am DP 528740 – 528740.

- GRS 53066907

PW Coll Pt 531691.

Straggler Line 522677 – 531687 - 528708

5. a. Current SOI.

- Rad silence prior to 0515

- CP – see overlay

- Bns select & report

- MILTONBURGER

OFFICIAL:

Craig

S-3

Impressed with the weight of the support which was to b given in this delivery of the "Sunday punch," the tanks, the tank destroyers, the tremendous artillery rolling barrage – a concentration on this narrow front which would include not only the 105mm fire of the 161st Field Artillery Battalion and Cannon Company, but also the reinforcing fires of two medium battalions (a total of twenty-four 155mm howitzers), the 127th from Division Artillery, and the 963rd from corps, leaders departed the meeting with full confidence that the German defenses would break before their attack.

The noisy armor rumbled into forward assembly positions during the night, and, fortunately drew little artillery fire. The 1st and 2nd Battalion prepared to go.

At 0515 the artillery opened up and the troops started to move; the 115th Infantry, on the left, was jumping off at the same time to renew its assault from the east. Von Kluge’s "all-out American drive for St. Lo" was on.

But wait, the German artillery had opened fire as well as the American. Then came the chatter of small arms fire. It appeared that the enemy was launching an attack of his own! Already men of the 3rd Battalion, even as they lay in their foxholes, were getting hit.

Men of Company I could see Germans starting to move toward them. Captain Joseph P. Hartung moved up to see what was happening. As he was crouching beside a hedgerow directing measures to stop any counter-moves, the intensity of enemy shellfire was stepped up. A mortar shell burst right behind him. He rolled over on his stomach as blood began to ooze from countless wounds spread from head to toe. Mostly it was his back; hundreds of fragments had torn his field jacket to shreds. His messenger, always at his side, tried to help him. The loyal helper called for the medics, got word back to send up a litter team, and then sat down to keep watch over the captain. Hartung could hardly move a muscle, but his mind was clear. In combat less than half an hour, and already he was out of action. The thought brought a feeling of disgust. He was an old Army man; this was the day against which he had been preparing during those days of training; now he could do nothing. Hours seemed to drag by before the litter squad reached him. Shells still were falling. He wondered if they would get him before another finished him off. A squad of men from Company F walked passed the blood soaked captain. Hartung heard the squad leader turn toward the men and say, "Look at that poor bastard! He’s all done. That’s what’ll happen to you if you don’t take cover."

Ordinarily when the company commander is hit the executive officer immediately assumes command. However, only minutes after Hartung had been hit, a high explosive round fell in the very area being used for a company command post. Lt. Billy Guice, executive officer, was wounded, and First Sergeant Frank E. Conner was wounded so severely that at first he was thought to be dead. This was the first event of a series which was to make Company I one of the ill-fated companies of the Regiment for its company commanders.

When this news reached Colonel Thomsen, he looked around and called for Captain Philip Bauer. He had been assigned to the 3rd Battalion back at Camp Butner, and though he had been assigned "on paper" as commander of Company M (in order to satisfy the stringent requirements of the current tables of organization for the movement overseas, officers had been shifted about in their assignments to the point that an inquiry as to one’s assignment was likely to draw a question in return: "Do you mean on paper and for real?") the battalion commander had retained Bauer at battalion headquarters. He had "pinch-hit" for a while as S-3, and for another while as battalion executive officer, and had proven his capabilities. Now he was handed one of the toughest assignments in combat:

"Go up and take command of Company I, and get it reorganized."

"Yes sir."

Captain Bauer hardly knew a non-commissioned officer in the company. The company was in confusion after losing its C.O., its executive officer, and its first sergeant. Indeed the company headquarters had practically been eliminated. But the company’s new commander – the third within the space of an hour – went up immediately and got the position reorganized.

Defending the approaches to St. Lo in this sector – and this meant primarily Hill 122 – was the German 352nd Infantry Division, a unit which had been organized in 1943 for the defense of western France. Hill 122 (it took its name from its height in meters) did not loom as a high, dominating terrain feature from the north, but rather it consisted as a series of plateaus – with the usual hedgerows and sunken roads running across its gently-sloping face. But the nature of the elevation gave the enemy an even greater than ordinary advantage in observation, and his well-co-ordinated defensive firing positions made the hill foreboding enough. Its tactical importance became more apparent with a closer study of the maps and aerial photographs; it seemed clear that here was the key to the whole situation; this terrain dominated St. Lo which nestled below in a saucer-like valley at the bend of the Vire River. Hill 122, then, was the immediate objective as the men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved, in well-deployed formations, throughout the area of the 3rd Battalion and through the artillery which already was falling, toward that last hedgerow short of "no-man’s-land," toward that spot which becomes the last lot for all infantry riflemen, where there is nothing out in front but the enemy.

The attacking men tried to escape the thought which impressed itself upon them, that this first day of battle would be the last for some of them. They were under no delusions concerning the task which they faced, but the training, and discipline and leadership would admit no faltering now. They saw wounded men of Company I and Company K, but it hardly occurred to them that this and worse might be their own fate. Perhaps there was a trace of cold sweat at the temples and in the palms of the hands, and a tenseness in the stomach and dryness in the throat, but they pressed on with an increasing momentum toward the hedgerow which would be their last barrier to the bullets of enemy fire, and, reaching it, they began to scramble over, unconscious of the pricks and briers or even of the weight of their equipment . There hardly was a moment for adjustment of thoughts once the men were moving toward the enemy positions. The demoralizing high-speed machine guns began to chatter furiously, and shellfire – mortar, artillery, high-velocity, direct-fire "88," became even more overwhelming. But there was confidence to be found in the answering chatter of the familiar Browning machine guns and automatic rifles, and of the outbursts of rifle fire (one might have likened the sound to the popping of mixed-quality pop corn, under less pressing and more peaceful circumstances). There was further reassurance in the tremendous artillery barrage which the 161st Field Artillery, and its reinforcing battalions, was laying down before them. It seemed that surely it must smother all opposition before it. Men of the 134th Infantry had trained with artillery support, and they were familiar with its sounds; but never had it been so close or so terrible.

Responsible for much of the effectiveness of this unique barrage was Brig. Gen. Theodore L. Futch, Division Artillery commander. It was an old method applied with new technique. It was a close rolling barrage with fire registered in the middle of the zone of attack; forward observers with the assault companies already had fired in the initial barrage line. Rather than the old World War I practice of using a time schedule, then, the fire was lifted 200 yards on call to successive barrage lines. In order to conserve ammunition, the rate of fire varied, but it included high explosive, smoke, and time fire. Sometimes even this, the supporting artillery, seemed to fall too close, too close, for even the calls of forward observes could not always keep pace with the enthusiasm of the rifle squads as they burst through German defenses, and then its survivors scrambled over the next hedgerow to carry on.

It took nerves of steel to stay in the fight that morning , but the men of the 134th stayed, and carried the fight to the enemy. Yes, sometimes men cracked. The men of one platoon watched their platoon leader, in the loss of all self-control, get up and run about as a man possessed, and they watched him cut down almost at once by machine gun fire. Some men of another platoon could see their platoon leader and two other men run into a foxhole as an especially heavy enemy barrage descended, and they saw a shell explode directly in that foxhole, and their leaders’ bodies destroyed beyond recognition. But the whole attacking wave of the 1st Battalion had run to the first German-held hedgerow and seized it with complete surprise.

Company C was leading the 1st Battalion’s attack on the right, and it was moving behind the rolling barrage (1st Battalion had priority of artillery fire) of the supporting artillery and the screen of bullets from its own weapons. Captain John E. Davis of North Dakota directed his company with the steadiness of a veteran sea captain in a squall, and it was steadiness in the midst of life-and-death action.

Any German small arms fire – and there was plenty of it now – was almost sure to draw fire several times over. The hedgerows, however, were such effective defensive barriers that a single Nazi machine gun frequently could hold up a whole platoon, and there was no way of removing the obstacle many times except by direct attack. It called for heroism and initiative of the kind which Sergeant Freddie A. Sorenson of Nebraska demonstrated when he crawled, voluntarily, and alone, across an open meadow to the next hedgerow where he knocked out a machine gun with a hand grenade. Unfortunately, his bravery was hazardous, and it was a real loss to his whole company when, later in the day, he was killed in action. Similarly, Sergeant Oreste F. Bottare of Illinois, no less determined to continue the advance of Company C, crawled to another machine gun and was able to destroy it before an artillery shell snuffed out his own life. And always the squad leaders were exposing themselves in the ways that Staff Sergeant Floyd W. Hawkins of Nebraska was trying to direct the fire of his rifle squad when he was killed.

Rifle platoon leaders carried a tremendous responsibility in that action. It was the inspiration of such young leaders as 2nd Lt. Raymond Ogen who kept going, at the head of his platoon, in spite of a painful shoulder wound, which kept the company moving against such destruction. This same determination was to be found all along the line. It was to be found in men like Pfc. Joseph O. V. Beaulieu of Maine, who found himself alone with a light machine gun when all the other members of his squad were killed. There is no feeling quite like that of being alone, near death, on the battlefield. In spite of the feeling of being a part of a gigantic, overpowering army, a feeling which tends to grow during training, and even on maneuvers, on the battlefield one might feel himself quite alone when his comrades disappear into foxholes and behind hedgerows, and , particularly during lulls in the fire of his own and supporting units, he might feel that he is out there facing the whole enemy army all by himself. Doubtless such a feeling was even more pronounced for one in the position of Beaulieu who had just seen all his comrades of the squad killed. But his reaction was not one of despair, rather it was one of determination to carry on. He did carry on; he kept the light machine gun in action, spurting out the fire so necessary for the riflemen’s advance, until he too succumbed and joined his squad in death. There was a like action on the part of a heavy machine gunner of Company D. Private Harold G. McKay of North Platte, Nebraska, too was seized with a determination to continue the attack when all other members of his squad were killed or wounded. He wrapped all the belts of ammunition he could find about his neck, laid his heavy machine gun on a hedgerow, and went into action. He remained at his post until a mortar shell killed him.

Back in another section of the Weapons Platoon, Pfc. Anselem R. Rumpca of South Dakota, likewise found himself alone with a crew weapon – but this time it was a 60mm mortar. By 0610 the whole crew had been knocked out of action with the exception of Rumpca, and even he had a wound in his left arm. Nevertheless, he too continued to fight back. He kept up the mortar fire until his ammunition was exhausted, and then went up to the hedgerow and went to work with his automatic pistol until another German mortar shell knocked him unconscious.

It was the enemy shellfire which was causing the greatest difficulty. Small arms fire, and especially rapidly-firing machine guns and the hated machine pistols ("burp guns"), to be sure were troublesome enough, but those weapons could be maneuvered against, or brought under fire, or possibly avoided, once their location was determined. But against artillery fire there was that feeling of helplessness which grew out of the inability of the infantryman to undertake any direct action against it. The only thing to do was to move forward, and that was possible only with the benefit of a trained discipline.

Casualties were mounting. But men of Company C could not be aware of how heavy they were. It was not always a picture of thin lines of advancing men growing thinner as men fell while the others continued marching. One did not really see very many men fall. Many of them were caught as they lay in foxholes or behind hedgerows. Others, of course, were caught as they moved forward, but few really saw it happen because their view was hidden – again the hedgerows – from those a safe distance away, and those who were close were themselves dropping to the ground in an effort to find protection. By 0630 Company C had advanced "to the second hedgerow beyond the creek," but already its platoons had suffered 60 percent casualties.

It was the same kind of slow, vigorous costly fighting for Lt. Col. Denver Wilson’s 2nd Battalion over on the left, but the advance continued. There the heroism found in the 1st Battalion was being duplicated. Again there were the lone ventures through fire-swept meadows to take out machine guns, as that of Company F’s Staff Sergeant Vaughn H. Davis of Tennessee, who finished a machine gun crew with hand grenades. Another F Company squad leader, Wayne R. Palmer of Illinois, accomplished similar results with bayonet and rifle, though he was able to bring back four enemy soldiers alive. Commanding this young-spirited Company F, the right company in the 2nd Battalion’s formation, was Captain Joseph B. Scully of Illinois. As his company got underway, it approached a fallow mine field, a field which had been laid some two years earlier and which since had become so overgrown with grass that mine detection practically was impossible. Captain Scully, however, was able to lead his men through without a casualty. It was then that the company again came under heavy enemy fire. When men began to fall dead or wounded in such rapidly increasing numbers, when every officer except the captain himself had become a casualty, it seemed surely that the company must falter and fall back. At this critical point Captain Scully, defying the heavy fire, leaped to the top of the next hedgerow, and with a challenging battle cry that could be heard beyond the thunder of the bursting artillery shells, led his unit on to a 700 yard advance.

Company G, on the left, had run into the same kind of enemy fire, but there the barrage caught the company commander, 1st Lt. Lawrence D. Canatsey of California. He lay with a severe leg wound, but his thoughts remained on his objective. Two of his platoon leaders also had been hit, and as the men began to fall back, it fell to 1st Lt. John A. Creech of Texas, to get the company reorganized and to get it moving. Lt. Canatsey was able to orient his executive officer on the situation, and he was calling words of encouragement when a litter team arrived to evacuate him. As he was being moved to the relative safety of the aid station on one of the medical jeeps a second shell struck, and this one killed him.

Lt. Creech, meanwhile, was acting promptly and effectively to get the company back into the picture. He, himself, had been wounded by shell fragments, and blood oozed from his body, but he continued his task. With the resumption of the attack, 17 prisoners were taken and an even greater number of enemy were killed. Lieutenant William D. Brodbreck, for three months acting company commander of Company L, and now executive officer of that company, reported on receipt of orders to Company G to take command. But a few hours later, he too was hit, and with his evacuation, the responsibility remained with Lieutenant Creech.

Demonstrations of leadership seemed to be contagious, and soon the whole company was on the move again. One of the most inspiring exhibitions was that of an ammunition carrier in a G Company 60mm mortar squad. When the squad leader of his squad became a casualty, the whole squad seemed to let down into ineffectiveness. Private First Class Charles E. Kurtz of Ohio, ammunition carrier, assumed the initiative. He ran over to a disabled tank – the supporting tanks as well as men were in trouble - (that he was under enemy fire and observation was apparent from the disability of the tank which he approached), removed the tank’s light machine gun, and, using this as his own weapon, lead his squad in the advance (their specification numbers as mortar men notwithstanding).

Meanwhile, the fire continued in the 1st Battalion’s area. Undoubtedly, with an advance of 500 to 600 yards, an important penetration had been made, but in the hedgerow country defense went from one barrier to the next, and Company C had been fought almost to its limit. Shortly after 0900 Company A abreast of C, on the left, made an envelopment to gain the rear of the enemy’s position of the nose of the hill. Captain Davis was able to reorganize his company to make a contribution, in spite of heavy casualties, to a renewal of the attack. Such reorganization under fire was made possible by efforts like those of 2nd Lt. Michael Hanna of Pennsylvania, who, though wounded severely in the wrist, and suffering from loss of blood, remained on the scene to get his platoon organized before he would be evacuated.

Now Colonel Boatsman sent Company B on the right, and Captain Francis C. Mason of Nebraska, went forward to make his reconnaissance as Captain Lorin S. McCown, another Nebraskan, took A Company into the intensive action. Now the tanks were becoming more prominent in their support, and close co-operation opened the hedgerows for them and followed up their raking fire on the next hedgerow. Soon, Company A had 38 prisoners on the way to the rear, and the pace was being quickened. But again it was at awful cost. Lieutenant Clarence B. Bartsdh of Chicago; Staff Sergeant Wesley D. Stahlhut of Nebraska City, energetic light machine gun section leader; Private First Class Eugene E. Burnett of Wichita, Kansas; Pfc. Dewey F. Adams, Gainesville, Georgia; for these of Company A, their first day of battle was their last.

At 1250 the 1st Battalion renewed the attack; Col. Boatsman was throwing everything he had into the drive in an effort to conquer the remaining 600 yards to the highest part of Hill 122. Already his companies had moved 2100 meters from the line of departure. Twenty minutes later, leading elements of the battalion were in Emelie, approaching the objective. It was beginning to look as though the break had come. Lt. Col. Alfred Thomsen was ordered to assemble his 3rd Battalion and prepare to follow up the 1st Battalion’s penetration.

Entries in Major Craig’s S-3 Journal suggest the attention which the project was attracting:

1320 – Gen. Baade (division commander) come to CP of 134 to study plans and co-ordinate the exploitation of 1st Bn Adv

1325 – Talked w/Arty Ex O authorized one arty Bn to 2nd Bn until follow-up on rt starts

1345 – Gen. Corlett (corps commander) Just talked to 115 Inf and they have not advanced materially. He believes we have something here. Supplement this thing too fullest. To break this defense would save lots of casualties in units on right and left.

Continued bitter German resistance in front of the leading battalions, however, made it clear that there remained much fighting to be done before St. Lo could be reached. Subsequent entries in the S-3 Journal:

1440 – 516659 counterattack forming

1630 – F Company held off counterattack. NCO Co F reports Capt. Scully the bravest sunofabitch they ever saw. 2nd Bn going ahead.

Colonel Thomsen ordered the companies of his 3rd Battalion to fall into a battalion column along the Villiers-Fossard-St. Lo road, and he sent ahead a party – including Captain O. H. Bruce, S-1; Captain Ray Carroll, S-3; Captain Earl J. Ruby, commander of Company M, and some men of battalion headquarters – to reconnoiter for an assembly area. Then he sent Lt. "L.D." Reischel, battalion motor officer, and Lt. Clyde Payne, anti-tank officer, to make contact with the first party and to select a site for the battalion motor park somewhere south of Villiers-Fossard.

These preparatory measures taken, Colonel Thomsen moved up to the head of the column which Battalion Headquarters Company was forming, and , accompanied by the remaining members of his staff, began to lead his troops over toward the Villiers-Fossard road.

A few minutes latter there were some rapid cracking sounds overhead – each series followed a second later by a similar succession in a lower key. It was one of the hated "burp-guns," or machine pistols. It sounded like the noise of a redheaded woodpecker working at top speed on a telephone pole, followed by another, working on a hallow tree trunk. The first burst of noise was the sound of the bullets cracking the air overhead; the "echo," a second later, was the report of the weapon itself. This is what made it difficult – especially for the uninitiated – to guess from what direction the fire was coming. Sergeant Donald Buckley of Nebraska (the supply sergeant, now at the point), had his carbine at the ready position and began stalking trees which he thought might be likely locations for the sniper. The men began seeking cover behind the hedgerow – all that is, except Colonel Thomsen. He stood his ground there in the middle of the trail, and then said, "Nothing but a lonesome sniper; let’s go."

The headquarters column crossed a couple of fields, and then came upon a narrow sunken trail or ditch lined with foxholes. German equipment was piled high on either side. This immediately engaged the attention of the battalion intelligence officer. He turned to some of the men of his intelligence section and pointed out the weapons, "Look, there are some of those 5 centimeter mortars we were talking about the other day; see how much they resemble our 60’s? And look at that neat little pile of ammunition they left."

"Boy, those Krauts must have pulled out of here in a hurry," someone observed.

The crossing of another field brought the welcome sight of American soldiers – it was the left company of the 320th Infantry. Colonel Thomsen convinced himself that the questionable road was the one he wanted and turned back in its direction.

"Aren’t you travelling pretty heavy?" one of the 320th officers, observing all the equipment being carried, said to one of the staff officers.

"Oh, yes," was the reply, "but you see we are only moving up to an assembly area."

They re-crossed the abandoned German positions and were going through the next field when the close crackling of a Nazi machine gun sent them all down in the tall grass. They crawled a short way, hesitated, got up, hit the ground again in response to another burst. Finally, they made it over the next hedgerow by advancing in rushes: four or five men at a time would get up and run at full speed until behind new cover. This presented too poor a target to draw more fire just then.

Now Lieutenant Reischel hurried up to tell the battalion commander that he had run into German soldiers in the area where he had hoped to locate a motor park. The commander’s first reaction was to suggest that the motor officer must have gone to the wrong place. Reishcel then sent out to find the machine gun. He found German soldiers moving about – he fired a few times, but the only result was another burst of machine gun fire over the battalion staff. At this point Bruce, Carroll, and Ruby returned to say that they had begun to allocate company areas in the new forward assembly position when they noticed numerous enemy soldiers in the vicinity – "and their actions were definitely not friendly."

Confident that the enemy troops which had been seen were only a few which the 1st Battalion had by-passed, Colonel Thomsen sent his S-2 and a pair of intelligence scouts forward to see if they could locate and neutralize the machine gun which had been making the trouble. Impatient after a few minutes wait, he called for a platoon from Company L to go up to help out the intelligence section on the right of the road, and then formed the remainder of the battalion – less Company I who had become involved in a fight alongside the 1st Battalion up forward – into a route column along the road. Company K furnished the advanced guard, and Colonel Thomsen took his S-3 to accompany the point.

Meanwhile Reischel had a squad from Company L up to the place where earlier he had seen two enemy soldiers along a hedgerow in some bushes. These had departed, but now the motor officer directed the fire of the squad to assist Lt. Lou Dailey’s platoon which had gone forward. Suddenly a burp gun opened fire from the same side of the hedgerow; Reischel quickly returned the fire, but missed, and his antagonist scampered over the hedgerow and then threw back a "potato masher" grenade. Fortunately for the 3rd Battalion’s motor officer, the grenade hit the hedgerow and bounced back before it exploded. Reischel’s reply was a grenade of his own.

Lt. Dailey’s platoon was going into action against the enemy which the S-2 observed in the vicinity of the sunken trail were the battalion had crossed only minutes earlier. The battalion column was approaching now, and Colonel Thomsen call up to the S-2, "We’re going to move on – we can’t let one machine gun hold up a whole battalion; we’ll leave Dailey there with his platoon to protect our flank."

As the point approached the vicinity where the reconnaissance party had observed the enemy soldiers, it came under intense crossfire from well-located machine guns. The head of the column was halted at a slight bend in the road, and it was under fire from machine guns in a large brick house some 150 yards beyond. And then it seemed that all hell was breaking loose. Burp guns rattled to the left and to the rear; shellfire began to drop in to add to the confusion. Small shells were bursting along the adjacent fields, on the tops of hedgerows, and then down the road . . . My God, it was those 5cm mortar shells that had been stacked so neatly; the battalion headquarters must have walked right through the German positions! Large caliber mortar and light artillery shells began to burst all around – they had a way of hitting the tops of hedgerows, and, bursting in red flame and black smoke, would send fragments and dirt on the men who were seeking cover in the shallow side-ditches below. Wounded men – those who could walk – began moving to the rear.

Assigned the mission of going after the machine gun in the house to the front, two men of Company K climbed over the hedgerow to the left; but just as they disappeared on the other side a large caliber shell burst precisely at the same spot.

A round of time fire burst overhead leaving a ridiculous little cloud of black smoke. Men crouched against the hedgerow. When they looked up, doom appeared to be on its way for some of them. A rapid-firing, direct fire gun was searching down the shoulder of the road. In quick succession shell bursts were creeping toward their positions. Each burst about three or four yards nearer than its predecessor. Ray Carroll had his .45 caliber pistol drawn. "What is it?" a fellow officer called across the road to him.

"Looks like some kind of damn tank coming down the road!"

No longer could Colonel Thomsen be seen up ahead. Finding an opening in the hedgerow, he had disappeared into the meadow and made his way farther forward. There he saw this armored vehicle, but there was a group of four or five soldiers in front of it – not 50 yards from where he stood. Traditionally one of the best marksmen in the Regiment, he drew his Colt .45 and took aim; he fired – and missed. He fired six more rounds and missed every time.

The men down through the columns were hearing of an approaching tank, and they began drawing back. Down in this narrow cut – for such was the nature of a sunken road – strung out in a column where it could not fight back, with an armored vehicle approaching which was capable of laying down a devastating enfilade of fire, and automatic weapons and mortar playing on every side, the battalion faced the prospect of near annihilation without having even been committed to action. The column turned back toward Villiers-Fossard and the companies moved off the road to take up defensive positions north of the creek which ran across the zone about 400 yards south of the village. Inasmuch as the whereabouts of Colonel Thomsen were, at this point, unknown, the reorganization was undertaken under the supervision of Major Foster H. Weyand..

Reorganization had become a difficult enough task in itself. Company I was still on the flank of the 1st Battalion as it fought for Hill 122. Captain Richard Melcher of K Company tapped in his company telephone on the regimental wire to inquire of the location of the 3rd Battalion. Captain Carroll remained forward long enough to check the positions of the companies, and then he made his way back to the battalion C.P. - a line of foxholes behind a hedgerow just south of Villiers-Fossard. But no one had seen Colonel Thomsen since he had gone up to get into that pistol-tank duel. Carroll called some men, and , forming a patrol, went back to look for him. They returned an hour later with no word of the battalion commander.

It was dusk when Carroll got back to his battalion C.P. At 2025 a telephone call went through to the 3rd Battalion. It was Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, assistant division commander, and Carroll, out of breath and still not fully oriented on the battalion’s new position, took the call and tried to explain the situation. The general was blunt and to the point. "Be in Emelie at 2200 tonight," he said.

Colonel Thomsen appeared at his battalion C.P. shortly thereafter. Cut off for a time behind German positions, he had made his way back by creeping and crawling through mortar and machine gun fire to safety. Now, after learning what he could of the situation in a few minutes, he called regimental headquarters to give a vigorous explanation of what had happened. He thought, nevertheless, that his battalion would be able to give some assistance when the 1st Battalion renewed its assault at 2045.

For the 1st Battalion it was Companies A and B in that twilight assault against the final defenses of Hill 122. Captain McCown of Nebraska seemed to be everywhere, urging his platoon on, co-ordinating the welcome support of Sherman tanks, personally directing artillery fire against key enemy positions. His example extended to others and carried the company with it. Such an example was that of 2nd Lt. Constant J. Kjms of New York, a rifle platoon leader, a junior officer whose stature grew to command the respect of his whole company and the admiration of all who learned of his actions. Shell fragments had torn into his arms and face, but it would take more than that to put him out of action. He continued at the head of his platoon throughout the day’s fighting.

On the right, Captain Mason of Nebraska, after bringing his Company B in to make effective the initial penetration, maneuvered to carry the struggle to the last defenses of the battalion’s objectives. Like Kjems in Company A, 2nd Lt. Leeta L. Casner, Jr. of Illinois, in Company B, remained to inspire his 1st Platoon in spite of an earlier wound.

Other men of Company B were fighting furiously against ever mounting casualties. Again there was the selflessness of daring to keep up a fire power which would continue the advance. Again there was gallantry in protecting each other from the destruction of enemy fire. When Corporal Robert W. Godfirnon and Pfc. Mitchell R. Helton, both of Nebraska, saw two of their comrades lying wounded in a field where danger of continuing machine gun fire remained, they crawled out to the wounded men, and, blinding the enemy machine gunners with smoke grenades, were able to return them to safety.

The 2nd Battalion launched no less than five separate attacks during that day to keep unrelenting pressure against the right of the German defenses. Thus busied, those defenders could offer no assistance against the overpowering thrusts of the 1st Battalion against their left. Some men of Company B were able to fight their way to the top of the hill at 2150. Half an hour later both Companies A and B were on the hill, but they could not hold it; a counterattack drove them back 200 yards. But by 2305, they were back on Hill 122, and the uncertain situation persisted through the night, with sporadic firing and Nazi infiltration adding new question marks to the situation.

It was only certain that with the close of its first day of battle the 134th Infantry, though suffering heavy casualties, had made itself felt. Already it had achieved success where veteran troops previously had thrice failed.

A War Department account of the results of the day’s action concluded:

The 29th Division’s effort had produced results only at the very end of the day, and then by an advance which left the spearhead battalion dangerously isolated, 1,000 yards ahead of the rest of the front. The 134th’s advance to Hill 122 was promising; it threatened to cut off the enemy salient north of the Vire bend, and put the 134th Infantry only 2,000 yards from the outskirts of St. Lo.

. . . The 35th Division’s advance should now be giving the enemy as much concern as did the battle east of St. Lo.

- St. Lo (American Forces in Action Series)

Only one day of battle! It seemed surely that the Regiment had been engaged for days and weeks on end. All of the violence and death and tension and sweat that the Regiment had known in its illustrious history seemed to have been re-enacted within the space of an hour; but so to was all the heroism of its tradition re-enacted. And it seemed that the completeness of participation on the part of the men of the 134th was something unparalleled. In any battle it is only a small proportion of the men who actually deliver any fire and contribute to the unit’s advance or defense. (Colonel S. L. A. Marshall found from post-combat mass interviews with approximately 400 infantry companies in the Central Pacific and European Theaters that "In an average experienced infantry company in an average stern day’s action, the number engaging with any and all weapons was approximately 15 per cent of the total strength. In the most aggressive infantry companies, under the most intense local pressure, the figure rarely rose above 25 per cent of the total strength, from the opening to the close of the engagement." Interestingly enough, the tactical situation, the terrain, enemy fire, or combat experience seemed to have little bearing on those figures.) Yet, the "green" 134th Infantry, in its first day of battle, delivered such a volume of fire that it used more ammunition that day than any two divisions had used on any previous day of combat.

The Regiment’s task for July 16 was mainly one of consolidating on the 1st Battalion. That this would be no mean task was indicated by Colonel Wilson’s report at 0600 that a sizable enemy group had moved in behind Company F. The 1st Battalion still had a problem of clarifying its situation around Hill 122 – in doing so, further evidence of the previous day’s heroism was found: Captain Leslie G. Wilson of Omaha, Nebraska, 1st Battalion adjutant, and a group of men had fallen victim to a Nazi machine gun, but around them they had left unmistakable signs of a terrific fight and they had taken a high toll of German dead.

For the 3rd Battalion, consolidation meant a full scale attack along the right of the regimental zone in an effort to come up abreast of the 1st Battalion. A platoon of tank destroyers was attached to that battalion, and the time for the attack was set for 0730. Colonel Thomsen had been hoping to make use of some of the tanks which had been working with the 1st Battalion, but shortly after 0700 they indicated that they were going to pull back, and his effort to hold them were to no avail, for they were acting on division order. At 0715 Lieutenant Davoe, artillery liaison officer with the 3rd Battalion, called in to request artillery support for the attack. This had to be refused because the location of the 1st Battalion was not known precisely enough. Colonel Thomsen had his company commanders at his C.P. awaiting the final word. It was 0720 and the attached TD platoon had not appeared. The battalion commander, in an understandable vexation, grabbed his field telephone and called Regiment. "I can’t have any tanks; I can’t have any artillery; I’ve got no TD’s. Just how the hell am I supposed to make an attack?"

It was after 1000 by the time the TD’s arrived and the battalion moved off. It met immediate and intense opposition, but small groups began to move forward slowly. Again there was such individual heroism as that of Pfc. Darwin Mohovich of Company K, who removed on obstacle to his platoon’s advance by creeping along the edge of a field until opposite the right flank of an enemy machine gun, and then hurling two grenades into its position for an effective elimination. Around 1400 hours the TD’s were getting up there and firing their powerful 3-inch guns into the hedgerows with telling effect. Late in the afternoon there was another pause in the driving through the hedgerows. It was to be resumed in a co-ordinated attack by all three battalions at 0430 the next morning (July 17).

With a company of tanks, a platoon of tank destroyers, and a 4.2 in. chemical mortar company attached, the 3rd Battalion was ready to make the main effort on the right.

Fog delayed the coming of dawn, but the battalion commanders were determined to attack on time. At 0415 the men were finishing their breakfast unit of K ration (unless, finding the cheese of the dinner unit more savory in the early hours than the small tin of cold, ground ham and egg, some were making substitutions) and were beginning to form up preparatory to the jump-off. It was not necessary to begin to stir very much before zero hour. Sleeping in a foxhole (or more accurately, a slit trench) fully clothed – the helmet for a pillow and the rifle for a bedfellow – and with hair clipped short, there was little else to making one’s toilet than simply getting up.

The battalion hardly got beyond the line of departure before they drew withering machine gun fire. The fog was still on and it was impossible to use the tanks with any effect without observation. The fog likewise made it impossible for the artillery liaison planes – the little L-4 Piper Cubs – to get into the air. Unquestionably these observation planes were highly effective in directing fire; but the doughboy came to attach an almost phenomenal importance to them. He wanted those "Grasshoppers" up there all the time – he felt that the enemy’s artillery would be less intense if those spotters were watching for gun flashes. (That there was justification for this feeling is indicated by notes of a conference between the commander of the German Seventh Army and Field Marshal Kluge in which the former requested that the German air forces combat the "particularly obnoxious artillery liaison planes, and the heavy bombers and fighter bombers, at least once in a while," as a needed boost for troop morale.)

Some further excerpts from the S-3 Journal give a graphic description of some of the action that morning:

0615 – Col Wilson – Rt held by pillbox

E go on by now

Col at C.P.

Have adv about 450 yds

0635 – Col Boatsman reports that his Bn is getting plenty of arty fire this a.m.

Overhead B Co messenger report to Col Boatsman that B Co CP had been raided.

This is a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0700 – Blue 3 – still having a hard time w/position

adv. 400 – 500 yds by L & K Co. Co I to right of K. Plat on rt tks to help clean up MG who have been holding them up. Putting TD on left L right away.

0725 – Col Thomsen reports tanks being used to overcome MG fire.

0728 – Col Boatsman reports some friendly arty fire would help doughboy’s morale.

0730 – Sun is up and fog may clear allowing arty planes to fire.

0755 – Capt. Mason reports he must have tanks to do any good up there. Enemy dugouts are impossible to get out as it stands at this time.

0810 – Col. Thomsen pushed on left very much. Asks if this is "Hold at all costs" affair. Co L being c/atk on left at this time.

0835 – Having difficulty with TD but are moving now.

Co L men coming back.

Lay mortars lay on draw just in case.

Shall we move switchboard back w/o breaking commo.

A temporary lull at this time

Col states he must reorganize and try something else. He has a plan that may work.

He sure needs (one).

0915 – 15 tanks moved by Col. Thomsen.

Co I & K pinned down on LD.

0930 – Mine field being worked on.

1045 – Calling Col. Thomsen to give new instructions.

1045 – Ordered tanks of 2nd Bn to join 1st Bn as quickly as possible.

At last the tanks were roaring into action. Demolition crews from the ammunition and pioneer platoons and from the engineers – the men who knew how to blast a hole through the hedgerows – boarded leading tanks, and they rumbled on up toward the enemy.

Bang! A leading tank halted in a flash of flame and smoke. It had hit a mine. The tank was burning, and with it members of the crew and a demolition team.

Other tanks were able to get into the meadows, and the TD’s got into firing position. A tank tried to blast its way through a hedgerow with its 75mm gun, but it was no use. A well-placed charge of TNT, however, did the trick, and the tank crashed through the opening to begin covering the opposite hedgerow with machine gun and high explosive fire.

Company L was approaching the same large brick house where the 3rd Battalion’s column had been held up two days before. Captain James Lassiter, redoubtable company commander, called for the 4.2-inch chemical mortars to put some white phosphorous shells on the troublesome stronghold. Minutes later the mortar officer called "on the way!" and huge billows of thick white smoke began to rise over the target. As a matter of fact, this mortar unit – Company C, 92nd Chemical Battalion – accounted for four machine guns with 26 rounds of ammunition; and the elapsed time from "target sighted" to "mission accomplished" was just 11 minutes.

As the battalions started to move forward again, the number of prisoners in the regimental cage began to swell. These PW’s looked like beaten creatures. They were bareheaded or wore soft caps (according to the rules of land warfare a prisoner was supposed to be allowed to retain his steel helmet until he got out of artillery range; but the Germans coming in to surrender almost never wore a helmet; this is how they were recognized as giving-up), their green-gray uniforms were dirty and wrinkled, but they almost always wore good boots. Most of them carried the cylindrical gas mask container, but it usually had some rank cheese and stale bread in it. Many of them came in saying "me Ruski," or "me Polki." It was no surprise to encounter a number of Russians and Poles, for intelligence personnel long had been aware of the formation of "East Battalions" – commanded of course, by German officers, and including a strong cadre of German soldiers. However, their cries of "me Ruski" did not always win the sympathy of the combat infantryman. His view was that this fellow had been shooting at Americans, whatever pressure had been brought to bear in that direction; it was difficult to conceive that Russian armies ever ran into groups of Americans fighting against them on the Eastern Front. There as a striking contrast between these prisoners, and the haughty, arrogant SS man. Most prisoners babbled like children in giving all the information they could (sometimes they were obviously painting the picture rosier for American eyes than it really was), but not the SS man; he would say nothing. They illustrated their devotion to their families by displaying dozens of photographs. One little German who looked to be about 40 years old said that he used to live in Chicago – out by the stockyards – but that he had returned to Germany in 1933.

As the afternoon wore on, there seemed to be no diminishing of the enemy resistance. There would be lulls, to be sure, and sometimes there would be minutes of silence so complete as to be almost frightening as the loudest noises. But each time the companies would begin movement, they would find themselves "stirring up a hornets’ nest."

Over on the right, the 3rd Battalion was moving again, but as platoons moved through and area thick with trees and bushes, burp guns seemed to be everywhere. Many soldiers declared that enemy snipers transmitted signals by systems of regular long and short bursts of these machine pistols. However that might have been, the Nazis were demonstrating a clever co-ordination between automatic weapons and mortars. The machine guns and pistols would open up, pinning the troops to the ground, and then the mortars would traverse and search over the whole area to exact casualties among soldiers who were held on the target by the streams of bullets cracking over their heads.

To remain in such a position was to invite disaster, but to overcome the inertia of natural fears which tended to spread among the men required courage and leadership of the highest order. Again it was for junior officers and non-comes in half a dozen local areas to assume the initiative for an advance. One of these in the 3rd Battalion’s zone was the same 2nd Lt. Lou Dailey, Nebraska, of Company L, who had been so busy with the right flank during that long first day. Dailey was able to lead his platoon in driving a wedge into the enemy position, but in doing so, he died in an enemy mortar barrage.

On the right flank Captain Richard D. Melcher of Omaha had been able to achieve an advance of 500 to 800 yards beyond the creek with his Company K. Progress continued as far as the road which ran across the front between the villages of LaMesnl-Rouxelin, on the right, and Emelie, on the left. Then it was another of those wicked machine guns. Firing from the right flank, the German 42 had the whole company pinned down. Captain Melcher moved up to determine the trouble. He saw the machine gun fire was coming from the edge of the village (La Mesnl). His whole company frozen in place, Captain Dick started after the machine gun himself. He found himself going through a real "infiltration course" – more trying than those of Camp Rucker and Camp Butner combined – for when he saw that the fire was coming from a church, he had to creep and crawl through an open field under the machine gun fire in order to get to it. He got out three hand grenades and laid them on the ground. He lay quiet for a moment. He was breathing rapidly, and sweat was running through his dirty four-days’ growth of beard. Dragging oneself across a field like a reptile, was exhausting enough in itself – not to mention the nervous strain of stalking a deadly machine gun. Captain Melcher raised himself up, and, in rapid succession, hurled the three hand grenades through a church window. Result: complete destruction of the enemy.

Company L’s Private First Class Buster E. Brown of Omaha was out to repeat his heroic action in destroying an enemy machine gun position the preceding day. Company L still was under all kinds of enemy fire, but prominent locally was the fire of another cleverly-located machine gun. Again Brown, now armed with an automatic rifle, advanced alone toward the dangerous obstacle. While he was yet 150 yards from his goal, a bullet struck him. This only increased his determination. He opened fire with his B.A.R. and advanced quickly behind its stream of bullets. Once again he was wounded. Nevertheless, he was able to deliver a fire that was so effective that it destroyed the German machine gunners.

At least the machine gun platoons of the heavy weapons companies all down the line practically had become the front line troops. Often their risks were considerably greater than those of riflemen, for they shared the front lines, but had the additional disadvantage of having to man-handle their heavy weapons and ammunition. More than that, a machine gun was likely to draw enemy fire very soon after it had opened fire. One of the officers making sure to keep that support available was 2nd Lt. Halley Dickey, Kansas City, Missouri, of Company M. He remained on the job in spite of a wound earlier in the day, in order to see that his weapons were prepared for defense against a counterattack. Then he noticed a wounded man lying in a position where he was exposed to enemy fire. Dickey crawled to the wounded man and started to drag him to safety, but then he found himself in a field of deadly anti-personnel S mines. A litter team, accompanied by Major Foster H. Weyand of Nebraska, 3rd Battalion executive officer, arrived to carry out the more seriously wounded man. But one of them stepped on a mine, and it meant death for Lt. Dickey and one of the litter bearers, and a painful wound for Major Weyand, who carried a wound stripe from World War I, and was a veteran of the "old" 2nd Battalion’s expedition to the Aleutians.

Over on the Regiment’s left, Lt. Col. Denver Wilson too, was throwing everything into the battle, and Company E had joined Companies F and G in advancing the attack. Again the action was characterized by acts of individual heroism. Thus, an important factor in the advance of Company F, was the contribution of Technical Sergeant R. D. Drennan of Illinois. After personally driving a jeep several times over a hazardous thousand-yard trail the day before to bring up water and ammunition, Sergeant Drennan now assumed command of the platoon when his platoon leader was wounded and led it in the capture of the small village of Bourg d’Enfer.

Private Robert L. Heberling of Pennsylvania was one of those whose exploits made possible the advance of the small units concerned. He crawled across a field, gained the enemy side of the hedgerow, and delivered an accurate shot with his M-1 rifle which silenced a machine gun which had been holding up the platoon’s advance. In other cases, squad leaders took it upon themselves to perform the only kind of action which meant advance. Sergeant Rodman Davis of Illinois, a Company E squad leader, duplicated Heberling’s feat. Another squad leader, Staff Sergeant Louis J. Hirschman of Nebraska, in similar circumstances, achieved satisfactory results by creeping up near an enemy machine gun and hurling hand grenades into its position. A slightly different problem faced one of the platoons presently as it tried to continue its advance. This time it was mortar fire – mortar of uncanny accuracy – which was holding the advance. Staff Sergeant Bernard G. Hemperly of Nebraska, platoon guide, saw that about the only way to fight mortar fire is with other mortar fire. He made his way up to a position, then, where though exposed to enemy fire, he could find the location of the enemy mortar doing most of the damage. It only remained for him to direct the 2nd Battalion’s mortars on to the target. In doing so, he obtained a direct hit, and once more it was possible to advance.

For the 1st Battalion it was a renewal of the warfare of the first day’s attack. The opposition seemed to be as strong and determined as ever, but so was the drive and determination of the 1st Battalion as strong as ever. Captain Mason, with Company B, still was dominating the scene on the battalion’s right. A close shell burst had jarred him with its concussion, but he had been able to remain in action to watch an exposed right flank and to direct personally the movements of the attacked tanks in the final drive that afternoon. Captain Mason had capable assistance in his executive, 1st Lt. William O. White, Jr., of Georgia and South Carolina. White seemed to be covering the whole company area – and sometimes the whole battalion area. Already he had distinguished himself with such achievements as reconnaissance into enemy territory to locate hostile gun positions and routes of approach for the battalion, and the removal , by himself, of seven enemy mines which he discovered in the route of advance. In spite of his wound two days earlier, Lieutenant Leeta L. Casner, platoon leader, remained in action. At the 1st Battalion’s drive for complete control of that part of Hill 122 in its zone reached a climax, Casner was playing a leading role with his platoon. He hurried back to guide three tanks up to a position where they could be effective in supporting his platoon’s attack. Casner climbed into the open turret of the leading tank as it roared toward the next hedgerow. An enemy shell struck it, however, and all but one member of the crew were killed; Casner was dazed by severe concussion, but he was still present when the company reached its objective. Another of Company B was 2nd Lt. Edward K. Hum of Ohio. This evening’s war was only one of many close calls which featured the diminutive lieutenant’s service. On this particular occasion his platoon had become isolated from the remainder of the company. Hum, however, turned the precarious position into an advantage when he salvaged some telephone wire and then slipped through to establish communications with the battalion command post; then he was able to lend some valuable assistance in adjusting counter battery fire. Dramatic rescues were being made all afternoon. Company B’s Staff Sergeant John E. Wieck dragged an unconscious comrade back across a meadow; several times he had to stop during heavy artillery concentrations, and then he would shield his comrade with his own body; finally he was wounded as he tried to lift the man over the hedgerow.

Captain Lorin McCown "Larrupin Lou" as all-state tackle on Beatrice (Nebr.) high school football teams back in 1929 – 1931 – was carrying his A Company right with him in his drive to reach the objective. Repeatedly he would leap onto a tank, and shout words on encouragement to his men as they drove unwilling bodies forward. He led the final phase of the attack from the open turret of a tank. Defiant of direct artillery fire, mortars, machine guns, he breathed a determination which seemed to spread to all those who could hear or see him. As they were driving the task to completion, however, a burst of machine gun fire caught him in the abdomen. It was a severe wound, but the captain insisted on staying up with the fighting until Colonel Boatsman ordered his evacuation. Lieutenant Kjems was carrying on with an aggressiveness which had become habitual.

By early evening the 1st Battalion had established itself well down on the forward slope of Hill 122, and the regimental command post moved up to the vicinity of Villiers-Fossard. But the Germans were not yet ready to call it a day, for at 1810 they delivered a strong counterattack against the 1st Battalion. Fortunately, the battalion still had enough left to meet any threat. Its defense was successful because, just as in the attack, there were heroes there that evening who refused to give in. Private First Class Virgil D. Reimers of Nebraska, was an ammunition carrier in a Company D machine gun squad. He had been working hard all day to keep ammunition chests on hand for the hungry, heavy machine guns supporting the 1st Battalion’s attack. Now, at the time when every gun was needed most, enemy guns found the range and delivered a barrage which killed every member of the squad except Reimers and one other soldier. Reimers saw how perilous the position was, but he also saw how important every bit of support was. With the help of the other survivor, he got the machine gun back into action and remained there to cover a local withdrawal of some of the rifle troops – he kept the gun in action until he too was killed in a succeeding barrage.

Much of the burden of any defensive action fell upon the machine guns and 81mm mortars of the heavy weapons company. The commander of Company D, the one responsible for the co-ordination of this fire, was Captain Donald C. Rubottom of Nebraska (he had been a member of the University of Nebraska’s Rose Bowl squad for the game with Stanford on New Year’s Day 1941).

It was growing dusk, but the 3rd Battalion moved on another two hedgerows before consolidating for the night. It occupied a part of Hill 122 on the right of the 1st Battalion. Colonel Thomsen moved up with his command group to a sunken trail near some farm buildings which Company I had overrun. One of the buildings was on fire. Almost immediately an enemy direct-fire gun – a dreaded "88" began firing. Its shells, bursting every few feet on the ground, and sometimes overlapping, pockmarked the whole field. Most of the men could recognize the "88" (88mm gun – tank gun, anti-tank gun, or dual purpose , anti-tank, anti-aircraft gun) now for its loud "zip-bang!" There was no long whistle of the shell; in fact the shell arrived ahead of the sound. At first every enemy bursting shell – mortar, howitzer, gun – was attributed to the "88." But the effectiveness of the gun was second only to the stories about it.

The hard fighting was finished for that day, but that did not mean that the work was finished. There were supplies – ammunition and rations and radio batteries and water – to be brought up. Preparations had to made for attack on the morrow. No, no orders had been received, but there was no question about it – it would be attack, attack, attack, until St. Lo had fallen.

Twilight was adding its shadows of gloom to the already grotesque pattern of shelled and torn Villiers-Fossard when someone came up the road near the 3rd Battalion C.P. to say that there were some wounded men in a disabled tank about a thousand yards to the front. The tank was still exposed to enemy fire. Private Edward W. Thill, one of the medics, volunteered to go after them. Without allowing time for any refusal, he jumped into his jeep and took off. Once a Milwaukee taxi cab driver, "Mouse" Thill now drove his jeep with as much disregard for enemy fire and mines as he would have given to yellow traffic lights. Two considerations demanded speed: to get the wounded men back to the aid station as soon as possible, and to limit the time of exposure to enemy fire. Thill felt no reluctance to apply speed. Flying a red cross flag over the radiator, the jeep sped down the road to the vicinity of the tank. Then, disregarding enemy fire, he raced to the tank, and was able to extract two wounded men. He got them into the jeep, and then, half standing, half sitting on the back of the seat, he came speeding back to safety. His work was typical of the medics. All of them had won a high regard for themselves in the hearts of the doughboys. This regard was especially keen for the company aid men (one for each platoon when they were fortunate enough to be at full strength) who, unarmed, went right along with the rifle platoons and crawled from one wounded man to another to administer first aid. They were men like T/5 John S. Bradny of Ohio, who had been working unceasingly with Company A and the 1st Battalion in the most advanced positions. (At one time, in fact, he had been the only aid man present with the elements of three companies which were pinned down by enemy fire).

As night fell the periphery of the glowing light from the burning house up near Emelie extended farther and farther outward. The flames became a reference point which could be seen for miles in the clear night. Ammunition in the house began to explode, and a brilliant fireworks display continued sporadically almost all night.

Engineers and members of the Anti-Tank Company Mine Platoon were working on the road (the Villiers-Fossard-St. Lo road) to remove mines from an area where one burned out American tank still set. Supply officers and kitchen personnel were at work moving up supplies to the 1st and 2nd Battalions; leading columns of jeeps and trailers (usually one for each company), they picked their way through dark sunken trails and shell-plowed fields to reach the battalions. The 3rd Battalion’s supply train likewise set out from its motor park, but it soon discovered that mines remained in the vicinity of the knocked-out tank, for as Company I’s jeep started to pull around, it set off an explosion which completely enveloped it, and left maimed bodies and wrecked vehicles where moments before only the quiet purr of motors had broken the quite. (Anti-tank Company also lost a jeep there.) Engineers and anti-tankers tried to find an alternate route, but they met with no success. Finally the 3rd Battalion was able to get supplies forward by detouring over the route being used by the 1st Battalion.

The attack on July 18th largely was a repetition of the previous day’s. The first big objective, the corps objective, appeared to be within striking distance and the Regiment, now with a battalion of the 320th Infantry attached, jumped off at 1100. The battalions were able to advance two or three hedgerows, and then it was the old story of confronting those well dug-in, co-ordinated positions.

The regimental commander was at Colonel Boatsman’s 1st Battalion C.P. during the first hour and a half of the attack, and while he was there, a call from high headquarters came to Major Craig at the C.P. in which there was expressed a desire for the 134th Infantry to halt its attack at the edge of St. Lo. A second call came after the regimental commander had returned to his C.P. The corps commander asked that the 134th Infantry hold up at the outskirts of St. Lo in order to permit the 29th Division, who had that for its objective from the beginning, to enter the city. Naturally such a request was accepted without question.

Already at 1430 the 2nd Battalion reported that it had a patrol approaching the outskirts of the town, and by 1645, the 1st and 2nd Battalions were consolidating their positions along the north-northeastern edges.

In the 3rd Battalion’s zone, the heart of the city lay about a thousand yards beyond the battalion’s position. Now Colonel Thomsen was as anxious as higher headquarters to push on and complete this big initial assignment; he could look down and see shattered roof tops and spires beckoning to him. He notified the companies to reorganize and go for St. Lo at 1930, cautioning them, of course, to hold up at the edge of the city.

Captain Melcher and Captain Lassiter faced a difficult task in getting their companies, fought to near exhaustion, on the move again. Men were freezing to their foxholes. There was that tremendous inertia of fatigue and protection to overcome. Days of fighting were beginning to tell. Weariness had taken the edge off that discipline which had forced men to go forward without regard to themselves. But now one of L Company’s platoons was leading out. First Lieutenant Francis Greenlief of Nebraska had his platoon on the way. They went over the hedgerow and started across the next field. When a man hesitated, Greenlief called out to him. His voice could be heard above everything else. Suddenly, a German machine gun 42 opened up with a long burst from an opposite corner. It caught most of the squad. Four of them fell dead. The remainder of the platoon hit the ground and froze in place. The husky lieutenant urged them on, but they could not face that machine gun. He crawled to a wounded soldier and picked up his Browning automatic rifle – always a favorite weapon. The big platoon leader, still shouting to his men, jumped up and opened fire – firing from the hip. He stood up and sprayed the whole hedgerow ahead of him, and then, still firing to keep the Germans’ heads down – he knew that they would "freeze" under automatic fire as much as his own men – he rushed to the corner where the machine gun had been firing. He went in fast and destroyed the entire enemy crew. With this immediate danger removed, and such an example of heroism as this, the men no longer could remain down.

They began moving all along the line. Each took confidence as he saw his comrades moving with him. Now they were moving in short rushes, now in long rushes from hedgerow to hedgerow. No longer was it a pair of scouts or half a squad working forward along the hedgerow – it was fire and movement all along the front. Tired men forgot their fatigue. Frightened men forgot their fear. All of them brave men now, kept shooting and moving forward.

An L Company man leaped over the next hedgerow, but he dropped his rifle on the wrong side. When he looked up he saw three Nazi soldiers standing beside him. They were as surprised as he; but they had one important advantage – they were armed. Acting quickly – almost by reflex action – he grabbed a burp gun from the hands of the nearest adversary and with a single burst shot all three of them.

A frightened German jumped up and scampered over the hedge. "Get the rabbit! Get the rabbit!" men began shouting. Two or three riflemen paused for shots; he fell on his face with such violence that his helmet rolled out ahead of him, and his long hair (hardly a German was to be seen with a "German haircut"; most of them were wearing the long "Hollywood" style)strung out in front.

Someone started yelling the old war cry, "All hell can’t stop us!" – "Lah We Lah His!" The Kraut was on the run, and when he was on the run he could not very well shoot back. Company commanders tried to caution their men to halt at the edge of the town, but the assault was now out of their hands. It swept into St. Lo. After some effort the company commanders were able to recall their men back up to the edge of town and organize a defensive position. During the night the keeper of the regimental S-3 Journal made these entries:

2400 – Blue 3 wants to be sure liaison planes will be in the air at daybreak.

0115 – Capt. Heffelfinger (1st Battalion S-3) reports Strader (C.O., Co A) tied in on to Lassiter in St. Lo – cemetery on outskirts – out of the boundary. Strader is requesting AT guns to be there by daylight.

0130 – Called Blue 6 – Lassiter is tied on a church about 1000 ft due N of St. Lo – K is on right. Strader and Davis on left.

FO # 7

XIX Corps defends along line Vire R. – St. Lo in zone. Establish limiting point on MLR, RRL. Tie in w/29th Div.

As a result of the St. Lo action, the 134th Infantry and the 115th Infantry became the first two regiments in the European Theater to be mentioned in the press by name. It was an order of General Eisenhower that brought the War Department announcement that "two former National Guard regiments, the 134th and the 115th Infantry, have distinguished themselves in the capture of St. Lo" (in Stars and Stripes, ETO edition, Aug. 9, 1944). Further honors came in the form of a Croix de Guerre with palm from the French Government for the Regiment, and a unit citation for the 1st Battalion (see appendix).

It was habitual in times of pause in close proximity to the enemy to undertake active patrolling. First Lieutenant John Strader, now commanding Company A (Strader had been wounded in the shoulder earlier, but had left the aid station to return to his company on learning of the wounding of Captain McCown) led one patrol himself down around the western section of St. Lo, but in doing so he was wounded a second time; this time it was a bullet hole in the leg from the rifle of a sniper. (The command of Company A now devolved upon the dependable 2nd Lt. Constant J. Kjems when it developed that no other officers remained who were able to take command).

A few hours later another patrol – all officers – set out from the 3rd Battalion to reconnoiter the bank of the Vire River and determine points of reference for contact with the 137th Infantry on the right. The five lieutenants met along the sunken trail which served as a front-line trench, and, getting into patrol formation, started toward the right flank. They moved quickly, but cautiously, along the sunken trail to a small church where they entered a gravel road and followed it a few yards west to the asphalt paved St. Lo-Pont-Herbert-St. Jean de Daye highway. The afternoon sun shown brightly, and as they turned their back on the debris that was St. Lo, the countryside was most beautiful. Though they walked back to the north nearly half a mile, they were not free from the marks of war. There were wire obstacles, and there was a strong suspicion of mines. They paused once while one lieutenant went up to investigate a tank-looking vehicle which turned out to be only a huge truck. They made a left turn to follow another gravel road on to the west another half mile. A lone steel helmet lying along the road bespoke of a tragedy that had preceded them -–yes, at the road junction there was a jeep in which someone had ventured too far forward. They turned into a meadow and soon found themselves on a bluff overlooking the horseshoe bend in the Vire River. They located themselves on the map. The view below looked like a skillfully tinted enlargement of the aerial photograph in their hands. They just lay there to take in the view. It was the first time that they had been able to see beyond a hedgerow or two. Some 81mm mortars were adding to the color of the scene by sending out a few rounds of white phosphorous shells which burst like fiery fountains and then sent heavy white smoke mushrooming upward from the railroad buildings a thousand yards away. Finding a trail down the bluff, the lieutenants made their way down to the river, and then followed it back toward the town. Foxholes in the side of the hill commanded the valley, but the officers were relieved to find them abandoned. They noted landmarks along the trail which might serve as connecting points for regular patrols. Soon they were back amongst the rubble of St. Lo. They climbed up on some broken masonry that once had been a house and tried to find some of the streets which were shown on their map. But the streets were as unrecognizable as the house on which they were standing. Buildings had been flattened to spill rubble into the streets to a level equal to that remaining above the old foundations. A map was of little use in this sameness of destruction. About the only reference point was the church (the Church of Notre Dame, once a cathedral dating from the 14th Century); it was damaged severely, but the tall steeple was yet standing. Enemy artillery began to fall; it was doing its bit to make rubble of the rubble. They waited beside a garden wall until it subsided, and then started on up to find the highway. An automatic weapon opened up to their rear – it sounded like a B.A.R. No one was hit, fortunately, and, hugging the wall, they kept moving.

It was dusk – which meant it was past 10 o’clock – by the time the patrol got back to its area. As they entered the mouth of the sunken trail they heard aircraft overhead. Just then a bright flare caught members of the patrol in a brilliant yellow light. They felt as though they were standing naked; it seemed that the flare never would burn out, and that these particular individuals were the only persons in the world whom the Nazi pilot could see. They were flat on the ground by the time they heard the first bomb explode some distance to the rear. Then machine guns started to chatter. Red and green tracers could be seen racing across the now darkened sky. At first it seemed that the machine guns in the rear were sending up anti-aircraft fire, but no, those red balls of fire were coming down – he was strafing the hedgerows. Nine men of the 2nd Battalion were injured in the attack, as well as two men of the 3rd Battalion, and eight in Service Company. One man was reported killed in the Service Company area.

First Lieutenant G. I. Stoneburner was in the kitchen area (Service Company), and, like everyone else, ducked for cover behind a hedgerow – and lost his steel helmet. Groping about in the dark to try and find his helmet, he started crawling back along the hedgerow. He bumped into someone and looked into the spectacled face of 1st Lt. Joe Friedel of Nebraska. Friedel was crouching low as the machine gun bullets cut through the thick leaves. Stoneburner looked up quickly and said, "I can’t find my damned helmet."

Friedel yelled into his ear, "Here Rocky, you can share mine!" His head alongside Stoneburner’s Friedel lifted his helmet to cover partially both heads.

Staff Sergeant Harry P. Saali was killed in action that day. And that broke up a pair of twins from Peru, Nebraska, which almost never had been separated. Harry and Carl had formed a winning battery on Company A’s championship softball team; onlookers never were really sure which was pitching and catching. Their military career had been spent together in A Company. Their promotions always had come simultaneously – company commanders had protested that when one was promoted, the other had to be, for they could not be sure which they were promoting. But each had demonstrated his responsibility and dependability in his own right, and as staff sergeants and squad leaders they had been assigned to different platoons, but that was as far as separation ever had gone. Now, with one sudden blow the separation was made complete and permanent, as far as physical comradeship on this planet was concerned. Friends tried to keep the news from Carl, but he sensed it that very day. He knew that Harry was gone.

While the 3rd Battalion was organizing its position on the right flank, the 2nd Battalion was making contact on the left, the 1st prepared to move into St. Lo itself to relieve elements of the 115th Infantry. Artillery fire continued to move in as the 1st Battalion’s companies marched down dark streets to shattered houses to complete the readjustment. Colonel Boatsman took over the battalion C.P. located down in the safety of a well built tomb where wires and lanterns and maps and K ration cans had accumulated on the burial vault, and where the atmosphere was heavy from overcrowding, demands of continuous artificial lighting, and the lack of ventilation. But it offered protection from shellfire, and that was a highly important consideration in St. Lo.

Holding to the high ground south of St. Lo, the Germans seemed bent on rendering St. Lo untenable by artillery fire. Supply parties moved up at night from a quarry a mile or so north of town, and "ran the gauntlet" up "88 alley" to the companies.

Casualties continued to mount during the artillery barrage which frequented the area. But there continued to be examples of individual selflessness in the face of danger almost beyond the realm of common comprehension. On July 21, for example, Acting 1st Sgt. Richard S. Butterfield of Omaha, 1st Battalion medical section, was helping a concussion victim into an ambulance when an artillery barrage descended upon the old winery which was serving as an aid station in the valley behind the 1st Battalion’s cemetery command post. Butterfield’s first thought was for the safety of the patient. They dropped to the ground and he threw himself over the patient, holding him down, and protecting his body with his own. As a result the patient received only light fragmentation wounds, but it cost Sergeant Butterfield both legs.

It was possible, however, during this pause at St. Lo for men to shave for the first time – helmets were efficient wash bowls, and water from Norman wells was cool – and even to have hot chow a part of the time.

A thankless, but necessary, task fell to the grave registration officers who worked eight to ten hours a day all during this period to clear bodies from the battlefields. Jeeps came in from all three battalions pulling trailers loaded with the bodies of comrades who had fallen and of equipment which had been left by the casualties or simply had been dropped.

Now it was possible to recognize how much ingenuity and initiative had been required on the part of certain specialized personnel to support the Regiment’s drive into St. Lo and to keep it there once that goal had been attained. The expenditure of ammunition, the lose or destruction of weapons or equipment, the difficulties of combat feeding were problems which Major Thomas S. Morton and his assistants had to meet, or it would have been impossible for the Regiment to have accomplished its mission. No less important was the establishment and maintenance of communications, and here, it was Captain Robert W. Karlovich and the regimental and battalion communications platoons which performed an indispensable service. The problem was complicated somewhat by stories which had come down concerning the dangers of using radios, and they were used sparingly at this time. Almost continuous artillery during many periods made it necessary to patrol wire lines almost constantly, for a heavy barrage meant broken lines. It required superhuman effort to keep the wire communication effective. Platoon and company runners, operating in the most dangerous situations, often were the only means of communication in the companies.

Rotation of battalions in the defensive position at St. Lo sent the 3rd Battalion to relieve the 1st in the city, and the 2nd Battalion took over an additional sector on the left (east) on the night of 22 – 23 July. Three days later the 1st Battalion returned to the line to relieve the 2nd.

General Omar Bradley, commanding First Army, had seen as his immediate problem during July to be the extension of his area in order to permit maneuver, build-up, and accommodation for ever-increasing traffic. The unrelenting infantry attacks through the hedgerows had been expanding beachhead all right, but the ground attack had fallen considerably behind schedule. It had been hoped that Cherbourg would be taken by D plus 8; actually that port had not been captured until D plus 28. The V Corps had hoped to take St. Lo by D plus 9, but already it was D plus 39 when the 134th Infantry launched its initial attack toward St. Lo.

General Bradley was anxious to get the terrain which would permit the mounting of a big attack – a try for a breakthrough. He had hoped for the capture of St. Lo – Coutances line, but, with time running out, he had decided that the terrain along the St. Lo – Periers road would be satisfactory for mounting a new offensive. Target date for the operation – operation COBRA – had been set for July 18. St. Lo had just been captured by that time, however, and then a siege of unfavorable weather had set in. "Give us a clear day of flying weather," General Bradley is reported to have said, "and we’ll break out of the Norman peninsula." The days of delay were not wasted, however, for they made possible greater attention to plans and organization. The date then was set for 24 July, and planes took to the air for preliminary bombing, but bad weather forced a 24 hour postponement. That night Lt. Edgar Keltner, Jr., assistant S-3, telephoned the battalions to say, "The snake is going to begin to uncoil soon."

Men of the 134th watched in awe the next morning as nearly 3,000 airplanes flew overhead and began dropping their bombs. Bombs, 6,000 tons of them, fell at a density of ten per acre on a narrow area in front of the 30th and 9th Divisions (the 30th was on the immediate right of the 35th Division). It appeared to members of the 134th that some of the bombs were falling short, and unfortunately, this was true. In spite of casualties from the short bombs, the infantry in that zone was able to start moving at 1100. Reports came in that evening that the attack was making progress against strong resistance, but the next morning it appeared that the defenses had been penetrated; the armored divisions were going into action.

Obviously it would be necessary to maintain pressure in the zones adjacent to that of the major attack in order to prevent the transfer of enemy troops to the area of break-through.

It appeared, briefly, that the 134th Infantry was going to be relieved, perhaps for duty elsewhere, by the elements of the 28th Division. That possibility vanished, however, with an order at noon (July 27) for the Regiment to attack in its present zone that afternoon. Attachments to the 134th, making the main effort, were the 1st Battalion, 137th Infantry; Company A, 737th Tank Battalion; and artillery to the extent of 19 battalions were available for support. The regimental plan called for the 3rd Battalion to jump off at 1500, with 2nd Battalion to follow in reserve, and 1st Battalion, 137th Infantry, would attack on the left on order. There was greater distance for the 3rd Battalion to cover, because it was to execute a change in direction to the left after advancing half a mile southwest of St. Lo.

Passing the old, once beautiful Church of Notre Dame, men paused to point out to those who followed an inspiring curiosity of the ruins; stone dust had clouded what was left of the beautiful blue and white and gold of the interior; most of the roof was demolished; the walls were crumbling; but in the center of this destruction, resting upon the only opposing pillars which had been spared, rose the great crucifix, intact.

In a thin single file the 3rd Battalion moved over the deep rubble which filled the streets, wound down narrow steps to get to the river level, and then moved along the highway to the southwest. A small field of teller mines laid on the road surface near the edge of town suggested that the German withdrawal had not been well organized. Company L deployed on the left of Company I, and the 3rd Battalion moved warily ahead more than a thousand yards before it ran into any trouble. Here, after a brief firefight, Company I knocked out a machine gun and took some prisoners. Now leaving the highway upon which it had been guiding, the 3rd Battalion moved southeast through orchards and hedgerows. Here and there it would run into pockets of resistance and then move on. Prisoners in groups of four or five to 20 were taken, and, of course, men of the 134th were being wounded.

Attached tanks were unable to move through the rubble of St. Lo. A tank reconnaissance officer went down to look over the situation and estimated that it would take two days to get any armor through the town. Division engineers went to work with bulldozers and shovels and trucks - and mine detectors. They worked through the night to open a vehicular route in record time.

The 1st Battalion attacked straight south at 1800. Half an hour later it was involved in the same kind of firefight which had been delaying the 3rd Battalion. At 2110 Colonel Boatsman reported than an assault platoon of his battalion had reached the high ground which was the immediate objective.

Division orders were to continue the attack until 2230, and then dig in. At that hour, however, the 3rd Battalion was in another brisk firefight, and darkness had applied its own envelopment before quiet returned. The battalions, separately, formed "wagon-wheel", all-around defenses for the night.

Hardly had the men dug their foxholes before that bothersome German airplane was circling overhead. Again came those brilliant yellow, everlasting flares, and then the bombs, and then the machine gun bullets. It was awe-inspiring to watch as long as he kept at a safe distance, but when he came over one’s own orchard it was more comforting to hide the head ostrich-like in the foxhole and shut out the disrobing light. This night he seemed to be interested particularly in the area of the supporting 161st Field Artillery. One bomb tore a huge crater in the very center of a field which scattered thick mud - happily nothing more than that - all over the trucks and guns around the edges of the field. So regular had this visits become - 11 o’clock each evening - that everyone referred to the hostile airman as "Bed-check Charlie." And men were asking where was the famed "Black Widow" night fighter?

A regrouping of troops during the night (27 - 28 July) brought the 29th Division out of the line and shifted it, by motor, to a sector on the right; withdrawal of the 29th brought the 2nd Division to the Regiment’s left. The 35thDivision was now in Major General Leonard T. Gerow’s V Corps.

At 1000 the next morning (July 28) the Regiment resumed its advance generally to the southeast. The 3rd Battalion, on the right, near the Vire River, deployed on both sides of the road leading to Ste. Suzanne sur Vire and Conde sur Vire, and met only scattered, light opposition in its advance. It reached the high ground north of Conde just before sunset and reported "on objective."

One of the sergeants, happening upon a very-recently knocked out German platoon wagon and horse (the German infantry battalion at full strength was supposed to have 45 horse-drawn vehicles and 1120 horses) had discovered some tall bottles in the cargo, and, with a slight twinkle in his eye, had inserted a pair of bottles in the bosom of his shirt. Now, as the battalion prepared for its night defense, he dropped to the ground and leaned against a hedgerow. He withdrew one of the bottles and smiled eagerly as he removed the cork. He lifted the bottled to his lips with a deep breath and prepared to take a long draft. It was cut short very quickly, however, in wild sputtering and violent language.

"White lighting!" he said.

"Sure, it’s Calvados," added an expert on the subject.

On the left, the 1st Battalion was guiding on the St. Lo - Torigni sur Vire highway, and it found greater obstacles to its advance than did the 3rd. This meant a considerable gap in depth, as well as in width, between the 1st and 2nd Battalions (the "normal" frontage for a regiment in attack was supposed to be 1,000 to 2,000 yards; the regimental zone in this attack was more than 3,000 yards wide). Accordingly, the 2nd Battalion, in reserve, was ordered to move up on the left of the 3rd and take over the objective originally assigned to the 1st Battalion.

In moving up, the 2nd Battalion encountered some real trouble in the area immediately to the left of the route which the 3rd Battalion had followed. The firing became intense on both sides. Again it was Company F’s Captain Scully who was the central figure in the attack; but this was his last action, for a mortar shell burst above and killed him.

Not until the next morning were the three battalions able to make contact with each other. By that time the Germans, now following a more or less regular pattern, had withdrawn. But there was no intention of permitting the enemy any respite.

While the 3rd Battalion, from its position on the objective north of Conde, sent patrols forward for reconnaissance and to the right for contact with the 30th Division, the 1st and 2nd Battalions resumed their advances at 0900 that morning (July 29) in order to come up abreast of the 3rd. Third Battalion patrols destroyed a tank, or a self-propelled 88, in Conde sur Vire and captured the crew which had taken refuge in the village church.

An afternoon meeting at the Division C.P. brought orders for a renewal of the attack at 1700. With Torgnisur-Vire now the regimental objective, the 1st Battalion was again to be in the attacking echelon with the 3rd Battalion, while the 2nd was to revert to reserve once more.

Anxious to cover the ground in the quickest time possible in the few hours of daylight remaining, Colonel Thomsen decided to send out a platoon ahead of the battalion’s attack. If the platoon could reach the objective without a fight, the battalion could march quickly up and garrison it; if, on the other hand, the platoon should encounter enemy resistance, it as least would have determined something of the location and strength of the enemy forces, and the battalion would be able to apply its fire power with more effectiveness. Assigned the special mission was 2nd Lt. Jack Campbell of Chicago and his platoon from Company L. Moving out an hour before the general attack was supposed to be made, the platoon proceeded through Conde sur Vire and continued southward until encountering a high railway embankment. Campbell sent his sergeant one way to look for a trail crossing or underpass, while he went the other. As he left the platoon, the lieutenant noticed a German soldier walking ahead of him, but thought that it must be only some straggler. Soon, however, he discovered that he was in the midst of a German bivouac area - complete with tanks! He hurried back a few steps in order to see his platoon and, with downward motions of his hand, signaled "Hit the ground." His men saw him, all right, but they interpreted his signal as meaning "withdraw!" and they lost no time in executing it. It was a rather embarrassing moment for Campbell, but apparently the Germans had caught glimpses of the Americans and had determined to apply similar caution. Happily, a contingent from the 35th Reconnaissance Troop arrived in the vicinity, and Campbell could radio back "all clear."

By 1900 the 3rd Battalion was passing through Conde sur Vire, and the 1st Battalion was approaching the road which ran between Conde and St. Lo-Torigni highway. Nor did opposition develop during the next two hours while the battalion advanced another two thousand yards. When the 3rd Battalion reached a small cluster of farm dwellings and barns noted as "le Bust" on the map at 2130, enthusiastic French people were out to greet the Yanks. It was about the first time since entering combat that French families were found occupying their homes. Villiers-Fossard had been almost completely abandoned; St. Lo was a ghost town; Ste. Suzanne and Conde sur Vire practically lifeless.

At 2200 both attacking battalions were encountering heavy volumes of machine gun and mortar fire, but it ceased when they stopped to prepare defenses for the night. There was some indication from division headquarters that the attack ought to continue during the night, but a call by the regimental commander, pointing out that there had been no opportunity for reconnaissance of the ground beyond the present position and that serious opposition could be expected upon renewing the attack, was successful in having further operations postponed until 0900 the next morning.

While the 1st and 3rd Battalions were moving into position in the vicinity of le Bust, the 2nd was moving along the road south of Conde sur Vire beyond a railway underpass.

Some headquarters men were walking through Conde. "It’s almost 11 o’clock," one of them said, "We’re going to have to step on it to beat "Bed-check Charlie."

They quickened their pace, but darkness was upon them when they reached the group of buildings - a large farm house and out buildings - about mid way between Conde and le Bust which had been chosen as the new site for the regimental C.P.

"Here comes Bed-check!" someone called, "don’t you hear that old ‘washing machine’ motor? Its Kraut all right."

"Get cover before the flares come!"

In this vicinity men were scattering among the buildings; the 2nd Battalion began dispersing among the hedgerows. A string of flares cast its bright yellow light over the landscape. There was a burst of machine gun fire from across the railway. The airplane answered by swooping down with its machine guns strafing over the 2nd Battalion. A bomb sent tremors through the earth.

Some of the headquarters men found themselves in a half-wrecked room of the big farmhouse.

"Well, I have read in the papers how English civilians get under a heavy table during an air raid," one said.

"Here’s a table."

A communications sergeant began throwing refuse aside. The others joined him to push the table up against the most substantial looking wall, and dived underneath. They grasped each other to cultivate the reassurance of comradeship, and sat quietly. They could hear an occasional burst of machine gun fire; the slow-turning motor began to sound louder. They could hear a high pitched screaming whistle; it was a crescendo, violent tone whose intensity heightened as it came closer. Then the shrillness was lost in an engulfing reverberation. Bits of masonry fell onto the table over their heads; plaster dust fell down their necks.

"Boy, that must have got the house."

They waited a few minutes and then, as the overhead drone became faint, crawled out for a look around. Apparently no one was hurt in the vicinity of the farm buildings, but news came that the 2nd Battalion had suffered rather serious casualties during the air attack.

Someone interrupted some exchange of criticism of the Air Corps for failing to provide night fighter protection against such a regular adversary. "Say, he got a bulls eye; did you see what he did to that bridge?"

The bomb, rather than hitting the house, had made a direct hit in the center of the bridge over the railroad. Crumbled stone from the demolished span lay amongst the twisted rails below. To cross the railroad now it was necessary for one to climb down into the deep cut and out again over the rubble on the other side.

A system of green flares, apparently fired from the ground, practically had outlined the area of the forward battalions just prior to the air attack; men wondered if some of those friendly people were disguised Germans or German sympathizers.

The drone of an airplane overhead interrupted the sleep of those members of the 134th who had been able to recline for a few hours in a grass-lined foxhole. As they looked about they could see green flares bursting in all directions. Now "Reveille Pete" was joining "Bed-check Charlie" in making a nuisance for the 134th. Units were well-concealed, however, and "Pete" retired without bringing any further casualties.

Lt. Col. Alfred Thomsen, plastic map case in one hand, long field coat slung over the back of his belt, walked up to the corner of the field, paused momentarily to collect his command group, and moved up a hedgerow to a sunken road where he paused to direct the 3rd Battalion’s attack. The companies jumped off at 9 o’clock, but the German withdrawal pattern had been altered - there were immediate bursts of hostile fire all along the line. The enemy added artillery to his small arms fire. Companies K and L unable to advance, Colonel Thomsen sent Company I around to attack on the left of L; but there was no flank, and "I" was under fire before it even came abreast. All companies were suffering casualties, and were gaining nothing.

A barrage hit the corner of the orchard which was the 3rd Battalion C.P. Lieutenant Flory M. Garner, communications officer, was seriously wounded; a tank officer who had come up to coordinate the employment of tanks was hit; a company messenger was killed; the battalion clerk was wounded in the leg and side; Captain Ray Carroll, acting as executive officer, had gone forward to contact Colonel Thomsen, and he returned to find his field coat torn to shreds. Later Captain O. H. Bruce, battalion adjutant, was put out of action by a near shell burst.

Meanwhile, the companies were trying to go forward, but neither the 3rd or the 1st Battalion was able to make any substantial advance. Local gains developed from time to time through the sheer heroism and determination of small unit leaders, or of men who assumed the initiative in those trying circumstances. There was, in Company K, Technical Sergeant Paul Forney of Nebraska who, finding himself in command of his platoon when the lieutenant was hit, rallied his men to cross through enemy fire to the next hedgerow, and went on to throw grenades over the next obstacle before a burst of fire killed him. And there was Pfc. Edward Abraham of Ohio who leaped over a hedgerow, and, though wounded, crawled up to destroy a German machine gun with his grenades. Or there was such heroism in Company L as that of Pfc. Luverne Strand of Minnesota and Robert Hanlon of Washington D.C. when they ran up to take over a B.A.R. whose crew had been wounded, and kept the automatic riffle going in a vital position until a direct hit from an enemy mortar killed both of them. And then there was the action of Technical Sergeant Leonard Oseik of Ohio who grabbed a light machine gun, and fired from the hip to cover a withdrawal of his platoon, only to be killed as he turned to climb over a hedgerow.

Over in the 1st Battalion, there was the same determined resistance. Colonel Boatsman looked for every possible way to bring additional firepower to influence the situtation, but at times it seemed difficult enough to hold the present position let alone try to advance. Here again there were similar individual exploits. One outstanding example was that of Staff Sergeant Orville J. Cox of Indiana and Pfc. Vincent J. Kline of Ohio. A particularly troublesome enemy machine gun was holding up the advance of the units which Sergeant Cox and Pfc. Kline, machine gunners of Company D, were supporting. They decided to undertake an enveloping action with their own machine gun. Before they reached this objective, however, they discovered that a farm house near their route of approach was occupied by the enemy. They turned their machine gun fire upon it with such effect that they killed or wounded ten of the enemy, and the remainder fled from the house. The path clear now, they crept toward their original objective, and were able to get close enough to destroy that machine gun position with hand grenades. Unfortunately, as they crawled back to rejoin their unit, enemy fire caught them, and Pfc. Abraham was killed.

There was no sign of the enemy’s weakening as hour followed hour in this life and death struggle. A jeep was going up toward the 3rd Battalion’s C.P. after a contact mission to the Regimental C.P. (wire communication was out during much of this time). The men in the jeep heard shells coming in again. They jumped to a side ditch along the road while the driver backed into a meadow. Another shell came close. They lay there and mentally dared one to come closer. It did. It left their ears ringing and their nostrils filled with the odor of burnt powder. They glanced up the road to a group of farm buildings on the left. A long whistle announced the approach of another shell. It burst on the barn. Members of the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon - several of them wounded - came running out of the old building.

The 3rd Battalion Medical section, with its aid station in a small building about a hundred yards to the left of the road, was having its busiest day. Now a barrage hit the aid station. One man was holding out his hand to have his finger bandaged; a big shell fragment took off the hand. Wounded men lying helplessly on the floor were wounded a second or third time; medics were wounded so that they could not care for the others. Captain John R. Matthew of Indiana, battalion surgeon, decided he must move the aid station to the rear. It was a pathetic group which emerged from the damaged building and filed out to the road. Bloody bandages binding arms or heads or shoulders . . . wounded medics carrying men on litters who were unable to walk . . . everyone in a hurry, but no one able to run, out to the road to join a stream of God-forsaken human beings. Walking wounded from the Pioneer Platoon, and others from the companies, added their numbers to the battered column. French civilians from the little hamlet - the ones who had been so gay only the night before - now contributed to the general confusion by coming down the road with carts stacked high with bedclothes, utensils, what foodstuffs they might have. It was a motley assemblage that trudged down the road in the warm afternoon sun.

Company aid men were performing with their habitual heroism. With Company K, Pfc. Julius P. Morrison was wounded as he crawled up to give aid to men in pinned-down squads; nevertheless he kept going, and continued giving first aid until a second wound left him unconscious. Similarly, Private Louis T. Albertini of Pennsylvania was wounded in the right leg as he worked among the men of Company L, but he remained on the job for two hours to administer first aid to men lying in an open field under enemy fire.

Efforts to get the 2nd Battalion into action to relieve some of the pressure were not immediately effective. Colonel Wilson, suffering from the effects of the preceding night’s air attack, had to be evacuated and the 2nd Battalion’s executive officer was nervous exhaustion. It was not until the battalion S-3, Captain Frederick C. Roecker, Jr., of Washington, a young West Pointer, was reached that any action could be obtained. Presently, Captain Carlyle F. McDannel of Nebraska approached the 3rd Battalion C.P. with Company E. The company was moving up in single file. McDannel called up to the men to keep under cover, and then directed the leading men to the area where they should contact the 3rd Battalion’s left flank. But another barrage was on the way. Tree bursts sent leaves and boughs fluttering to the ground, and send steel fragments among the men below. A shell hit in the midst of an M Company mortar squad in the field to the right. Other shells burst on top of the hedgerow and on the ground beside it; they cut down that column of men from Company E. Wounded men were writhing all along the hedgerow. One man lay mortally wounded in the back, but he remained conscious, and he called out in a loud voice until death relieved him a few minutes later. Others died more quickly.

It was nearing 1700 hours now, and Colonel Thomsen was worried about the situation. He chafed at being unable to advance; he was impatient that neither tanks nor the 2nd Battalion had been able to give any assistance, and he was concerned about the loss of men. Already their had been over 100 casualties in his battalion alone. Captain James Lassiter of Company L had been seriously wounded in the abdomen; names of platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers were prominent on the growing casualty lists. Colonel Thomsen was standing in the sunken trail near a large tree. A barrage burst among the trees to scatter its lethal fragments along the hedgerows below. Pfc. Joe Morahan, intelligence scout, shook his head and coughed. He looked up and saw that almost everyone in the command group had been hit. A 300 radio on his back, he began running up and down the trail - when artillery has been coming in, any place feels safer than the present position. He saw that Colonel Thomsen had been wounded. Morahan sat down to report on the radio what had happened. He knew that Captain Melcher of Company K was near and he called to him. Captain Carroll hurried up to get things reorganized. Medics were at work quickly, but they had a big job to do. Colonel Thomsen had a very serious head wound. All the members of the artillery liaison section had been hit, and their radio was destroyed. The battalion sergeant major was killed as he sought cover in a foxhole beside the hedgerow. The intelligence sergeant was wounded, but he refused evacuation until the others had been cared for only to die when another shell struck and killed him as well as the litter bearers who were carrying him away.

Enemy shelling subsided as dusk approached, but there was little fight left in the 3rd Battalion. The immediate problem was to get the 2nd Battalion into the line to relieve the 3rd. Fortunately, friendly night fighters were in the air this night and the relief went on without any interruption from "Bed-check Charlie." Lieutenant Earl J. Ruby had posted all available members of his Company M, as well as the survivors of Headquarters Company, along the road to act as guides in order that riflemen would not go wrong as they marched through the cool, clear night to an assembly area in an orchard about a kilometer east of the Regimental C.P. It was the end of a day which survivors of the 3rd Battalion always would remember as "Bloody Sunday."

In the assembly area, Lt. Col. Albert D. Sheppard, regimental executive officer, was on hand to supervise the reorganization until the new battalion commander should arrive. And the new commander was to be none other than Lt. Col. Robert E. Moore, formerly executive officer of the 137th Infantry, and close friend and associate of Colonel Sheppard’s from the days of national rifle and pistol matches at Camp Perry, Ohio back in 1929 and 1930, and executive officer, under Colonel Sheppard, in the Missouri State Police. Colonel Moore was expected to arrive at 8 o’clock the next morning. Other changes took Captain Harlan B. Heffelfinger, 1st Battalion S-3, to the 3rd Battalion as executive officer, and Lieutenant Frank Snyder went from 1st to 3rd Battalion as communications officer.

With a turnover, in the Regiment as a whole, of about 35 percent since the beginning of combat, men of the 134th began wondering when their turn would come. Percentages looked well enough when figures were given dealing with the whole Army, for most of the Army does not fight, but in the fighting elements of infantry regiments, men began to see that they had no odds in their favor. It was becoming a question not of if they were going to get hit, but when, and how badly. During these two weeks the Regiment had suffered 1,333 casualties – 61 officers and 1,272 enlisted men, and of these, 283 had died.

In spite of the difficulties growing out of the "Bloody Sunday," the Regiment prepared to move on. The watch word was "push, push"; the enemy must be allowed no respite. Apparently, the previous day’s action had hurt the Germans even worse than the Americans; for there was no real opposition during most of the day. Down the sunken trails, over unused highways, across hedgerows, through meadows and orchards, the thin battalion columns – the 2nd on the right, the 1st on the left, the 3rd following the 2nd – moved through the Bocage country. By about 1300 the leading battalions were on their objectives "B" (for Boatsman), and "T" (for Thomsen).

This success soon brought another division order. It changed the regimental boundaries to place Torigni sur Vire in the zone of the 320th Infantry, on the left, and called for a new attack southward – toward the Vire River – to be launched at 1600. This time Colonel Boatsman’s 1st Battalion was in the assault, with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions following in column.

Reports came at 1545 that the 320th was passing through Torigni without opposition. The enemy seemed to be withdrawing all along the front. The 1st Battalion was able to continue its advance, practically unmolested, until about 1800. Then it was the old story again.

Small arms fire criss-crossed in front of the 1st Battalion, and mortars began working over its pinned down companies. Once again Company C found itself in a difficult situation. Pressure on the flanks was relieved somewhat, however, when Sergeant James T. Walton of North Carolina, light machine gun squad leader, picked up his light machine gun, ran forward and opened fire with such effect that he forced the enemy at that particular spot to withdraw. (Later Sergeant Walton was killed in action.) In the midst of the action was C Company’s First Sergeant Thomas R. Coates of Nebraska. He was moving all along the line to assist in coordinating fire and to keep up the Company’s determination to hold its ground and keep moving forward; but enemy rifle fire caught him and he was killed in action. (He had been recommended for a battlefield commission as second lieutenant.)

The firing subsided with the coming of darkness, and a division order at 2100 directed the 134th Infantry to continue its attack until 2130; Task Force Sebree (the 137th Infantry plus attachments), on the right, and the 320th, on the left, were to continue their attacks an hour longer. Patrols were to be maintained to the front, and in case of an enemy withdrawal, the attack was to be resumed. Otherwise, the 134th was to renew its attack at 0800. Regimental C.P. opened in a new location 400 yards west of Torigni.

The pattern of advance for the column of battalions was much the same the next day (August 1). There were strong points to be eliminated here and there, but, in the main, it was continuos infantry advance. For the 1st Battalion, leading the advance, there were the difficulties of stiffening resistance in the late afternoon, and once again it was costly in the loss of leadership. This time Technical Sergeant John G. Meints of Nebraska, platoon sergeant of Company C’s 1st Platoon, crawled up to the right flank of a machine gun position to destroy it with hand grenades; but it was at the cost of his own life. Shortly after 1800 the Regiment deployed out of column to send the 2nd Battalion to the right of the 1st, and 3rd to the left rear of the 1st. It was in this general formation that the Regiment was digging in for the night when Lieutenant Haugen arrived at the C.P. (now located a mile and a half south of Torigni) with a new division order. It indicated that V Corps (including the 2nd Division on the left) was to attack during the night for the Vire River. (There was a change in direction of the Vire at Pontfaroy so that it lay across the zone of advance in the area three or four miles south of the Regiment’s present position.) The 35th Division was to continue the attack throughout the night. The Regimental order called for a renewal of the attack, in the same formation, at 0200.

A successful night attack is a difficult thing under the most favorable circumstances, but without benefit of planning or reconnaissance, it becomes especially hazardous. (The field manuals had taught that "Night attacks are seldom justified without ample time for daylight preparation," and "a battalion should have a minimum of 3 hours for daylight preparation.") Yet, if such an attack could catch an enemy in the act of withdrawing, it might be well worth while. In any case, real activity that night was confined principally to the groupings of combat patrols. Daylight disclosed that the enemy was making no immediate defense, but there were mines and other obstacles to be eliminated before vehicles could get through.

Ambitions of higher headquarters grew with the advance. Initial objectives (north of the highway which led to Villedieules – Poeles and Avranches) taken during the morning, a new order at 1120 announced a new Regimental objective, the city of Vire, another 10 or 12 miles away. A visit to the regimental C.P. by the corps chief of staff resulted in the demand for an immediate crossing of the Vire River. Telephone calls from division G-3 and a visit by the division commander backed up this project. Once again there was some cause for concern because of the lack of consideration for the necessities of planning and reconnaissance in demand for an immediate effort against the dominating terrain commanding the Vire River.

Battalion commanders did find enough time to make a brief reconnaissance before their battalions – the 2nd on the right, the 3rd now on the left, followed by the 1st – moved through a quiet, sunny afternoon toward the river.

Moving out in front, the 3rd Battalion, in a long column, marched toward a big military bend in its zone; the axis of advance beyond the river was to Pont Bellenger - Hill 203 - La Masure Le Lange. The men moved down through shoulder-high grass to the water’s edge.

"Is this the Vire River?" someone said. "Hell, I can spit across this." Nevertheless there was a general feeling of dread as they looked at the high, commanding hills on either side of them and started up the valley.

"What just one machine gun on each of those hills could do to us," they thought. It might have been just like being with Custer at Little Big Horn. It was difficult to imagine why the enemy should not defend these heights.

Still, without any kind of enemy opposition, the column followed along the side of the valley toward Pont Bellenger 1,500 yards to the south. As Companies I and K uncovered from behind the nose of the hills and began to approach the town, the enemy opened up. Machine guns and rifles sent bullets cracking through the valley and shell fire quickly followed. Mortars searched the column all the way back to the crossing site. Fortunately the enemy had failed to set the trap at his disposal, and there was no direct fire from the tops of the riverside hills. However, that fire from the vicinity of Pont Belllenger was sufficient to be costly. Company I, in the lead, had 25 casualties within a few minutes. Nearly the whole battalion was pinned down. Captain Dick Melcher crawled up to his radio, but as he reached for the handset, a shell fragment tore away the mouthpiece and killed the radio operator.

Colonel Moore and most of his command group were pinned down in a little shed. Just outside in the meadow lay Private Elton Ridge of Missouri, one of the new battalion intelligence men; he had come up with replacements the day after "Bloody Sunday," and now he was getting his initiation. Company I men were falling back, and Ridge was crawling toward the relative safety of the little shed, where he would join the other members of the command group, when an I Company sergeant came upon him.

"Where the hell are you going?" the noncom yelled. "Stay up there and shoot!"

Naturally all the new men in the companies had not had a chance as yet to become aquatinted with each other and the sergeant obviously thought Ridge was one of his own replacements. At any rate the new intelligence scout found himself on the I Company firing line blazing away. Men were still falling about him; rapid bursts of machine gun fire were grazing over his back; a shell hit within a few feet and set his ears to ringing. He glanced up and saw a wounded man lying a few yards ahead of him out in the meadow. In spite of all the natural fear which was crushing down upon him, Ridge crawled out under that machine gun fire and amidst that shell fire to drag the stricken man back to safety.

The wounded comrade looked up and said, "What’s your name, soldier? That was a great thing you did."

The companies of the 3rd Battalion withdrew around the nose of the hill to reorganize. Company I was again without a commander - Captain Howard E. Craig of Ohio had been killed in action, and 1st Lt. Walter R. Bickford, second in command, had a severe wound in the leg. In these circumstances Captain Ray Carroll, battalion S-3,volunteered to take over a strange, disorganized Company for a resumption of the attack. Some confusion resulted from the coincidence of two hills designated on the map as "203," but ultimately this was clarified, the 3rd was ready to go again at 2030. It moved up about 200 yards before stopping for the night.

Meanwhile Captain Roecker, commanding the 2nd Battalion now, had led his troops across the river, and moved up to the ridge line to advance toward Hill 203 in their zone. They too encountered some of the heavy fire from the hill, and in this instance it was Company E which was pinned down. And here another element - air attack - came into the picture.

Bridging difficulties made it necessary for carrying parties to take up ammunition, water, and rations during the night. "Bed-check Charlie" made his regular visit, but inflicted no local damage. Artillery fire - friendly, that is - maintained continuos rumbling and a reddened southern sky. The sister regiments continued to advance; the 320th came up on the high ground to the left - amidst some confusion of challenges with sentries - and before 0700 it reported that it had men on the second Hill 203, southeast of Pont Bellenger; and the 137th had elements on Hill 193 to the southwest of Pont Bellenger. Now it did began to appear that enemy resistance had been broken.

That now familiar odor of broken tree limbs and phosphorus which associated itself so closely with death among the hedgerows lay heavy in the air as the battalions moved forward again at 0630. Half an hour later the 2nd was well beyond Hill 203, and the 3rd Battalion soon was making similar progress on the left. No opposition appeared until after 1500, and after failing to move far beyond Annebecq, the battalions stopped for the night. The advance moved on at 0630 (August 4) without difficulty.

Soon there were rumors that Vire no longer was to be a 35th Division objective; there were indications that the 2nd Division and the British were to take it. Men of the 134th had heard so many rumors about being "pinched out" that the term had become a popular by-word. Now, however, as the battalions advanced, queer-looking British vehicles began to appear along the roads to the left. Before noon orders came to hold up the advance; elements of the 2nd Armored Division were approaching from the right. On reaching their preliminary objectives, the battalions went into defensive positions in the orchards and the meadows. The Regimental C.P. opened at 1350 at La Metairie.

It was as though a tremendous weight had been lifted from the shoulders of all concerned. Men washed and shaved, and built small cooking fires, and got fresh water (always putting in the purifying halazone tablets, of course), and basked in the warm afternoon sun. For the first time in three weeks there was something beside enemy out in front. For the first time in nine days it looked as though there would be no order calling for the resumption of the attack within a few hours. It was known that the Third Army was now racing across Brittany; the situation called for a change in sector for the 35th Division, and officers and enlisted men alike speculated on the possibility of mounting trucks and returning to the Third Army to follow General Patton’s armor.

Looking through the clear night which succeeded the bright day, men of the 134th could see Vire burning and they noted the flashes of artillery barrages, but the sounds scarcely were audible. They munched on chicken and rabbit and contemplated on the end of the campaign in Normandy.

To a vet of St. Lo a remembrance of juiceless unripe apples, abandoned combat packs, a jug of the white-lightning Calvados, a dead GI still standing behind a hedgerow, Spring onions plucked gingerly from a booby-trapped garden, a ransacked peasant’s bedroom, a bevy of bees kibitzing over a can of 10-in-1 jelly, may cause the complete picture of Normandy to unreel in his mind. Again he will see vividly the dense green foliage of the hedges; the bright petite fields and orchards checkering Purple Heart Hill; the sunken roads, foxhole-ridden.

Or perchance he’ll recall a green-uniformed, blackened Jerry carcass, a great barrel of cider in a cool barn, the fried spuds of the first hot chow, the swim in the Vire, the fourth foxhole dug in rocky ground in one day, the first clean clothing, a bloated and putrid dead horse, and again the Normandy drama will enact itself swiftly. He’ll jump off in the attack. He’ll hear the burp guns and the 88’s and the startling mysterious sounds of the endless night vigils. He’ll watch the wind-whipped Red Cross flag as the litterbearing jeep carrying his wounded comrade disappears down the road.

- Story of the 320th Infantry

List of Illustrations:

"St. Lo . . . at a bend in the Vire . . . in the hedgerow country

By digging down a deep foxhole . . . behind these hedgerows . . .

And there were sunken roads

Maps of St. Lo

The burning house became a reference point

Soon they were amongst the rubble of St. Lo

St. Lo . . . this sameness of destruction

Holding the high ground to the south, the Germans still could look down upon St. Lo

unable to advance . . . and a barrage burst among the trees (Lt. Col. Thomsen)

Message center in a typical French village north of the Vire

1st Battalion Anti-Tankers - first across the bridge over the Vire River

Men washed and shaved . . .

ChapterV

Counter-Counterattacks at Mortain

Around St. Jean du Cordl

Attack is the reaction. I never think I have hit hard unless it rebounds.

- James Boswell

The second vital battle was that of the Falaise pocket. Here the enemy showed that fatal tendency to stand and fight when all the logic of war demanded a strategic withdrawal.

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report of the Supreme Commander

"To us that night will always epitomize the confusion of warfare. It would have been funny if it hadn’t been such a serious matter . . . The Germans . . . infiltrated into our territory . . . finally, everybody had everybody else surrounded – it was a sandwich! We had to ‘fight’ our supplies into our units. One of our lieutenants tapped a man on the shoulder to ask if he was from K Company – and the German turned around and fired at him with a ‘burp’ gun."

- Reported by Lawrence Youngman in the Omaha World Herald

With the successful breakout at St. Lo it became obvious that the Germans had failed either to drive the allies back into the sea or to contain the invasion forces in the Cotentin Peninsula. As American armored and motorized troops broke into the open and swept toward Paris and the Seine-Loire gap on a 53-mile front, one last desperate chance remained for the Germans if they would turn the tide in Western France. This was to isolate the racing Third Army by cutting the narrow corridor at Avranches through which that Army’s vital supplies funneled. Gathering the remnants of six panzer divisions as the core, the Germans launched their counter-offensive on the night of 6 August. Aiming at the seizure of the key city of Avranches, the Nazis the very next day recaptured Mortain and penetrated three miles toward the sea. It was a desperate gamble loaded with danger for the Allied offensive; but Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, commanding the American ground forces, elected to counter with a gamble of his own – let the Third Army continue on its way.

This development found the 134th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of Louvigne. It, with the other units of the 35th Division, was there as a part of the XX Corps. Teamed with the 5th Division and General Jacques Leclerc’s 2nd French Armored Division, the 35th was on its way, presumably, to the vicinity of Rennes, where it would become another of General Patton’s fast-moving columns. Orders had come before noon on 5 August to be prepared on short notice to move by motor. The Regiment had assembled that day near Annebecq, but crowded traffic conditions on the roads had necessitated an opportunity – it was Sunday – to hold general services in the battalions for the first time since the beginning of combat. Men had been intensely conscious of the beauty of the day and had enjoyed an unusual freedom from the pressures of combat duty with rest and cleaning and exercise with baseballs (there even had been a home-like feeling when someone sent a ball through a truck window) and footballs. The motor column had moved out at 1950. Little to the surprise of anyone familiar with the visits of "Bed-check Charlie," the column had come under air attack shortly after 11 o’clock – as it passed through St. Hilaire. Even then Nazi columns had been on the move in the initiation of their great effort to cut the very corridor through which the 35th Division was passing.

It had been a comforting thing for the men of the 134th to be moving on reliable 2 ½ -ton trucks rather than upon their own feet. It had been a reassuring thing to move in a single night a greater distance southward (about 35 miles "as the crow flies") than they had advanced during their weeks of combat from St. Lo to the area northwest of Vire.

The decision of the high command had been to let the Third Army go on its way. That had not included the 35th Division, however, for it practically was "flagged off the road" to postpone its rejoining the Third Army, and to return to the First Army (with Lt. Gen. "Lightnin’ Joe" Collins’ VII Corps) for action against the German threat in the vicinity of Mortain. For men of the 134th Infantry, it meant a return to the hedgerows. Before noon on that same 7 August a warning order came to prepare to move in that direction. Combat teams (Combat Team 134 included the 161st Field Artillery Battalion, Company A, 110th Medical Battalion; Company A, 60th Engineer Battalion, with the 134th Infantry) were on a 30-minute alert status, and when the order to move came, they were able to respond quickly. At 1430 CT 134 began moving to the northeast, toward the vaguely-defined area of the enemy south of Mortain.

This move took the battalions to defensive areas generally along the St. Hilaire-Buais road east of Les Loges Marchis (two and one half miles south of St. Hilaire) were the Regimental C.P. opened at 1730. The enemy had not penetrated this far, however, and there was no intention to wait for him to do so. Half an hour after the Regiment had closed in, there was another warning order to prepare for further movement. Now the Regiment was to move to contact. The objective was the ground southeast of Mortain along the Mortain-Barenton Highway.

With a platoon of the Cannon Company, a platoon of tanks, and a platoon of tank destroyers attached to each battalion, the Regiment – still motorized – began moving at 2030 in two parallel columns, the 3rd Battalion on the right, and the 2nd Battalion on the left. The motor columns moved through the twilight, made eerie by the uncertainty of the situation, to close the gap between themselves and the enemy. The 3rd Battalion had to infiltrate across the St. Hilaire-Buais highway, for it was crowded with tanks and other vehicles of the 2nd French Armored Division. As the 3rd Battalion passed through Villechien – where the 35th Reconnaissance Troop had reported enemy only half an hour before – making a turn to the north, and then very shortly another to the east again, bursts of machine gun fire could be heard, and tracers could be seen streaking across the road to the north – the 4th Cavalry (mechanized) was involved in a brush at DeBerre.

There was considerable confusion when it became necessary for motor columns of the 134th Infantry to cross the armored columns of General Jacques Philippe Leclerc’s 2nd Armored Division that 7 August south of Mortain.

At one town the French troops were receiving the customary wild welcome by the populace.

As each tank rolled by, crowds lining the sidewalks would read out loud the name stenciled on the front and shout it to those in the rear.

"Vive Bordeaux!" they shouted, and a cheer went up "Vive Lorraine!" another cheer.

Somewhere along the route a GI supply truck had slipped into the convoy. Stenciled on its radiator was the familiar sign, "Prestone, 1943", indicating that Prestone had been put into the cooling system.

"Vive la Prestone!" shouted the crowd wildly.

- Tom Hoge in Stars and Stripes

August 15, 1944

This lay near the route of the 2nd Battalion. Already Staff Sergeant Bill Harris of Nebraska and a group of his men from the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon had discovered – by way of being fired upon by a machine gun – that there was enemy along the 2nd Battalion’s route about a mile east of Milly. Members of the 2nd Battalion soon discovered it too, and leaving their trucks, they engaged in a brief fire fight near DeBerre at 2200, while the 3rd Battalion, leaving its trucks a mile or so short of its objective, marched up to Notre Dame de Touchet and went into position without serious difficulty.

It was a little surprising when the 3rd Battalion resumed its advance at 0600 the next morning, and moved rapidly beyond Notre Dame, and on down the warm dusty road toward its objective beyond the Barenton-St. Jean du Cordl highway without meeting any opposition. Object for some resentment on the part of the marching infantrymen was the platoon of tanks which moved through the column churning up choking dust over the dogfaces. They were regarding the tanks as another of those things which "you can’t get along with, and can’t get along without."

During a temporary halt after some hours of marching, a familiar formation of high-flying B-17’s – Flying Fortresses – appeared overhead. The regular pattern of faint silver crosses presented a striking beauty against the bright blueness of the sky. But the picture of innocent beauty was marred presently by a series of dark blotches. Anti-aircraft shells were bursting beneath the big bombers; soon it became intense – puffs of smoke appeared all through the formation. But not a plane wavered from its course; straight through the flak they flew. Then it could be seen that one was crippled; it lost its speed, seemed to pause for a moment there in the air, and then its nose turned and it plunged earthward – there was no spinning, no turning, no pause; in ever increasing speed it fell straight down until it disappeared behind trees on the horizon. Seconds later, there was a noise of a great explosion, and a pall of smoke rose above the trees. Infantrymen remembered that there was a squad of men in that plane.

Soon other airplanes appeared. This time they were fighter-bombers. Three pairs circled over the high, wooded hill southeast of Mortain. First, the P-51 Mustangs, guided by smoke shells, went into dives toward the enemy positions and loosed their bombs, and then zoomed upward. Jerry hardly had time to shake his head after that before the P-47 Thunderbolts came in to "lay their eggs." And that was not all – most beautiful of all (thought members of the 134th Infantry who had made their acquaintance in California) were the P-38 Lightnings’ diving down, then streaking up again as an earth-shaking roar came across the valley and clouds of dust and smoke billowed into the air.

The 3rd Battalion went into position on its objective before noon, and sat down to await further developments.

There was no such good fortune – and this was what made the 3rd Battalion’s advance surprising – when the 2nd Battalion jumped off at the same 0600 hour. On the contrary, the fire fight began about where it broke off the preceding night, and before 0630, Company E once more found itself pinned down among the hedgerows. Soon Company G was in the same situation. At this point Captain Fredrick G. Roecker, commanding the 2nd Battalion, decided that it was going to take some personal initiative to get the battalion moving. He went to the company C.P. to see what could be done, and though he was wounded, he remained to direct a platoon personally in an enveloping action which permitted a continuation of the battalion’s advance. In the action he was wounded a second time, and had to accept evacuation. Another young West Pointer, Lt. Col. Fielder Greer, arrived to take over the 2nd Battalion, but he was relieved shortly, and Captain Carlyle F. McDannel assumed temporary command. It was slow progress for the 2nd Battalion east of DeBerre, even after the reserve tank platoon was sent to its assistance at 1030.

In an effort to achieve a break in the situation, the 1st Battalion was committed on the left of the 2nd at 1230. Now the 3rd Battalion, alone on the objective, was sticking out like a proverbial sore thumb. Anxious to take advantage of this favorable, if precarious, position the regimental commander had initiated a plan to have the 3rd Battalion form a task force to take up position to the southeast of St. Jean were it could cut off the enemy withdrawal and annihilate him as the 1st and 2nd Battalions attacked from the west.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, though running into fierce local fire fights, were able to gain a few hedgerows during the afternoon, and the Regimental C.P. moved to some farm buildings along the axis of advance of the 3rd Battalion about 2,000 yards west of Barenton at 1800.

Just how precarious the whole situation was became abundantly clear half an hour later. Enemy tanks and infantry, moving from the north, were attacking the rear of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. There was some consternation as men whose primary duties were to support the companies heavily engaged to the front suddenly looked up to see those fearsome steel monsters approaching behind a rain of machine gun fire, and, worse, direct high velocity cannon fire. They brought their destruction through the 1st Battalion’s motor park, took some of the men prisoner, and went on to create havoc in the 2nd Battalion’s rear area. The brazen SS men captured the 2nd Battalion’s Aid Station, including the surgeons, the chaplain (Father William J. Hayes), and numerous supply and motor personnel. The attached Cannon Platoon practically was surrounded by tanks at close range. The men swore at the ineffectiveness of their weapons for fighting tanks and at the lack of protection for themselves, but they had no intention of surrendering. The platoon leader wounded, Technical Sergeant John Gillen of Kansas, platoon sergeant, assumed command and reorganized the platoon for withdrawal. First they turned their attention to the destruction of their equipment so that the Germans would not be able to find any usefulness in its capture, and then they made good their escape without further loss.

Major Warren C. Wood of Nebraska, 1st Battalion executive officer, quickly set to work organizing the elements of the battalion headquarters to fight the tanks. Message center men became rocket launcher (Bazooka) teams, and pioneers became their rifle protection and anti-tank grenadiers. Meanwhile a pair of Company A squad leaders, Staff Sergeant Verlyn J. Carpenter of Nebraska and Staff Sergeant Albert V. Sampson of Minnesota, teammates on Company A’s division championship basketball team, set out to bring up tank destroyers. They made their way through enemy-held territory, and hurried on four miles to reach the T.D.’s and to guide them back to the relief of the battalion. They arrived in time at least to keep a fluid situation fluid and to deny to the enemy the completion of a promising success. Another enemy group approached the 3rd Battalion’s task force, fired a few rounds, and withdrew. All of this was enough to keep most members of the 134th Infantry on the alert that night.

The 134th Infantry was at grips with the cream of the German forces – the vaunted SS Panzer Division "Das Reich," and the regiments in the area were the "Deutschland" (home station, Munich), and "Der Fuehrer" (home station, Vienna). "Das Reich" had been formed as a motorized division in the winter of 1940 – 41, and after action in the Balkan campaign, it had participated in the invasion of Russia. In the summer of 1942 it had been transferred to France to be reorganized as a panzer division, but then had returned to the southern sector of Russia early in 1943 for the German offensives toward Kharkov and Kiev. Here at least was one division which the invasion of Normandy had drawn from the Russian front.

The order the next morning (9 August) was the kind which one learned to expect in those situations where attack was meeting attack. The 320th Infantry was to go in on the north of the 134th; the 3rd Battalion, 137th Infantry, was attached to the 134th Infantry, and took over the 1st Battalion’s zone while the latter reverted to reserve and was to follow closely behind the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion was attached to the 137th Infantry, which was operating northwest from Barenton.

Long before the 0900 attack there were highly convincing indications that the enemy had not yet resigned the initiative, nor was he going to pass up the advantage which he had gained the previous evening without another try. At 0340 the 1st Battalion reported an estimated "15 to 50 enemy tanks to their front." As other activity continued to the north and west, Colonel Boatsman could see that the threat to the rear area had not been eliminated, and he worried about the shortage of bazooka ammunition with which to fight the tanks. (This was relieved somewhat when Lieutenant Charles D. Hall arrived with a load of ammunition from the 3rd Battalion.) The volume of fire which the enemy sent up toward a liaison plane of the 161st Field Artillery gave further indication of the fire power facing the Regiment. The only word from the division was a call at 0910 saying that the "mission must be accomplished without delay."

There was little to show in way of advances for that whole morning’s efforts against the continued resistance. Shortly after noon, another truck was coming the other way. The vague signs of danger to the north and west assumed concrete form, and once more, tanks and paratroopers were approaching the rear area of the 1st Battalion. A tank rumbled up to the hedgerow which ran along the orchard being used for a battalion motor park. It pushed its long, ugly gun across the hedgerow, and deliberately opened fire. It blasted the 1st Battalion’s vehicles as though they were sitting ducks. Five jeeps crumbled before the explosive steel, and then five other trucks were blown to destruction.

Captain Elbert B. O’Keefe of Omaha, regimental assistant operations officer, arrived on instructions from the regimental commander to find out the situation and report back. It seemed that tanks were closing from all directions. Tanks reached the MSR (main supply route) to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, and both appeared to be cut off. There had been a report that there was a "lost battalion" of the 30th Division surrounded near Mortain. Now it looked as though there was to be a pair of lost battalions here. Radio communications were fairly good, but it was not wise to give too much of a bad situation over the air. The regimental commander was impatient for information. Finally he was able to contact Captain O’Keefe at the 1st Battalion.

"O’Keefe, you get back here right away," he said.

"Yes, sir, I sure would like to, sir, but I’m afraid it would take a whole armored division to accomplish that right now."

A tank destroyer ventured down the road to make an effort to open the supply route, but it was knocked out before it could deliver a blow. Neither were anti-tank guns able to succeed where the T.D.’s failed. Renewed efforts cost two more tank destroyers, and when the 1st Battalion called upon the reserve tank platoon for assistance it lost four tanks.

The 1st Battalion, after beginning the day as a reserve behind the 2nd Battalion, had been ordered to swing south (i.e., to the right) during the afternoon and attack toward the objective. It had responded with a vigorous attack. Directing the action of one of Company A’s platoons was First Sergeant Leslie A. Gump of Nebraska City, who had been recommended for a battlefield commission as second lieutenant. A machine gun had the company pinned down, and Sergeant Gump was directed to maintain a holding action while a reinforced squad tried to envelop the enemy position. Seeking better observation and to make his own unit’s fire more effective, Sergeant Gump moved forward. Then, in the face of heavy fire, he went on far enough to throw hand grenades into the enemy position. This paved the way for the reinforced squad to complete its mission, but it cost Sergeant Gump his life. His loss was a blow for the Regiment. Not only had he provided capable leadership for Company A, but he had schooled several other first sergeants of the Regiment – First Sergeants Donald R. Simmons of 1st Battalion Headquarters Company, Eldon H. Bunn of B Company, then Paul R. Pickering, Sergeant Gump’s successor in Company A and later, Herbert B. Rawlings of F Company, and Gerald P. Felthauser of Cannon Company, all came from Company A and Sergeant Gump’s tutelage.

Other men in the 1st Battalion had survived the Normandy campaign, only to die in the hedgerows that same day: Pfc. Walter A. Clark of Detroit, Michigan; Staff Sergeant Charles J. Van Dyke of Grand Rapids, Michigan. In the 2nd Battalion, First Lieutenant Victor J. Martenson of New Orleans, battalion S-2, was killed has he sought to coordinate the activities of the companies and learn the true situation; then there was Staff Sergeant Cecil W. Gibson of Kimball, Nebraska; Pfc. Roy Ellington of Nebe, North Carolina; Pfc. Ned Potts of Rome, Georgia; Sergeant Thomas F. Singleton of Norwood, North Carolina; and in the 3rd Battalion, Pvt. James H. Galloway of Kingwood, West Virginia; Pvt. Robert M. Clark of Wethersfield, Connecticut; and in Cannon Company, T/5 Arthur E. Bernitt of Maow, Michigan. (On the previous day, 8 August, seven men of Cannon Company were killed in action, and two more were killed on the 10th; that is, in three day’s time, 10 men of Cannon Company were killed.)

Finally, as night approached, an alternative supply route – accessible only to carrying parties – was found, and it was possible to bring supplies essential to the battalion’s holding to their positions. It seemed to be another case of seeing which adversary could outlast the other; unrelenting ground attacks and then tremendous artillery concentrations that night gave the margin of difference.

Someone found time to write a letter home even on 9 August:

I had not realized that it had been so long since I have written. Please forgive me. But here the time and opportunity for writing are not very frequent. And time does not mean a thing. We went to call up Division Headquarters the other day to find out what the date was – until our phone operator happened to remember because it was his birthday.

It has been two or three days now since we have received our Stars and Stripes or any outside news, but there have been some luscious rumors floating about.

We have been in some pretty rapidly moving situations lately.

Sometime after midnight that night Father Hayes walked into the Regimental C.P. His arrival immediately touched off a series of questions, and this became a barrage as sleepy officers came into the room to hear the story of this chaplain returned from captivity. Had the Germans indeed been so considerate of chaplains that they had set him free? Had he escaped from his captors? Neither was true. He brought a message from the German commander.

Chaplain Hayes had been marched up the heavily-wooded hill – through a devastating barrage from American artillery – beyond the German defensive positions to the headquarters of the commander. The Nazi officer had made a proposal.

"Chaplain," he had said, "the Americans have captured three or four high-ranking German officers in the area; we have several hundred American prisoners."

"Yes, sir."

"Now, I propose to exchange all the Americans for those German officer," the German officer continued, in substance. "I want you to take my proposal to the American commander. I shall guarantee you safe conduct through our positions, and I shall have a party to meet you on the road at the foot of the hill tonight. You can notify us by radio when you are prepared to return so that we can watch for your safety."

"But we have no German radio; I couldn’t notify you," the chaplain had protested.

"Don’t worry about that. Just send the message on your own radio, and we’ll get it all right."

"Very well, sir, I shall return as soon as I can get the answer."

Here was someone who had seen the enemy’s positions. Every intelligence officer up the line would be anxious to question him. Briefly, the chaplain went up "through channels," found the corps commander would entertain no such proposals, and came back through channels to arrive at Regiment in the evening. He was preparing to return to the rendezvous.

"But chaplain, you don’t want to risk going back to those Germans; you’re free now; they’re not supposed to take chaplains prisoner anyway," the regimental commander told him.

"But I promised; I gave my word of honor," the chaplain insisted.

"Very well," the C.O. said, and slipped quietly outside to order the provisional M.P. platoon to put the chaplain under arrest. Thus could he remain with his own Regiment with a clear conscience.

There were indications as the battalions - the 1st on the right, 2nd in the center, 3rd Battalion, 137th, on the left - began their advance on 10 August that the enemy had had all he could take in that particular location. There still was bitter resistance, to be sure, but once again the battalions could give that reassuring report which had become so common: "moving forward." One example of the determination to keep moving forward in the 2nd Battalion was the action of Staff Sergeant Robert A. Meier of Kansas, a squad leader of Company F. In an exchange of close-range fire, Sergeant Meier’s rifle was shot from his hands and broken; but this served to free his hand for grenade work, and he proceeded to destroy two machine gun positions in the hedgerows with the hand explosives. Soon Father Hayes’ rendezvous point had been overrun, and hedgerow to hedgerow the battalions continued slowly. Another blow came to Company A as its commander, 1st Lt. Edgar H. Keltner, Jr. of Texas, moved forward to coordinate the fire against the enemy machine guns and tanks and was severely wounded.

The regimental C.P., initially following the 3rd Battalion, had returned to a location a mile north of Notre Dame where it would be in rear of the battalions now engaged in the difficult fighting. Progress permitted another move forward for the C.P. shortly after noon.

More that that, the Regiment’s progress, together with that of the 320th Infantry on the left, permitted a task force composed of that regiment’s 1st Battalion and tanks of the 737th Tank Battalion to undertake a dash north toward Mortain in a effort to reach the beleaguered "Lost Battalion" of the 30th Division. In a hectic night of battling, that special mission was successful in making contact two days later, and it followed up with delivery of supplies (under armored escort) and evacuation of wounded.

For the 134th Infantry, it was heavy resistance again when orders came to dig in for the night.

Even this was not necessarily an undesirable development, for heavy resistance at nightfall frequently was a prelude to withdrawal, and intelligence reports suggested that this might be the case now.

It was another 0600 attack on 11 August, and it held little promise as far as members of the 1st Battalion could see, for they reported "at least four tanks to their front." Patrols from the 2nd Battalion, however, discovered no enemy 300 yards to the front. Actually the enemy was withdrawing, and before noon the 1st Battalion was on its objective, and the 2nd Battalion as well as the 3rd Battalion, 137th Infantry, was moving with almost equal rapidity. The regimental C.P. was able to move up all the way to La Ga Hamel, south of St. Jean du Cordl, at noon.

Reports came to the 1st Battalion that there were some wounded American soldiers in a house some distance to the front, behind enemy lines, and Master Sergeant Edward F. Bloch of New York, military intelligence interpreter with the Regiment, went with a combat patrol to investigate the reports. Though resistance had subsided in front of the 1st Battalion, the patrol found that the enemy remained to resume his defense against further advance. It was a discovery made at close quarters, and Sergeant Bloch assumed the role of combat leader rather than interpreter to lead a squad in the capture of a German outpost. Upon interrogation of the prisoners, then, Sergeant Bloch was able to obtain information of enemy defenses which contributed in large measure toward their subsequent elimination.

Also curious about the reported wounded Americans and the situation to the front of the 1st Battalion were B Company’s Lieutenant Edward K. Hum and First Sergeant Eldon H. Bunn of Nebraska. Their reconnaissance too was interrupted by an encounter with Germans. But this time they were far outnumbered and the Germans were approaching, not waiting. There was time for only a brief exchange of fire, and enemy soldiers closed in upon Sergeant Bunn and hustled him away. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Hum had hit the ground; he was playing dead! He sweat blood as he called upon every ounce of determination to deny his body the urge to tremble. Two or three of the Germans walked over to him; they looked at his face, kicked him in the side, mumbled something, and walked away. Hum lay quietly until darkness brought concealment to him, and then he hurried back, alone, to his company.

The 2nd Battalion was having a more difficult time of it, and it stopped before a well-organized defensive position at 1630. Night patrols encountered hostile machine gun fire, but the battalions were able to occupy the whole of the regimental objective early the next morning (12 August). There was little reward for the infantrymen for their success, however, for once again the occupation of an objective only brought the earlier assignment of another - another hill several hundred yards to the northeast. The 1st Battalion led in the new attack, the 2nd following in column. The enemy was not yet ready to abandon the whole area, however; his withdrawal had been only far enough to set up defenses on a new terrain feature. After knocking out a tank, the 1st Battalion found itself up against the new position at 1345, and soon after, the 2nd Battalion too was involved in a fire fight at the bottom of the hill which was the objective.

Another letter from Mortain.

11 August, 1944.

Today is a real summer day - one of our hottest. It’s the kind that would be good for going to a ball game or going swimming.

Things keep changing so rapidly around here that one hardly knows what to expect next. Everyone keeps hoping for a breather to wash up good and catch up on a little sleep.

Frenchmen are still in their houses around here and do not seem too concerned with the noise going on about them. When there gets to be too much excitement they load everything they can carry into their two-wheeled carts and disappear to the rear. As soon as it is safe, back they come, wondering whether they have a home left, and move in - even if only into ruins.

Much of the country in the section does not have that striking war-torn look until you come upon some specific locality which has been hard hit.

The trees, the hedge-lined meadows and grain fields offer a striking appearance - how unfortunate that they should be viewed just as holding places for guns!

Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion, 134th Infantry, was participating in a new attack with the sister 137th Infantry Regiment. It had moved around through Barenton the preceding evening in order to attack to the northwest toward a major hill position (while the rest of the 134th was attacking northeast). While the men of one of the platoons crouched behind a hedgerow that evening to await orders, one of them - a newly-arrived replacement - had turned to a battalion staff member who happened by.

"Sir, will it be very rough? I just came up, and I don’t know much about it," he had said quietly and seriously.

"Well, sometimes it’s not so bad, but other times it gets very rough; but I think we’re going to come out all right this time." The officer was anxious not to frighten him by drawing too dark a picture, but, at the same time, he did not want him to think that it was going to be anything easy. Most men never had realized how heavy the casualties were going to be in a rifle platoon.

"I’m afraid I may not know just what to do all the time," the soldier continued.

"Do you know your sergeants - your squad leader and assistant squad leader?"

"Yes sir, that’s my squad leader right over there."

"Well, don’t get too far away from them, and do everything they tell you; when in doubt ask them; then you do everything as much as you can just like they taught you back in training - that will work all right."

The 3rd Battalion had gained its first objective by sending out a combat patrol - a reinforced platoon - to occupy it during the night. But when it resumed the attack that afternoon, it encountered the same kind of stubborn resistance which was troubling the 1st and 2nd Battalions. Lt. Col. Robert E. Moore was close behind the assaulting companies to direct the attack. He paused behind a small barn (with his command group) as firing became intense, but a high angle mortar round dropped behind this relative cover, and once again the 3rd Battalion command group was hit. Colonel Moore had to be evacuated, and so did the artillery liaison officer, and several men of the party. Captain Ray Carroll found himself splattered with scores of tiny wounds, but he remained until Captain Harlan B. Heffelfinger, executive officer, came forward to take command, and then he left the battalion only long enough for emergency treatment at the aid station.

All this was only a few hours before the Regiment was to be relieved. At 1810 a call came from division to send guides to pick up trucks again. That night parties arrived from the 8th Infantry, and soon units of the regiment were marching up to take over the positions of the 134th.

Upon completion of the relief the next morning, units of the 134th Infantry assembled in an area 3,000 yard east of Notre Dame to await orders for movement.

Throughout this whole week of attacks near Mortain, the enemy had held stubbornly to his desperate efforts to continue his drive toward Avranches and the sea. Indeed he showed no signs of letting up until 12 August - the day that relief arrived for the 134th Infantry.

This detour back to the hedgerow country had been a costly one for the Regiment. In the week’s fighting there had been approximately 500 casualties in the Regiment, about 130 of them killed. It had cost the 3rd Battalion its second commander, and the third commanding officer for the 2nd Battalion.

Later the news came that Colonel Thomsen, after earlier promise of improvement, had died of wounds he had received back south of Conde sur Vire. His loss was another of the frightful losses of war for the men who had depended upon him so much for leadership. But he had impressed his personality so indelibly upon that battalion that his courage became its courage, and its victories in the days to come would just as certainly be his victories.

The new assembly, again on a bright, sunny day, restored enthusiasm throughout the ranks of the Regiment. Once more men relaxed and prepared to move out early the next morning (14 August) again to rejoin General Patton’s Third Army.

Hundreds of Nazi propaganda leaflets were given a distribution in the Mortain area beyond the greatest hopes of the Germans. Men of the 134th Infantry picked up bundles of the leaflets stacked in captured houses, and soon everyone was collecting them as souvenirs. They played upon themes of British-American rivalry, on the uselessness of continued fighting, and the safety of prisoner-of-war camps. One copiously illustrated number showed an American sergeant with an English girl who was saying:

"You Americans are s-o-o-o different!"

And on the other side it pictured a British soldier’s grave and said:

"British Soldiers!

You are fighting and dying far away from your county while the Yanks are putting up their tents in Merry Old England. They’ve got lots of money and loads of time to chase after your women."

Mortain

Chapter VI

Across France

In Nancy; wild, happy throngs greet their liberators.

With his main forces trapped and broken in Normandy, the enemy had no means of checking the Third Army drive, the brilliant rapidity of which was perhaps the most spectacular ever seen in modern mobile warfare. The three corps, each spearheaded by an armored division, raced headlong toward Paris and the Seine with an impetus and spirit characteristic of their leader, at once guarding the flank of the armies to the north and seeking fresh objectives of their own.

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Report of the Supreme Commander

As members of the 134th Infantry once again mounted trucks to become a part of the rapidly moving columns of the Third Army, there was reason to believe that there would be no turning back this time. Even as the Regiment had fought against the German threat at Mortain, spearheads of General Patton’s Army had continued their divergent paths - across Brittany to the west, east toward Paris, north, and even northwest, to Argentan. Concurrently, these operations had been aimed at sealing off the German Seventh Army in the Falaise-Argentan pocket and in continuing the relentless drives toward the Brittany ports on the one hand, and the heart of France on the other.

Now, as the 134th Infantry began its move to the southeast at 0425 that August 14, the Battle of the Falaise-Argentan raged on, but no longer was the central issue that of saving the supply corridor of the Third Army; it had been turned to the question of how much of the German Seventh Army Von Kluge would be able to extricate from that precarious position.

In such circumstances, officers and men of the 134th Infantry could enjoy a freedom from immediate concern and an absence of threatening peril to a measure not know since the landing of Normandy. It was the kind of situation which could not but boost morale to new heights. Here the most attractive conditions for boosting the morale of the infantryman all were present at the same time: he was riding rather than walking; he was moving rapidly forward, which would imply to him large scale victories; he was out of contact with the enemy - there was no shooting, machine gun, mortar, or "88," to bother him.

Throughout the warm, sunny day the motor column of the 134th Infantry moved on. The industrial capacity of America was making its superiority felt through the means which had made it most noted - automotive power. The German Army had won headlines in 1939 and 1940 for its spectacular use of mechanized and motorized forces; but the German motorization (the exact extent of which is now known to have been considerably overestimated) was nothing to be compared with that which now threatened its destruction. The Germans still were using horses for company and platoon transportation in their infantry companies as well as for moving much of their artillery. In this modern American Army in Europe, on the contrary, horses were unknown. Here was one of the decisive advantages of the American forces; their superior mobility power. The continuing mobility of the Third Army was to be a source of unending amazement for its German enemy. The jeeps - the diminutive, but sturdy, quarter-ton also, referred to as the "beep" or "peep" - used for reconnaissance and command; the three-quarter ton trucks, used for maintenance or communication; the 1 1/2-ton trucks, towing 57 mm anti-tank guns or carrying pioneer equipment; the 2 1/2-ton trucks, carrying kitchen equipment and supplies - the organic transportation of the Regiment was moving in company with 2 1/2-ton trucks, personnel carriers, from an Army Quartermaster trucking company, as the column moved through LeMans to the east.

The trip was a refreshing one. It was refreshing because instead of ghost towns of ruined bare walls, there were towns humming with activity; for the first time men saw French shops open for business. It was refreshing because attractive farms replaced the squalor and death that had been Normandy, and in these farms the feeling sprang that, in spite of war, people in this area were not going hungry. The trip was like a triumphal procession the whole way; enthusiastic people lined the streets at every village, and often in between; they called, waved, tossed fruit and flowers; a minute’s delay of a vehicle would bring cheering crowds surging around it, and cider and wine - and even champagne - would begin to flow; and children would crowd the streets crying "cigarette for papa" . . . "chocolate, chocolate". . . and they would scramble for the caramel candy or lemon powder from a K ration . . . "ou, la la!" Men could even begin to speculate on the relative merits of French and English women. It was a new war.

Some 10 or 11 minutes beyond LeMans - always remembered by the soldiers of the 134th for its sidewalk cafes and thronging citizenry - the Regiment went into bivouac between 1800 and 2000 hours. The day’s movement had been of a kind completely foreign thus far to the 134th Infantry in France. Where a day’s advance had been measured in terms of two or three hedgerows, now they had moved farther in one day than in three weeks in Normandy. If this was the nature of open warfare, they were all for it. They awaited anxiously for news of the leading elements of the XII Corps. (Composed of the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions and the 4th Armored Division, the XII Corps was commanded by Major General Manton S. Eddy.)

This news, when it came, was to the effect that a task force under Brig. Gen. Sebree, made up of the 137th Infantry, the 737th Tank Battalion and Combat Command A of the 4th Armored Division - and other special troops - was on the way to Orleans.

The rapid occupation of that historic old city called for a new 70-mile move to the east on the part of the 134th Infantry - now Corps reserve - on August 16. Transportation was available only for the 1st Battalion and regimental headquarters and special units, and when those units moved out at 1400, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained behind for a second day of rest while rumors of the spectacular advances and the impending fall of Paris continued to fly.

The Regiment collected at Semerville - 20 miles west of Orleans; with the closing in of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions at 0730 on August 17, there was another day’s pause to await developments. And sunny France was at her best. Here was an opportunity for officers and men to become more familiar with their units, to perfect their tactical organization, to discuss lessons to be found thus far in the experience of combat. Perhaps it was a little depressing to the buoyant spirits of the individual soldier to be asked to concentrate his thoughts on such perils as he had so recently escaped; but no responsible leader was taking the new turn in the nature of the war as meaning the end of vigorous combat. Optimism was bounding; there is no question about that but the battalions and the companies were seeking to preserve a psychological preparedness based on the assumption that plenty of work remained to be done. Yet, even a few hours’ training schedule was such a welcome change from unending combat of Normandy that officers and men alike greeted it enthusiastically. "Care and cleaning of equipment" was a far cry from continuous renewal of attack among hedgerows.

Even the hedgerows were no more in the open country of central France. Here great fields, which only a few weeks earlier had yielded their important crops of wheat, would rival those to be found in the American Middle West. If there were such a thing as "tank country" - (General Patton had said, "There is no such thing as ‘tank country’ in the restrictive sense. Some types of country are better than others, but tanks have and can operate anywhere.") if there is such a thing as "tank country" in the non-restrictive sense, then this appeared to be it.

Every effort was being made in this move to keep the soldiers informed of the events in which he was participating, and of actions on other fronts and in other theaters, and of news from the homeland. Stars and Stripes, the Army daily newspaper arrived with a high degree of regularity, battalion and regimental radios were able to pick up newscasts of the BBC (and of the Armed Forces Network, presently), and there were bulletins and maps sometimes available from the Information and Education Division. During this day among the groves of Central France, each unit was giving a portion of its training time to this subject of "orientation." The news – as far as the "big picture" was concerned – had been good most of the time since D-day. But now it was especially good. In recounting the news of the previous 24 hours, orientation officers described the battle which still raged in the Falaise – Argentan pocket a "massacre"; . . . The Air Corps was having a field day in working over some 3,000 vehicles; . . . there were reports of friction between SS and Wermacht troops; . . . the new Allied landings in southern France were moving rapidly, and already, within two day’s time, troops of the American Seventh and the French First Armies had extended the beach-head inland 25 miles and held an 80-mile front . . .on Germany’s other exposure the Russians had entered East Prussia . . .

Battalion intelligence officers undertook some road reconnaissance while the Regiment awaited orders for the next move. One report, for example referred to roads and distances to villages in the vicinity: bivouac to Verdes, 1.7 miles; Verdes to Membrolles – narrow, but good crushed stone road – 3 miles; Membrolles to Villampuy, (Juvrainville to Villampuy, narrow blacktop), 4.9 miles – 35th Rcn states enemy pulled out Patay 0400, 35th into Patay, 1100; Villampuy to water tower, .4 mile – Highway 155, first class blacktop; water to Turnoisis, 7.3 miles; Turnoisis to Patay, 4.3 miles – civilians report Boche pulled out of Patay 2000 – report three vehicles, two German and one American, passed through Gaubert this morning en route to Chatres; old man, speaking English, accused of being "Gestapo."

Regimental liaison officers were making more distant reconnaissance to the north and the east in order to contact the 137th and the 320th Infantry, and in order to obtain information on the possible routes for the next move.

The relative military inactivity of the moment permitted the assumption of some interest on the part of the Nebraska men toward a burning issue current in their home state – the attempt to restore prohibition. They – 312 of them – made known their sentiments by signing a petition – a document destined to bring some interesting reactions and nationwide attention a few months later. It was couched in these terms:

France

18 August, 1944

To the People of Nebraska:

We, the undersigned citizens of Nebraska, who are now serving in the armed forces in defense of our country, are dismayed to learn that those of us who survive this war may have to return to the kind of Nebraska that our fathers returned to in 1919. We feel that we are being disfranchised. Our minds are fully occupied with two propositions: To kill as many Germans as possible to the end that we get home as quickly as possible; and to ourselves survive until we can get home again. We ask the people of Nebraska to see it that the Nebraska we return to will be the same Nebraska we left when we entered the Armed Forces.

Pauses of much longer than a day were not to be expected in this fast-moving warfare, and the next morning (August 19) brought a warning order to prepare to move sometime around noon. Actually the time turned out to be 1430, and this was a shuttle movement. Trucks first carried the 1st Battalion – assigned the advance guard mission – to the new area south of Janville (a distance of about forty miles), then returned to meet the marching troops of the 2nd Battalion and, finally, those of the 3rd.

Now the Regiment was assigned a tactical mission of its own; it was not anticipated that there would be very much organized resistance yet, but the Regiment now would be going through areas not yet cleared by other troops. Leaving the 3rd Battalion at Santilly as division reserve, the 134th moved out at 0700 on August 21, by motor and marching, to advance – through a light rain – another 20 miles to the east and to occupy the high ground just to the west of Pithiviers. Hardly had this objective been reached when a new order came to move on, seven or eight miles to the southeast, to Bouilly-en-Gatinais.

But the pressure grew in the execution. It was 0100 when the next movement order arrived (August 22). This time the objective was to be an area about 4,000 yards west of Montargis. It was to be a coordinated advance at 0700, with the 134th Combat Team on the right, and the 320th on the left.

Continuing in its role of advanced guard, Colonel Boatsman’s 1st Battalion was on the objective less than two hours after its column of 6 x 6 trucks crossed the IP. The 2nd Battalion followed at 0920. First Battalion patrols, probing out toward the city of Montargis, encountered enemy groups at 1000. It was the first active contact with enemy forces since leaving the hedgerow country around Mortain. Patrols maintained their activity until they were able to get into the outskirts of the town, but it appeared that here was an objective which was going to require some effort in the taking. Even in reaching their initial objectives those battalions had captured and destroyed three tanks and had picked up three prisoners.

While the 1st and 2nd Battalions were organizing patrols to send into Montargis, Lt. Col. John T. Hoyne, division intelligence officer (G-2) determined to make an effort to obtain capitulation without further fighting. Toward this end he led a small, unarmed party into the city under a white flag. Marching down the main street, tense in the feeling that Nazi eyes were watching their every move, they advanced toward the center of the city. Formal and cool toward the enthusiastic welcome of the French populace, but warm within from the bright sun, the long march, and the nervous tension, they moved on, head and eyes straight to the front. Tension almost reached the breaking point when they encountered a German soldier riding a bicycle. Cooperative Frenchmen quickly manhandled the Nazi and turned his weapon over to the Americans, but Colonel Hoyne, anxious lest the incident bring down fire from hidden Germans, quickly restored the weapon to the cyclist while the crowd watched with some bewilderment. The G-2 had intended to present an ultimatum to the German commander to surrender or receive the full force of an artillery barrage. But it appeared that the German commander already had decided to leave that hopeless situation. He was no where to be found. Numbers of German soldiers remained in the town, all right, but they were a disorganized lot, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions had the situation under control. In fact, as the G-2 left the town he met Captain Glen Saddler who already was setting up the 1st Battalion C.P. Later that afternoon a 2nd Battalion patrol made its way completely through the city to reach the railway at the eastern edge.

Operations at Montargis netted some 265 prisoners, including 5 officers. Actually there seemed to have been only one organized defensive unit in town - the 1st Battalion of the 738th Infantry Regiment. A general officer and lieutenant colonel had abandoned the city the night before, and left the defenses in the hands of a major of the 2nd Battalion of that German infantry regiment. This major had been assigned the task of organizing another battalion out of the mixture of troops from other units who happened to be there, but the attack of the 134th had come before he was able to accomplish that organization. There were Poles and Austrians as well as Germans in the enemy unit and the state of disintegration of the German forces could be seen in how the various units happened to be in Montargis at the time. One unit had been passing through en route from Avignon to Paris; another group had been withdrawing from the vicinity of LeMans and Orleans; some men had been separated from their units and had been merely withdrawing in the general direction of Germany; one man had just been dismissed from a hospital in town and had not been able to rejoin his unit.

One of those incidents of the kind which the world tended to associate more and more with Nazism came to light in Montargis as the result of some investigations of Master Sergeant Edward E. Bloch of New York, military intelligence interpreter with the Regiment. According to the reports of eyewitnesses, a French priest, named Fouche, had gone to see a German officer in order to ask permission to evacuate some civilians to his sacristy several hours before the arrival of American troops in Montargis. The officer’s reaction had been to curse the cure and throw fruit at him; then, as the priest had turned to go away, either the officer or one of the men in the vicinity, had shot him in the back and killed him.

While these events around Montargis had been commanding the attention of the Regiment, its 3rd Battalion had remained in division reserve. The XII Corps was on the southern, or right flank of the Third Army, the 35th Division was on the corps right flank, and now the 3rd Battalion, as division reserve, was assigned the mission of guarding the right flank along the Loire River. At this point the protection of the Third Army’s exposed flank was "in the hands of the Ninth Air Force and the 3rd Battalion." Such disregard for the flank was made possible by the very momentum of the corp’s forward drive in disrupting the German forces, and by close liaison with the attached fighter-bomber group of the XIX Tactical Air Command - air observers kept a close watch on that flank, and their bombs and machine guns would discourage any attempt of the enemy to collect a serious force there. The 3rd Battalion’s role in the flank protection consisted of maintaining a series of "road blocks" or outposts along the highway which paralleled the Loire River northwest of Gien.

While the men of Company L and tank destroyers went south to man the road blocks, the remainder of the 3rd Battalion was formed into a task force (Wood) to prepare an assault on Bellegarde were it had been reported that there were some 2,000 of the enemy. Company I was to ride tanks, and Company K to follow on trucks. However, it was discovered that any enemy groups which might have been in Bellegarde had withdrawn before the battalion launched any attack, and that unit was able to move without difficulty to successive locations near Montigny, at Lorris, and Ouzzey.

The 3rd Battalion’s Company L also contacted enemy groups on August 22 for the first time since the beginning of this "new war." It happened that Captain Heffelfinger, battalion executive officer, had gone down to inspect the outpost positions of Company L. He and the company commander, Lieutenant Greenlief, walking along the road toward Gien in a countryside which appeared to be harmless enough, ventured beyond the last roadblock. Suddenly two Germans jumped up from the side of the road, mounted bicycles, and started to flee. A quick exchange of fire - in which the battalion executive officer’s pistol proved to be completely worthless in the emergency - brought an end to the flight of the two Germans, but it also brought more firing as additional riflemen began to appear on each side. Shortly the squad which had come to the assistance of the two officers was able to drive away the remaining Germans and to occupy the former enemy positions.

Major Warren C. Wood, who had gone to the 3rd Battalion (he previously had been 1st
Battalion executive officer) to take command four or five days earlier, arrived on the scene of this latest skirmish a few minutes latter. He carried a pair of major’s leaves for Heffelfinger and a pair of captain’s bars for Greenlief. On receiving this indication of a promotion, Greenlief’s response was, "And just think, if that Kraut had beaten me to the draw, I would have ended my career a lieutenant!" (Other officers in the Regiment were receiving notice of promotion about this same time: Captain Roecker to Major; First Lieutenants Keltner, Saddler, Krebsbach, Pescosolido, and Ruby to Captain; Second Lieutenants Campbell, Casner, Erickson, Hum, Kennedy, Kjems, Mann, and Wardwell to First Lieutenant.

Operations terminated successfully at Montargis, elements of the Regiment - including the 3rd Battalion, now released from its mission in division reserve - assembled east of the city on August 24, and prepared to resume the advance on the morrow. The new objective was Joigny and the high ground to the east. It was a distance of about 35 miles from Montargis.

When the 1st Battalion - continuing as advance guard - crossed the I.P. at Amilly at 0700, there was welcome reassurance in the report of the 1st Battalion patrol which had found Courtenay (on the main highway north of the route to Joigny) free of the enemy, and the report of another patrol which had found the route clear as far as Chateaurenard. This indicated that there should be nothing to slow the advance at least for a third of the way. Beyond that point, however, there could be no such assurance. French reports mentioned a German battalion in Joigny.

But any question about the defenses of Joigny were settled little more than two hours later. By 0915 the 1st Battalion was on its objective east of that town; but it appeared that this was going to be about as far as the column could go without encountering the enemy. Patrols reported enemy groups to the south and east of Joigny.

Indeed, even the progress thus far, rapid and easy as it seemed, was not without its cost. The high spirits and the news of the great advances, the news bulletins and headlines back home, all these sometimes tended to blind those who read them to the shadow of sorrow which still reserved the right to creep in. Only the day before, the war had ended for Sergeant Marshall R. Carpenter of Company B. And now on the way to his wife in Dothan, Alabama, would be that War Department message - the telegram of which loved ones lived the war days and nights in dread. Now, while news broadcasts and newspapers told of the liberation of French towns and "light casualties," while men in local barbershops traded glowing accounts of their sons in the war, while neighbors in the local groceries greeted each other in excited comments on the way the war was going, in the midst of all this hope, hope and a world had come to an end for his wife, Madge. Sergeant Carpenter had been a member of one of those patrols whose necessity remains constant for security and reconnaissance in any fast-moving situation. The sergeant had died in a burst of machine gun fire; but his unit had escaped threats to its own safety or to the renewal of its advance that next day.

Regimental Headquarters moved into Joigny at 1000 and set up the C.P. A town of about 7,000 population, Joigny was an attractive town which had escaped serious damage, though there were at least two large unexploded bombs there.

Last elements of the combat team did not close in until 1230, but when the 3rd Battalion arrived - following the 2nd - it had a truck half filled with German prisoners. The battalion intelligence section - that is, the S-2, the sergeant, a scout, and the jeep driver - had rounded up seven of the prisoners during a pause in its contact mission with the motor column.

But this was only the beginning. Even as the last elements of the Regiment were moving into the Joigny area, reports came from an artillery air observer that a large column of German troops were moving northeast from Villemer - a village about eight miles southeast of Joigny. Added to reports of the French and of the Regiment’s own patrols, there was no question but that the enemy was in the area in rather large numbers. The question was, would he fight?

Now the French brought a report that there were a hundred or more Nazis near Villemer who were willing to surrender; but they would surrender only to Americans. Here was a task cut out for the regimental intelligence officer, Major Dale M. Godwin. With a reinforced platoon from the 3rd Battalion’s Company I and Sergeant Bloch, the interpreter, the S-2 moved out in quest of prisoners. After a couple of changes in direction, the column approached the town where the enemy was reported to be. Stopping the trucks above the military crest of a small hill, where they would be safe from direct fire, the major and interpreter dismounted, took a white flag, and walked down the dusty road toward the enemy position. On arrival, they found a typical "Hollywood" Nazi in command. Asked to surrender, he replied that he would like four hours to think it over. Major Godwin told him to come out within 30 minutes, or all the artillery at his disposal (which was very little) would be brought down. Officers with the small task force made every effort they could to get some artillery fire within that time, but had little success. Fortunately, some artillery from somewhere did fall in the general vicinity. After some delay, then, a group of about 50 Germans came over the hill to surrender. Shortly after, another group of 26 came up the road on bicycles. Soon a 2 1/2-ton truck was in regular shuttle service hauling prisoners.

This particular source of prisoners ceased only when, late in the afternoon, the 3rd Battalion was ordered to move on to St. Florentin, 17 miles farther east. But prisoners were coming from other units of the Regiment.

One of the more spectacular of the actions in this multi-ring circus of gathering up Germans was that of the Antitank Company. This action, as all such should be, was the result of active reconnaissance and the exercise of initiative and aggressive leadership. First Lieutenant William P. Sheehy of Nebraska, an anti-tank platoon leader on motor reconnaissance over the roads in the Joigny vicinity, noticed groups of Germans in a field some distance away. Sheehy’s immediate reaction was to open fire, though it might have meant a hostile and dangerous response from numerous enemy. The Germans retired to a woods, however, and when Sheehy led a patrol down to the woods, he returned with 42 prisoners. Anti-tank guns opened fire on a German column on the road, and the lieutenant directed additional fire into the woods. Results were decisive in a space of time hardly to be reckoned in minutes. Destroyed material cluttered the road, there were all kinds of motor vehicles and numbers of horses to be had, and the Anti-tank Company contributed more than 300 prisoners to the regimental cages. By the end of the day, no less than 796 German soldiers had been retired from the opposition by the prisoner of war route.

Only a partial list of the units represented in this group of prisoners indicates something of the extent to which disintegration had overtaken the German forces in the area: 10 companies of the 758th Infantry Regiment (including three 75mm anti-tank guns), one company of the 759th Infantry Regiment, three companies of the 11th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, two companies from the 1010th Motor Security Regiment (one of these companies, armed with six 20mm anti-aircraft guns, had been in action at Montargis), three companies of the 192nd Security Regiment, the 57th Signal Regiment (Luftwaffe - Air Force), Luftwaffe Home Guard, Luftwaffe Supply Company, 852nd Flak (Anti-aircraft) Regiment, Bombardment Squadron Flight 7, 698th Anti-aircraft Replacement Regiment, 1708 Artillery Regiment.

As the arrival of additional prisoners continued to swell the total during the next day, the activities of the Regiment were centered largely around patrolling and security measures, and in following up reports of local groups of the F.F.I. (French Forces of the Interior), the abundance of which reports seemed to grow with each hour. But already those underground fighters of the "Marquis" had gained the respect of American leaders by their active assistance in the early days of the breakout. Their contributions had been such that General Eisenhower could report:

When our armor had swept past them they were given the task of clearing up the localities where pockets of Germans remained, and of keeping open the Allied lines of communication. They also provided our troops with invaluable assistance in supplying information of the enemy’s dispositions and intentions. Not least in importance, they had, by their ceaseless harassing activities, surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of danger and hatred which ate into the confidence of the leaders and the courage of soldiers.

Their actions in rising up to seize towns as the Americans approached, the security they provided for such a rapid advance by protecting its rear, the assistance they gave in pointing out directions (even though it seemed to take a committee conference to do it sometimes) were worth divisions in the task of liberating their own country. These me who, for the most part, were engaging in hazardous enterprise and risking their lives neither for the attraction of lucrative pay nor out of fear for articles of war, now were anxious to give all possible assistance to the American Regiment which had worked its way to their midst. Such assistance sometimes even tended to assume the character of annoyance of the regimental and battalion intelligence sections as reports of enemy groups, columns, activities - each demanding immediate attention - crowded upon each other during those two days and nights in Joigny - St. Florentine area.

Motor patrols continued their activity - an activity ever assuming a greater range. As a measure toward maintaining security over the main communications route, the 3rd Battalion’s Company I received an assignment to move to Bouilly - 20 miles east of St. Florentine - and to operate patrols all the way to Troyes to contact the 320th Infantry. French reports of a German column - 1,000 to 2,000 strong, equipped with horse-drawn artillery - in the vicinity of Tonnerre, about 16 miles south of St. Florentine, brought a motor patrol of the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon and the 3rd Battalion Intelligence Section; this group failed to catch up with the columns, but it did enter the city of Tonnerre only a few hours after the Germans had withdrawn - it was another triumphal entry. Amidst cheering, happy throngs. The prisoner "take" ran the total for August up to 1765.

But the "drive to the east" was halted at Aix-en-Othe (15 miles north of St. Florentine) on August 29.

By the time the news had arrived of the fall of Paris and of the rapid advances being made by allied troops in nearly every area, and optimism was mounting among all ranks. Rumors and good news continued throughout the week. On September 5, Stockholm and Paris reports said that American troops had reached Perl, Germany, 12 miles northeast of Thionville, while other troops were reported to have crossed the German frontier from Belgium toward Aachen; unconfirmed radio reports also announced the fall of Antwerp, Dunkirk, (Dunkerque), Boulogne, Calais, Metz, and Nancy. Rumors of advances continued the next day, and there even was a rumor of German peace overtures. It was confirmed on the 7th that the Third Army had had patrols in Germany, and the climax of it all came that day with the publication of the Army’s plan for demobilization. Wagers were being laid on how much longer the war could last - three weeks or six, or "over by Thanksgiving." Even officers at Supreme Headquarters were sharing in the almost unbounded optimism; one general officer there predicted an end of hostilities within three weeks; the deputy G-2, in speaking of the Siegfried Line remarked, "Why, of course, we’ll go right through it." (As a matter of fact, when the 28th Division did reach the Siegfried Line on September 10, its patrols did walk right through - without opposition!)

In spite of all these reports of spectacular advances and bursts of optimism, the 134th Infantry was conducting disciplinary drill, weapons training, conferences in small unit tactics, marches, inspections, and, of course, continuos motor patrols. There could be little question but that a regular daily schedule (some units even were sounding bugle calls), the First visit of Red Cross "Clubmobiles," with doughnuts and coffee - and American girls - an opportunity to see a movie for the first time since landing in France - all these were welcome and refreshing experiences for the infantrymen of the 134th. But they must have known, deeply, that however much they hoped for a prolongation of their vacation from war, that they were living in a "fool’s paradise," for each day of military inactivity granted the enemy another precious day in which to gather up his disintegrating forces and form new lines for defense.

The Third Army was slowing to a halt for want of gasoline. That supply lines should be taxed in trying to support an advance at once so rapid and so far away from the bases was to be expected. Something of the nature of the problem was suggested in the announcement on September 4 that airplanes had dropped 10 tons of maps to General Patton’s racing units. But the Third Army was losing its race with the supply lines, and priorities on supplies were going to Field Marshall Montgomery’s 21st Army Group for a major effort in the north. Recognizing the unfortunate disadvantages in permitting the enemy these days of grace in which to prepare new defenses, we proposed that the infantry should resume the advance on foot. A march of 15 (Sherman’s field order for the "March to the Sea" had called for a daily march of 15 miles) to 25 miles (all units of the Regiment had marched 25 miles in eight hours with full field equipment) a day should have been entirely feasible, but a restraining order to the Third Army, holding it in place, ruled out even this expedient. For ten days, then, in addition to the two at Joigny and St. Florentine, the 134th Infantry remained in bivouac around Aix-en-Othe while the enemy prepared his defenses behind the Moselle River.

By September 8, the gasoline shortage had been alleviated sufficiently to permit further movement of the 35th Division. It was a move of 125 miles, and took the 134th Infantry to an area around Thuilly-aux-Grosielles, a town approximately at the apex of a triangle between Toul (about eight miles to the northwest) and Pont-St. Vincent (a slightly less distance to the north-northeast, at the junction of Madon and Moselle Rivers). On closing in the new area, the battalions began to operate motor patrols, and the French began to bring information of the enemy.

There were a number of very strongly-built forts on dominating hills throughout the Toul-Nancy area, and a determined enemy would be able to make a great deal of trouble at any of them. Mazieres (a village about 5 miles east of Thuilley) had been receiving artillery fire from time to time. (Indicative of an organized defense, these reports of artillery fire had been the first since the hedgerow country.) Enemy artillery weapons were reported to be located in the Foret de Haye - a large forest in the big bend of the Moselle between Toul and Nancy. American troops (the 80th Division) had advanced eastward from their bridgehead to Toul to enter Gondreville, Domartin-les-Toul, and Chandeney, but the enemy still held strong Fort de Villey-le-Sec. Moreover, it soon became evident that German patrols were operating to the west of the river near the 134th. That evening a patrol jeep of the 3rd Battalion halted at Maizieres with a flat tire, and while the driver changed tires, it came under fire from a group of Germans; an effective return of the fire on the part of the other members of the patrol protected the driver while he finished his task, and all were able to escape safely.

Shortly after arrival of the Regiment in its new area, a lieutenant from a mechanized cavalry unit into the C.P. to propose that if we would send along a platoon of infantry to hold it, he would undertake to attack Fort de Pont-St. Vincent. A brief inspection of the map was sufficient to indicate the desirability of holding this key terrain feature - and it was not difficult to see what disadvantage it would be to us to leave the fort to the enemy. That high ground dominated the valley and crossing sites of the Moselle River along the most direct route to Nancy. Division Headquarters had not yet established itself in this area, and technically the fort lay beyond the "goose-egg" assigned to the Regiment. Its occupation was so plainly desirable, however, that the cavalry lieutenant departed with the assurance that he would have the support of an infantry platoon, and the hope that by nightfall he would have gained the fort. Assembled on the high ground west of Viterne, the 1st Battalion was near the route to the fort, and the mission fell to Company A’s 1st Platoon.

Whatever German resistance remained in the fort, it had little effect against the attacking force. Moving behind a screen of almost continuous machine gun and 37mm fire from the light tanks, the Company A platoon found itself escorted across the final 400 yards of open ground approaching the old fort just at dusk. Continuous streams of tracer bullets made a spectacular display, and best of all, there was no effective resistance on the part of what few Germans might have remained.

What might have been an almost impossible task had been accomplished with little difficulty; yet that lone platoon could hardly rest with very much assurance of security, for now it found itself with the mission of holding a fort which might more appropriately have been garrisoned by at least a battalion. Perhaps built as early as 1870, the fort was one whose construction would defy most modern weapons. It was a pentagon - a five-sided structure - with wall 300 yards long on each side. There was a broad court within, and subterranean chambers extending three stories below the surface of the ground. There even was a moat around the outside of the walls, and a drawbridge. Numerous firing ports facilitated the defense, but several entrances and the magnitude of the thing complicated the defense when it was in the hands of such a small unit.

When a telephone call came from Division Headquarters that evening ordering the seizure of the fort "and hold at all costs," it was something of a pleasure to reply that we already had the fort.

In order to make that control more secure, the remainder of Company A was to proceed to the fort the next morning. Arriving just in time to take command of Company A in this assignment was First Lieutenant William D. Brodbeck. Although Brodbeck’s combat time amounted to a total to be computed in a few hours, already his service had been spread over all three battalions. After going into action as executive officer of Company L when the 3rd Battalion relieved elements of the 29th Division north of St. Lo, Brodbeck had gone to the 2nd Battalion three hours after the jump-off on the 15th, to take command of Company G; four hours later he had been wounded by a shell fragment. He had returned to the Regiment with Major Weyand (also wounded north of St. Lo) in time for the latest move, and then had been assigned to the command of Company A. Even his assumption of this command, however, had not been simple, for, though enemy contact had been slight, Brodbeck became a casualty again as he moved with the motor column. This time the jeep in which he was riding hit a 2 1/2-ton truck, and though he had been thrown clear of the wreck, he had received some uncomfortable, though not serious, injuries. It was from this latest day of medical treatment that he was returning on this September 9 to lead the remainder of his company up to join the 1st Platoon in Fort de Pont-St. Vincent.

Already the Germans evidently were regretting their abandonment of the fort, and sporadic mortar fire was falling about as the reinforcing platoons approached the stronghold. Lieutenant Brodbeck paused briefly to time the mortar fire. Finding it to be falling in intervals of 60 and 90 seconds, he sent groups of men rushing into the cover of the fort during the interval, and the company suffered not a single casualty. The shelling continued sporadically throughout the day. A few minutes after a visit by the division commander, a shell dropped into the court and wounded some men. Lieutenant Brodbeck, thinking that he had about 50 seconds before another shell, ran out to the court to help one of the wounded men get under cover. Unfortunately, the Germans seem to have been firing for effect at that particular moment, and another shell burst in the courtyard just in time to wound the newly arrived company commander again.

The shelling intensified after that, and at 1800 hours a gun of very large caliber - it was a 280mm weapon - began firing in an apparent effort to soften up the defenses preparatory to an attack. Brodbeck had organized those defenses expertly, and members of Company A were on the alert for the attack when it came the next morning.

Now, with the evacuation of Lieutenant Brodbeck, the direction of the defense was in the hands of Lieutenant Constant J. Kjems.

While the artillery fire had been falling, a German battalion had been crossing the Moselle River over a partially destroyed bridge near the town of Pont. St. Vincent. A force of approximately 700 men, the German Battalion included four infantry companies and a company of parachute troops. During the hours of darkness, those hostile companies, intent on regaining the lost prize, moved up toward their objective and completely surrounded the fort. With the coming of dawn, observers of Company A could make out a party of Germans coming - under a white flag - toward the fort. They carried an ultimatum calling upon the Americans, in view of the fact that already they were surrounded, to surrender. It was not in the nature of Kjems and his men to surrender. His answer was to call upon his company to get ready for an attack. The enemy’s answer was fire - mortar, rocket, machine gun, but Company A met fire with fire as the enemy attacked from all sides. The major assaults came against entrances to the fort, and time after time the Germans drove to the very gates by sheer force of numbers, only to have their ranks riddled by the well-coordinated fire of the defenders. But the determined enemy refused to give up; he only renewed his assaults with greater vigor. Enemy troops were closing around the walls; some were gaining entrance into the fort. Kjems called for artillery; he ordered the men to remain under cover, and he called for time fire on the fort itself! By now artillery battalions had moved forward to positions in the broad valley running to the south of Fort de Pont St. Vincent. They could have fired on the fort by direct laying. Here was one of the rare occasions when member of artillery gun crews could see the results of their own firing. It was a vicious barrage that those artillerymen sent up to that hill. It was a coordinated "time on target" mission, and scores of 105 and 155mm shells which burst in the air over Company A’s fort were immediately effective. There remained the matter of closing out a small group of Germans which had occupied one corner of the fort, but the attack had been broken. It had been repelled - by virtue of the well-coordinated fires of infantry weapons, and the immediate and accurate response of artillery - at a tremendous cost to the enemy battalion. Men of Company A swear that there were as many as 100 German dead to be found after the attack.

While Company A remained involved in its own battle, the other units of the Regiment were moving - this time it was on foot - toward new objectives on the west bank of the Moselle River. It will be recalled that there was a big bend in the Moselle in this vicinity; one might reach that river either by going north or east, and while it ran below the hill of Fort Pont St. Vincent, it was about 10 miles away in an easterly direction. Actually the regimental objective was the Moulins Bois, between the Madon and the Moselle.

It was 0800, September 10, when the Regiment moved out. The 2nd Battalion, (Major Roecker, after a few days’ illness was back in command) moving east from its area at Germany, was on the right; Colonel Boatsman’s 1st Battalion (except Company A, who had its hands full at the fort) advanced on the left, and Major Wood’s 3rd Battalion, in reserve, followed the 2nd. No enemy resistance interfered with the advanced infantry columns during the morning hour. About the only outside activity was a beautiful bombing attack - carried out by American light and medium bombers - on the Foret de Haye (to the north of the regimental zone, within the big bend of the Moselle). By noon the battalions were fording the shallow Madon River - the 1st below Xeuilley, and the 2nd and 3rd at Pierreville. Because of the angle to the direction of march in which the rivers - and the objective - lay, the 1st Battalion had a somewhat less distance to go than did the 2nd. With no enemy opposition in its path, then, the 1st Battalion was on its objective at 1320, and already was beginning reconnaissance of the principal obstacle to any further advance - the Moselle River.

Some artillery fire - sporadic and scattered - had begun to fall in the zone of advance as the battalion crossed the Madon. A particularly bothersome point of resistance developed from Frolois - a town just east of the Madon - as the enemy began firing into the left flank of the 2nd Battalion. There was some treacherous 20mm fire; there was small arms fire; an artillery barrage fell in the midst of the thin columns of the 3rd Battalion as it marched down toward Pierreville from the west, but the men deployed quickly and by some miracle escaped injury. Major Roecker had no intention of becoming involved in a delaying action at Frolois, but he could not ignore this threat to his flank. He called for an artillery mission, but he could not expect artillery to be permanently effective against the protection which the enemy had in the village. Therefore he called upon Company G to clean out Frolois while the rest of the battalion continued toward its objective. All this did involve some delay, but men of Company G carried out their side mission decisively. Climax of their action came when a bazooka team, suspicious of the German use of Church steeples, fired a rocket into the steeple of the village church. It rang the bell, and out fell two Germans.

As Companies E and F approached the woods which marked the reverse slope of the ridge which would be their objective, they came under grazing machine gun fire. It looked as though there might be a mean job of cleaning out the woods to do, but German positions were confined to the edge of the woods - so located around the corners of that section of wood that flanks and front of the advancing companies were subject to fire. Responding with tremendous bursts of fire, E and F were able to force their way into the woods, and to overrun the cleverly constructed German dugouts. Strands of red-covered communication wire running over the ground led to a German C.P. The whole resistance was overcome in a much shorter time than might have been expected, and soon the 2nd Battalion could report that it too was on the objective, and was beginning a reconnaissance of the river to its front.

The 3rd Battalion halted in the woods a thousand yards south of those which the 2nd Battalion occupied, and its leaders too began reconnaissance to the front. Members of the 3rd Battalion party reached the village of Flavigny - on the banks of the Moselle - just in time to see Nazi troops withdrawing to the accompaniment of scornful jeers and "boos" from the villagers. Armed with a boldness encouraged from this spectacle, Captain Ruby (Company M) and Lieutenant Hyde (Company I) proceeded to inspect the principal parts of the town. Their security, however, did not equal their ambition, and soon they found themselves in the midst of so many remaining Germans that their escape appeared to be highly doubtful for the time being. Automatic small arms fire chased the other 3rd Battalion leaders over the hill and followed them down the road. It was a long and anxious minutes later that Ruby and Hyde, successful in evading would be captors, returned to their battalion.

Reconnaissance in the 2nd Battalion’s zone revealed something that might change the whole plan for renewal of the attack. A highway bridge across the river - just northwest of Flavigny - remained intact. The decision to seize a bridge whenever one remains intact is almost automatic, and Major Roecker had instructions to take advantage of any existing bridges. He already had reached his day’s objectives, however, and division headquarters was planning a coordinated attack on a broad front for the next day. It was advisable, therefore, to refer the decision to higher headquarters. When Major Roecker called Regiment, then, to report the find, it appeared that here was a windfall. The highway which crossed this bridge was the direct route to Nancy eight miles to the north. And here was a possibility for the 134th Infantry to get a ready-made crossing! The prospect was appealing. No infantryman was likely to harbor a relish for making a river crossing by assault boat. But more than that, with a good bridge and a highway available, tanks would be able to cross without waiting for construction, and not only would they be available for defense of the bridgehead, but they might be available to make a rapid thrust toward Nancy. Of course, as in any military operation, an attack to seize the bridge would involve risk; the extent of the enemy’s defenses were not known accurately. But a success would mean a valuable prize.

When, in the interest of coordination. the matter was referred to division, the reaction of the chief of staff was brief and decisive. "Grab it!" he said. (An entry in the 134th Infantry S-3 Journal for 10 September, 1944, states; "1240 - Flavigny - Bridge intact at this pt. Grab this if possible.")

Plans already were being made for a coordinated division attack the next morning at 0500. The 134th and 137th Regiments were able to make the crossing at six sites, with the 137th on the right. Pursuant to this plan a regimental order was prepared at 1720 hours that evening. Each battalion was assigned a forward assembly area where it was to assemble during the night, and then the 3rd Battalion was to cross at a point, on the regimental right, designated as "D," while the 2nd was to cross simultaneously at site "E," and the 1st was to follow the 2nd and then cross at sight "F." With the decision to make a try for the bridge, however, the 2nd Battalion was ordered, at 1700 hours, to make the attack.

Even as that battalion moved down toward its precarious objective, a new order, calling for a crossing by the 1st and 3rd Battalions in the coordinated effort at 0500 the next morning, was prepared. This would be put into effect should the 2nd Battalion’s attempt fail; but in the meantime these two battalions were to get ready to cross the bridge immediately behind the 2nd.

At first everything went well for the 2nd Battalion after it started moving at 2200 hours. Within an hour Companies E and F, a part of G, and a heavy machine gun platoon had raced across the bridge. Then, as it appeared that success was imminent, the Nazi defenders discovered what was happening, and heavy artillery concentrations began to fall. Tank destroyers were ordered to the scene; one platoon was directed to cross immediately. But they failed to arrive in time; and the Germans were counterattacking with tanks.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion was marching down in order to cross as soon as the 2nd had cleared. Continuous flares and an unending roar of mortar and artillery shells marked the bridge site that night. The column halted along the open road while Major Wood went forward to contact the 2nd Battalion commander. Making his way to the highway, whose surface was covered with leaves and boughs freshly cut by flying shell fragments, and where dead of the preceding battalion lay along the shoulders where they had fallen, he walked through the continuing barrages toward the bridge. He found the 2nd Battalion command group operating in a culvert beneath the approaches to the bridge. Aid men crowded in to work over the wounded, communications men worked vainly to keep the telephone line open, officers struggled against the roar of shells to hear and make themselves heard on the radio; and there was no pause in the enemy shells which were bursting on and around the bridge. The intensity of this fire was making it difficult to move any additional troops across the bridge, and the way was not yet clear for the 3rd Battalion to begin crossing; at the same time the violence of the counterattack on the opposite side of the river was making doubtful the fate of the men who already had crossed.

Then at 0130 came a thunderous explosion on the bridge. An artillery shell - or, more probably, a sympathetic detonation of a fixed charge - had destroyed one of the spans. This left the men who had crossed in the extremely perilous position of facing an overwhelming counterattack with means neither for reinforcement nor for escape.

Those men of the 2nd Battalion knew almost automatically that the thunderous explosion, ringing in their ears above all the fire that continued, signaled what they had dreaded most. They were cut off. Germans, screaming "Hiel Hitler!" closed in. Now, in the dark confusion which set in upon the lack of communication, the lack of contact, the lack of visibility, and the presence of Germans - with tanks - in their midst, individuals and small groups were on their own. For some, the prospect of facing German tanks without anti-tank defenses - and of defending themselves when the only thing clear in the whole situation was that help could not reach them - all this was too overwhelming to be endured. Some counted on the blindness of the tanks at night and reasoned that the darkness was as much a handicap to the Germans as to themselves. Others entered into no calculations whatever, they simply were seized with a determination never to give up.

One man of such determination was Sergeant Raymond M. Parker of Vermont. An assistant squad leader, Parker, cut off from his own unit, found himself with some machine gunners who were separated from their leaders. His instinct was to fight with whatever means might be at hand, and he lost no time in organizing a pair of makeshift machine gun squads and getting the guns into action. But machine guns invite fire and death as well as dispense it, and enemy reaction soon exacted its toll; but then Parker himself manned one of the guns until his ammunition was exhausted. His means for defense eliminated, Parker soon fell into the hands of the Germans. It was only a temporary captivity, however, for the sturdy sergeant saw a fleeting opportunity and dived into the inky darkness and ran toward the river. His first major obstacle was the Canal de L’Est which ran in a concrete bed just along the northeast bank of the river. There was no time for hesitation, and he plunged into the water, reached the opposite side with a few quick strokes, and scrambled up the concrete bank. Without pause, he made for the river itself, and after a long swim - with a river current now to be fought - he made good his escape.

When a pair of Germans suddenly came upon another 2nd Battalion sergeant from the rear, he was, unbeknown to them, in a rather awkward position; he had just pulled the pin from a hand grenade preparatory to throwing it at a suspected enemy position. Of course the grenade would not explode until about five seconds after the sergeant should release his grip and so permit the striker to function. There was nothing to do but hold on to it, and this the ineffective inspection of his captors permitted him to do. They marched him for several minutes over rough ground and finally up a road to a small house. When his eyes became accustomed to the light of the stuffy room, he saw several German officers and soldiers staring at him. Obviously he was at a battalion or regimental command post. He could detect a look of dismay come over the faces of a few officers who were gazing at what he was carrying; that dismayed look, to the accompaniment of guttural undertones, quickly spread about the room. The German staff was in very much of a dilemma. If they demanded that the American sergeant drop the grenade, they invited destruction for themselves; they did not dare wrest it from him, for in the transfer from one hand to another, the lever would be released the instant necessary to set the mechanism to functioning; they could not order him to do anything, for if he refused, all they could do would be to shoot him, and that too would mean the release of a live grenade in the same room with themselves. In that moment of awkward hesitation he took his cue. He bolted out the door before the guard could think, and pausing just long enough to hurl his precious grenade over his shoulder at the house, he fled haphazardly through the night. He fell over some stones, but was up before he knew whether he had injured a knee; a few wild rifle shots came after him, but he kept on, stumbling over ruts and tree roots, falling into bushes. Instinctively he ran down hill; that would be toward the river. At last he could see the dim outline of the canal ahead, and he paused for just a moment. His heart was pounding as though it would burst, but he scarcely noticed it; he was vaguely aware of the continuing artillery and mortar barrages - coming from both sides - and he crouched low as flares threatened to reveal his location; but his whole being was concentrated on attaining that far shore of the river. Now the swim of the canal and the river were anti-climatical for him, but it sapped his remaining strength. Once he found himself safely among friends again, he felt an almost overwhelming faintness - now that he could reflect on his experience, it seemed more terrible than ever.

There were other heroes that night at the bridge at Flavigny. An inspiration to those about him, Major Carlyle McDannel went forward to assume command of the 2nd Battalion when Major Roecker was wounded for the second time. McDannel’s cool-headed manner was in sharp contrast to the confusion and strain reigning in that culvert beneath the approaches to the bridge. Already the bridgehead was being abandoned, and it was under his direction that surviving members of the 2nd Battalion were being collected. Captain Hake was everywhere, locating a machine gun platoon which became separated, finally withdrawing the company from the bridge after the big explosion.

Nor were they all infantrymen that night. Engineers crossed the bridge with the infantry companies - 1st Platoon, Company A, 60th Engineers was a part of the 134th Combat Team, and was considered part of the family - and the squads were neutralizing demolitions on the bridge. When the force of the enemy counterattack drove his unit back across the bridge, Corporal Thomas Downing of New York, assistant squad leader, found that a part of his squad remained on the hostile shore. Braving the unrelenting artillery concentrations, Downing re-crossed the bridge, found the missing men, and was leading them to safety as he himself fell mortally wounded. Other engineers - Private First Class William O’Brien, Private Arnold Feuerman, Private Patrick J. Brennan, all of New York - remained in the vicinity of the bridge, through that unceasing fire, for as long as six hours to assist in evacuating wounded and applying first aid.

Another close member of the family, Captain Edgar Nicholson, artillery liaison officer with the 2nd Battalion, remained in his own observation post on the forward slope of a hill overlooking the bridge in order to match the unprecedented German artillery concentration with his own.

Unfortunately, this was one of those situations in which individual heroism could not overcome the inherent disadvantages, and the bridgehead was lost. There still remained, however, the alternate plan - the plan according to which the 1st and 3rd Battalions would participate in a coordinated division attack at 0500. But the hour was growing late. In a way, the very tenacity of the 2nd Battalion in its vain effort to hold the bridgehead complicated the problem. That is, its fight prolonged hope so long that now relatively little time remained in which to mount a new attack. Nevertheless, it was imperative that every effort be made to win a crossing of the Moselle, and at 0300 instructions went to the 3rd Battalion to make a crossing, by assault boat, to the right of the 2nd Battalion zone. The crossing was to be made prior to daylight; boats and treadway bridge were dispatched to the vicinity of the bridge.

The 1st Battalion was supposed to move to the former assembly area of the 2nd where it would be available to support the 3rd: it was to cross as soon as a bridge could be built.

There were some delays in getting the boats to the site, and there were delays in getting any accurate information about the 2nd Battalion. To Major Wood, chances for a successful crossing by his 3rd Battalion appeared to be growing very slim. There could be little hope for surprise, he felt, in making a crossing in the same general area where already there had been such a violent battle. But what made a boat crossing especially hazardous in this area was the canal which ran parallel to the river. This meant that, in the face of probable enemy fire, the first groups of men would have to drag their boats from the river, carry them across a few yards of open ground, and launch them again in the canal - or else attempt to swim the second channel. Moreover, daylight was approaching and the whole river line would be under observation. There was danger that a new attack might turn out to be a case of "sending good money after bad" - of losing another battalion as an effective fighting force.

As these considerations weighed heavily on Major Wood, he became convinced that the whole situation was not clear to higher headquarters. Therefore, as the time for the attack approached, he sent his battalion intelligence officer back to the regimental C.P. to try to explain what had happened. Major Craig delivered the brief supporting the battalion commander’s observations.

It was not a simple decision for a regimental commander to make. To order postponement of the attack would be to act contrary to the letter of his instructions; he had to consider what effect it might have on the general plan - whether it might involve difficulties for the neighboring regiment which was to be crossing some distance to the south. On the other hand, an attack into certain failure not only would fail to be of any assistance in the over-all plan, but it might impair the effectiveness of the Regiment to such an extent that it would be unable to render any kind of assistance to the common effort for some time to come. One of the reasons for the effectiveness of the American Army has been in the importance attached to the initiative of the individual soldier and the relative freedom of action in commanders of all echelons. The regimental commander was in the possession of information which could not have been clear to higher headquarters. He alone was in a position to influence the situation.

His instructions were for the 3rd Battalion to cover the reorganization of the 2nd.

Commanding the 2nd Battalion now was Lt. Col. James T. Walker. After arrival at the Regiment the preceding evening, Walker had been assigned initially to the 3rd Battalion, but after the wounding of Major Roecker, he had gone to the 2nd. His battalion now counted a total strength of 295 men. This meant that the fighting strength of that battalion, deducting company and battalion overhead, was somewhat below that of a single "normal" company.

The loss was a severe one for the 134th Infantry. One battalion had been eliminated, for the time being, as an effective fighting unit. It was a difficult thing to accept. This prize of a good bridge and a direct route to Nancy had been almost within grasp, but the counterattack had been too strong.

As a matter of fact, the Moselle River was found to be a bitterly defended barrier all the way along the line. Indeed, later that morning the 2nd Battalion of the 137th Infantry likewise was forced to abandon a crossing, although later that Regiment was able to make a new attack and secure a permanent bridgehead. Whether it was the 90th Division at Pont-a-Mousson, or the 80th below Toul on the north side of the big bend, or the 35th around Flavigny and Lorey and Coyviller, the results were similar. The Nazis had made good use of those days which the 134th Infantry had spent in bivouac at Aix-en-Othe. Now the Stars and Stripes was saying: "Some of the bitterest fighting since St. Lo and LaHaye de Puits was reported from the Third Army front . . . Germans with their best remaining divisions along the Moselle were trying to hold the fortress towns of Metz, Toul, and Nancy."

The Regiment now faced a task of reorganization to prepare itself for another try at crossing. Company A during all this time had been holding securely to Fort de Pont St. Vincent in the face of repeated threats, and now that key terrain feature took on an even greater importance. Pending the reassembly of the 1st Battalion, which presently would move most of its strength to the fort, the 3rd Battalion’s Company K was ordered to reinforce the fortress garrison.

Changes in Regimental Headquarters now had seen Lt. Col. Sheppard evacuated because of illness, Major Craig now acting as executive officer, and Captain Carroll - who this day received notice of his promotion to major - had come to the Regiment from the 3rd Battalion to take Major Craig’s place as regimental S-3.

The next day plans for a crossing were renewed, and Major Craig led a party - including the battalion commanders and S-3’s - to make another reconnaissance. But according to the new plans the crossing sites were some distance to the southeast. In addition to the advantage of a new location in affording some possibility for surprise, there was the added consideration that the canal there was on the near side of the river (its concrete bed crossed the river at Haut Flavigny) and there was a considerable distance between the two obstacles as well as the concealment of woods.

Farther to the south the attack of the 137th Infantry was going well, and the 320th was crossing after. And tanks of Combat Command B of the 4th Armored Division were crossing in the zone of the 137th to "take off" toward Luneville while the 137th and 320th would swing to the northeast. It appeared that, after all, the 2nd Battalion’s fight at the bridge might have been a real contribution to the over-all picture. The coordinated artillery fires of two German divisions had been directed against that attack, and the tanks and infantry which the Germans threw into the battle were not available for use elsewhere. It was the feeling of General Patton, who heartily approved of the initiative shown in making that attempt, that the bitter struggle had drawn German forces to that area from the south and so had contributed materially to the success of the other crossings. Moreover, the 80th Division was reported now to have two regiments across the river in the zone to the north.

Lt. Thomas C. Haugen, regimental liaison officer, always faithful in keeping the Regiment informed of latest developments at Division Headquarters, brought instruction for the 134th to remain in position and continue patrolling to right and left. He brought further news that a plan was in the wind to form a special task force of the 134th and a regiment of the 80th Division - to go for Nancy.

Shortly before noon on 13 September, the regimental commander was called to the XII Corps’ C.P. It turned out to be a meeting for formation of the special task force. On orders from XII Corps the 134th Infantry - with the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division as the principal other unit - was to become a part of a task force. Under the command of Brig. Gen. Sebree, assistant division commander of the 35th, the task force was to assemble the next day in the bridgehead which the 80th Division had established east of Toul, and then attack directly eastward for Nancy on the 15th.

With the 2nd Battalion remaining to provide security in the present position and to absorb some 113 replacements which had arrived that day, the remainder of the Regiment moved early on the 14th - through a light rain - to the area east of Toul. The 3rd Battalion relieved units of the 319th Infantry in holding the line Fort de Villey-le-Sec-Gondreville.

Nancy, traditional capital of Lorraine and fifth city of France, was on objective to be covered both as a military and as a political prize. Though the city itself had not been formally annexed by the Germans after their 1940 victory, it closely associated itself with, and was regarded as the political leader of, the region to the east which had been incorporated into the Reich. By its very size and location Nancy was certain to be a center of the German occupation forces. With a population of more than 120,000 - and 50,000 more in the suburbs - Nancy was an important communications center 200 miles east of Paris and 60 miles southwest of the German border. It was an important railway center; the Rhine-Marne canal and its branches provided other arteries of commerce for the city. An important position in industry was assured by its location near the rich Lorraine iron ore deposits. Aside from the mining there were manufactures of shoes, glass, furniture, casks, tobacco. It was proud of its university, and of its artisans. Now a city of fine buildings and beautiful churches, it traced its colorful history back to the 11th and 12th Centuries. And it was the symbol of these people - the cross of Lorraine - which had become the symbol of the Fighting French. (The origin of their double-barred cross is traced back to the Crusades and the conquest of Jerusalem by Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lorraine.) The March Lorraine practically had become a second national anthem for the French.

When the 134th Infantry’s 3rd Battalion took over the positions of the 319th Infantry, it assumed responsibility for the defense of a front of nearly 6,000 yards. Now Company I, on the right flank had a fort - Fort de Villery-le-Sec - similar to the one which Company A had defended at Fort de Pont St. Vincent. It too was a reinforced concrete structure in which a whole battalion easily could have been lost. Company L occupied the left flank of the position along the eastern edge of the town of Gondreville, while reserve and Battalion Headquarters were in a position midway between the two, but some 3,000 yards to the west, in the outskirts of Dommartin-les-Toul. The 4,000 yards of open flatland between the two forward companies was covered by observation during the day, and by listening posts and contact patrols at night. All of this was to cover the preparations which were being made for the next day’s attack.

Men of the 134th knew that they had been transferred to this area to participate in an attack, and there never was anything particularly attractive about looking forward to an attack for an infantryman. There was something of a feeling, however, that a reprieve had been won in leaving the proposed assault across the Moselle. There is no more attractive way, from the infantryman’s point of view, of effecting a river crossing than moving into a bridgehead that had already been secured. Yet there remained the possibility that the move might prove to be a leap from the frying pan into the fire. True, the great barrier of the Moselle had been conquered, via the 319th Infantry’s bridge at Toul, but there remained what might be an even more formidable obstacle - the Foret de Haye. There could be no detouring that forest, for it extended the whole nine miles across the width of the area within the big bend of the Moselle; that is, it extended from the river on the right to another part of the river on the left. Its depth included about six of the nine miles between Gondreville and Nancy. That it might be a major obstacle was indicated in the mass of intelligence reports which had reported, from time to time, all kinds of German troop concentrations within its area. Already, in Normandy, men of the 134th had become acquainted with the viciousness of tree-bursting artillery; again they could envision the difficulties of seeking out completely hidden positions, of advancing against the demoralizing ricochets of small arms fire, of running into the fine wires of mines and booby traps.

Brig. Gen. Edmund B. Sebree assembled the unit commanders of his task force that evening in his headquarters in Fort de Gondreville - another of the huge forts characteristic of the area. In a voice filled with determination, he addressed the officers who crowded into the big room. "Tomorrow morning we go for Nancy," he said, "our objective is the high ground west of Nancy, but with that we will get the city; I know that we ordinarily do not attack for ground as such, but tomorrow I want that high ground; let nothing interfere with that objective. I don’t want to hear of any cases of ‘battle fatigue’ tomorrow; so far the 134th Infantry already has taken 2,500 casualties, and they’ll take that many more if necessary to get the job done. We’ll attack in a column of regiments, 319th Infantry leading . . ." He went on to express his doubt of serious opposition and his confidence in success.

The order, as confirmed in writing, took this form:

1. ENEMY SITUATION: The establishment of the bridgehead N of here by the 80th Inf Div has attracted a considerable amount of enemy. The 35th Div having crossed in the south, it is believed that the enemy is not in great strength. About 6 trains observed this afternoon moving north. Were attacked by Air Corp and arty also concentrated on above-mentioned target. There is every indication that the enemy is moving out of this sector.

2. This TF attacks, seizes and holds the high ground generally along the north-south grid line 82 which is in the eastern edge of FORET DE HAYE. Axis of advance - TOUL-NANCY hwy. Formation for the atk - regiments in column. Time of atk - 0600, 15 Sept 44, Ld - present frontline. Boundaries between regiments upon reaching the obj is the TOUL-NANCY hwy, include to 134th Inf.

3. a. 319th Inf (-) 1 Bn; w/1 tank Co, 1 plat 654 TD Bnm 691 TD Bn, 1 plat 633 AAA atchd, will atk on a 400 to 600 yd front astride the TOUL-NANCY hwy and seize the high ground which runs along north-south grid line 80. Prepare to advance on Div obj. They will protect the flanks of their column initially.

b. 134th Inf (-) 1 bn; w/Co A, 654 TD Bn (-1 plat); 1 Co 633 AA (-1 plat) are in TF reserve. One (1) Bn will follow the 319th Inf prepared to assist that regt in securing the obj. The remainder of the regt will assemble vic GONDREVILLE prepared to move by motor on order.

c. Arty will fire 15-minute preparation beg at 0600. Support the advance by arty concentration. Also will fire counter-btry & interdiction missions.

d. Engrs: Atchmts as per combat teams.

e. Medics: Atchmts as per combat teams.

4. Adm details later.
5. The plan is to advance as rapidly as possible, the spearhead of the TF to by-pass as much of the enemy as possible and get on the obj. TF CP initially will be here. Col. Ellsworth will be with the tanks initially. Col. Miltonberger will be here. When Col. Davidson’s regt reaches its obj, deploy to the S on the high ground. The 134th Inf will deploy on the N of the hwy.

SEBREE

TF Comdr.

There was reason to believe that General Sebree’s confidence was well founded. This became more clear late that night when men from Company L’s outpost brought in three Frenchmen who said that they had just come from Nancy. Those three Frenchmen had been sent by the F.F.I. in Nancy to seek coordination of the American attack with an uprising in the city. They informed the American staff of the locations and types of mines; they would be available to serve as guides in leading American columns into the city; they pleaded for cancellation of a proposed aerial bombardment of Nancy. Best news for the infantryman was their report that the Germans had withdrawn from the forest. Reconnaissance patrols from Company L confirmed this. Not only was Nancy spared the bombing, but General Sebree even cancelled the artillery preparation which had been scheduled to precede the attack.

Quiet reigned, then, as the first squads of the 319th Infantry moved out at 0600. Initially that regiment had been ordered to attack on a front of 400 to 600 yards. By 830, however, leading companies of the 319th Infantry were marching down the smooth asphalt road in route column with only patrols moving through the woods to protect the flanks; then infantrymen mounted tanks to speed forward.

Though the enemy appeared to have departed from this area, there still was some reason for concern. There might remain devices just as dangerous to those coming within their effective area as direct artillery - a highway through a wooded area (where there would be little opportunity for vehicles to leave the road) was a place to expect mines. Leaders hoped that the withdrawal had been too rapid to permit the laying of effective mine fields, and they were sure that a speedy movement was the best way of insuring themselves against the return of German patrols which might attempt such projects.

The 134th Infantry’s 1st Battalion mounted trucks to follow closely behind the leading regiment while the 3rd Battalion assembled near the western edge of the forest, and later began marching down the road until the trucks could return to pick it up. A ditch across the road delayed the column for some time as its head neared the objective, but engineers worked rapidly to bridge it, and the column moved on boldly. So far, mines had not been encountered.

On reaching the objective, however, the tanks moved off the highway to deploy on either side of it. Only then, after coming that far with no difficulty, did some of them strike anti-tank mines. At this point 1st Lt. Flory M. Muehl of Wisconsin, 1st Battalion anti-tank platoon leader saw the desirability of getting his anti-tankers into position as soon as possible. He told his driver to turn his jeep around, and back up the road he went to get his platoon. But, as the jeep rolled along in no apparent danger, meeting columns of vehicles still moving forward, there was that incomparably sudden, tremendous explosion characteristic of an anti-tank mine. It was only by a miracle that Muehl escaped with his life, but his wounds were so severe that this was the end of combat for him. He had been the victim of a mine on a road already passed over (mostly on the opposite side) by scores of tanks and tank destroyers and trucks.

Its mission accomplished when the high ground to the west of Nancy was occupied; Task Force Sebree was dissolved, and while the 319th Infantry returned to join the 80th Division in its attacks on the north of the big bend, Col. Boatman’s 1st Battalion, on tanks and trucks, swept into the city. Col. Wood’s 3rd Battalion then moved up to positions on the northern edge of the city.

Meanwhile, forces of the underground had been taking things into their own hands inside Nancy. At 1045, M. Peeters, president of the Committee of Liberation, and Major Pierret-Gerard, chief of insurrectionists, appeared at the city hall to notify M. Schmitt that he no longer was mayor of Nancy; M. Prouve immediately was installed as the new mayor. Then there followed those most anxious of moments. Would the American’s arrive soon? Would the Germans try to come back?

At 11:10 the first American tanks, carrying men of the 134th Infantry, arrived. Within 20 minutes a new commissaire de la republique, M. Chailley-Bert, was installed, and immediately he issued a proclamation to the population:

NANCY IS FREE

but the battle is continuing at the gates of the city where Frenchmen and Americans are uniting their efforts.

When a wandering German officer had gone into Nancy during the last days of the occupation, according to a story in the New York Sun, he had

found the city full of German troops, unconscious of their doom, drinking and singing, playing musical instruments, and dancing with and making love to French girls. Not till the bullets began to whiz about their ears in Nancy, did the Germans suspect that these French girls who were ostensibly fraternizing with them, were secret agents of the Resistance, waiting to hear news of orders for them to pull out. That was the signal for street fighting to begin. You had to be on the inside of the underground to know that.

Now as the 134th Infantry moved into the city, wild, happy throngs lined the streets, and crowds filled the great open square - Place Stanislas - to acclaim the liberators. There were still some snipers and small groups for the 1st Battalion to clean out, while excited Frenchmen ran about seeking to ferret out snipers, German stragglers, collaborators.

Captain Abbott hurried into the downtown area to look for a good location for the regimental C.P. He succeeded in taking over the whole Hotel Thier, and it still was early afternoon when regimental headquarters moved into that attractive location.

Joyful crowds swarmed through the streets all afternoon and evening. Nancy was free! Among the papers to come to the Regiment was a record of the anxieties of the people of Nancy which some citizens had written during those trying days of waiting - while the 134th waited at Aix-en-Othe -

The people of Nancy and their neighbors have been put to a hard trial. Perhaps never, during their whole lives, have they realized as they do now, the significance of these words: to wait.

Not only for heart and mind, supported by hope, and always anticipating a little the events; but also for news, since four years featured by a life agitated from thousands of rumors, echoes, hopes, deceptions, very often from painful events, want of food - aside from a few fortune-privileged people or some very shrewd cheats.

And there were also the partings: prisoners, workmen sent into Germany, and cruel griefs of those who die in exile, maybe near no one, but far from those who they wanted to see, martyrs to the national cause, of whom we never will dismiss our thoughts in dismay through all the savage cruelty exerted by German agents.

At last we were near escape from this nightmare. News followed news, each better than the other.

Paris liberated herself. The first part of the American 3rd Army, led by its famous General Patton, was speeding toward us like a glove’s finger. Chalons sur Marne was already taken, Reims was falling, Vitry-le-Francois was liberated, and, on the wings of fancy, many of our citizens were speaking with certainty of Bar-le-Duc, Fougerolles, and even - that was curious and even a little astonishing - of Luneville.

But it’s true that many people, without consulting either the map or the reasoning, yield themselves to the witchery of pictures expected and caressed by fancy the more easily as all this ends by a kind of a little dizzy attitude - like a good wine stimulus does for a host ready to sit joyfully at the most beautiful feast of his life.

Then the till now fine weather, increased by a tropical heat, began to darken. Rain is now falling, pressed, thick, heavy, grey, as for drowning more easily the wating’s excessive excitation, and which, at this time, has no bounds.

One particularly heavy afternoon, under a pitiless sunshine, all the German services, officers, shoulder-knots (flunkies, valets, menials), scum collected in Nancy for 4 years, wavered in an extravagance of war, broke heavily upon every road leading to the Reich with thousands of queer vehicles which had been stolen, borrowed, taken away from the owners, and was like the smoke of a half-dried grass fire which dislodges thousands of insects that have earthed themselves in a thicket.

On the following days the whole resources of a retreating army unfurled. Heavy and powerful trucks doubled by weighty cars. One of these vehicles was crushed against a wall at the Avenue Bouffler’s declivity. Never its occupants would see again the "Great Reich" as they said. This wild column was covered with boughs, nests, the most complicated and also the most improvised things for hiding themselves before the look-out man bent from his plane above this bewildered flight. An old Lorraine woman of the surrounding country found the right words. She found that it was like a procession decorated for Corpus Christi Day, but that this people were thinking more about saving themselves than about God.

Feverishly this night, the Nanceen waited.

Would they come, the prodigious drivers from beyond the seas, the drivers of rapid tanks, in a word, those who ought to charge in a folly their palpitating pango.

No, they did not come.

Better informed people knew that the three columns of the 3rd Army, which started respectively from Revigny, St. Dizier, and the country of Joinville, stopped in their rush.

The first, because she met a strong German withdrawal (action) propped against the Argonne, and advantaged by the Aire’s valley pass. Verdun, St. Mihiel had been firstly overflowed, and again occupied by Germans, and at last taken again after heavy battles.

During this time the 2nd column arrived on the level of Flirey was slackening his push, doubtless for preventing a German sally between Metz and Nancy. And of the Joinville’s column, no news. Time was now fire again, with a light autumn’s wind, yellow leaves and this first melancholic impressions which belong to autumn, in simile something tired, of a nature soon going, like a glory of the German Army, into the grave.

Nancy was quiet again, very quiet, too quiet for the impatient Nanceen.

As the occupier took away, with a little violent proceedings, all the bicycles, the town was soon only a passer-by city. No car was circulating, but sometimes here or there a lonely German tank escorted and guarded by soldiers, with rifles in hand.

News was murmured in the streets: soon men would not go out of their homes, every circulation would cease, phone lines would be cut.

Incidents started in different places because of a tardy arrest by the Gestapo, or of resistance of a boy, more courageous than the others, and who did not want to give his bicycle, knocked with his aggressor.

During the night, a lonely plane had been prowling above the city and dropped bombs, one on the Leopold Avenue, the others on the old ducal district. Why did it do it? Nobody could say.

Hours followed hours, extraordinary news was always coming from north of France, Belgium, Holland. Lost Germany seemed to turn around on the same place. But always around before Nancy, good news for stopping as if it were wanting for breath, or for wings in the purpose of the last soaring.

On Tuesday, the 5th, in the morning, big guns shot from daylight till about noon. The radio, whose reporters, like the Nanceen, took their wish as reality, did announce the liberation of the Lorraine capital, Stanislas’ city.

This day, Radio-National informed that the Germans raised Pont-a-Mousson and that American tanks were going down the side-hills along the Moselle, for cutting off all retreat to crowded German columns which directed themselves toward the safety bridge.

With Nancy safely in the hands of the 134th Infantry, the 2nd Battalion was relieved of its mission on the Moselle, and brought up to the Foret de Haye to clean out any Germans which might have been by-passed in the rapid thrust toward Nancy. Company E had the task, in carrying out this new mission, of moving up to Fort Frouard in the Northeast part of the forest. The company, filled with replacements since its misfortune at Flavigny, was moving in trucks behind the leading jeep of its company commander. First Lieutenant William E. Powell, commanding Company E since Major McDannel had gone to battalion, was leading his company through a wooded area known to be a region of possible danger, but apparently abandoned now of all organized groups of enemy. But it was no remaining group of enemy which now went into action. Men riding the leading 2 ½-ton truck – replacements who sensed a nervousness always to make itself felt in approaching the enemy or the unknown – saw their company commander’s jeep enveloped in flame and smoke and dust as waves of concussion jarred their ears. In the complete destruction of the jeep, Company E lost its commander as well as the driver, T/5 Frank H. Murray.

It was a forlorn hope for men of the 134th Infantry that they might have a few days in which to enjoy the luxury of their newly won city. If the Third Army was going to have to halt its drive again, those infantrymen could think of no better place for defense than Nancy. That, however, would have been a greater surprise than the order which came, for its nature had by now become a familiar pattern: attack.

Nancy had been liberated, but Nancy would not be safe from observed artillery fire until the heights east of the city – across the Meurthe River – had been taken.

The order to continue the attack for that high ground, after a warning at 0830 (16 September) to permit some reconnaissance, was issued at 1000 hours. The order contemplated a crossing in column of battalions, the 1st following the 3rd, at a point a short distance below a dam where the river was reported to be fordable (designated as site "A"). At the same time, however, it was directed that one rifle company of the 1st Battalion should cross in assault boats at a point over a mile upstream (to the right) in the vicinity of Tomblaine. This company not only would create diversion away from the main crossing, but it would be in a position to seize Tomblaine and the site where it was planned to put in a treadway bridge. The 2nd Battalion was to continue its mission in the Foret de Haye, prepared to relieve the 1st Battalion in Tomblaine. The Regiment was to launch its attack at noon. Even this was not too much time for adequate reconnaissance, but it was more than it had been possible to have for most previous attacks, and battalion and company commanders made full use of it.

Major Wood set up his O.P. in a mill directly overlooking the crossing site which he had selected within his area, and Captain Greenlief, whose Company L would be leading the assault, oriented his platoon leaders and issued his company order. The 3rd Battalion had started moving toward the river from its position above Maxeville on time. The column drew a few rounds of artillery fire as it marched down the face of a hill, but then it disappeared from enemy view among the buildings of Nancy.

Company A had drawn the assignment to make the boat crossing near Tomblaine, and now, as the 3rd Battalion marched toward the river opposite Malzeville, Lt. Kjems led his company down across the Marne-Rhine Canal, and prepared to put 17 engineer assault boats into the water. (Handling the boats in the water would be men of Company A, 60th Engineers.)

With good machine gun and mortar support, as well as an artillery preparation directed at the higher ground of the objective, Company L’s riflemen plunged into the swift waters of the river, and waded across in a depth of two to three feet. The whole company was across within 15 minutes. There was some delay, then, when the battalion anti-tank platoon found it necessary to manhandle its 57mm guns across the river while the 1 ½ ton prime-mover crept along behind. Presently, however, Company I was moving, then Major Wood and his command group, and finally Company K – now wading with the support of a guy rope which the engineers had strung across the river.

Apparently the 3rd Battalion’s attack had caught the enemy off balance. It was known that there was enemy opposite the crossing site - Major Wood had discovered that and the fact was emphasized by a few more rounds through in drawing some rifle shots as he made his reconnaissance, the window of the O.P. But there was no organized defense to stop the attack, and it progressed with little serious opposition. It seemed that the German defenders had been expecting a crossing near the Malzeville bridge (below where the 3rd battalion had drawn artillery fire), and, as a result, this attack had hit the flank of his defenses.

Meanwhile Company A’s attack had been going as well. Minutes in an assault boat making for a hostile river shore are dreadful minutes, for in the face of an organized defense the boats may become as ducks sitting on a pond - with no wings on which to fly away. Company A, however, made the crossing quickly and efficiently, with the result that it was decided to send the whole 1st Battalion across at site "B."

Succeeding waves, however, did not enjoy quite the same degree of immunity which had been the fortune of Company A. The first wave evidently awakened the Germans to the threat against them, and they were able to bring fire on the boats as they brought the other companies. But it was too late to turn back the 1st Battalion.

By evening, the 1st Battalion had Tomblaine and the ground beyond, and the 3rd Battalion had Company L in Malzeville and Companies I and K on the objective, the near edge of the Plateau de Malzeville, a table-topped hill whose wooded slopes rose 620 feet above the Meurthe River.

As soon as the high ground to the immediate front had been taken, engineers of the 1135th Engineer (C) Group set to work putting in a treadway bridge at Tomblaine and a Bailey bridge at Malzeville. At 1300 the next day (17 September), traffic began moving across the Bailey, and an hour later the treadway was open. With supplies available now, the battalions could resume their attacks.

That same afternoon the 1st Battalion struck out to the northeast. Platoons ran into small arms and artillery fire in Essey-les-Nancy, but the battalion renewed a coordinated attack at 1800. By nightfall, leading elements were fighting, with the valued assistance of tanks, against continuing resistance in Pulnoy - a town more that four kilometers northeast of Tomblaine.

Its task completed in the Foret de Haye (one attached engineer squad had removed 103 mines in one day), the 2nd Battalion assembled immediately west of Nancy, and sent Company G to relieve Company L in Malzeville.

This permitted the 3rd Battalion to consolidate its position and concentrate upon making its hold on the high ground secure. Captain Greenlief’s L Company encountered some machine gun fire as it moved over to the right toward Company K; the opposition was overcome with the assistance of tank destroyers - in another example of the successful use of T.D.’s for offensive action. It was late in the evening before the objectives were taken. Company K, after encountering strong resistance at Dommartment, moved up to seize Butte St. Genevieve, a rounded appendage of the Plateau de Malzeville. The stage was set for a renewal of the attack all along the line next day.

Once more the 134th Infantry was the central unit of Task Force Sebree. It appeared that an effort was about to be made to strike a decisive blow in this sector. Indeed, it appears that leaders still were nursing hope for another breakout. The Corps’ objective was said to be Mannheim, Germany! Capt. Milton Maurer, regimental motor officer, was having all kinds of headaches trying to find a place in Nancy for the 43 Quartermaster trucks which had been attached to the Regiment in anticipation of a resumption of rapid, mobile warfare. He was competing for space with the newly arrived 6th Armored Division which was just completing a move all the way across France from Brest. Already combat commands of the 4th Armored Division were driving deep into enemy territory from the area of the 320th Infantry to the south, and the 80th Division to the north. At the same time, the 137th had come upon the right of the 134th, and the 80th Division was fighting its way southward in an effort to meet the 35th.

After some late adjustments in plans, the 134th jumped off on 18 September at 1000 hours. This time it was throwing everything; all three battalions were attacking generally to the north. No continuos enemy defense line appeared, or rather the opposition was not of a uniform tenacity, but each battalion did, before the attack was very old, come under fire.

The 2nd Battalion, attacking north from the vicinity of Malzeville very soon ran into a stubborn resistance. German machine guns, cleverly concealed on the wooded slopes of the plateau, were delivering fire into the flank, and every foot of ground gained was at high cost. Leaders of the 2nd Battalion here faced a particularly trying situation. They were taking into battle companies whose fighting strength was made up chiefly of replacements. This battalion was making its first major attack since its unfortunate losses at the bridge at Flavigny. The results were an indictment of the whole replacement system. The replacement system had been inaugurated in an attempt to get away from what had been the common practice in previous wars when "it had been the accepted practice to organize as many divisions as manpower resources would permit, fight those divisions until casualties had reduced them to bare skeletons, when withdraw them from the line and rebuild them in a rear area." Actually it frequently was the case in this war to fight divisions until they were bare skeletons, and then just keep on fighting them and refill their ranks with replacements without any withdrawal from the line. The arrival of replacements had brought the 2nd Battalion somewhere near "normal" fighting strength - on paper. But its strength was not the strength it knew before its depletion. The replacement system seemed to deal principally in numbers - so many infantrymen make a regiment. But just as important for the effectiveness of a fighting unit is its esprit de corps. These new men had had no opportunity to become acquainted with the traditions of the regiment, to feel themselves a part of it. They had not even had an opportunity to become acquainted with their leaders or with each other. It is a depressing thing to go into battle as a replacement - the regimental commander had done so in World War I. To face death amongst strangers, with no "buddies" or close acquaintances, means that a man is not going to be able to be at his best. Surveys have shown that ordinarily in combat no more than 15 or 20 per cent of the men actually participate in the firefight; more than that are willing to stay and face the danger, but they do not shoot. In a company filled with replacements this percentage may be much lower. This means a greater burden for the very few remaining "fighters" and greater responsibility - and personal danger - for the leaders. It was a hopeless task, then, which faced the leaders of the 2nd Battalion as they tried to urge their men forward.

In the center, companies of the 3rd Battalion were moving around the wooded edges of the plateau - a plateau which had served as an ideal location for a German airfield. Here, Company K, moving around the right edge reached its objective with little difficulty, but Company I was having a more difficult time of it on the left. Lt. Hyde’s company was running into some of the same defenses which were proving so troublesome for the 2nd Battalion. Hyde himself moved up to see why the company had halted, but in doing so he exposed himself to enemy fire. He fell seriously wounded as a bullet pierced his head.

The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, had stirred a good fight as it moved north from Pulnoy. It was moving up the broad valley on the right of the 3rd Battalion’s plateau objective. Selchamps fell to its attack, and the battalion moved on toward new objectives. It did so at the mercy of German observation on the high ground to front and to the right. The 3rd Battalion had secured the Butte St. Genevieve and the southern rim of the Plateau de Malzeville, and so the 1st Battalion could advance across that open ground without concern for its left. The right flank, on the contrary, was exposed, for the 137th Infantry was having a difficult time of its fighting through the Foret de Champenoux, several kilometers to the southeast, (or right rear) of the 1st Battalion’s position. German observers at Amance, on a high ridge about four kilometers north and northeast of Selchamps, could command at least a thousand yards of the terrain across which the 1st Battalion had to go, but a more immediate obstacle lay directly in the battalion’s zone of action. It was Paine de Sucre, or Sugar Loaf. This was a key terrain feature. It rose, a knob independent of other hill systems, to a height as great as that of the Plateau de Malzeville, and, affording excellent observation in every direction, it commanded practically the entire valley. This became the immediate objective for the 1st Battalion. In the vanguard of that attack was Sergeant Ralph F. Greely and his machine gun section of Company D. When enemy direct fire guns and small arms fire threatened to halt the advance, Greely set an example in courage which went far in assuring its continuation; he seized a mounted heavy machine gun and dragged it alone to an exposed position where he could support the advance. It cost him his life, but the attack now gathered momentum. Driving Nazi defenders before it, the battalion, in company with Company A of the 737th Tank Battalion, moved steadily along, and its drive for the key terrain feature was not to be denied. Beyond Pain de Sucre, on the northwest, lay a typical French village called Agincourt. This was not the same Agincourt known to history through the exploits of Henry V in the Hundred Years’ War, but its association with the field of battle was much more real to the men of the 134th. Effective defensive fires poured from Agincourt toward the advancing skirmishers as they came into sight over the western nose of Pain de Sucre. A high velocity tank gun scored a direct hit on one of the supporting Sherman tanks, and it stopped dead and burst into flames. 2nd Lt. Gerald M. Hassel of Wyoming, field artillery observer, hurried forward in order that he might bring effective artillery fire on the enemy positions; but he too came under the fire of the enemy tank and was killed in the attempt. Capt. Francis C. Mason sensed that this was a critical point, and he knew that the only way to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy fire was to keep moving forward. He carried men of Company B along with him; Kjems and Company A remained on his flank, and supporting tanks stayed with them. They swept into Agincourt and began routing the Nazis at close range. American tankers gained revenge in knocking out a dreaded German tank in the streets. Even on forcing entry into the town, the issue had not yet been settled. That remained for decisive action on the part of heroic individuals. It required effort such as that of Sergeant Thaine J. Hale of Nebraska, as critical fighting continued through dusk and evening. Hale was one of a group of some eighty men of the 1st Battalion which suddenly found itself cut off. The immediate response of some to being surrounded is an attitude of resignation. Sergeant Hale’s reaction was quite the opposite. A veteran platoon guide of Company A, Sergeant Hale had been wounded in Normandy and only recently returned to his company. He was anxious to make up for all the time which he had lost. His personal courage knew no bounds. The 80 men held on to 20 prisoners which they had captured and took refuge in barns along one of the streets. It was clear that their continued safety demanded immediate action. Sergeant Hale moved quickly. He ran out into the confusion of the village, making his way through growing darkness by the unsteady glow of the burning tank, found an American tank outside the village, and jumping on it, he directed it to the vicinity of his trapped comrades. At this point it was discovered that the tank was without a machine gunner. Sergeant Albert Rogers of Kansas, a machine gun squad leader among the encircled men in Agincourt, rushed out to fill this vacancy. He climbed into the tank and got its valuable machine gun into action. The tank fire was effective in dispersing the German forces and permitting the Americans to rejoin their units; but during the maneuvering in the streets, while Thaine Hale rode the tank to rescue those 80 men, he met his own death.

Already in position on the Plateau de Malzeville were the firing batteries of the 161st Field Artillery. Major Shuster, always one to follow the attack closely, was on the plateau shortly after the jump-off, and machine guns and rifle bullets still cracked across the erstwhile Nazi airfield as the howitzers went into position.

With most of the regimental objectives won - albeit not without some difficult fighting - even more ambitious objectives were assigned for the morrow. In addition to the normal combat team attachment (principally the 161st Field Artillery and Company A, 60th Engineers), other units had been attached to the Regiment to give additional power to the task force. These had included Company A, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company A, 737th Tank Battalion; and the 127th Field Artillery Battalion (155 howitzers). Now, according to the order, the 2nd Battalion would attack straight to the north at 0700 to capture the town of Chamois and continue the attack to the north, and the 1st Battalion would jump off at 1000 for the heights at Amance (five kilometers northeast of Pain de Sucre) and continue to Bouxieres-aux-Chenes (two kilometers north-northwest of Amance). The 3rd Battalion was to follow the 1st, prepared to attack in either direction.

Between the time when this order was issued (1900 on 18 September) and the hour for which the attack was scheduled, the enemy executed some plans of his own. He was not yet ready to give up such a key terrain feature as Pain de Sucre. In the complete darkness of 0300 hours, men of Companies A and C, in a defense organized late the preceding evening, sought to gain some rest for the coming attack. A torrent of machine gun fire and heavy, accurate barrages of mortar fire, announced the coming of the counterattack. Men of the 1st Battalion were quick to respond, but very quickly enemy soldiers were amongst them, bring confusion in their midst. Heavy casualties added further to the confusion of the situation, as some of the finest leaders of the 1st Battalion died that night. Sergeant Philip G. Blair of Utah, was one of those soldiers whose potentials had not displayed themselves completely during training. His physique had not always been able to withstand the rigors of long marches and vigorous exercise in the hot Alabama sun. But since the opening battles in Normandy, he had driven himself with a determination that had made him one of the most valuable noncommissioned officers in Company A, and his endurance had carried him safely all the way through. Now, however, the odds had become too great, and he was killed in action during these operations. Then there was Lt. Constant J. Kjems, whose leadership since taking command of Company A at Fort de Pont St. Vincent had been exemplary; early in the counterattack he too was killed in action.

Lt. Edward K. Hum of Ohio, executive officer of Company A, immediately assumed command, and led what men he could find in the darkness into the thick of a close range and even hand-to-hand fight. With the coming of dawn, Lieutenant Hum discovered that he and eleven of his men remained on the high ground, surrounded by the enemy. It was a test of leadership to get those men through the enemy’s position, but, blessed with a light fog, Hum met the test and rejoined his company which had withdrawn to a low ridge some distance to the south of the hills.

Another group of men found itself in similar circumstances. Staff Sergeant George W. Daugherty, Sergeant Penn D. Soland, Sergeant Harold H. Schultz, and Private First Class Hobert Hunt likewise found themselves isolated. They kept up sniper fire until three of them decided that they could infiltrate through the enemy positions to rejoin their units. Sergeant Schultz remained in position to fire while his companions made the attempt. They were successful, and some time later, Schultz too was able to make his was to safety.

With the loss of the Sugar Loaf and the heavy casualties to the 1st Battalion, it was quite obvious that the plans for the attack scheduled that day (19 September), would have to be altered. The 2nd Battalion, nevertheless, could proceed with its attack on time (0700), and did so with little initial opposition.

Once again, however, when considerable opposition did spring up, the men froze to the ground. Exposing himself in an effort to get the attack underway again, Capt. Glenn W. Saddler, who had taken command of Company F after Flavigny, was forced out of action and Lt. Bibby took command of that company.

Meanwhile, conferences were proceeding at the C.P. of the 1st Battalion where Major Craig, acting regimental executive officer, Major Wood of the 3rd Battalion, and Colonel Boatsman of the 1st Battalion were meeting with General Sebree to consider means of bringing the 3rd Battalion into the picture to effect a recapture of the Sugar Loaf. In a telephone conversation with the corps chief of staff, General Sebree was told the hill should be retaken, but then to prepare to hold.

At first a plan was offered which would have brought the 3rd Battalion around to the rear to attack through the 1st Battalion. Major Wood preferred a plan more obvious to him - to attack directly to the east from his advantageous position on the Plateau de Malzeville. The would be across the front of the 1st Battalion, and that unit would be in a position to assist the attack by fire. It would be necessary, however, to protect the left flank by containing Agincourt.

This view prevailed, and, with two platoons of tanks and one platoon of T.D.’s, the 3rd Battalion launched its attack at 1330 after a 10-minute artillery preparation. It was a model for tank-infantry attacks. From the vicinity of "Five Corners" (the junction of five roads near St. Genevieve Farm at the point where the Butte St. Genevieve joined the Plateau de Malzeville) one platoon of infantry from Company K - five men on each tank - rolled down the Agincourt road (alongside the plateau) to the northeast, while the second platoon of tanks - and its platoon of mounted infantrymen - moved down the road which ran to the east along the Butte St. Genevieve). Company K’s support platoon and Company L followed on foot. As the tanks reached the bottom of the valley and crossed the highway, both columns fanned out to form a single irregular skirmish line, and, behind their own continuos machine gun fire and sporadic 75mm cannon fire, they began to advance up Sugar Loaf hill. Until masked by the advancing troops, the 1st Battalion continued in effective diversionary fire from the south. Meanwhile, Company I and the tank destroyers followed on the left column down the slope, and when the preceding platoons turned toward the hill, the company "peeled off" and continued toward Agincourt. It was here that the most serious opposition developed, but Company I was "containing Agincourt," and the attack toward the main objective was progressing smoothly. By 1345 the tanks were three-fourths of the way up the hill, and by 1410 they were on the crest. At this moment an anti-tank gun from a neighboring hill scored a direct hit on the command tank - on which Lt. Jack Campbell, commanding Company K, was mounted; fortunately there was no serious injury. Company I continued its fight in Agincourt under Lt. James Cecka, who had gone from Company M to take command after Lt. Hyde was hit, for some time yet, but finally, after another tank had been destroyed in the streets, occupied the town.

The achievement had been in taking quickly, and with almost negligible casualties, and objective which the Germans had prized highly enough to make a counterattack for its recapture less than 12 hours before. Adequate reconnaissance, close cooperation of tanks and infantry, clearly assigned tasks for each unit, supporting and diversionary fire, an approach from a new direction, and skillful, precise, dynamic execution had contributed to the result.

But once again the enemy came back in an effort to regain possession of the key terrain feature. At first it was only a slight infiltration into Agincourt at 0500, but 15 minutes later, it was apparent that it was a full-scale attack against both Agincourt and Pain de Sucre.

Again there was the tense, close-range fighting in the darkness. Technical Sergeant Charles Ostrom of Oregon, a K Company platoon sergeant, noticed two German soldiers, armed with machine guns, crawling up the slope toward the battalion anti-tank gun in the company’s area. Ostrom crept down to close range and threw hand grenades to kill both; but as he make his way back to his platoon, he himself was killed by enemy fire. A few minutes later, that same anti-tank gun stopped a tank which was supporting the German attack. Rifles, mortars, machine guns, grenades, were resounding all over the hill. Messengers, artillery observers, all were firing in a determined effort. This time Companies K and L, closely coordinated, had been set for an attack.

Company I was having a more difficult time. German squads moved in to overwhelm the command post, and several other small groups. In one of the houses so surrounded, Staff Sergeant Huston Temple of Tennessee, a squad leader, saw that he could not expect to hold out against this surprise force, but, on the other hand, neither was he willing to surrender. Therefore, he ordered his men to find their way out, and he opened fire to cover their withdrawal. The enemy sent up flares as the Germans waited for the men to surrender, but Temple, moving rapidly from one window to another to create an illusion of numbers, was able to fire accurately in the light flares, and he took a heavy toll among his would-be captors. Then he made his own escape without injury.

Agincourt was lost, but the principal feature - the Sugar Loaf - had held: at 0630 it was reported, "everything under control on the hill." And Agincourt, without dominating Pain de Sucre, was an empty holding. At noon a terrific artillery shelling was brought down on the town, and late in the afternoon it was found to be clear. The next day a patrol counted 42 German dead in Agincourt. Pain de Sucre was secure. A news dispatch in the New York Times noted:

One of the sharpest battles for strong points behind the lines is now raging at "Sugar Loaf Hill," four miles from Nancy. The hill changed hands for the third time yesterday when it was retaken by American infantry, but they had to fight off a German counterattack a few hours later.

While the 3rd Battalion concerned itself with consolidating its hold on Pain de Sucre and the 1st Battalion continued reorganization (Company B now was on the Plateau de Malzeville reinforcing the 3rd Battalion), the 2nd Battalion renewed its attack to the north. Colonel Walker’s battalion had extended its zone to the right in order to take over some of the area formerly held by the 3rd Battalion when that unit assembled for its attack on the Sugar Loaf, Company G, in the zone formerly assigned to Company I, led the attack. It moved toward a hill which was an appendage of the plateau. It moved with the support of a platoon of tank destroyers. But the terrain was not easy, and the Germans still held to the well-concealed positions which had been so effective in stopping previous attacks. Once again the deadly fire opened up from those entrenched positions on the right flank. Once again it appeared that the attack would bog down. But at this point, Staff Sergeant Junior Spurrier undertook some decisive action. He ran back to one of the supporting T.D.’s, climbed upon it, and grasped the handles of the .50 caliber machine gun (a weapon mounted primarily for anti-aircraft defense). Directing the T.D. toward the flanking fire (in another heretical use of the T.D. "as a tank"), he opened fire with the awe-inspiring .50 caliber machine gun. Almost immediately its deadly effectiveness gained fire superiority for him. As enemy soldiers fell and fled before the approaching iron monster, Spurrier jumped to the ground and ran close to the dugout to complete destruction of its occupants with hand grenades.

He remounted the tank destroyer and proceeded to clean out a second position in similar fashion. Naturally, the tank destroyer was drawing enemy fire, but Spurrier remained to reach the summit of the hill and to capture 22 prisoners. The exploits won for the West Virginia soldier a Distinguished Service Cross and widespread acclaim as a "one-man army." Now the whole company was moving forward. Other emplacements held out against direct T.D. fire, but with the assistance of white phosphorous grenades, resistance was broken.

Hardly less spectacular was the action of another G Company soldier, Private First Class Thomas G. Holt of Mississippi. An automatic rifleman, Holt jumped aboard a tank destroyer to man its vacant .50 caliber machine gun, and though blown from his position by a near shell burst, he scrambled right back up to maintain a stream of highly effective supporting fire for his comrades.

Task Force Sebree had been dissolved the preceding afternoon and now the Regiment was operating again directly under division control. Anxious to get this area cleared out, General Eddy, corps commander, kept up with the situation by direct telephone conversations, and that afternoon (22 September) he, with General Baade, visited the C.P. They were calling for a continuation of the attack to the north - toward a meeting with the 80th Division.

Early in the morning of the 23rd, the 1st Battalion moved across the Plateau de Malzeville to take up positions on the right of the 2nd Battalion in preparation for a coordinated attack - to be launched on division order - toward the Bois de Faulx. Previously intelligence reports had indicated that an enemy force of approximately 1700 men - including elements of the 1119th Grenadier Regiment, the 1120th Grenadier Regiment, the 1121st Grenadier Regiment, the 92nd Luftwaffe Regiment, and the 593rd Flak Battalion - occupied Bois de Faulx.

While the 1st and 2nd Battalion awaited orders to attack, the 6th Armored Division moved out of corps reserve at 0700 for a thrust to the east.

Time for the 134th’s attack was set for noon. Immediate objectives were Lay St. Christopher for the 1st Battalion, and Bouxieres-aux-Hames for the 2nd. Most serious obstacle of the terrain for those battalions was a deep draw paralleling the front through which ran a railroad and a small stream. They soon learned that the enemy had the railroad well covered with fire. The 2nd Battalion had two companies across the railway by 1435, but they were unable to get up the open slopes to the front. Mortar and machine gun fire became more intense with the approach of darkness. Company A at last was able to reach the objective at 1940, and Company B moved up 45 minutes later. The 2nd Battalion, however, still was unable to make any progress.

In order to create a diversion, a special force - made up of T.D.’s, the I and R Platoon, and a part of the Anti-Tank Company - was formed into "Task Force Magruder." The Anti-Tank Commander moved his group back across the Meurthe River, and moved down the west bank to a position opposite the flank of the enemy facing the 2nd Battalion. At 2230 the force opened fire with 57mm gun, 3-inch gun, .50 caliber, and .30 caliber machine guns. It created a tremendous uproar along the river, and resulted in material assistance to the advance of the 2nd Battalion.

During the afternoon Pain de Sucre had proved its value as an observation post. Already enemy had been seen withdrawing from Eulmont and generally from in front of the 1st Battalion as it attacked north of the plateau, and General Eddy had called from corps headquarters to say "air having a field day." Then at 1520, Lieutenant Campbell, Company K, reported to his battalion that there was a long column of enemy infantry, horse and tractor-drawn artillery, including heavy pieces, and command cars, moving north in the vicinity of Moulins (about three miles north of Pain de Sucre); he requested an air strike in the most urgent terms, and in the meantime, corps and division artillery would fire on the column. Campbell reported the progress of the column, and at 1543, Major Wood called Regimental Headquarters "begging for an air strike." Fighter-bombers already were in the air; hardly more than 15 minutes later planes were swooping down over the target. Again and again planes returned to their prey in attacks which continued for nearly an hour. Results were noted in the regimental S-3 Journal:

1600 - L Co observer reports air is really working German column over moving toward Bouxiers. Maj. Wood says it was complete rout.

1642 - Maj. Wood reports that our planes are dropping gasoline bombs on infantry. Horses running around and Air Corps just raising complete hell with the German withdrawal.

The break had come, and when the 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off the next morning they were able to advance all the way through the Bois de Faulx without meeting any resistance. The 2nd Battalion made contact with the 80th Division at Custines. The way was cleared for a renewal of the general advance to the east. The 3rd Battalion began moving again - to Eulmont, Moulins, Bouxieres-aux-Chenes. Then, late that afternoon, the 3rd Battalion mounted trucks to move over the main highway - a highway reported to be heavily mined - to Leyr.

Leyr was reported to be in the hands of CCB of the 6th Armored Division, and that unit was to hold it until the arrival of the 134th Infantry. It was something of an embarrassing situation, then, when the kitchen and baggage trucks, carrying the 3rd Battalion, rounded a curve outside Leyr to find that the town was being thoroughly sprayed with machine gun fire from every direction. The 3rd Battalion went into a compact "wagon wheel" defense on a slope south of Leyr pending the outcome of the battle; the 1st Battalion which had been moving to Bey (three miles east of Leyr), returned to Lay St. Christopher to await clarification of the situation.

Early the next morning (24 September), the 3rd Battalion moved into Leyr.

The 1st Battalion was attached to the 6th Armored Division, and it prepared to follow, in trucks, a mechanized drive to the east of the Foret de Gremecey area. But even before that battalion moved out with the armor at 1620, news had come that this could be only a local effort. The whole Third Army was to go over to the defensive.

List of Illustrations:

Operations terminated successfully at Montargis, they moved on to the east.

Prisoners by the hundred at Joigny.

Chaplain Reentz found time to hold church services in a school yard near Troyes.

As the 2nd Battalion and supporting anti-tank guns forded the Madon River . . .

Leaders of the task force met in a great fort near Toul.

Going into Nancy

Nancy is free (place Stanislaus)

The Americans arrive in Nancy

It would . . . seize Tomblaine . . . where it was planned to put in a treadway bridge.

Tanks helped clean out machine gun nests.

Nancy pass.

Honor to the liberators of Nancy

The srcoll presented by the city of Nancy.

Chapter VII

Gremecey Defensive

The outstanding feature of a Lorraine landscape is its forest. The height and depth of the woods, the strength of the lofty oaks, beeches, elms, firs, and birches, are typical aspects of the Lorraine forest. They cannot be compared with Fontainebleau or Compiegne. They have a character of their own.

U.S. Army, Lorraine and Nancy

The mud up here has all the substance of pea soup and the penetration of a good horse liniment. It seeps through the lacing of our boots. It finds its way into our food . . . And daily the mud grows deeper. Full rains had already softened up the French soil to bread pudding consistency . . . These lads of the Thirty-fifth Division, made up originally of Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska National Guard units, are veterans.

Virginia Irwin in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Assumption of the defensive was an unusual thing for the 134th Infantry, and it came as something of a blow to the prevailing high confidence which had been nourished on offensive warfare. Not since St. Lo had there been a defensive order issued, and it was clear at that time that such a role would last no longer than a few days. Now, however, came an order to go into a deliberate defensive position, with attention to mine fields (anti-tank and anti-personnel), demolitions, tank traps, road blocks, fields of fire, automatic weapons emplacements, barbed wire – tactical and protective – and all the rest of it. The order aroused some concern in the minds of the men who heard it, for they could conceive, immediately, of only one reason for resigning the offensive and going into such a deliberate defense – an imminent German counterattack!

It was true that there had been some recovery of strength on the part of the Germans since the first week of September – there was evidence for this in the crossings of the Moselle, and, more recently, in the great tank battles in which they had engaged the 4th Armored Division in the Dieuze-Luneville areas during the ten days immediately preceding the issuance of this order (24 September). But the German recovery in Lorraine doubtless was related closely to the high command decision, late in August, to divert priorities to the 21st Army Group (Field Marshal Montgomery) for the effort in the north to turn the defenses of the Rhine and of the Siegfried line. That meant slowing down, and finally halting, the Third Army. It was ironic that such a force should have been halted when patrols a few weeks earlier had found little opposition around Metz and even in the Siegfried line itself. Nevertheless, the doughboys, once the reason was made clear, were not too disappointed to accept a relatively stabilized situation and let someone else carry the ball for a while. But there was a bit of irony too in this hope, for the situation during the first several days in the Foret de Gremecey area proved to be anything but a stabilized one.

Yes, the armored columns of the Third Army finally had stopped, but it was a stoppage growing more out of logistical difficulties – of keeping up the supply lines – than of any resourcefulness on the part of the enemy. Now the area to which the Regiment was assigned for defense was in the zone of the 6th Armored Division. Already the 3rd Battalion had relieved elements of that division in Leyr – but then it had been in contemplation of further pursuit of the offensive; on the same assumption the 1st Battalion had been attached to the 6th Armored Division’s Combat Command B, and now was accompanying the armored thrusts beyond Fossieux, Malaucourt, and Jallacourt. Therefore, the 2nd Battalion was assigned the mission of initiating the relief of C.C.B., and preparatory to doing so, it moved up to assemble at Armaucourt.

Late that evening, the 3rd Battalion, leaving Company I for the time being, moved – largely on its own jeeps, anti-tank trucks and pioneer truck – from Leyr to an assembly position in a woods south of Bey. After reconnaissance on the part of its leaders the next morning (25 September), that battalion began moving into position in the Foret de Gremecey. Actually, it became the first to go into position, because difficulties of coordination with the 80th Division on the left delayed the 2nd Battalion’s occupation of its sector (that is, the left of the regimental sector).

Troops of the 35th Division occupied something of a salient in this area. The 134th Infantry faced generally north, while the 137th Infantry, on the right, faced generally east.

The Regiment’s main line of resistance was organized along an irregular line, on a frontage of over 12,000 yards ("normal" frontage for a regiment in defense was supposed to be 2,000 to 4,000 yards), running near the forward edge of the Foret de Gremecey and along the ridge to the left. In front of this position there was a line of towns, two to three kilometers apart; right to left (west to east) they were Fresnes, Jallacourt, Malacourt, Fossieux, and Ajoncourt. Then there was another series of villages near the center of the regimental area. North to south they were Manhoue, Aboncourt, and Alincourt. On the morning of 26 September, the Regimental C.P. opened at Aboncourt.

First indication that this was not to be an unchallenged defensive position came with the 1st Battalion’s withdrawal to regimental reserve. With units of C.C.B. of the 6th Armored Division, Colonel Boatsman’s 1st Battalion already had cleared most of the towns immediately to the front of what now was the Regiment’s defensive area, and the new order called for withdrawal from some of those newly-won positions. Any withdrawal in the face of the enemy is likely to be loaded with danger, and in this case, the 1st Battalion became involved in a firefight at Fossieux. It was 1615 when the enemy opened fire. One point of difficulty was an American tank which the Germans had captured. A platoon of Company B was given the task of recapturing the tank. As the leading squad worked through the street a shell from a tank gun burst near and killed Pfc. Charles A. Catenazzo. Other members of the platoon moved on, but as they reached the vicinity of the tank, Germans closed in upon them. A few darted into quick hiding – one practically beneath the tank – but the Nazis were able to get the others and their leader. The rest of B Company meanwhile, moved back to relative safety, but A Company was not able to extricate itself from Fossieux until after dark. Company B was attached to the 2nd Battalion that evening in order to fill a gap between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The later moved its C.P. from Alincourt to the Farm Rhin de Bois, and the 1st Battalion (less Company B), went into assembly at Alincourt.

Support for the Regiment was moving over a bridge across the narrow Seille River which had been put up during the darkness of the preceding night by men of the ammunition and pioneer platoons of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions working under the supervision of Captain Thurson J. Palmer, Omaha, of Regimental Headquarters Company.

Patrols during the night of the 26 – 27 September found enough enemy activity in front of the Regiment to suggest that the defenses were about to be tested. Further evidence of such a threat came with an early morning shelling of Company F’s position. At 0730 enemy infantry, accompanied by two tanks, were reported to be moving south from Oriocourt. Hardly 15 minutes later, strong elements of the German 1120th Infantry, with tank support, had moved through the center of the 134th Infantry’s main line of resistance to seize Manhoue. The threat had to be met quickly, and the decision was for Company B to move to the left to support Company F in a counterattack to repel the enemy from the position. That this was a part of a German plan which was seeking to pinch off the whole 35th Division’s area was suggested when reports announced a strong attack against the right of the 137th Infantry; in fact, enemy tanks and infantry had broken through the road block at Chambrey and proceeded all the way to Pettoncourt, where, at 0800, they were being engaged by the 137th Infantry’s Service Company! This meant that the enemy’s spearheads, having effected a penetration amounting to nearly 3,000 yards in the 134th’s section, and 5,000 yards in the 137th’s, now were no more than 8,000 yards apart, and their junction would mean the surrounding of the bulk of those two regiments. In order to get the regimental reserve up to a position were it would be in a position to block any further penetration, and, at the same time, to provide greater security for the installations of the command post, the 1st Battalion was moved up to Aboncourt (half a mile south of enemy held Manhoue) and the C.P. displaced from that location back to Alincourt. As this was being done, the report came at 0920 that the 137th Infantry had lost Pettoncourt. The enemy’s strength, however, was not sufficient to conquer the defenses which had been organized behind it, and soon his effort was about spent as far as further offensive action was concerned. Happily for the darkening picture, troops of the 137th were able to retake Pettoncourt very quickly after its loss, and that alleviated a dangerous threat to the rear.

Soon Company F’s efforts – with the support of Company B – were showing results toward Manhoue. But as the company entered the town it found itself up against close range street fighting. By 1340, nevertheless, it was in possession of Manhoue; two German tanks had been knocked out there.

It still was obvious, however, that the enemy had not given up his designs upon the Foret de Gremecey and the adjacent area. Shortly after noon the 3rd Battalion outpost (a reinforced platoon of Company I), reported that a German company had moved into its rear, and tanks had appeared on its flank; it was ordered to withdraw, and was able to make its way back to the battalion reserve area. German troops continued to move into Jallacourt during much of the afternoon.

Company F had to beat off some local attacks against Manhoue in order to hold it, but no further major attack developed that afternoon. However, it seemed evident that one was forming, and steps were taken to strengthen the Regiment’s position. The remainder of the 1st Battalion (less Company A held as regimental reserve), moved up to join Company B, so that now all three battalions were in the line, 3rd, 1st, 2nd, right to left. Corps and Division artillery was to continue fire on such points of enemy concentration as Fossieux, Malacourt, Jallacourt, and LaJuree woods. In an order reminiscent of California days, it was directed that there would be a "stand-to" – during which every officer and enlisted man was to be alert – until an hour after darkness in the evening, and from 0530 to 0730 in the morning. Companies were to establish listening posts to the front with wire (usually sound power telephones) communication. Companies were to report hourly during the night.

German patrols were active again during the night. About midnight one the size of a squad walked by an L Company local outpost (on the 3rd Battalion’s left). Shortly after, a listening post reported that there was an enemy patrol down near a blown-out bridge on the creek in front of the forest. But the climax in German audacity came when a five-man patrol made its was into the L Company area and pulled a man out of his foxhole and took him prisoner. Another patrol attempted to infiltrate through the left of the 2nd Battalion; one of the enemy threw a hand grenade at a gun position, but a burst of fire broke up that patrol. All companies, and the Regimental O.P., were reporting vehicular movement, tanks, loud talking, flares. At 0400 there was heavy shelling in the area of the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Before 0600 such concentrations of German troops were approaching that both Companies K and L were calling for pre-arranged artillery fire.

Daylight revealed long columns of enemy forces. Tanks, half-tracks, horse-drawn wagons, and artillery were moving along the road between Jallaucourt and Manhoue, and other vehicles appeared on the ridge to the east of Jallaucourt. Obviously here was a target for air attack, but a hurried request for an air strike brought the response that aircraft would not be available before 0900 at the earliest. Other forces were attacking toward Manhoue from a more northerly direction. Nor was it reassuring to learn that tanks and infantry again were attacking the 137th Infantry; it looked like another effort to carry out the mission which intelligence reports had revealed had been assigned these German units just recently arrived from the Metz area – to "encircle and clear out the Foret de Gremecey."

At 0710 the tanks were approaching the point on the road toward Manhoue between the 3rd and 1st Battalions. Two of the 3rd Battalion’s 57mm anti-tank guns were in a position to cover those approaches, and they opened fire. The left gun was able to get off only four rounds – two at a tank and two at another vehicle – when enemy tanks returned the fire. One man was killed instantly, and six other were wounded in a direct hit on the position. Continuing hostile artillery and small arms fire denied survivors access to the guns. If air power were delayed, the dependable artillery still was at hand, and it began to rake the Nazi column. The German tanks halted, and started moving back toward Jallaucourt. One leading tank had been knocked out, and two others were dragging it away. Artillery fire followed the enemy troops back into the town, and at 0840 Jallaucourt was on fire after an ammunition dump apparently had been hit. At 0900 an air strike was reported to be on the way; but it did not arrive until after 1420, and then it hit Malaucourt instead of Jallaucourt.

Local attacks persisted against Company L and Company E, but, with some effort, including Captain Greenlief’s commitment of Company L’s support platoon in a counterattack, the efforts were beaten back, and the line held. Even this seemed to offer no discouragement for the determined enemy – an enemy whose boldness seemed to be growing with the lack of American attacks in this sector. A new attack came against Company L just before midnight. There still was cause for some concern in the situation of the 137th Infantry, and Sergeant Jeeter (Texas), of the I and R Platoon spent the night at the 137th C.P. with instructions to report back if "things turn for the worse."

In a meeting with the battalion commanders that evening it was possible to announce that the Third Army was expected to remain on the defensive at least until 15 October, and probably longer. Positions were to be improved; all possible ammunition was to be dumped on the position; overcoats were to be issued to all men. And there was a division order which opened with the categorical statement, "Enemy will attack from Fresnes at 0500 into woods . . ." The general proposed to meet it with an attack of his own. There was to be a 100 percent alert in the division at 0430. The 137th Infantry was to attack at 0500 to regain the edge of the woods which it had lost during the day’s fighting, and a battalion of the 320th Infantry was to attack on a narrow front to meet the enemy, and then was to hold Hill 282 south of Fresnes.

The attack came all right, though it was a little behind schedule; but so too was the battalion of the 320th Infantry a little late in getting started. The Germans won the race for Hill 282, and then the 3rd Battalion directed some effective artillery fire upon them. They were able to continue, however, to make a penetration through the left company of the 137th Infantry. In order to meet this contingency, Lieutenant Campbell of Company K sent his support platoon to protect the Regiment’s right flank and to reestablish contact.

Taking advantange of this situation on the right, the enemy now, at 0745, struck again on the left – against the 2nd Battalion. This time it was the 1st Battalion of the same 1120th German Infantry Regiment which had attacked before, and it was attacking at Ajoncourt. There was a heavy firefight there, and then the center of activity seemed to shift to the right – toward Han. This village of Han, in enemy hands, was developing into a cancer for the regimental defenses, and once more Company F was called upon to eliminate it.

Company F launched its attack upon Han at 1400, and very soon its men were demonstrating that they had lost none of the courage or resourcefulness which had characterized their capture of Manhoue. First they flanked the village – cut it off from the east and west, and them moved in for anther effort at street fighting. One of those men leading this assault was Private Thomas J. Wisniewski of Pennsylvania, an automatic rifleman. He moved rapidly, but cautiously toward the village. He sensed the increasing volume of fire bearing down upon him, but he fought back any inclination to hesitate. He hurried toward a group of buildings, but staggered a moment. His left arm felt numb; vaguely he was aware of something warm trickling down the arm. He had been wounded – there were two bullet wounds in his arm. Even this was no cause for pause. He had seen the source of some of the troublesome fire – a group of Germans in a horse stall in the barnyard ahead. He rushed up to a good range and opened fire. He emptied his 20-round magazine in a single burst. Two of the enemy fell dead, while the others – seven of them – threw down their rifles and machine pistols to surrender to the wounded soldier who brandished an empty B.A.R. Then there was another Pennsylvania soldier who, though wounded, kept going to the village – Pfc. Charles P. Konarski. It was difficult for him to walk in his condition, but he refused to turn back. Once in the village, he entered house after house, without hesitation, seeking out the enemy. Ten of the enemy fell before his assault, and he practically cleared a whole side of the street while the squad on his right moved forward rapidly to encircle the enemy remaining in the vicinity. And then there was the courageous action of Pfc. Melvin L. Jagel of Wisconsin, who kept on fighting even though he was suffering from a severe abdominal wound. Again there was outstanding leadership, leadership of the caliber exhibited by Staff Sergeant Joseph H. Grimes of Maryland, as he led his squad through the streets in the face of terrific fire and was instrumental in the capture of some 20 prisoners. It was a difficult assignment, but there never was a doubt concerning its successful execution. At 1645 F Company had control of Han.

This was the same Company F which had had such difficulty in moving along the railroad north of the Plateau de Malzeville only two weeks before. These were largely men who had come to refill the ranks of the 2nd Battalion after its misfortune at Flaigny. Here was a commentary on the enduring character of a Company, and the carry over of esprit de corps. In this short time, that large group of replacements had been assimilated into the Regiment and had caught its spirit.

A heavy shelling of Company L at 0440, September 30, heralded another attack. At 0600 enemy infantry hit the center of that company. Machine guns and rifles opened fire along a 400-yard front; men of the anti-tank platoon joined the line and began firing anti-tank rockets; artillery and mortar concentrations fell into the ravine in front of the woods with deadly effect. At 0615 Captain Greenlief reported that anti-personnel mines in the woods had killed and wounded a large number of the enemy, but large numbers of others were still coming. At 0645 Major Wood decided to commit his reserve – Company I; and fifteen minutes later the regimental reserve – Company A – went to the assistance of the 3rd Battalion. Lt. William Chavet of Omaha, led Company I up a ravine which ran along the east side of the Farm Rhin de Bois – it was the execution of a predetermined plan for counterattack – to the area of Company L. When over 30 prisoners had been taken, and Company I reached the edge of the woods to see Germans withdrawing toward Jallaucourt, it seemed that the attack had been stopped. But such was not the case, for other groups of enemy were coming in toward L Company’s command post. They had penetrated all the way through the woods in that particular area – all the way to the position of a section of Company M’s 81mm mortars.

With the sudden approach of the enemy, the mortar crews had abandoned their guns and joined Company L in its defense. Corporal Homer Gettler of Indiana, and Corporal Paul E. Faulconer of Texas, mortar gunners for the section, were feeling rather helpless in this situation inasmuch as they were armed only with pistols. Then they remembered that they had left a considerable amount of ammunition with their mortars, and those weapons still were in firing condition. Should the enemy seize them he might turn them to the support of his attack. As soon as they had determined the main area of the enemy attack they hurried back to the mortars. Just as they arrived at the position, enemy fire killed Corporal Gettler; but Faulconer was determined to carry out their plan alone. Quickly he aimed the mortar, and then, in rapid succession fired all the remaining shells. Not only did he keep the ammunition from falling into German hands, but he turned it to effective use to break up groups of the approaching Germans.

Meanwhile men of Company L were battling to save their command post. Staff Sergeant Albert Grobe of Oregon, had his trigger finger shot off, but he stood his ground to destroy his assailants; 60mm mortars, in position just outside the woods, proved to be a determining factor with their short range bursts. (Sharing the plight of the beleaguered defenders of the L Company C.P. was Major Wood, who had gone forward during the earlier development of the attack.)

Another "battle of the C.P." developed in Company K. German soldiers had come through the opening in L Company and moved through the woods all the way to K Company’s C.P. without encountering any of that company’s front line troops. Lt. Edward Kennedy of Pennsylvania, company executive officer, quickly organized his few headquarters men for the defense; he manned a machine gun mounted on a jeep. The firepower was enough to stop the enemy, and then Kennedy had the jeep move down the forest road while he continued to fire. But a sudden rocket from an enemy "Bazooka" demolished the jeep and killed the driver and seriously wounded the other occupants. But the command post had been saved.

There still was a danger to the right, however. The enemy was making another attack against the 320th Infantry, and was threatening the right flank of Company K even while its command post was being attacked from the left. When a machine gun opened fire on the guns of the regimental anti-tank platoon which was protecting that flank, Lieutenant Lyle Reishus, platoon leader, made his way forward and destroyed the enemy crew with two hand grenades. Then he discovered a group of about 30 enemy infantrymen approaching Company K’s exposed right flank. He hurried back to his platoon and organized an effective defense line to protect the flank and rear of Company K and his own guns and equipment.

The situation was under control at K Company by 1430, and now Company A moved up the ravine to join Company I in the counterattack to repel the enemy from the position and restore the line. Lt. Hum, now commanding Company A, was wounded, much to his disgust, early in the encounter. Persistent efforts, however, were effective, and by evening most of the Germans had been driven from the woods.

Now during this action the regimental commander and his S-3 were called to a meeting at the command post of the 320th Infantry. There, crowding in the old French house, were no less than six general officers - the corps commander, the Third Army chief of staff, the 6th Armored Division commander, the commander, assistant commander and the artillery commander of the 35th Division; four full colonels - the division chief of staff and the three regimental commanders; and numerous lieutenant colonels and majors, subordinate staff officers. Shortly after the conference met a large caliber artillery shell burst in the yard just outside a big window. It was almost a million-dollar shell! Actually, one man was killed, several drivers and others were wounded, most of the jeeps parked outside were destroyed, at least partially - nearly all the tires were flat. And the conference adjourned to the basement.

The conference was for consideration of the problems growing out of the weakening of the position of the 137th Infantry, and now the threat to the 134th. The decision called for the abandonment of the Gremecey Forest area and withdrawal behind the Seille River. A regimental order was prepared and issued for withdrawal - the first such order in the Regiment. It called for movement to the rear during the night, with covering forces - one platoon in each battalion - to remain until 0300. However, just as the battalions were beginning their reconnaissance, a telephone message came, just an hour and a half after the order had been issued, announcing that the order had been rescinded. (The Third Army commander, on learning of the proposed withdrawal, is reported to have said, "Withdraw hell, we’ll attack!) At 2320 the commander of Combat Command A of the 6th Armored Division reported to Regimental Headquarters with his plan of attack.

Already the keeper of the 3rd Battalion Journal had noted:

2230 - Tanks start moving into assembly area near C.P, Thank God!

With enthusiasm and belligerency, leaders of the three task forces assembled their unit commanders in the 3rd Battalion’s C.P. and issued orders and coordinated plans.

The vigorous, positive action of the armored counterattack in its sweep through the left end of the Foret de Gremecey and then through the towns on the ridgeline in front succeeded in discouraging further ambitions of reconquest on the part of the Germans in the area.

It was not that German activity ceased, but it seemed to assume more of a defensive attitude. During the days which followed there was almost continuous artillery firing, work toward the improvement of positions, and patrols. In addition to fire on observed targets - or on specific areas where activity could be heard - there were nightly TOT’s (time on target) on such favorite targets as Fossieux, Malaucourt, Jallaucourt, Fresnes, and LaJuree Woods by corps and division artillery. In addition there were frequent air strikes - usually by P-47 Thunderbolts - and the 81mm mortars of the heavy weapons companies (D, H, M), as well as supporting 4.2-inch chemical mortars, joining in to the extent that their ammunition ration would permit. Seeking a greater stability in communications, the communications platoons laid heavy German cable to the companies for telephone lines. Nearly every night two patrols went out from each battalion - most of the time they were led by officers - to reconnoiter near the enemy positions. They were patrols like that from Company B, led by 2nd Lieutenant Alvin S. Reed of Ohio, which stole into Fossieux late on the night of 1 October; there, coming upon three enemy soldiers, they quickly grabbed them and gagged them before they cried out; information from the prisoners as well as observations in the town proved invaluable in the operations a few days later.

With the defensive positions in the Foret de Gremecey once more secure, there was little to fear on the right. The regimental left, however, left something to be desired as far as the position was concerned. There was the thought that the position would be more secure if the line could be pushed forward, in coordination with the 80th Division, in order to eliminate the unfavorable characteristics of a salient. Plans for such a coordinated attack were laid 6 October, and the regimental order was issued the following afternoon for an attack at 0615 on 8 October. It was to be a blow carrying sufficient weight to force a decision. Attached to the Regiment were the 3rd Battalion, 137th Infantry; 737th Tank Battalion, and Company B, 86th Chemical Company (4.2 inch mortars); in direct support: 161st Field Artillery (reinforced), Company A, 654th TD Battalion; and Companies A and B; 60th Engineer Battalion. In addition, Combat Command B of the 6th Armored Division was to participate in the attack, and units of the 80th Division would be attacking at the same time on the left. Regimental objectives were Fossieux and Arraye-et-Han. The plan called for the 3rd Battalion, with the support of the 737th Tank Battalion, to make the main effort on Fossieux. And once more Company F was called upon for a special mission - this time to go with a task force of the 6th Armored Division to capture and secure Arraye-et-Han.

Infantrymen of the 137th’s 3rd Battalion mounted tanks at 0600 and the attack jumped off on time. There still was darkness, however, and fog reduced visibility to zero. This persisted to such an extent that there was no need for the 4.2-inch mortars to lay smoke. The poor visibility - not to mention enemy resistance - delayed the progress somewhat, but at 0940 the infantrymen dismounted from the tanks while the latter "shot up the town," and then the doughboys fought their way into Fossieux shortly after noon. Already armored units had moved into Arraye-et-Han, and Company F was mopping up; a patrol to Ajoncourt found that town also to be clear. A prisoner bag of over 200 was evidence of the effectiveness of the day’s operations.

Late that afternoon the 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion, 137th Infantry, and the later withdrew to an assembly position. Early the next morning (9 October), the Germans, apparently never knowing when they were beaten, drove back into Fossieux with tanks and infantry of their own. Reports of air activity and of enemy columns to the north indicated that the enemy still might be able to assemble a decisive force in this area. It was a costly, nerve-racking, daylong struggle. Tank destroyers were able to knock out several enemy tanks, but they were not able to deny entrance to Fossieux, and before noon the enemy had regained most of the town. But there was no disposition on the part of the 1st Battalion to let matters rest there. Colonel Boatsman directed the companies back into the attack, and by nightfall the battalion was in possession of half the town. While mopping up operations, with the assistance of the 3rd Battalion, 137th continued the next day, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to assemble at Manhoue as regimental reserve.

The attached infantry battalion returned to its own regiment on 11 October, though the 1st Battalion still was involved in mopping up around Fossieux. At last, however, that battalion too was relieved - and glad to be free from Fossieux, which had been a headache for it ever since arrival in the area - and the 2nd Battalion returned to the line while the 1st went to Manhoue as reserve.

Apparently the Germans had interpreted the attack against Fossieux as the opening of a general offensive and the beginning of a break-through. It seems that some tanks of the 11th Panzer Division, en route from Strassbourg to Dieuze, were hurried up to Fossieux to lead the counterattack.

With the whole situation now pretty well stabilized, the division undertook a policy of rotating the regiments, holding one out in reserve. The 137th Infantry relieved the 134th on 15 October, and Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Brin-sur-Seille. The 3rd Battalion moved to Gremecey where it would be immediately available for counterattack, and it maintained one company in position of the ridge immediately east of Gremecey to lend depth to the position of the 320th Infantry.

Somber fall weather, with frequent drizzles and perpetual soupy mud had prevailed most of the time since the arrival in this general area, but now a great proportion of the troops could take advantage of the shelter of abandoned French villages and they could give some attention to other activities than the basic problem of keeping alive and defending their positions. There were movies for all troops . . . shower baths . . . passes to Nancy . . . the ceremony in Nancy honoring the regimental commander and the 134th Infantry for the liberation of the city . . . conferences on tank-infantry cooperation . . . Marlene Dietrich’s show (and her admonition to the grizzled veterans to kindly remove their steel helmets before applying a kiss) . . . Bing Crosby’s appearance . . . Red Cross clubmobiles, with coffee and doughnuts, and jazz records - and American girls . . . and then, the height of escape from warfare, quotas, 40 men and four officers, for passes to Paris.

There were awards and promotions and battlefield commissions. Already Major Wood of the 3rd Battalion had been advanced to lieutenant colonel. First Sergeant Cecil Foster of Cannon Company, First Sergeant Joseph Piets of Anti-Tank Company, and Technical Sergeant Thomas E. Higley (Omaha), of G Company, were appointed second lieutenants.

There had been a great deal of dependence on the part of German soldiers upon the promised appearance of a new secret weapon which might turn the tide of the war in their favor. But now many were becoming skeptical of any such weapons. One of those taken prisoner in the Gremecey Forest area told a joke which was making the rounds in the German lines:

"Hans meets his friend Fritz who is carrying a large suitcase. Hans asks: "Fritz, what do you carry in the suitcase?" Fritz replies: ‘Shhh, the new secret weapon.’ Then Hans opens the suitcase and says: ‘There is nothing but straw and hay in there.’ And Fritz replies: ‘That’s for the asses who still believe in the secret weapon."

Now too was an opportunity to check clothing and equipment, and in supplying those necessities of life and of combat, Major Marton and the supply services of Service Company found little more time on their hands than before. They had set up a weapons repair shop in order to save the evacuation of a large number of weapons. There was the task of battlefield salvage, of coordinating the issue of rations - hot meals or K rations, or C, or 10-in-1 rations, depending upon the tactical situation. There was the problem of checking replacements and correcting shortages of equipment, and of handling the pass details and shower details. The job was done in a way to maintain the high morale of the men and the effectiveness of the Regiment.

The 1st Battalion’s difficult mission completed around Fossieux, and reorganization completed, it now was possible to bring Lt. Col. Boatsman, senior battalion commander, back to Regiment to take up his duties as regimental executive officer. Major Dan E. Craig, previously S-3, and, since the evacuation of Colonel Sheppard, acting executive officer took command of the 1st Battalion.

At last the long siege of warfare had caught up with Captain Francis Mason of Company B. The "iron man" of the company commanders, Mason had defied the law of averages longer than any of the others - he was the last of the original company commanders to leave, and then no single wound had done it. And the quality of his performance had matched his endurance. The company commander is a key figure in any operation, and upon him focused all the pressures from above and below. He is responsible for the training, the supply, and the tactical employment of his company as well as for the welfare of his men - administrator, logician, father confessor, and tactician he must be. While others sleep he must report to battalion for late orders, and then make plans and issue orders of his own; always he must check his dispositions, his security; he must concern himself with the distribution of rations, the ordering of dry socks and radio batteries. Regimental and battalion commanders have staffs to assist in those details, but all of them - adjutants, intelligence officers, operations officers, supply officers, and all the others had to deal with the company commander. His, in other words, was the ultimate responsibility. Commanders of the caliber and endurance of Mason were a tremendous advantage in any regiment.

On 24 October, there was another shift of position, and the 134th Infantry relieved the 320th in the right sector of the division. Once again it was necessary to have all three battalions on the line in order to begin to cover the frontage. Now the Regiment faced generally east, and right to left it was the 3rd Battalion, with companies in Moncel, Chambrey, and Bois de Chambrey (an appendage of the Foret de Gremecey); then, the 2nd Battalion, along the edge of the forest; and the 1st Battalion, extending around to the regimental boundary opposite Fresnes. Now the 137th was on the left, and on the right arrived the 26th (Yankee) Division. The Regimental C.P. was set up at Attiloncourt. Again there was some enemy shelling - and the inevitable casualties (the Regiment had suffered over 300 casualties in this area) - but the sector remained a relatively quiet one. Patrols were active again every night - now patrol missions were being handled by special groups of men chosen for that type of duty and relieved form all other responsibilities. There were further conferences on tank-infantry cooperation; there was a stirring address by General Patton before company commanders and field grade officers (except executive officers who had to remain in charge of the units).

The Third Army commander made it clear that resumption of the general offensive was not far away, and in fact, such an order did come on 5 November - the Third Army was to move forward toward Germany on 8 November.

Major Roecker returned to the Regiment the next day, and he did so at a very opportune moment. He now could take command of his old 2nd Battalion again as Colonel Walker went to the 320th Infantry to take command of its 1st Battalion, whose commander, Major William G. Gillis, had been killed.

The C.P. moved to Pettoncourt. At 0600 on 9 November the 137th and the 320th Infantry jumped off.

List of Illustrations:

Daily the mud grows deeper

Men catch some sleep after attack around Fossieux

The personnel section remained at Nancy

Field officers in the field: (kneeling, left to right) Maj. McDannel (2nd Bn.), Maj. Weyand (1st Bn.), Maj. Heffelfiner (3rd Bn); (standing left to right) Maj. Craig (acting exec.), Lt. Col. Boatsman (1st Bn.), C.O., Lt. Col. Walker (2nd Bn.) Lt. Col. Wood (3rd Bn.)

Combat staff at Brin: (left to right) Maj. Godwin (S-2), Maj. Craig (acting exec.), C.O., Capt. Abbott (S-1), Maj. Carroll (S-3), Maj. Morton (S-4)

Some men of 1st Battalion Hq. with their C.O.

Marlene asked that soldiers kindly remove helmets

They could give some attention to other activities

ChapterVIII

Through Lorraine to Germany

When you know Lorraine it seems fitting that it should have given Joan of Arc to France. Today you may still see such peasant girls as she was, straight as young birch trees.

. . . . The villages have changed little since she tended her flocks and the character of the people is much the same as when she went forth from shepherding her flocks to lead an army. From high ground clusters of red roofs break into view on the rich river bottoms and in valleys mottled with woodlands and pastures, but proximity removes some of the charm and picturesqueness as you enter narrow streets where manure is piled in front of the house door.

- Frederick Palmer, American in France, (1918)

The terrain was nowhere kind to a campaign out of season.

- R. C. K. Ensor, A Miniature History of the War, (1945)

Dec. 12 – Third Army troops cross the Blies River into Germany and took Habkirchen, four miles northeast of Sarreguemines.

- The World Almanac, 1945, p. 104.

The attack of the 35th Division on 8 November, 1944, was a part of the resumption of the general offensive by the whole Third Army. Initially it was the 137th and the 320th in the assault, but there were no illusions in the 134th Infantry concerning any long duration of its status in reserve. Indeed commitment of this Regiment in the attack came the very next day. After an alert for movement at 0900, the order for the attack came within the next hour. With the 3rd Battalion attacking on the right, and the 2nd on the left (the 1st remaining in reserve), the objective was Coutures and the high ground to the north of that village.

Jumping off from Chambrey and the Bois de Chambrey with heave machine gun support, the 3rd Battalion moved northeast across the open valley and into the Bois de la Marchande with no active opposition, though it did find it necessary to proceed with utmost caution through treacherous mines – one man of Company I was killed when he stepped on a mine. The 2nd Battalion likewise was able to move east from its area in the northeast corner of the Foret de Gremecey without active opposition. There was some hostile fire against the 2nd Battalion late in the afternoon, but both battalions reached their objectives before nightfall.

Only mines blocked the way as the 2nd Battalion, with the 3rd following now, continued to the northeast the next day (10 November), through Amelecourt and to a position midway between Amelecourt and Gerbecourt. Now the pattern changed somewhat as the whole column – including the 3rd Battalion which was following on the wooded ridgeline near the edge of the Foret de Chateau Salins – came under artillery fire. A small arms fire fight soon developed along the 2nd Battalion’s front. It was of sufficient magnitude to warrant the commitment of the 3rd Battalion on the left at 1530, and at 1800 the two battalions, after an advance of 700 yards, were consolidating their positions for the night.

There was the breath of winter in the cold, damp air that afternoon, and buildings began to become more and more of a premium as adjutants sought shelter for their command posts. Announcement that a desirable town had been cleared had the effect of a break in the dam before a swollen river. Immediately a stream of vehicles – mostly jeeps – would start pouring down the road, and, in such a situation as this when there was but a single town in the immediate regimental zone, the three battalion adjutants – Captains Donald Krebsbach of the 1st Battalion, Amato Pescosolido of the 2nd, and O. H. Bruce of the 3rd – would hurry in to stake their claims. But this time Captain Abbott of Regimental Headquarters was there too, and that evening the town of Amelecourt found itself burdened with all three battalion C.P.’s plus the regimental C.P.! They were dispersed within the town as well as could be, but there was a rather attractive concentration of vehicles and installations here, and it came under heavy German shelling that afternoon and night. Fortunately, damage was light.

Armistice Day found the 35th Division fighting in Lorraine not far from where it had been on 11 November, 1918, but there was little thought of terminating hostilities now as the men of the 134th Infantry moved forward to renew them. The assault battalions continued to the northeast, the 2nd meeting the responsibility of clearing the towns in the valley while the 3rd concentrated its attention on the ridge to the left. It took only an hour for the former to get into Gorbecourt, but soon thereafter both battalions slowed in the face of enemy resistance. That resistance included some tanks in the zone of the 3rd Battalion. Though American doctrine had taught that tanks are not defensive weapons, a doughboy usually considered them rather formidable obstacles whenever he found himself confronted with one. There really was little that he could do about it, unless he could get within close range. Neither could he depend upon supporting weapons: tank destroyers, with their light armor, could be used only on the defensive or in covered positions; Sherman tanks, with only a 75mm gun, were not supposed to be used to fight tanks; artillery usually was ineffective, unless a chance direct hit could be obtained with a large caliber gun; therefore, it was for the doughboy, armored with an O.D. shirt, and armed with rifle, rockets, and grenades, to attack defending tanks. This is precisely what Lieutenant Bartholomew J. Hanusovsky of Connecticut, and his platoon of Company I proceeded to do. They stalked an enemy tank until the platoon leader was within 10 yards, and then he hurled a grenade into the open turret. This touched off an explosion which demolished the German tank, but, in doing so, it eliminated from action almost the whole platoon; Lieutenant Hanusovsky was killed, and so was Sergeant Laurie J. Griffin of North Carolina; and Staff Sergeant Albert M. Antone of Michigan, and Sergeant William L. Zais of West Virginia, were severely injured.

Though the hour was growing late, and darkness was approaching, it seemed important then to exploit the advantage which had been gained, and the 3rd Battalion was ordered to renew its attack to capture the dominating hill in its zone. It was not an easy task, but Company I – whose commander had been wounded again – and Company K drove for the hill in the complete darkness which had overtaken them. Rifle shots as signals and directions by radio were necessary to get them together and to bring Company L and a machine gun platoon up with the supplies – that task of getting radio batteries, and dry socks, and rations, and water, and ammunition to the companies over narrow, muddy trails through woods and up hills in a blackness whose completeness was unchallenged, required most of the night.

Yet, there was evidence that the added effort had paid dividends, for when the battalion jumped off the next morning (12 November), they discovered scores of German dead and all kinds of enemy equipment (and the enemy always was particular about picking up his dead when it was possible). And there were no other Germans there to man the defenses, and once more the battalions marched forward without opposition.

Now, for the first time since the jump off from the Gremecey Forest and since Major Craig had assumed command, the 1st Battalion entered the attack. At 1100 it followed a heavy artillery preparation into Vaxy, just to the right of the 2nd Battalion, and about a kilometer to the northeast of Gerbecourt. The 2nd Battalion was through Vannecourt before noon, and the 3rd, keeping abreast on the left, broke out of the northeast tip of the Foret de Chateau Salins. The 3rd, spreading out to an open formation, continued to move along the ridge as the 2nd Battalion pushed through Dalhain, and, at 1700, occupied Bellange. It was an advance of five miles for the day, and, up to this point, the only signs of the enemy had been signs of his withdrawal. At day’s end, however, those signs gave way to indications of an active defense as heavy shells began to fall on the positions of the troops and in the towns of Vannecourt, where the Regimental C.P. was located, and in Dalhain, where the battalions had their command posts.

November 13 was a day to be remembered in the 3rd Battalion as "Blue Monday" on Red Hill; in the 2nd Battalion it would never be forgotten for one of the greatest battles in that unit’s operations – Achain; and the 1st Battalion found it memorable for its difficult attack against Pevange.

Cold, damp weather had prevailed almost continuously since the opening of the offensive, but there was an even more noticeable chill in the wind this evening, and infantrymen sought protection, not only from the enemy’s fire, but from the weather’s blast as well. The season’s first snow blanketed the whole landscape in its full whiteness as a gray dawn broke and men of the 134th prepared to move toward objectives which loomed more formidable than any they had encountered all week.

Rougemont, or Red Hill, was a high, dominating terrain feature whose capture seemed to be the key to the whole situation. There was some brush on its slopes, but the top largely was bald. One platoon of Company L had taken a forward position on a small hill which rose on the left as part of the same ridgeline of which the big hill was also a part. That platoon’s diversionary fire apparently directed German attention in that direction while the remainder of Company L and Company K moved forward over what should have been the more difficult approach – down across an intervening, open valley, and then up. But leading riflemen were on the hill half an hour after the jump off. As they did so, however, intense mortar and small arms fire descended upon the battalion. Mortar shells left their dingy marks on the contrasting white snow, and they formed a pattern to show the effectiveness of the barrage. Casualties began to mount. They mounted higher as the companies paused on the hill to await further orders; the commanders knew that they were to follow the easterly change in direction of the ridgeline, but now there was some word that the 4th Armored Division, which had been operating in the division’s zone of action, might send a unit across the front of the 3rd Battalion and into Achain. Actually, armored units did appear on the highway which ran along the ridge on the 3rd Battalion’s left, but there they waited. Captain Greenlief was meeting with his platoon leaders of L Company to point out directions for continuation of the attack when a shell burst near the group and scattered to hit every member. Greenlief refused evacuation, but the others had to give up; platoon sergeants took command of their platoons, and men of Company L renewed their vicious assaults. Some four machine guns had been concentrating on the 3rd Platoon, and, in doing so, had killed one of the automatic riflemen; Staff Sergeant Eddy Teply of Nebraska, the platoon guide, picked up the B.A.R., and fired it as he rushed toward the source of the heavy fire. He was wounded as he approached, but he was to put two of the guns out of action. When enemy shells caught members of L Company’s mortar section, two one-man squads appeared – Privates First Class Wayne Fleener of Indiana, and William O. Halfner of New York each carried his squad’s mortar and base plate forward, set it up, and resumed firing.

Men were falling in the snow, and blood from their wounds was turning Rougemont truly into a red hill. After the initial rapid movement the situation had grown more difficult, and fighting continued the rest of the morning with little advance to show for it. Lt. Col. Warren C. Wood had been following closely behind Company L, and now, with members of his command group, he hurried forward to see what could be done toward getting the advance underway again. But as he walked over the snow-covered hill a shell from an enemy tank gun burst in the group. Colonel Wood was wounded very painfully; Captain Ruby, the heavy weapons commander, was wounded, and Sergeant Robert J. Field, his radio operator, was killed; Captain Jack Hunt, the artillery liaison officer was wounded. For the third time the 3rd Battalion’s command group had been hit; for the third time it had lost its commander and the artillery liaison officer and some of their assistants. Major Harlan B. Heffelfinger, executive officer, immediately left the battalion C.P. to take command of the 3rd Battalion on Rougemont. Actually the enemy resistance had just about been broken in the 3rd Battalion’s zone, and Major Heffelfinger directed its advance to a position a thousand yards beyond – an orchard northeast of Achain.

At 0930 the 1st Battalion had been altered to prepare to attack in the right of the regimental zone. An hour later that battalion, with tanks of the 737th Tank Battalion, attacked with Pevange, a village about 8,000 yards northeast of its assembly position at Vannecourt, as the objective. Division had reported that Haboudange, a town near the right boundary of the regimental zone midway between Vannecourt and Pevange was "occupied by friendly troops." This report was discounted with some emphasis, however, as the 1st Battalion came under fire from that very place on attempting to by-pass it to go directly toward the main objective. But this enemy position on the right flank had to be eliminated before the attack could proceed. That accomplished – with 50 prisoners taken – the 1st Battalion moved on to Pevange, and, after another brisk fire fight, could announce that town cleared before 1400. Then while C Company secured the town, B Company moved out to secure the ground to the northeast and A Company occupied Hill 260 on the left. Even then the battalion pushed on the Hill 273 before calling it a day.

Meanwhile, Major Roecker’s 2nd Battalion, attacking through the valley toward Achain, had been having reassuring successes at first. Indeed, it appeared to the 2nd Battalion commander that Achain had about been taken by shortly after noon. Then, however, resistance suddenly stiffened, and it began to appear that the enemy intended to hold to Achain at all costs. The companies deployed to approach the town on a broad front and envelop the flanks. Machine gun fire halted much of Company E, but men like Privates Clyde Smith of West Virginia, and William J. Mohr of New Jersey, who moved out ahead of their platoons to throw grenades which destroyed a machine gun and its crew, fought back with determination, and the company closed in. Company F was advancing through an orchard near Achain. Lieutenant Frank D. Derouin of Louisiana, leader of one of the leading platoons, was wounded by rifle fire, but he kept going, and, more than that, he kept his platoon going. But the firing continued, and he was hit twice more. This time, he fell mortally wounded, but, with his last breaths, he was calling to the platoon to keep moving.

Abreast of Company F on the outskirts of Achain was Company G, and that company was finding the fighting as difficult as were the others. Again German defenders had established themselves in an orchard, and their intense and accurate small arms fire was a definite deterrence for men trying to reach the town. At this point Pfc. J. B. Isbell of Tennessee, already holder of the Silver Star, entered the picture. He entered the orchard alone, and immediately obtained such a fire superiority that three Germans were killed and he emerged with seven prisoners. Staff Sergeant Junior J. Spurrier of West Virginia, meanwhile, appeared to be growing impatient with the whole thing. Nominally assigned to the command of the squad, Spurrier agreed with Caesar that it was easier to do it himself than to keep track of a whole squad. Now the 2nd Battalion had been attacking from the south toward Achain, and Company G, on the right, was moving around to come into the town from the east. Spurrier, however, left to his own devices (he already had earned the appellation "Task Force Spurrier" for his action in the attacks east of Nancy), elected to confound the enemy with a simultaneous entry from the west. He descended upon an enemy outpost with overwhelming suddenness, and two of his adversaries fell before the fire from his Garand rifle while the other fled. Much to his satisfaction, he found the streets alive with Germans. Now he pressed into service other weapons, from his own collection, from wounded enemy, or fallen comrades. A Browning automatic rifle was his principal weapon for the attack against the first strong point; his effective fire killed three more Germans here. Then he completed that particular phase by picking up a bazooka and firing rockets into the house to set it on fire. This brought out a captain, who was the garrison commander, a lieutenant, and 14 enlisted men. By this time other men of Company G were fighting their way through the streets, and Spurrier marched his prisoners down to turn them over to the company, and then he returned to his own sector to resume his house-cleaning activities. Another burst from his automatic rifle brought down another pair of Germans, but then he found himself under fire from a group of Germans in another building – and he was out of ammunition. Fortunately, the Germans themselves had provided for this shortage, for Spurrier’s eyes fell on a good German grenade in the street. He picked it up and threw it into the window of the house to kill four more Germans and eliminate that particular danger spot. By this time two-thirds of the town was in the hands of the 2nd Battalion, but darkness came and the strenuous fighting continued through most of the night. Defense was organized to hold the part already taken, and Sergeant Spurrier had charge of one of the outposts. Making the rounds of the positions, he heard Germans talking in a barn. He stole up and set fire to some hay and oil at one corner of the barn. The occupants came out with their hands up, and Sergeant Spurrier marched another group of prisoners back to the command post. When he returned to the outpost he saw a figure crawling toward a sentry; there was no answer to his challenge, and another accurate shot ended the career of another German. This brought the day’s total up to about 25, and, in addition, he had captured two officers and 18 enlisted men. All this meant the addition of a Congressional Medal of Honor to the plucky sergeant’s collection of decorations.

By morning Achain was clear, and unquestionably Sergeant Spurrier had played a big part in its capture; but it was far from being a one-man performance. All companies of the 2nd Battalion were engaged heavily in the action, and it cost the battalion 106 casualties – including every officer in Company F. Battle casualties in the other battalions ran the day’s total for the Regiment above the 200 mark, and, in addition, there were more than 50 men evacuated as a result of exposure to the cold, wet weather. Men of the 134th took what consolation they could from the knowledge that the enemy had suffered worse casualties – no less than 116 prisoners were taken – and that the weather was as bad for him (though there was some advantage for those who defended from houses while their attackers came out of water-soaked foxholes and across soggy ground toward them).

The snow melted in light rains early the next morning, and once more all three battalions faced an effective enemy in miserable weather. The coldness seemed to grow in its penetration of light rubberized raincoats, or the rain added weight as bulky overcoats absorbed the moisture. Neither of those garments, nor a combination of both, was satisfactory for the fighting man in that weather. (Most preferred to rely on a field jacket and sweaters). Some kind of a coat that would turn both wind and rain was needed, and in fact, that such a coat could be made up was demonstrated in the field coat – of a closely-woven water repellant cloth with a detachable woolen lining – which was available for purchase by officers at post exchanges; yet no such garment had been made available for issue. Another bit of irony was to be found in the absence of satisfactory footwear. An order had come from Division (or higher Headquarters) at the beginning of this attack that no overshoes, (although they had been issued) were to be worn during the operation – soldiers were to travel light so that they could move rapidly. Many soldiers did not like to wear overshoes anyway, but members of the 134th did know that other footgear had been designed that would be more satisfactory; they had used shoepacs – the leather boot with the rubber foot, worn with thick felt insoles and two pair of ski socks – on West Virginia maneuvers.

Many elements of warfare are unpredictable, but one thing should have been certain – that winter weather would be coming around November. It was unfortunate that the supply services had not made provisions for that development. Now feet swelled inside water-soaked G.I. shoes and grew numb; men who followed the advice of higher headquarters to change socks daily and exercise the toes, often found it impossible to get shoes on again, and their loss to the Regiment was just as effective as though a new barrage of "88" shells had descended upon them.

The 3rd Battalion had little trouble in advancing from its position on the ridge (14 November), to Hill 317, which commanded the northwest approaches to Morhange, but the second did encounter strong opposition – one of its supporting T.D.’s was knocked out as it ventured to engage a German tank – as it left Achain to advance on Rode. Most trouble this day came for the 1st Battalion as it moved toward the high ground southwest of Morhange. It even had to make new attacks to complete its control of Hills 260 and 273. (Company C was in the assault on Hill 260 this time.) As in most important advances in difficult situations, there was individual heroism which often meant the difference between success and failure in a local action. Lt. Willard C. Hedge of Nebraska, a C Company platoon leader, crawled forward 60 yards to toss two hand grenades against the enemy machine gun, but he was killed as he tried to get back to his platoon. Another C Company soldier, Pfc. Wilbur C. Pyle defied enemy fire to advance upon a series of foxholes. A bullet knocked his helmet off, but he went on without it, and rushed in to capture three of the enemy before they could either stop him with their fire or get out of their hole. But this was only the beginning. He continued, behind a barrage of his grenades, to a second and third foxhole, took two more prisoners, and then threw a grenade into a fourth foxhole to kill one enemy soldier and capture another. When anther machine gun held up the company’s advance, Staff Sergeant Gilbert T. Wright of Kansas moved out to destroy it with one of his grenades; then he got the crew with his rifle. Enemy forces rallied, however, against Company C. Now Lt. William D. Jardine of Minnesota, and his supporting machine gun platoon of D Company assumed the initiative. An effective use of hand grenades gave an opening, and the machine gunners began moving forward; indeed, they pushed out to a knoll (Hill 257), 150 yards in advance of rifle platoons and went into action. With this advance base of fire, rifle platoons were able to work their way forward, and they picked up 15 prisoners doing so. But then a counterattack developed and forced a withdrawal of some of the troops. The D Company machine gunners, however, held their ground; they kept up their machine gun fire until one gun was destroyed by a direct hit, and the ammunition ran out for the others. Fire from a German tank killed the section leader, Staff Sergeant Delmer C. Belders of Nebraska, and claimed other victims in the platoon. Survivors, nevertheless, now turned to rifles and automatic rifles for their defense, and at last the counterattack was repulsed.

With the 1st Battalion now on the high ground commanding the approaches to Morhange from the southwest, the 3rd Battalion in a similar position to the northwest, and the 2nd Battalion in the valley between, east of Rode, the stage was set for the attack against Morhange itself. (The Regimental C.P. now was at Bellange.) Stretching along a west-east axis of about 3,000 yards, Morhange was very much of a military town. There were military barracks in its east end, and it was an important supply point for the German forces. It had been the scene of one of the first important battles between French and Germans in the opening weeks of World War I, 1914. Now its defense was in the hands of the 11th Panzer Division which was under orders to hold at all costs. In addition, there would be remnants of the 1126th and 1127th Infantry Regiments which had fallen back before the 134th earlier attacks. The 11th Panzer had seen a great deal of action in Russia, and some of its units had arrived in the Morhange area only this week after reorganization and training at Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. In addition, labor battalions were being kept in the barracks of Morhange, and from there workers went out each day to work on anti-tank ditches and other defensive obstacles in the area to the east of the town.

A message from division headquarters earlier had indicated that with the capture of Morhange, the 35th Division was to be "pinched out" (again!) and revert to corps reserve. This made more desirable the early capture of that objective. First step in reducing Morhange itself was an all-night artillery barrage. The Regiment’s supporting 161st Field Artillery (already those artillerymen had won new favor for themselves by reporting the destruction of 14 German batteries during one day) had received instructions to fire 3,000 rounds into Morhange during the night, and other battalions of "Divarty" had similar assignments. In addition, corps artillery – including gigantic 240mm howitzers – joined in the program.

The plan of attack, as it finally evolved, was for the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to go through the town together, while the 1st Battalion remained in position on the high ground to the south. Both battalions ran into some enemy fire as they maneuvered across fresh snow to get into position, but after a fire fight at the edge of the town – including some wicked 20mm fire – resistance disappeared, and both battalions, the 2nd on the right, the 3rd on the left, marched cautiously, but rapidly, through the streets. The 3rd Battalion reached the church . . . it passed the Adolf Hitler Café . . . the Heinrich Himmler Café . . . and soon were pushing toward the eastern outskirts. Here, however, the 3rd Battalion found a new factor introduced into its troubles. The most intensive machine gun barrage that they have ever seen caught the men of that battalion by surprise, and they scattered for cover not knowing whence the fire came or what could be done about it. Actually, it was coming from the left rear, and soon the rhythm of slow-firing machine guns (relatively) became familiar to experienced ears – they were American, and the fire was coming from tanks of the 4th Armored Division which were following along the highway to the left rear, There were no direct communications, but Lieutenant Shields, acting as assistant battalion S-3 at the time, ran into a house, grabbed a white sheet, and, waving this frantically, he ran out to the tanks and had them hold their fire. Afterwards the tanks turned their fire against the enemy at Tie Lorraine – out along the railway, just northeast of Morhange – with such effect that Company L had no further difficulty in reaching that objective. The other units moved out to the railway – the 1st Battalion now had renewed its attack to drive through Racrange, about a mile southeast of the edge of Morhange; the Regimental C.P. and special units moved into the city, and the Regiment was prepared to stay for a while. Companies improved their positions next day, and supply personnel made special efforts to rehabilitate clothing and equipment. Three men of a Service Company salvage crew were killed, and another wounded, when one stepped on a mine in a field west of Achain.

The promised "pinch-out" for the division failed to materialize, but the Regiment did get to remain at Morhange as division reserve when the 137th and the 320th resumed the attack to the northeast three days later (18 November). Now the 6th Armored Division came into this zone, and while the tanks and the other infantry regiments pushed on through Harprich, Vallerange, Virming, Berig-Vintrange, Bertring, Gros-Tenquin, Linstroff, Erstroff, the 134th Infantry awaited further orders at Morhange. The Regiment was placed on one hour’s alert at 1230, on 19 November, but no further order came after that; in fact, no further order came until the 21st. The pause gave an opportunity for the men of the 134th to make good use of the much-sought-after shelter of the town; it permitted the assimilation of newly-arrived replacements into the companies, gave the Red Cross man a chance to function, let Captain Anderson check personnel records, allowed the chaplains to hold church services. It was during this period that a provisional Military Police Platoon, with Captain Lloyd D. Gibson, commanding, was organized in the Regiment.

The order on the 21st was for movement forward to an assembly position at Linstroff. It required a march of about six miles, but the village, a typical Lorraine farm village, had little to offer in the way of protection, and headquarters installations – regimental, battalion, artillery – soon had it overcrowded. This became, then, one of the rare occasions on which the members of the line companies did pitch shelter tents. That same evening tanks of the 6th Armored Division’s Combat Command B, with a battalion of the 137th, took Hellimer.

A new corps order on 22 November, again envisaged the "pinching out" of the division (and of the 26th Division, on the right), after another three-mile advance, and then continuation of the attack by the 80th Division (on the left), and the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions. But the 134th Combat team was to be attached to the 6th Armored Division. At 1500, the 1st and 3rd Battalions began moving toward Hellimer for attachment to C.C.B. The 35th Division’s attached tank battalion (the 737th), was also attached to C.C.B., and now task forces were formed as follows: TF 1 (Kroechell) – 737th Tank Battalion; 1st Battalion, 134th Infantry; Company B, 603rd TD Battalion; 1st Platoon, Company A, 60th Engineers; 1st Platoon, Company A, 25th Engineers (Armored); 1st Section, Battery B, 777th Anti-Aircraft Battalion. TF 2 (Lagrew) – 15th Tank Battalion; 3rd Battalion, 134th Infantry; Company C, 603rd TD Battalion (less one platoon); Company A, 25th Engineers (Armd.). (Less on platoon), two sections, Battery B, 777th Anti-Aircraft Battalion, 128th Field Artillery (Armd.), direct support. TF 3 (Wall) – 50th Armored Infantry Battalion; F Troop, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mezd); 1st Platoon, Company C, 603rd TD Battalion; one section Battery B, 777th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion.

Thanksgiving Day was approaching, and turkey, with all the trimmings, was on the menu. But it was a risk to order turkey dinners in this kind of situation, and the battalion had to make a guess at the most opportune time. The 1st Battalion took advantage of their reserve position, and served the celebrated bird on the 22nd – just before orders came to move into an assembly area. The 3rd Battalion waited a day longer, and was able to beat another order by a slight margin. It made little difference which day was chosen, for cold rain made its attempt to dampen spirits at whatever time was chosen. It was almost a pathetic scene that found men huddling together under a kitchen fly, or in a pup tent, or in an old shed, trying to shield the attractive turkey and giblet gravy and potatoes and cranberry sauce from the rain, and eat it before all the heat of the cooking escaped into the cold mess kits. It was a radical change from K rations, and the grim battle veterans enjoyed it enthusiastically. It almost was a communion feast, in thought, as memories resurrected happy times at home with joyful families. Once it was over, the day seemed more dismal than ever, and Lorraine even farther removed from home.

The turkey eaten, the 3rd Battalion marched out of armor-crowded Hellimer for St. Jean Rohrbach, about four miles up the highway to the northeast, to join Task Force Lagrew. The 1st Battalion, with Task Force Kroechel, moved from Erstroff to Petit Tenquin and prepared to attack toward Hilsprich.

Briefly, the combined infantry-armored attacks were only partially successful. As the first step toward the objective of Puttelange, infantrymen of the 3rd Battalion cleaned out groups of enemy from intervening woods on 24 November, but a deep anti-tank ditch running across the military crest of the ridge as it sloped toward the narrow Maderbach River necessitated bridging operations that night before tanks could enter the next day. That done, the tanks jumped off, but the odds were against them. They had to stay on the road to cross the anti-tank ditch, and as they did so, they came under the effective fire of a long-barreled German tank gun which was firing from a Puttelange cemetery; then, if they deployed off the road, they bogged down in the deep, sticky mud. With this attack stalled, the 3rd Battalion’s Companies I and K turned to the right and moved down to seize Remering. There they met men of the 1st Battalion, and divided the occupation of the town. The 1st Battalion had retaken Hilsprich after a hard fight the day before (the 1st Battalion, 137th previously had won and lost that town), and then continued through a thousand yards of woods, and then debouched from the woods to continue to Remering.

The 2nd Battalion had remained in reserve during these operations, but now it moved to a new assembly position at Hilsprich, (Regimental C.P. moved to St. Jean Rohrbach), and then, at 0900 on 26 November, it attacked southeast to attack Hirbach and Hinsing (on the Maderbach River about three and four kilometers southeast of Remering).

There the situation was to remain for a while, but the 134th was relieved of attachment to the 6th Armored Division. Units of that division executed an orderly relief the night of 28 November, of the Regiment’s units on the line, and the battalions assembled at St. Jean Rohrbach the next day to board trucks – the first truck movement since Nancy – but it was a short move (10 miles), to a group of villages around Lixing-les-Avold. Now, in corps reserve, there were a few days for rest and rehabilitation and some training in the assault of fortified positions (against pillboxes of the Maginot system) and for special schools for aid men and communications men.

On 2 December – such periods always seemed to be far too short – the Regiment returned to the line; in fact, it returned to its old positions around St. Jean Rohrbach and the Maderbach River, a thing which seldom occurred in this combat. Units of the 6th Armored Division relieved in the zone, the Regiment now was on its own for the capture of Puttelange. There was one more important advantage now: there was to be a whole day for reconnaissance; and the battalion and company commanders of the 1st and 2nd Battalions – scheduled to make the assault – made good use of the time with extensive reconnaissance on the ground and in the air (in an artillery liaison plane). Such reconnaissance was of particular importance now, for it was in contemplation of a night attack.

It was 0400 when men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions lined up in the night rain to deliver their surprise for the sleeping Germans. It was a night fit neither for man nor beast to be abroad. There was no artillery preparation, no lights, no whistle signals. Just soft calls of "Come on, let’s go," and then the sloshing of heavy shoes in mud or the scuffing of shoes along the road. But an absence which was more welcome was that of enemy fire. Captain William N. Denny of Missouri, commanding Company C, and Captain John W. Williams of Nebraska, commanding Company A, directed their companies expertly down to the preselected crossing sites, past Maginot Line pillboxes, and went into the town from two directions. The surprise was complete, and the leading companies were nearly through the town before any firing started. Sleepy Nazis found themselves hustled off as prisoners with scarcely time to put on their boots. Major Craig and his command group came under machine gun fire when they tried to go into the town; they were pinned down at one spot for about ten minutes, tried to find another route, were pinned down again, but finally were able to infiltrate past the defenses. As a matter of fact, while A and C Companies continued on to the east, B Company had to do a recleaning of the town. So many Germans – and most of them were members of the 17th Panzer Division – had been by-passed in the darkness that the reserve company took more prisoners than did both of the assault companies. No less than 80 of the Nazis had to be aroused from their sleep; this raised the total bag to 109. At 0600 the 320th Infantry (on the right) reported 200 enemy moving from Puttelange across their front. One man in the 1st Battalion had been killed, but there had not been another casualty. Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion had been meeting with similar good fortune in its attack on the left. Companies F and G, with E following, overran German defenses on the high ground to the north of Puttelange. Enemy forces did attempt a counterattack, but heavy artillery concentrations broke up that threat. After waiting for engineers to complete bridges across the Maderbach, and for supporting tanks and T.D.’s to come up, the leading battalions renewed their attack in the afternoon. It carried the 1st Battalion to Ernestviller (three kilometers northeast of Puttelange), and the 2nd Battalion beyond Hill 287 to Guebenhouse. The 3rd Battalion, in reserve, had moved up to Diffembach at dawn, and now moved into Puttelange.

When men of the 134th took to the roads again the next day (5 December), there was a well-founded hope that the German forces had withdrawn to the Saar River. It was largely an unopposed advance through Woustviller and Roth – here the 3rd Battalion "peeled off" to the right to take Neufgrange – to the outskirts of the important industrial town of Sarreguemines (population: 16,000). Sarreguemines lay astride the Saar River at the point where the Blies met the Saar, and where, according the pre-Hitler reckoning, France met Germany. Here the 2nd Battalion ran into another fire fight, and street fighting continued in the darkness. One platoon, penetrating far into the city, captured an 88mm gun intact, and killed the six members of the crew in the process. That same night, a platoon from Company K patrolled down to Remelfing, on the banks of the Saar about two kilometers Southeast of Sarreguemines, and, finding it clear, occupied it while Captain Jack Campbell took advantage of the darkness to have the remainder of the company steal into that strategic location before daybreak. Already reconnaissance was underway for a river crossing.

There was some street fighting to be done in Sarreguemines the next day. One Platoon of Company G went through its zone alright, but soon it found itself isolated in a building at a considerable distance from other friends. Aware of this situation, the company commander was anxious to make contact with this platoon. Pfc. Melvin K Hoff volunteered to deliver the message. Hoff found his way through fallen brick and plaster and wires to the vicinity of the house. But as he approached it he noticed four German soldiers trying to get in through a side entrance. His reaction was quick; he opened fire in time to get all four – three were killed and one wounded. He delivered his message and returned to the Company.

Plans were afoot to attempt a crossing of the river on 7 December, but orders came the preceding evening to delay operations 24 hours.

Reconnaissance had failed to disclose any very satisfactory crossing sites in Sarreguemines itself, but a Company I patrol had found that one of a pair of railway bridges (they formed a Y in crossing the river midway between Sarreguemines and Remelfing) was passable for foot troops, and an L Company patrol had crossed the river from a point southeast of Remelfing, and found it satisfactory for crossing to Sarreinsming. An attractive possibility suggested itself – perhaps the Regiment could steal across the railway bridge. It would be a gamble to send all three battalions across at that one site, but, should the leading companies arouse opposition, it still would be possible to send the 3rd Battalion up to the other site to cross by boat. The additional day made it possible to complete such plans, and it also was a "field day" for artillery observers hiding with Company K and directing the accurate artillery fire onto German entrenchments hardly 100 yards away on the opposite bank of the river.

At 0500 the next morning, men of the 1st Battalion led out in another stealthy night attack. The 2nd Battalion, coming down from the heart of Sarreguemines, followed, and lastly, came the 3rd Battalion, down the tracks through the Foret de Sarreguemines. All were across by 0655, but then, the German machine gun fire broke out. It caught the last platoon of Company K and Company L, and they were pinned down by fire from a group of buildings to the right of the railway. But the other companies kept going – the 1st and 2nd Battalions, on the northeast, and Company I, with two platoons of Company K close behind, up the river bank to the right, toward Sarreinsming. Lt. George M. Kryder, Jr., of Michigan, twice wounded, had returned to the Regiment in time to take command of Company I at St. Jean Rohrbach. Now he took his troops rapidly through the night, rolling up the flank of the German entrenchments with highly effective left flank protection being furnished by tanks and T.D.’s firing overhead from positions on the hill across the river, moving into Sarreisnming without delay. The company had captured 50 prisoners, but there was no way to evacuate them now, so that Kryder set up his own PW cage, established an aid station to care for the wounded, and assembled civilians in one section of the town so that they could not interfere with operations, and so that they could be screened.

The 1st Battalion also was involved in difficult fighting as it attempted to get a settlement called Stembach. The 2nd Battalion had forged ahead on the left, but then Colonel Roecker held up to await development in the 1st Battalion’s engagement. It was well that he made that decision, because a counterattack was forming. Counterattack always is the big danger after a river-crossing, but here it would be a particularly precarious situation as long as there was no bridge to bring across armored units and anti-tank guns and the support of the three battalions of foot troops. The counterattack came that afternoon against the 2nd Battalion. Eight tanks supported the German infantrymen. Perhaps it was fortunate that the division chief of staff arrived at the Regimental C.P. just after the 2nd Battalion reported the counterattack; immediately he called to arrange for the concentrations of nine battalions of artillery against the danger spot, and a few minutes later he called for an air strike. At any rate, artillery did answer the call of the 2nd Battalion observers in a tremendous volume, and the Germans soon were scurrying back. A timely air strike arrived to complete the breakup of the enemy concentrations.

It was late that afternoon before L Company was able to break loose and move into Sarreinsming, and the 1st Battalion was able to move forward. Late that evening a six man patrol from the 2nd Battalion went down to the left front to investigate the town of Neunkirch. Wary of moving too freely through enemy-held territory, the men stopped at a house near the edge of the village to seek information from the civilian inhabitant. He seemed to be cooperative enough as he invited them in. Too late, they realized that they had been led into a trap. German soldiers appeared suddenly. The Americans darted for the exit; three got away, but the others were caught. These three lucky ones then started back along the dark, strange road toward their own battalions. But again, there was trouble when they ran into a large enemy outpost. Rifle fire hit one of them, but finally the two survivors got back to the battalion just before midnight. Half an hour later the first three men returned – only the man who was hit was missing.

Company E lost another commander when Captain Byron T. Blackburn of Nebraska, died in an artillery barrage near the Saar River. Barney Blackburn had joined the Regiment as an enlisted man, and had left Company M’s Mortar Platoon to take command of E Company in time to lead some of the attacks east of Nancy. He was sold on his new command. He was sure that his company was the best in the Regiment. "They’ll go anywhere," he had remarked once. "All I have to do is get out in front and say ‘come on.’"

Battalions expanded their bridgeheads the next day, and bridging operations proceeded under a screen (but intense artillery fire just the same) laid by the 81st Chemical Smoke Generating Company. Engineers were able to get a treadway across the first of the obstacles – here again, there was a canal parallel to the river – but the accurate artillery fire on the major bridge site – engineers were putting in a bailey bridge over a destroyed span of the old bridge at Sarreinsming – delayed operations there. Pending the completion of that bridge, the engineers built two infantry support rafts in order to get the needed support weapons across the river. They would not float a T.D., however, and there was even some difficulty with one’s carrying and anti-tank gun. Technical Sergeant George L. Frank of North Dakota, Anti-Tank Company platoon sergeant, went down to get a 57mm gun and its 1 ½-ton truck prime mover across the river to the 3rd Battalion’s position around Sarreinsming. The men took the truck and the gun aboard the hastily-constructed power-driven raft. An artillery barrage greeted the raft as it pushed out into the river. The motors failed. Shell fragments tore through the structure. Sergeant Frank had his men bailing water furiously with their helmets, but the thing was sinking. It ran aground on a bar, and it began to be only a question of whether the artillery or the river waters would deliver the coup de grace. Frank jumped into the stream to test its depth. Finding it possible to stand, he called the others into the water. It took 40 minutes of vigorous pushing and pulling to land the craft, and then the crew took their gun through the mud and wire and mines and got it into action.

Late that night the engineers completed their work of assembling the Bailey Bridge, and a tank destroyer rumbled down to push it into position.

The bridge was open to traffic, and tanks and T.D.’s and artillery coming across, the battalions could resume their advance the next day (10 December). They moved through another heavily-wooded area – La Grand Bois, and the 3rd Battalion, on the right, seized the wooded dome-like hill called Bauerwald, while the 1st Battalion took Folpersviller, and the 2nd Battalion occupied another woods to the rear, along the Neukirch highway. Now the leading battalions were within a thousand yards, or less, of the Blies River – and old Germany.

It required a few hours for the 1st Battalion to complete the clearing out of Folpersviller the next morning, but then the 137th Infantry was coming up on the left (after crossing the Saar on the railway bridge and clearing that part of Sarreguemines which lay northeast of the river), and it was possible to get down to the Blies River at Frauenberg without too much further trouble. Troops of the 3rd Battalion drove down out of the Bauerwald and seized Blies Ebersing, a village on the Blies River about two kilometers up stream (southeast) from Frauenberg.

Tentative preparation began for the third river-crossing operation of the week. And this promised to be the most difficult of them all. The enemy emphasized this when he loosed an artillery barrage on Folpersviller that afternoon of 300 rounds in 30 minutes. A telephone message came from division at 1415:

G-2 reports Blies River is swift. Forts on other side of river are well manned. Enemy fire denies observation. Depth of river in zone is over a man’s head.

This would have to be a crossing by assault boat. Captain Mercer of Company A, 60th Engineers, reported that 40 boats and 216 feet of bridge material were available for crossing. Orders went to the 3rd Battalion at 1645 to begin reconnaissance for a crossing site. But the decision, initially, was for the 1st Battalion to make the crossing by assault boat at Frauenberg. Colonel Craig received orders at 2000 "to cross the Blies River by morning and seize Habkirchen." (Habkirchen was a town which extended for a thousand yards along the bank of the river opposite Frauenberg.) The pressure was on to get a foothold in Germany, and it seemed that that might have greater assurance of success if two battalions were to undertake a simultaneous crossing. At 2045, Major Heffelfinger was ordered to be prepared to take the 3rd Battalion across the river at the same time as the 1st, but at a different spot. The plan was to have the two battalions go into Habkirchen from opposite directions – the 1st from the northwest, the 3rd from the southeast – and close a pinchers on it. The 2nd Battalion was to move to Blies Ebersing and cover the crossing by fire.

The 3rd Battalion S-3 was ordered at 2100 to the Regimental C.P. to discuss further details of the plan. But before he arrived, 45 minutes later, there were one or two other developments. The engineers reported that not 40, but 20, assault boats were on the way to Frauenberg; there would be none for the 3rd Battalion. It appeared that this might not be necessary, however, when the S-2 picked up information from civilian sources that the river in the right of the zone was fordable at one point where the water was shallow, the bottom sandy and rocky, the width 15 to 20 meters. After discussing the situation with the 3rd Battalion S-3, and considering the fact that the civilian report was unconfirmed, it seemed desirable to seek whatever expedients might be available to assist this effort. The only possibility seemed to be to make use of the small rubber reconnaissance boats of the engineers; the thought was that ropes might be secured on either end of them, and then teams might pull them back and forth across the stream in a shuttle service. As it turned out, this remained as almost the sole responsibility, because a Company L reconnaissance patrol under Lt. Tom Parris of Georgia, found that the stream definitely was not fordable in the Blies Ebersing area – the patrol got out to a small island, all in complete darkness, of course, but then a man stepped off the other side and went in over his head. They were able to reach German soil by swimming, but it was not a way recommended for assault troops. Major Carroll, Regimental S-3, had called the engineers for the rubber boats – seven were available – and for 1200 feet of rope. Four more boats ultimately were available, and the 3rd Battalion S-2 and S-3 led the Battalion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, with the boats, down through the black night toward Blies Ebersing. A knocked-out T.D. on the highway necessitated a detour, and by the time the group found its way through the blacked-out woods, and down through Folpersviller, and then east toward Blies Ebersing (as far as a destroyed creek bridge), and then the crews struggled with hopelessly tangled ropes, it was becoming a race against daylight – a daylight which would expose the assembled 3rd Battalion to the fire and observation from the hills across the river.

Men of the 1st Battalion, during this time, were forming in Frauenberg for their crossing in engineer assault boats. The sounds of swift waters covered somewhat the sounds of launching the boats, and they pushed out into the stream – Company C was leading – without arousing enemy reaction. But the river itself was problem enough. One of the boats tipped, and it went down; men disappeared beneath the dark, swirling water without a sound. Some of them were able to swim to the bank, but the current and the heavy equipment was too much for the others. The other boats, however, were able to continue, and men of Company C went up the bank and into the first houses of Habkirchen to complete another surprise night attack. By 0730, Company B was across the river, and going into buildings on the left side of Company C. Now, however, German defenders had awakened to the attack, and the crossing site came under fire. Company A then was awaiting the completion of the foot bridge, but heavy artillery fire delayed all bridging operations. This meant that Companies C and B, with supporting machine guns from Company D, were all alone in the enemy village with no immediate means for reinforcement or for supplies. Swift current and daylight had denied a crossing for any part of the 3rd Battalion with the little rubber boats, and those companies had gone back, under fire, to the protection of the buildings of Blies Ebersing – where the 2nd Battalion also now had moved.

Close fighting continued in Habkirchen during the day with little change either way. It was with such leadership as that of Technical Sergeant Cecil G. Eckley of Kansas, a Company B platoon sergeant, who reached a house near the village creek with five men of the light machine gun section, and then remained for nine hours to direct fire and adjust mortar and artillery fire against repeated enemy counterattacks, that the 1st Battalion was able to hold out.

That night the 3rd Battalion marched down the old railway from Blies Ebersing to Folpersviller where it would be available to reinforce the attack against Habkirchen the next day.

At midnight groups of Germans began storming the American-held houses. A rocket from a German bazooka would streak through the window and burst in a blinding flash and jarring explosion; then would come a series of concussion grenades, and then enemy soldiers would dash through the doorway. In this pattern the Germans began reducing the number of houses which were "American occupied." Most of Company B was being "sacked up." Colonel Craig ordered Company A across the river on the footbridge to go to the assistance of B and C, but only a part of that Company was across when the bridge capsized. Those who did arrive on the scene were able to do little to influence the situation. Captain William M. Denny of Missouri, the Company C commander, was in radio contact with B Company, and tried to coordinate the defenses. When a German 88mm gun went into action, Denny advised battalion headquarters that it might not be wise to send more troops under the circumstances, but they were on their way – and the collapsed bridge that reduced the number that arrived anyway. As Germans closed in against the B Company C.P., Denny sent some of his men over to the other building to bolster the defenses there; but they were captured en route. Only Lt. George Melocheck, company executive officer, and a handful of men survived in Company B – the company commander, and all the other officers were gone. They made their was over to the big house where C Company still was holding up. Captain Denny had 21 men left in the house – and 65 German prisoners which had been captured during the preceding day were herded into the basement. It was a slim toe-hold which the Regiment held in Germany.

But the 3rd Battalion was on its way. Alerted as soon as reports of the midnight counterattacks had come, the 3rd, once again in a night of absolute blackness, was filing out of Folpersviller by 0215, and an hour later it was assembled in Frauenberg, ready to cross the river. Now the footbridge still was down, and only ten boats were available. It took another 45 minutes to get these ready and down to the river. Company L led this crossing and was able to reach the opposite bank without difficulties beyond those of the swift current. Company I started across, but machine gun fire began to rake the crossing site while nearly half the company remained yet to cross. The thud and burst of rockets and grenades and streams of colored tracers from machine guns and wild screams announced that another counterattack had come.

There were 60 or 70 Germans coming against the house of C Company. A rocket blazed through one of the windows and the concussion of its burst knocked an automatic rifleman down, but he got up and resumed firing. Acting First Sergeant Dal M. McClara of Nebraska had neither his helmet nor his rifle – he had been in the boat which had overturned, and had been fortunate to escape with his life – but he had picked up a German rifle, and was using it so effectively that he knocked out a German machine gun. Lieutenant Melocheck was at an upstairs widow turning a German M.G. 42 against the enemy with a vengeance. When the assailants closed in shouting "Komm heraus," Melocheck let them have some of their own machine gun fire. They got no farther. A group of nine men were still holding out in a house a short distance forward. The alerted men heard the enemy coming. They watched a group bunch on the road and come closer to the house; they held their fire a little longer, then threw grenades. Germans kept coming; a bazooka round came through the door, and then concussion grenades. All but three of the defenders were knocked out. With hand grenades these killed the first group of Germans who entered, and then ran down into the cellar. But now the house was burning, and Sergeant Granzie Nicholas of Kentucky and the other refugees hurried upstairs and dragged their wounded comrades down to the underground hide-out before the roof fell in. They remained hidden in the basement until the Germans, apparently believing them dead, departed. The heroic stand of Company C and the 2nd Platoon of Company D was recognized later in the Presidential citations.

The 2nd Battalion had moved from Blies Ebersing to Frauenberg in order to follow the 3rd Battalion across the river to Habkirchen, but not all of the 3rd had been able to get across. Some men of the 137th Infantry, six or seven boat loads, had been able to cross, but it was reported that "the enemy is lowering the boom on them." In the face of such devastating enemy fire, all the newly-arrived troops tended to gravitate toward Company C’s house, which was the first good cover. As a result, added numbers were not adding to the strength of the bridgehead, but were complicating the picture by adding to the already overcrowded building.

Fierce fighting continued throughout the day (13 December). Sporadic machine gun and rifle fire marked every movement in the streets, across the lawns, or in the houses. German mortar and artillery fire continued along the river - around the boat crossing site, the footbridge, the old bridge site where engineers hoped to put in their Bailey bridge; and supporting tanks and tank destroyers and anti-tank guns of the 134th Infantry, on the heights across the river, poured highly effective direct cannon fire into the German-held buildings, while artillery ringed the approaches to the town. Men of Companies I and L had been able to gain possession of some additional buildings, but enemy pressure never diminished. Company I lost its commander when Lt. George Krider got a painful back wound. Indeed casualties on both sides mounted to the point that there was an unofficial truce that afternoon while medics, both German and American, worked to evacuate the wounded - Germans even went out of their way to help the wounded enemy.

Engineers were able to get the footbridge back into service that evening, and, under cover of darkness, Company K now went across into Habkirchen. (One platoon of Company I remained in Frauenberg for flank protection.) Still results were indecisive. There was not room in the bridgehead for maneuver, but there were more houses to be defended against German counterattack.

There did remain, however, another possibility for maneuver. That was to send the 2nd Battalion around to the right to cross a bridge in the zone of the 320th Infantry and then swing around to take the high ground east of Habkirchen. It was the long way around, but the 2nd Battalion moved out that night (again under the command of Major Carlyle F. McDannel, for Lt. Col. Roecker had been evacuated for the third time), retrace its steps back up to Blies Ebersing, and continue to the bridge, where it crossed at 0400 (14 December). The battalion was on its objective - on the hill east of Habkirchen - at 0600, and the men dug in for all-around defense. From the German point of view this was a rather embarrassing spot for an enemy battalion. It was athwart the main highway running into Habkirchen from the east. Several German supply people were caught unawares. One truck was knocked out that bore Red Cross markings - but carried a load of mortar ammunition.

There was little gain, however, in Habkirchen itself. Colonel Craig and Major Heffelfinger, who had been coordinating the efforts of their battalions from an O.P. in a riverside building of Fruenberg, went across into Habkirchen to direct the battle from the C Company house. It was another day of close battling, direct fire, house-to-house fighting, indecision. More force on the ground to the rear, and less in the constricted area, seemed yet to recommend itself. Company K was withdrawn from Habkirchen that evening at 1900, and moved on trucks to the site where the 2nd Battalion had crossed earlier that morning; it ascended the hill on the left of that battalion. As the column marched up the hill, a squad of men fell in on the tail. The new squad attracted no particular attention until they could be heard mumbling. They were Germans! Mutual recognition was almost simultaneous. There were one or two wild shots, some were captured, but the other Germans scattered toward the town while the Yanks made for the woods on the hill.

When all battalions renewed the assault at 0800 on 15 December, the battle for Habkirchen was approaching a climax. Engineers reported the Bailey bridge completed at 0845. Tanks and T.D.’s rolled into Habkirchen before 0900, and the immediate battle for the bridgehead was won. Troops of the 1st and 3rd Battalions moved out of their close quarters, crossed the creek which cut through the town, and completed the job of mopping up before afternoon. Almost without pause the 3rd Battalion continued the fight to the high ground to the east where its depleted L and I Companies joined K in a fire fight through the woods. Another 73 prisoners (still mostly from the 17th SS Panzer Division) came into the regimental cage.

With Habkirchen clear, supporting units began pouring into the town early on 16 December. Cannon Company crossed the bridge - now hotter than ever from the artillery fire of a desperate enemy - and went into position, and the company’s celebrated mobile kitchen, "Can-Do," converted from a captured German command post wagon (Lt. Cecil D. Foster’s men had picked it up on Thanksgiving Day), rolled into the town to be the only kitchen of the Regiment to get into Germany at this particular time. Always carrying his reconnaissance close behind the infantrymen, Major Schuster soon was in Habkirchen selecting positions for the batteries of the 161st Field Artillery Battalion.

For the 2nd and 3rd Battalions it was attack through the woods again while the 1st Battalion remained assembled in reserve in Habkirchen. There was another bit of unfortunate tank fire - this time machine gun fire and demoralizing cannon fire in woods from tanks which were supposed to be supporting the 137th Infantry on the left. That corrected, the 3rd Battalion proceeded to join the 2nd in an attack against the Hoch Woods. But now German artillery was becoming more precise and more intense that it ever had been before. The battalions were coming within range of the guns of the Siegfreid Line.

That evening, as the 137th attacked against the rim of hills to the north of Habkirchen, German mortars and machine guns were firing counter-battery against the howitzers of Cannon Company and the 161st Field Artillery!

Its companies down to bare skeletons, the 3rd Battalion finally was relieved on 17 December, by elements of the 137th Infantry, and it went back to reserve at Folpersviller. The 2nd Battalion, now attached to the 137th, remained until the next evening, and then it went back to Habkirchen when the 1st Battalion moved up to its relief.

Casualties during those days were becoming greater, not less, but still the Regiment had to be driven on. None of the battalions had the strength remaining to launch an effective attack. Replacements were arriving, but there was not time for absorbing them into their units; there were not enough leaders in the companies to form a cadre to accept the replacements. Armed with casualty figures and facts of the situation, the regimental commander asked, in the strongest terms, for a long enough relief to permit some reorganization.

This demand received added emphasis the next morning (20 December), when a strong counterattack - infantry and tanks - hit the thinly held positions of the 1st Battalion (then under attachment to the 137th), and forced a 1000-yard withdrawal. Now the 1st Battalion was attached to the 320th Infantry; the 2nd was attached to the 137tth, but remained in Habkirchen.

Finally relief came for the entire Regiment. The 324th Infantry (44th Division, Seventh Army) was taking over the sector. In the nine days of bitter fighting at Habkirchen, the Regiment had taken 521 battle casualties - 37 killed, 244 missing (many of whom actually had been killed) 240 wounded. An additional 129 non-battle casualties brought the total losses for this one local engagement to 640 - about the fighting strength of a full battalion. When this is added to the previous 822 battle casualties - 142 killed, and 680 wounded or injured - it becomes apparent that the fighting through Lorraine - over difficult terrain and in the worse kind of weather - was some of the hardest of the war.

The Regiment moved back to the Puttelange area - the 3rd Battalion went to Louperhouse, the 2nd to Guebenhouse, the 1st to Ernestviller. Efforts at assimilation of the large force of replacements (55 new men arrived on the 18th, 111 on the 20th, 346 on the 22nd) began, but that had not been the principal reason for the relief. A great German counteroffensive had broken through in the Ardennes, and General Patton’s Third Army was being shifted to Belgium and Luxembourg to meet the serious threat. At 0417, an 23 December, the first march unit crossed the I.P. at Puttelange en route to Metz.

List of Illustrations:

"Task Force" Spurrier won the CMH (being presented by General Simpson)

Some were killed in a mine field

Men of Headquarters go to work on Kraut potatoes

Map - III Offensive in the Saar

TD's went into action in Habkirchen

Captain Mason of Company B . . . . he lasted longest

Chapter IX

The Ardennes Bulge

"There were more casualties at Lutrebois"

110th Medical Batallion

Thanks to Mr. Warren S. West, who served with Company A, 110th Medical Battalion for providing the following information: Left to right - Carrying the first litter are Edwin Konkol and Warren Schladenhauffen. Behind them is Squad Leader Ed Milhouse and a "Walking Wounded". Following them carrying the second litter are Henry Desmarais and James Fritsch, followed by Squad Leader, Jack Schwab. Behind Jack is Joe Lvoncek and another Walking Wounded. He can be identified by the white "EMT" tag hanging from his overcoat. EMT stands for "Emergency Medical Treatment". The purpose of the EMT tag is to let anyone treating the wounded later what has already been done for them. The Infantry Regimental Combat Team was comprised of the three battalions of Infantry, which made up the 134th Infantry Regiment. Assigned to the Infantry were one battalion of Field Artillery, one company of Combat Engineers and one company of Medics, plus other units. My outfit was Company "A", 110th Medical Battalion, of which the medics in the picture were members. Our job was to treat and evacuate the wounded from the front line, and bring them back to the Infantry Battalion Aid Station. The Aid Station was usually a couple of hundred yards behind the front line. Our ambulances waited at the Aid Station to take the wounded back to my outfit (Company A, 110th Medics) the Collecting Company. Here the wounded were given a little more treatment and possibly sent back to the front line. If not, they were sent back to the Division Clearing Station, maybe 15 miles behind the lines for much more complete care. This was a small hospital. The men in the picture were evacuating the wounded from a large stone barn (out of sight at the right side of the picture). This was the Infantry Company Command Post where they had been taken from the front line. They were being taken back a couple of hundred yards to the Infantry Battalion Aid Station where the ambulances would pick them up. I evacuated wounded along this road many times.

"Oh, if a man should come up an’ ask me, I’d say we got a dum good lickin’."

"Lickin’ - in yer eye! We ain’t licked, sonny. We’re going down here aways, swing aroun’ an’ come in behint ‘em."

"Oh, hush, with your comin’ in behint ‘em. I’ve seen all a that I wanta. Don’t tell me about comin’ in behin t-"

- Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage (1896).

South of Bastogne, as the New Year comes in, there are still the Old Year’s dead, with ice matting their eyelashes, and the burnt tanks softened by the drifting snow.

- Sgt. Saul Levitt, "They Held Bastogne,"

Yank, (British Ed.),

Jan. 28, 1945.

We attacked the woods. Thank God, we are still alive.

- Record of Events,

Morning Report of 4 Jan., 1945,

A company of the 1st Battalion.

Taking advantage of the thinly stretched forces of the four American divisions charged with the defense of the Ardennes sector, the Germans had launched a great counteroffensive on 16 December - at a time when the 134th Infantry still were very much involved at Habkirchen. Field Marshal von Rundstedt’s blow (more accurately, as far as inspiration is concerned, the Hitler-Model offensive) fell with a suddenness and weight which engulfed the unfortunate regiments which found themselves garrisoning the huge frontage as a result of the "calculated risk" of General Eisenhower and General Bradley to permit concentration of forces for attack elsewhere. The German effort had objectives no less than the capture of the great supply center of Liege and the indispensable port of Antwerp. And the momentum of that attack was such that it appeared for a while - particularly to those aquatinted with the situation - that such decisive results would not be long in coming. The situation demanded immediate action. General Eisenhower called the 82nd and 101st Airborne Division out of strategic reserve in the Reims area, and on 18 December they arrived at St. Vith and Bastogne respectively. Other units were hurried across the channel from England. These measures were taken to stabilize the situation. But at the same time the Third Army was to shift its forces to make a counterattack - not latter than 22 December - and this was to be followed by an attack by the forces under Field Marshall Montgomery (all forces north of the penetration, including U.S. Ninth, and most of the First Army were placed under Montgomery’s command, while those forces south of the bulge remained under General Bradley.) The response of the Third Army in moving up to deliver the counterattack was one of the remarkable logistical achievements of the war.

Other divisions had gone ahead of the 35th, but now its turn had come, and the 134th Infantry, following a rather circuitous route because of air attacks which had come against the 137th Infantry’s column, was moving on this bitterly cold morning of 23 December, toward Metz - about 40 miles west of Habkirchen.

Full companies (283 more replacements arrived on the 24th) fell in for formations in the paved courtyards outside big brick barracks and other buildings of the old military post (Casserine Roque), which the Regiment occupied in the fortress city of Metz. Here was an opportunity for the reorganization which the Regiment needed so badly. With tongues in cheek, but anxious to make use of every hour of time, training schedules were prepared and reconnaissance made of ranges for the firing of weapons. There was cause for celebration when word came that no move was expected on Christmas Day, and men gathered Christmas Eve to share Christmas thoughts and spirited escape from their incongruous setting for a Christmas celebration. Many captured fleeting moments of a feeling almost at home; they noticed with appreciation, and a slight inner tingling, the bright moon shining through evergreen trees "Christmassy" in a light snow.

Plans for training gave way to plans for movement when a warning order came at 1300 on Christmas Day to be prepared to move northward early the next morning. Men of the 134th Infantry were grateful for the Christmas holiday in the shelter of the barracks; but there was an apprehensiveness behind their thoughts - for a large percentage of the fighting men this would be their first battle - as their column moved northward through Uchange, Fontey, and on through Arlon to an area north of that attractive Belgian city. Regimental Headquarters went to Metzert, and the battalions found quarters in neighboring villages - the 1st Battalion at Grendel, the 2nd at Post, and the 3rd at Attert. Lt. Col. Frederick C. Roecker, Jr., had returned to take command of the 2nd Battalion, Lt. Col. Dan E. Craig was commanding the 1st, and Major Harlan B. Heffelfinger, the 3rd; Lt. Col. Herman F. Schuster now was commanding the attached 161st Field Artillery Battalion. Here the 35th Division was in reserve for Major General John Millikan’s III Corps. A message came at 2330 that night that elements of the 4th Armored Division had succeeded in making contact with the beleaguered 101st Airborne Division near Assenois (about four kilometers southwest of Bastogne, on a secondary road.)

The next day (27 December), the 35th Division was committed on the right of the 4th Armored Division; but the 134th remained in Division reserve, while the 320th, on the right, and the 137th, on the left, attacked at 0800. The Regiment was under orders to be prepared to attack through the 137th on the 30 minutes’ notice.

True, tanks of the 4th Armored Division have been able to make contact with the Bastogne garrison, but physical contact still could be maintained only by tank; the corridor would remain tenuous until the main Arlon-Bastogne highway could be opened and made secure. This was the highway along which the Regiment had been moving, and the next morning it moved, still by motor, a few miles farther north (to within about 10 miles of Bastogne) - to an assembly area in the vicinity of Warnach.

The 3rd Battalion, with instructions to cooperate closely with the 4th Armored Division, relieved a battalion of the 318th Infantry (80th Division) in a woods north of Sainlez that afternoon. Now Brig. Gen. Ernst, Commanding Combat Command A, suggested that if his tanks were to succeed in driving into Bastogne via the Arlon-Bastogne highway it would be necessary to seize Lutrebois - a town less than five kilometers south of Bastogne and 1500 meters east of the highway - in order to protect the right flank.

This was the immediate task for the 3rd Battalion. With mortars screening the tree-covered heights across the valley to the front (northeast), men of Company L emerged from the wooded hill on the near (southwest) side of the town and swept in to execute a skillful attack in which a German command car was wrecked, and 17 enemy were killed in the street. At the same times Companies I and K moved across the valley to the right and took up positions in a woods just short of a road which entered the far end of Lutrebois from the southeast.

Now the whole Regiment was being committed. The regimental order directed the attack to be made in column of battalions (3 - 1 - 2), and should one become involved in fighting, the next was to by-pass to the left and continue the drive toward the Bastogne area. With the 3rd Battalion so involved at Lutrebois, the 1st Battalion by-passed to the left and drove toward Marvie (three kilometers southeast of Bastogne) to make the first infantry contact with the 101st Airborne Division. Tanks of the CCA, then, were able to fight their way through Remoifosse and enter Bastogne. Now the main highway from the south was open; the immediate question was to keep it so. Lt. Col. Warren C. Wood returned from the hospital that evening, just in time to get back to the 3rd Battalion for its role in the defense.

There was a strong hint that this might be more difficult that the initial action indicated when a platoon of Company L ventured into the woods beyond Lutrebois to seize the high ground. Then, when the whole platoon was into the woods to a depth of about 200 yards, automatic weapons began firing on all sides; even an 88mm gun began sending high velocity shells into the area. It was with considerable difficulty that the platoon was able to get back into the town, where it joined in setting up defenses. Company L’s headquarters group, mortar section, and a supporting platoon of heavy machine guns maintained a position in the woods overlooking Lutrebois in order to lend some depth to the position. Battalion Headquarters shared a shell-torn chateau - located in a natural hollow behind the wooded hill - with a headquarters of an armored infantry battalion whose troops were holding a line along the north edge of the woods.

The enemy struck back in a pre-dawn attack at 0300 (30 December), with some of the best troops remaining at his disposal - elements of the 167th Volksgrenadier Division, the 1st SS Panzer (Adolph Hitler) Division, and the 5th Paratroop Division. (Soon elements of the vaunted Panzer Lehr Division also appeared on the Regiment’s front.) Two battalions of infantry, followed by 40 tanks and additional foot troops attacked in the 3rd Battalion’s sector in a bid to (1) capture a supply dump which they though to be in the vicinity of the chateau; (2) cut the Arlon-Bastogne highway; (3) then swing north to reduce Bastogne itself. That the attack was to be a coordinated, all-out effort was suggested when an aerial bombardment (for the first time since the Normandy invasion the Luftwaffe was in the air to give effective support to the ground forces) hit Bastogne. A call for pre-arranged artillery fires by commanders of Company I (now Captain Lloyd Gibson) and Company K (Captain Campbell) delayed the advance, but could not stop it. But the column avoided that woods which they occupied and moved on along the road to Lutrebois. Here the light machine gun section of Company L held up the whole force, but the determined enemy deployed into three columns, and while one advanced on either side of the town to surround it, the third started to move through the center. Nevertheless men of Company L were able to hold out until the enemy brought up tanks. As enemy lines advanced across the snow toward the woods southwest of Lutrebois, Company M’s well-sited heavy machine guns opened fire with deadly effect. With little rifle protection left to them, members of the platoon held their positions and repelled three successive assaults with heavy losses to the enemy. But as the machine gun positions were entered from the flanks, Lt. William Shapiro, the platoon leader, ordered the guns out of action, and, without the loss of a man or weapon, the platoon withdrew to go to the assistance of the defense of the battalion C.P. (Every one of the 24 members of M Company’s 2nd Platoon which participated in this action was awarded a Bronze Star medal.)

Although isolated now in a area a thousand yards from the nearest friendly unit. Companies I and K remained in their positions where the company commanders had excellent vantage points from which they could direct medium artillery fire on the tanks, and other artillery and mortars (including 4.2-inch mortars of Company D, 3rd Chemical Battalion) on additional groups of infantry forming in the woods to their front and right flank. Then, as enemy tanks deployed over the open ground to the northwest of Lutrebois, supporting tank destroyers (Company C, 654th TD Battalion), as well as tanks and TD’s of CCA, opened fire from their positions near the highway.

Inside Lutrebois, the men of Company L’s 2nd and 3rd Platoons (the 1st Platoon had lost its leader and suffered heavy casualties in the capture of Lutrebois, and its men were divided between the other two), under Lt. Davis and /Sgt. Ralph Van Landingham, were defending themselves in a manner which was becoming typical of American defenses in the battle of the Bulge. Though surrounded they continued to fight back. Small, but hopeful developments nourished their courage. Lt. Davis found himself in radio contact (though he no longer had any kind of contact with his company or battalion) with an unidentified artilleryman who called himself "Bill." Though strange, it was a friendly voice; "Bill" urged Lt. Davis to hold on, and he would help. As a result, the L Company officer was able to direct highly effective artillery fire - often by risking his life to move out in the open where he could get better observation. Soon an artillery liaison plane appeared overhead. Later, in response to urgent calls from the Regiment, relays of P-47 Thunderbolts began zooming down over the enemy. Hope remained until afternoon, but then radio contact with "Bill" was broken, the Piper Cub disappeared, the P-47’s did not return. By this time enemy troops were infiltrating through the southwest (rear) end of town, and their machine guns, covering the creek ravine which cut through the middle of the town, severed the defenses in two sections of the town. Soon the enemy had full control of the southwest section (Lutrebois lay along a single street, with a second street forming a loop near the center, for about a thousand yards across the valley), and other forces began another drive from the woods northeast of the town. Anti-tank mines, laid by engineers the night before, had stopped an earlier tank effort against the town, but now other tanks were accompanying the infantry. Bazooka teams had been down to four rounds of ammunition each when they went into Lutrebois, and that was gone. There was nothing with which to stop the tanks. A tank came alongside the house which Lt. Davis was using for a C.P. A German medic who was their prisoner went out and told the tankmen that there were several Americans in the house. By this time the German infantry and other tanks were overrunning the whole town. A tanker came into the house and told the occupants that a false move would bring destruction to the whole house. The big, ugly gun on his tank was trained directly on them. There were 49 men of Company L taken into the woods whence the counterattack had come. They were lined up, and with a light machine gun at the head and rear of the column, they were marched away to a small town about 5000 yards to the east. There they started their long trips to the prison camps.

Meanwhile, enemy soldiers were continuing through the woods southwest of town toward the battalion C.P. The 2nd Battalion had gone into position on the right of the 134th the preceding day in order to cover the large gap between the Regiment and the 137th, and Company E remained as the only available reserve to throw against the attack. This was done very early, but in the darkness of the woods and the confusion of the situation, that Company was unable to turn the tide. Runners, pioneers, escaped men of Company L, Company M’s headquarters and the returned machine gun platoon, and C.P. personnel formed a cordon around the 3rd Battalion command post, while other headquarters men took positions at windows or war-made loopholes in the ruined chateau. Men of the headquarters of the armored infantry battalion, with a tank and a half-track, joined in the defense. After a heavy barrage from 120mm mortars, Nazis came down the wooded slopes to attack with machine guns, rockets, and rifles. The C.P. defenders replied with a withering machine gun and rifle fire. The 81mm mortars shortened their range to 300 yards to cover the hill; but an enemy machine gun got into position where it could neutralize the mortars until Pfc. Edward Lentz of Indiana, one of the pioneers, stole through the woods to kill the three members of the crew with his M-1 rifle. A German officer and his party made their way into the yard, but they were cut down before they could reach the building. That officer died less than 400 yards short of the highway he was seeking to cut. Medium artillery, tank destroyers, tanks, and rocket-firing aircraft had combined to destroy at least 25 of the enemy’s armored vehicles. Now his infantry attack had been stopped as well.

Companies I and K were brought back across the valley, and , with some difficulty, they built up a defense line between the 51st Armored Infantry, on the left, and the 2nd Battalion, on the right. Indispensable to the defense was the artillery - there was close coordination between the 161st Field Artillery, and its reinforcing fires, and the armored artillery of the 4th Armored Division (which had the advantage of six-gun batteries and ample ammunition). All available artillery in the area joined in a reverberating serenade at midnight, 31 December - 1 January, to welcome the New Year. And their shells were more effective for the first use of the "pozit fuse" ammunition - those shells which contained small radio sets which brought an automatic detonation of the shell when it came within a certain distance of the ground or other solid objects, and so were highly effective even against dig-in positions. In its greatest volume of fire since St. Lo, the 161st alone expended 2,226 rounds of ammunition on 31 December, and 2,895 rounds on 1 January. It delivered 28 TOT’s (time on target - those devastating volleys so calculated that whatever the location of the participating guns, all shells hit the target at the same time) in one day, and the men would mutter to each other, "Hitler, count your men."

Hon, Chinese cook and general assistant to the 3rd Battalion staff, was reported to be preparing pancakes for breakfast that morning - an attractive departure from the K ration diet made possible by some shrewd oriental bartering with a fellow Chinese cook of the 4th Armored Division. Hon was disappointed and impatient when several of the officers failed to appear for breakfast, but he would save the batter until they were not so busy with counterattacks. He was perturbed when he was left alone in the kitchen with all the dirty utensils. He glanced out the window to see what all the commotion was about. Germans were running into the yard! His reaction was immediate. He ran to the table, picked up the precious pancake batter, and threw it out the window. "So damn Krauts won’t get it," he said.

In a bitter four-day struggle Companies I and K fought to regain Lutrebois. It was a struggle characterized by such individual heroism as two newly commissioned second lieutenants of I Company – Lester R. Clark and Walter A. Bomberger of Nebraska. Both were out in front of their platoons to lead them across a stretch of open ground into Lutrebois. Bomberger was killed in action (2 January), and Clark was wounded, but he refused evacuation until he could give battalion headquarters important information about the enemy dispositions. Then there was the action of 2nd Lt. David V. Cunningham of Virginia, a K Company platoon leader, who advanced alone to a fiercely defended house, climbed to the roof, and dropped grenades down the chimney to eliminate the strong point. Captain Jack Campbell was wounded by a mortar shell fragment that afternoon; the law of averages had caught up with the only "original" line company officer who was left. First, a platoon leader in L Company, and then, as commander of K Company, he had served continuously since the jump-off for St. Lo. An "original" who had been wounded at St. Lo, but recently returned, Lt. John Strader, took command of the company.

Companies I and K had regained complete possession of Lutrebois by 4 January, but beyond that they could not go. There was an attempt on the next afternoon, and parts of both companies got into the woods beyond Lutrebois, but there they found as much difficulty as had come to the L Company platoon a week earlier. In the confusion which developed when Germans were reported to be wearing American uniforms (probably overcoats, worn more for protection against the cold weather than for a trick), the companies fell back to Lutrebois and resigned themselves to its defense.

Protecting the rear of those companies, and giving depth to the defense of Lutrebois, all that remained of Company L prepared defenses in the woods to the southwest overlooking the town. It was a miserable existence in frozen foxholes with no opportunity for relaxation, warmth, or washing. Shelling brought further losses to Company L in that position, and it seemed that the jinx against battlefield-commissioned officers was extending to that company as well. Now Technical Sergeant John L. Cantoni of Nebraska, acting platoon leader and executive, was scheduled for a commission, but he was killed before his gold bars could be pinned on. (He had only recently rejoined his company after recovering from wounds received at St. Lo).

Lt. Joseph L. Brigandi of New York, now commanding Company L, was the only officer left in the company. As enemy threats continued, other units were pressed into service to strengthen the position where Company L overlooked the valley. During this period a War Department inspector, General Brown, visited Lutrebois. He heard sniper fire in the valley as he came up to Lt. Brignadi’s position.

"I thought two battalions went through here," the general said.

"Yes sir," the rough-bearded, tired, but alert company commander answered.

"Isn’t that enough to clean that out?"

"No sir, not the size of those battalions."

"How many men do you have in your company, lieutenant?"

"Twenty-seven, counting myself, sir."

"Who is left of your company?"

"Battalion A and P Platoon, sir."

"Who is on your right?"

"Regimental MP Platoon."

"Who is on their right?"

"The I and R Platoon, sir."

That was all.

While the 3rd Battalion concerned itself with attack and defense around Lutrebois, the 1st Battalion, separated from the 3rd by 3,000 yards of snowfields and woods, was engaging Germans from the vicinity of Marvie. There the battalion consolidated its positions to present an effective barrier against further attempts at Bastogne. Able to maintain a penetrating sense of humor in any kind of situation, its commander, Lt. Col. Dan Craig, continued to add color to his military character as he applied an exacting efficiency to his tactical dispositions and to the task of bring up hot meals, when possible, and the supplies essential to combat in cold weather. (Typical Craigism: "A successful commander or staff officer must maintain a half-way belligerent attitude toward the next higher headquarters." "Optimism increases in direct proportion to the distance from the front lines." "One’s deeds in retrospect tend to magnify." And - after it was all over - "I would not take a million dollars for this experience; nor would I take a million dollars to repeat it.")

As battalions joined in an effort to regain the initiative after the Germans’ counterattack at Lutrebois, the 1st Battalion attacked to the east of Marvie at 1330 on New Year’s Day. While Company C remained in position on bald Hill 500 south of Marvie, to support the attack by fire, Companies A and B pushed out to a position where they could cover a crossroads on the Bastogne-Wiltz highway. But here complications developed. Not only did they encounter strong resistance to their front, but by the next morning a group of enemy (estimated at a company) had worked around to their rear and had their supply route blocked. Two men were lost as they attempted to get supplies to A Company. It was far from a hopeless position, however, because there was contact with old friends on the left - the 6th Armored Division. However, there was no promise of progress in a continuation of these widely dispersed frontal attacks. A new plan called for the re-assembly of the 1st Battalion in Marvie on 3 January, and then an attack in a new direction the next morning - an attack to the southeast toward the Lutrebois area. In an effort to break the German defenses in the great woods east of that town, the 1st Battalion once more would depend upon the surprise of hitting a flank before dawn.

Snow fell upon snow that night, and when the men of the 1st Battalion jumped off shortly after 0700 (4 January), a cold wind was driving into their faces. It cancelled whatever advantage to visibility accompanied the arrival of dawn. An occasional German flare added to the eerieness of the enemy-infested woods. A tremendous artillery barrage fell to the rear of the leading companies, but they were beyond its effects. Through on finger of woods they moved without opposition - then through snow, sometimes knee deep, across an open field - then into the woods again. Abandoned enemy equipment and foxholes suggested on increasing proximity to defended positions. "There goes a Kraut!" someone called. Approaching a clearing, men of Company C noticed a Nazi vehicle several hundred yards ahead which appeared to be refueling. There was a pause for consideration of what action ought to be taken, but, with a suddenness of a bolt of lightning, the Germans opened fire. A C Company reinforcement (higher headquarters recently had ordered that replacements now should be designated "reinforcements"), who was participating in his first battle, Pfc. Nathaniel Schaeffer, gives a vivid description of the scene:

A stream of hot lead struck our flank. German machine guns, burp guns, rifles, and 20mm guns rattled out their tattoo of death and injury. At the initial burst I saw one of our men on my left stagger and slowly sink to the ground. Weighted down by equipment he awkwardly assumed a reclining position on his left side while his life’s blood gushed out in spurts from his severed jugular vein. He had received this mortal wound from a piece of shrapnel. His demise was hastened by his accelerated respiration due to the effort required moving through the snow and dense forest.

A squad sought cover in a small depression, but a shell burst in its midst and wiped out the whole group.

Actually Company C had caught enemy defenders by surprise, and overrun their outlying positions. In fact, the attack had been so successful, and the visibility and points of reference in the snowy woods so poor, that the company had over-shot its objective by about 800 yards. It was deep within enemy territory, and Germans were all around. Though ground contact between the company and other units was impossible, radio communication remained clear. Colonel Craig ordered the company to withdraw to a more favorable position. It was the only thing to do, but a company always regrets having to give up a newly-won position without a fight, and such a movement would mean abandonment of wounded comrades to their own fate. Again Schaeffer reported:

As we got ready to move, I can still remember some of the men begging, imploring, and entreating us not to leave them behind. I distinctively recall one man in particular, he had received four wounds, one in a vital part, struggle to his hands and knees and attempt to follow us by creeping along on his fours. What a sight to see him finally collapse, unable to keep up.

Staff Sergeant Rex L. Strom of Illinois, and Pfc. Dallas W. Viehe of Indiana, did remain in their particular sector long enough to permit initiation of evacuation for some of the wounded. Depending only upon their rifles, they stood their ground against a new German attack, and fired with such effect that they killed some 30 of the enemy.

Word from the rear of the column that German tanks were approaching urged men of Company C on. Successful in eluding further encounters with enemy forces, the men dispersed among the trees while leaders worked to locate themselves and determine a way out. Captain William M. Denny circulated among the troops, maintaining a calm and reassuring attitude, to restore their confidence. As the afternoon wore on, the men, numbed with cold, stood about talking in low whispers on the possibility of reaching friendly positions. Snow continued to fall intermittently, and the bitter cold penetrated through the heavy clothing. Feet were swelling with "trench foot." Some men nibbled on D ration bars in an effort to gain some energy. Water in canteens either had been given to the wounded (for taking sulfa tablets), or was frozen, and some of the men were scooping snow from the trees to eat.

Presently, after estimates of the location, and instructions from battalion headquarters, the plan for salvation from the Germans and the weather was to move to the west, and try to reach Lutrebois. Now at this particular time the 3rd Battalion still was fighting its way back through the town, and Nazis still held about half of it. Yet, it was conceivable that the appearance of C Company in the rear of the defenders of Lutrebois might contribute to the completion of its capture. At any rate, it seemed to be the only thing to do which offered any prospect of success. Night was approaching, and the hope was that the company could cover the open ground between the woods and Lutrebois under the cover of darkness.

The company formed a human chain, a column of twos, in order to maintain contact in the inky darkness. Only the sounds of heavy breathing and the crunch of feet on cold snow disturbed the silence of the night. A break in the clouds now and then permitted pale moonlight to come through. Finally the column came out of the forest. A road lay across their path; it was the road which would lead to safety. Hopefully, but even more cautiously, they moved on. Scarcely 100 yards later the "brrrp, brrp" of a burp gun pierced the still air. Sentinels of an enemy outpost on the right flank had discovered them. With the first burst the column halted, and then disintegrated. Men scrambled for the woods in an application of the final rule of desperation, "every man for himself." Captain Denny, at the head of his column, had been seized and made prisoner. One group of 12 men gathered about Sergeant Solomon Plotsky of New York, an assistant squad leader, and he lead their new attempt to get to friendly lines. A machine gun pinned them down. Sgt. Plotsky watched the weapon’s muzzle blast. He worked his way toward it, then rushed out and seized the barrel with his bare hands, wrested the gun from the German, and knocked him out. Subsequently they reached the 2nd Battalion.

Lieutenant Wallace P. Chappel tried to get the column reorganized, but he could gather only a few. One thing the German fire did - it brought on some friendly firing, and Lt. Chappel and his group of survivors followed its sounds and finally arrived at G Company’s position (in the woods south of Lutrebois in I Company’s former location). There was a bit of anti-climax when a part of this group got lost from the G Company guide, and once more found themselves wandering through strange woods. At last they found other friends and were led to the 2nd and 3rd Battalion C.P.’s. The walking wounded went to the aid stations, and the other men boarded trucks to return to Marvie. They arrived at 0300 on 5 January - it was less than 24 hours since they had left.

There were 37 survivors there that morning of a company strength of 120 men which had made the attack. Other survivors appeared in the succeeding days. Sergeant Frank L. Mazzi of Pennsylvania had assumed command of the machine gun platoon (Company D), which was supporting C Company when his leader was hit. He himself was wounded, but he directed fire to cover the withdrawal, and then, he tried to lead his men back to safety. He crawled forward to see if he could make contact with a friendly unit, but then he came under intense German fire, and worse, American artillery fire. Now he was separated from his own platoon. He sought cover until darkness, and then started moving. Sharing his plight was 2nd Lt. Lawrence Eschelman of Nebraska. They slipped past Nazi guards, evaded enemy rifle shots, and finally stumbled into Villers-la-Bonne-Eau (a village three kilometers south of Lutrebois in the zone of the 137th Infantry). They lived in a cellar, while Germans frequented the upstairs, for seven days on a diet of carrots and potatoes.

Meanwhile, Company B, attacking on the left, had shared the early successes. It had overrun the rear area of the German defense position and captured a battalion C.P., including the commander of the 331st Infantry (167th VG Division). The company entrenched itself on Hill 540.

Now Colonel Craig sent A into the attack to attempt to gain contact with the 3rd Battalion at Lutrebois, and to try to fill the gap left by Company C. Commanding A Company now was 1st Lt. William O. White, Jr. He had been twice wounded - both times in the same leg and had returned from his second evacuation while the Regiment was at Metz. He had served for a while in other units, but he carried a deep feeling for A Company, a sentiment growing out of long association as its executive officer during its training in the United States. The confusion of the situation extended itself to Company A. Once more there was the reverberation of intensive fire through the woods, and once more there was infiltration, and platoons became separated. There was some improvement when 2nd Lt. Frank R. Delitt of Texas crawled toward a machine gun while his men covered him with fire, and then eliminated the gun and a trio of Germans with two hand grenades. But other groups were coming toward the command group. Hurrying about to get defenses coordinated at this critical juncture, it seems that Lieutenant White stepped into a hole. His injured leg was broken anew. He lay helpless as the enemy closed in. The radio operator was pleading for help when enemy soldiers arrived; most of the command group fell into their hands. Captivity apparently brought no relief from suffering for the company commander. The exposure in his weakened condition was too much, and later, the capable officer from the deep South, a brilliant mind, and an able leader, was reported dead. His men always hoped that such a report never would come. Company A had 40 men left at 1635, and finally they were able to join the defensive position of Company B.

German counterattacks continued to strike back at the 1st Battalion. Even its Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon had to be committed on the left flank, and though Lt. Thomas F. Murray of Montana disposed his men well, and they did succeed in repelling an attack, many of them too were captured. Shelling in Marvie became so intense that it was necessary to remove much of the battalion’s headquarters to Sainlez (where the Regiment’s C.P. was located).

During all this time the 2nd Battalion likewise was having its troubles on the right of the 3rd Battalion. It will be recalled that it had been committed to action on 29 December, to cover the gap between the 3rd Battalion and the 137th Infantry, and that its Company E had been called upon to go to the assistance of the 3rd Battalion in an attempt to hold the defenses behind Lutrebois. In that effort - through the dark woods - E Company itself had become surrounded. Its commander and all its platoon leaders except 1st Lt. John E. Davis of Nebraska, had become casualties. It fell to Davis then to reorganize the company, and get it back to a defensible position. It was an expression of leadership that he succeeded in getting back to the 2nd Battalion. The other companies shared in the effects of the counterattack in the Lutrebois area. At 0900 (30 December), sharp attacks came against the left of Company F and the right of Company G.

Orders to the 2nd Battalion the next morning called for an attack through the woods toward Lutremange (a town about two kilometers southeast of Lutrebois). Men of the 2nd Battalion jumped off before 1000, but opposition was instantaneous and overpowering. Within a few minutes they were forced to return to their original positions.

Illness overtook Colonel Roecker and forced his fourth evacuation. Once more Major McDannel took over. Captain O. H. Bruce of Maryland, who had been acting as 3rd Battalion executive officer under the command of Major Heffelfinger, now went to the 2nd Battalion as executive.

Far from continuing its attack, the 2nd Battalion soon found itself hard-pressed to hold what it had. The 137th, on the right, was having strong counterattacks from the vicinity of Tannerie and Villiers-la-Bonne-Eau, and early that afternoon contact was lost with that regiment. This meant that as well as the threat to the left flank, growing out of the penetration of the 3rd Battalion’s position, an even more imperative threat was developing on the right flank. The battalion’s anti-tank guns were disposed on the important flank. Already, the previous day, the platoon had given a notable account of itself when 2nd Lt. Joseph A Mack of Nebraska, platoon leader, directed its fire to disperse an approaching column of Germans - with a dozen of the enemy killed in the action, though one squad did have to withdraw. Now it was infiltration; Germans had got behind one squad to cut it off. Lt. Mack formed a group to go to the squad’s rescue. He was within 10 yards of his goal when he was killed in action. The other members of the party, however, were able to re-establish contact.

Task Force Fricket of the 28th Cavalry Group (mechanized) arrived to cover the broadening gap on the right flank on 1 January, and the 2nd Battalion prepared to jump off in coordination with the 3rd Battalion as the latter undertook the recapture of Lutrebois. Companies F and G were attacking over the same ground, in general, which Companies I and K had covered in their initial attack. Down across the valley they went, and back into the woods southeast of Lutrebois where men of Companies I and K had watched the great procession of Nazi tanks a couple of days earlier. But again there were counterattacks and infiltration. The companies had to withdraw a short distance, and, in the process of withdrawal, Privates Eugene J. Fehal of New York and Sammuel B. Richard of Michigan, newly arrived reinforcements, found themselves separated from their unit - Company G. Four German machine guns kept them down in the snow, but they noted with satisfaction how American mortars and artillery were silencing them. But they were within German-occupied woods. They huddled together in a shallow slit trench , under the cover of a single blanket which, covered with snow, concealed their hideout. After four days and nights, each ventured out on a short patrol. One returned with some K rations which he had found on a dead Yank, and the other returned with a Bible which he had taken from the pocket of another fallen comrade. "The rations helped the first day - that and eating snow," they reported, "but the Bible brought us through." They took turns reading it to each other. After a week of this miserable existence, they found their way back to Lutrebois, and they entered with their hands up - lest they be taken for Germans in American uniforms.

Company F had remained in position to guard the right rear, but a troop of Task Force Fricket relieved it early on 2 January. Then one of Captain Bruce’s first jobs with the battalion was to organize and lead a special task force - F Company and supporting armor - to cooperate with the 51st Armored Infantry (4th Armored Division) in eliminating an enemy pocket which had persisted in rear of the 3rd Battalion’s positions behind Lutrebois.

The enemy re-asserted his domination of the ravine, and both E and G Companies were in practical isolation. The only way of getting supplies to them was by hand-carrying parties - accompanied by combat patrols. Even litter teams, under Red Cross flag, were unable to move freely across the valley; one team was fired on as it went across to pick up a man, and then drew mortar fire on its return. Part of a team was captured. The problem of supply was a critical one, and the fact that the companies were able to hold out was due in no small measure to the efforts of 1st Lt. Ben C. Washburn of Alabama, who reconnoitered the route, then led the carrying parties (consisting of about 30 men) on their missions during the nights of 2, 3, and 4 January, and organized additional litter teams to evacuate the wounded.

The Regiment had been able to hold its own against the strongest kind of enemy attacks - in which the C.P. itself, at Sainlez was not immune to intense artillery fire and threatened tank attacks - but with the heavy losses which had accrued, it seemed a greater concentration of force was needed to get a decisive break in the situation. An accretion of strength came on the afternoon of 5 January, when the 1st Battalion, 320th Infantry, was attached to the Regiment. With trucks of Cannon Company and the 161st Field Artillery, it moved up to the left flank on the 1st Battalion, and the next morning it launched an attack through the woods in rear of the 1st Battalion - the same fingers of woods through which C Company had gone. Three successive days of attack were indecisive, and now there were four battalions involved, and none had real physical contact with any other. A conference of all commanders concerned brought acceptance of a new plan - a plan for well-coordinated attack against the flank and rear of the whole enemy position.

During the evening of 8 January, the 2nd Battalion relieved the 3rd in Lutrebois, and the 1st Battalion extended its lines to relieve the 1st Battalion, 320th. Those battalions assembled that night (men of the 3rd Battalion filed across the snow-swept fields from Lutrebois at 0400) in a patch of woods to the northwest of the great woods in which the fighting had taken place. In this new effort the 1st Battalion, 320th was to attack on the right, across the front of the 1st Battalion, 134th. The 3rd Battalion would attack on the left, and, on its left, the 2nd Battalion of the 320th, with tank support from the 4th Armored Division, was to attack in close coordination with it.

After a 30 minute preparation by artillery and direct fire of tank destroyers, mortars, and artillery began laying down a beautiful smoke screen along the edge of the woods, the TD’s started rolling forward, the artillery shifted to the objective deep into the woods for another 20 minutes of fire while the long line of infantrymen stepped out of their woods in unison (1000 hours) and began advancing across the dazzling snow to the great woods. the success of the new approach became apparent almost at once. Riflemen advanced rapidly through the woods, overrunning enemy positions, taking dazed prisoners from their foxholes at bayonet point. The 1st Battalion had to launch an attack against an enemy strong point before the right of the 1st Battalion, 320th, could break loose, but soon all units were on their objectives along the trail which ran through the woods from Lutrebois.

B Company, with a platoon of medium tanks from the 6th Armored Division, eliminated a strong point along the road near the edge of Lutrebois the next day, and then the stage was set to complete the clearing out of the woods.

With the 2nd Battalion and Cannon Company, 320th Infantry, now attached, the Regiment executed another change in direction to launch an attack to the northeast at 0800 on 11 January. The formation was one calculated to maintain contact with Lutrebois by unfurling a long trail to the rear of the assault battalions: the 3rd Battalion attacked on the right (the Lutrebois trail was the boundary), the 2nd Battalion, 320th (and light tanks still were supporting the attack) on the left, the 1st Battalion, 320th Infantry, followed the 3rd Battalion at close interval, echeloned to the right, the 1st Battalion followed the 1st Battalion,, 320th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion remained in defense of Lutrebois with the mission of denying any further infiltration into the rear. Artillery support consisted of the fires of the 161st Field Artillery reinforced by the 216th, 177th, 231st, 176th (4.5-inch guns), and the two cannon companies.

Enemy resistance appeared in varying intensity, but battalions maneuvered reserve companies against it (1st Battalion, 320th, moved up on the right of the 3rd Battalion during the afternoon), the light tanks, taking advantage of a clearing, raced up and down the line firing demoralizing machine gun and 37mm fire among the trees, and German defenses could not stand against such a concentration of power. The advancing man were conscious of the smell of broken evergreens, and the death which had visited the woods so frequently. They saw the effects of the days of murderous mortar barrages of Companies D, H and M, and of the 4.2"s, and of the unprecedented artillery fire which had torn through the woods. Never had they seen as many German dead, left on the battlefields.

The next afternoon (12 January), the units of the 320th Infantry were relieved of the attachment, the 1st Battalion assembled, and the 3rd Battalion proceeded alone to the division objective at the northeast corner of the woods and established contact with the 90th Division, on the right, and the 6th Armored Division, on the left.

At last the division had been "pinched out" (by the 90th Division, attacking from the south, and the 6th Armored Division, attacking from the west), and the 1st Battalion moved back about five miles to Hompre and Salvacourt, and the 2nd Battalion to Chaumont, Hollange, and Grandue. A day later the 3rd Battalion moved back to that general area - to the villages of Remerville, Remichampagne, and Clochimont. (Regimental C.P. remained at Sainlez.)

The fighting in this area had cost the Regiment heavily, but the cost to the defeated enemy had been much worse. In spite of the deftness generally attributed to the Germans in removing their dead from the battlefield, the 3rd Battalion graves registration officer found German dead in the Lutrebois area in numbers whose ratio to American dead was approximately 8 to 1. But in his work in that area, Lt. Eldephonse C. Reischel discovered some evidence of Nazi brutality. Reischel and his crew - Privates First Class Andrew Baumgartner, Erwin C. Choate, and J. P. Brown - found the bodies of six members of the Regiment who apparently had been taken prisoner and then shot. Three of the men evidently had been wounded prior to their capture, for wounds in their limbs or shoulders had been dressed with bandages from American first aid packets. But they, as well as the others, each had a mortal wound, usually a single one, from the penetration of a small arms bullet through the head or through the vicinity of the heart.

The Battle of the Bulge was reaching a new phase. All forces now were pushing to recover the positions held before the great counteroffensive began. The Germans were on the defensive all along the line. Time for rest in shelter against the winter weather, and for Red Cross clubmobiles, and, yes, for training, could not be for long.

First to be recalled to action was the 1st Battalion. It was attached to Reserve Command of the 6th Armored Division late on 14 January (at about the same time that the 3rd Battalion was just coming back), but it remained on Hompre and Salvacourt until the next morning when it moved to an assembly position back up at Marvie again. It joined with Task Force Wall in an attack to the northeast the next afternoon. The combined forces drove into Arloncourt, where men could see the effect of the German attacks in the 15 knocked-out American tanks in town. By nightfall they were within 500 yards of the Longvilly-Bourcy highway.

The whole of Combat Team 134 joined this new attack on 18 January, when it became attached to the 6th Armored Division and moved up to relieve the 320th Infantry. En route a sobering scene of destruction impressed upon men of the 134th Infantry - whole columns of disabled Sherman tanks lay in grotesque positions along the road and fields around Longvilly. Whole batteries of armored artillery, the barrels of the howitzers leveled for direct fire, set where they had been overrun.

Initially the 2nd and 3rd Battalions (the 3rd on the right) assumed defensive positions in woods along the highway about a mile southeast of Bourcy, while the 1st Battalion reverted to Regimental Reserve and moved back to Oubourcy, Michamps, and Arloncourt. Remaining in this position while CCA and CCB renewed their drives to the northeast, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced through the woods northeast of Bourcy on 21 January. Tanks and TD’s moved along the open ground near the left edge of the woods, but the enemy had withdrawn. Biggest obstacle was the snow. Sometimes its depth was as much as three feet, and platoons found it necessary to rotate the exhausting position of trailbreaker. Greatest problem that evening, the objective achieved, was resupply across the deep snows - there was no road within a mile of the troops. Here the "weasels" - the track-laying cousins of the jeep - proved their indispensability. And further evidence of advantage of attachment to an armored division appeared, for light tanks carried loads of rations and water and equipment up to the companies - and towed jeeps which had tried but stalled in the snowdrifts.

Nor was that the only advantage to the attachment. Movement by marching now was found to be largely outmoded. The next move for men of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions was on the decks of tanks of the 68th Tank Battalion and tank destroyers of Company C, 603rd TD Battalion. It was a move to the northeast of another five miles - the 2nd Battalion to Hoffet and Weiler, and the 3rd to Hachiville (in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg). The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, attached to CCB and then to CCA, had moved to Troine and then to Hachiville, and the Regimental CP moved to Troine.

The 35th Division had moved back to Metz on 18 and 19 January, and it was on its way to the Vosge Mountains in Alsace to help bolster defenses behind the so-called "Little Bulge." Actually the threatening Colmar pocket had been contained, and weather remained as the principal enemy.

Combat Team 134, with the 6th Armored Division, was preparing further attacks. The Regiment, after the fashion of the armored force, became the core of "Combat Team Miltonberger," and, in turn this was made up of task forces: Task Force McDannel (the 2nd Battalion; Company B, 68th Tank Battalion; 1st Platoon, Company A, 60th Engineers), Task Force Wood (3rd Battalion; Troop B, 86th Cavalry Squadron; Company A, 68th Tank Battalion; Anti-tank Mine Platoon), and Task Force A (reserve, under Lt. Colonel Duval - 68th Tank Battalion less Companies A and B). The 1st Battalion (Task Force Craig) still was attacked to CCA, and the 161st remained as the CT artillery.

In an advance of 6 kilometers in the afternoon of 23 January, carried out against sporadic artillery, Task Force Wood occupied Basebellain, and TF McDannel took the high ground to the right (southeast). CCB, with the 1st Battalion, took the important town of Trois Vierges (two kilometers southeast of Basebellain). The 17th Airborne Division came up on the left, and there was some confusion in plans when it was discovered that the unit had been assigned some of the same objectives as had this CT. A clarification showed that there had been a change in boundaries, and, to the disappointment of none of the infantrymen, the impending continuation of the attack toward Goedingen and Huldange was cancelled. Instead, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions re-assembled in Hachiville.

It was for another move of six or seven mile to the east to relieve elements of the 357th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Division) along the "Skyline Drive" on the heights west of the Our River. Once more the 68th Tank Battalion (or "68th Armored Transport Battalion"), and its attached TD’s carried the personnel for which there was no room or organic transportation most of the distance. It was on steel and ice, and much of the way, was treacherous. As the column moved through the deep valley of the Clerf creek, one tank slid off the road and rolled down a ten-foot embankment. The companies proceeded on foot from that valley to the high ground above. The 3rd Battalion went into Heinerscheid, and the 2nd (on the right) to the area around Grindhausen. Both battalions established their command posts in Hupperdangen. Later the 3rd Battalion took over most of the 2nd Battalion’s area, and, leaving only F Company in Grindhausen, that battalion assembled in Hupperdangen. (Regimental C.P. was at Boxhorn.)

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion reverted from attachment to CCA to CCB, and then mounted its most difficult attack - against the strongly defended town of Weiswampach. It was another case of facing direct gunfire and small arms over snow-covered fields, and once more the 1st Battalion turned to night attack. It fought its way into Weiswampach at 0630 on 26 January, and, with a firm foothold among the buildings, was able to do an effective mopping-up. Elements of the 90th Division relieved the 1st Battalion there, and the latter, still attached to CCB, moved down to Fischbach, on the Regiment’s right. Those days in the defensive were days for highly effective observed artillery fire against almost continuous enemy activity to the front, and for daily and nightly reconnaissance patrols - accomplished with benefit of white camouflage suits (manufactured by Third Army out of mattress covers).

Last offensive operations in this campaign came with I Company’s pre-dawn capture of Kalborn, down the hill to the front of Heinerscheid. Lt. Warran D. Hodges of Kansas had sailed as a reinforcement officer from New York Harbor on 8 January, and had arrived in the Regiment on the 26th, and now, the following morning, he was commanding the leading platoon in the attack. He remained in command of the town with his platoon while the rest of the company returned to its position in Heinerscheid. The enemy had been cleared from the area west of the Our River and the German boundary. The Regiment stood at the line which Americans had held 15 December.

Its participation in the Battle of the Ardennes had cost the Regiment 1449 battle casualties - 140 killed, 1011 wounded, 298 missing. Some of those missing undoubtedly had been killed; other would be reported prisoners (the Regiment had taken 427 German prisoners during the period.) For its action there, the Regiment won a Presidential unit citation.

Difficult times lay ahead for those men who had been taken prisoner. Among them was Technical Sergeant Ralph E. Van Landingham and the other men of Company L who had been taken at Lutrebois. While the Regiment continued its attacks, they were on the way to prison camps. After their only ride in German motor trucks, they spent New Year’s Day in Clewaux. From there, they walked and walked - through Prum, where they saw 13 Americans killed by the strafing of an RAF Mosquito bomber - Gerolstein, where they had to carry heavy logs down from the mountains to railway tracks, and where a German guard, a Sergeant Eisenhower, entered their crowded room one evening in search of more "volunteers," and fired a shot from his pistol into the room, and killed one American (rations initially consisted of a can of cheese, equivalent to a No. 2 1/2 can, for each ten men) - Kelberg - Mayen - Koblenz - Bad Ems - and, finally, Limburg. Here was located Stalag XIIA, and it was the first time that any of the group was registered as a prisoner of war. There was no such thing as consideration. A Canadian paratrooper had been told at Prum that he had a piece of shrapnel near his heart, but he had to march the distance, and he dropped dead as he entered the prison camp. There was no heat at the Limburg enclosure; men of Company L slept on small piles of straw over a frozen floor inside frame buildings. Now rations consisted of one-tenth of a loaf of bread a day, ersatz tea in the morning, hot soup at noon (a cupful), and either three potatoes boiled with jackets on or a potato soup at night. After an interrogation in an old castle at Diaz, the group with VanLandingham returned to Limburg where they were given small portions of bread and placed aboard a locked boxcar for three days of travel. The weather was so cold that frost formed inside the car every afternoon about 1600, and remained until about 1000 the next morning. There was no water to be had during the trip, and the guards tried to sell the rations to the hungry prisoners for fountain pens, pencils, and watches. Some men’s feet were frozen during the trip. When they arrived at their destination, Hammelburg, on 31 January, each was handed about a pound of cheese and told that it must be eaten by the time they reached the camp - it was rations which the guards had been holding back in the hope of making sales. But at the camp at least there was one thing which was a real boost to their morale - the arrival of Red Cross parcels.

Back in the 134th Infantry that same 31 January, battalion and special unit commanders heard a new order: "Control of CT 134 reverts from 6th Armored Division to 35th Infantry Division upon departure from 6th Armored Division sector. Per VOCG, 6th Armored Division, the CT moves in one serial (four march groups) to the vicinity of Maastricht, Holland, 1 February, 1945."

On the occasion of that departure, the Combat Team received a commendation from Major General R. W. Grow, commanding general of the 6th Armored Division, which hardly could have been more complimentary. It indicated a feeling which was reciprocated completely on the part of men of the 134th who remembered the courage, the audacity and belligerency, the effectiveness, and helpfulness of that division in actions around the Gremecey Forest, around Puttelange, in the Ardennes. It said in part:

2. The Combat Team accomplished each of its missions promptly and effectively. The cooperation extended by Colonel Miltonberger and the battalion and organization commanders was most cordial and effective. The attitude of the personnel of this Division can best be expressed by stating that all ranks would greatly welcome the 134 CT as an organic part of the Division or in any manner in which the fortunes of war bring us together.

List of Illustrations:

Map of Ardennes Bulge

They got a German command car in Lutrebois

Lt. Col. Wood and Maj. Heffelfinger . . . the 3rd Battalion C.P. . . . in a war-torn chateau

Burnt tanks softened by the snow . . . at Lutrebois they knocked out 25

The 3rd Battalion's Lt. Mike Hanna (S-2) and Capt. Sam Houston (S-3) . . . they were glad that the C.P. had held

Cannon Company was here

Toward Bastogne

A Baily Bridge on the supply route of the 134th

In position - machine gunners of Company M
"The .30 caliber Browning heavy machine gun was the "Old Reliable" of Infantry weapons. It was too heavy, and that is a serious objection to any infantry weapon, but its stable mount made it accurate, it was water-cooled and so it was for long-range fire in supporting attacks. But is was a master of defense, and it proved itself in the Ardennes. Except for the guns of Co. M, it is likely that the Germans would have surrounded Bastogne again. On the other hand, the German air-cooled machine gun was much lighter, fired twice as fast, and had smokeless powder."
James A. Huston - Battery of a Battalion, The Life and Times of an Infantry Battalion in Europe in World War II

In the woods north of Lutrebois - more dead Germans than ever

It took snow plows to keep the route open to Bastogan. - 2nd picture - In Bastogne

Buster Brown recieved the DSC from General Baade

Once more the 68th Tank Battalion carried the infantrymen

Chapter X

The Roer to the Rhine

. . . crossed the Roer on a foot bridge and attacked toward Huckelhoven.

The third decisive phase in the campaign consisted of the battles west of the Rhine during February and March. Once again the enemy played into our hands by his insistence upon fighting the battle where he stood . . . . The war was won before the Rhine was crossed.

- General Eisenhower,Report of the Supreme Commander.

With the collapse of Wesel pocket yesterday, when 134th Inf on 35th Div. reached Rhine opposite the city, Germans lost their last foothold west of the river.

- The Stars and Stripes (Liege Ed.)

In moving northward, the 134th Infantry not only was leaving the 6th Armored Division, but the III Corps and the Third Army, and even General Bradley’s 12th Army Group. It was on its way to rejoin its own 35th Division and the Ninth Army of its old division commander Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, (and the 21st Army Group of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery). There were cloudy skies and some light rain as the column proceeded, 1 February, through Bastogne, Marche, Liege, to the area around Gravenvoeren Belgium (about eight miles south of Maastricht, Holland). Five days later - days of training (including a training film on non-fraternization with the enemy), USO shows, clubmobiles, movies - the Regiment resumed its journey northward to relieve the British 155th Infantry Brigade (52nd Division) in the quagmire of Bocket, Germany, and vicinity. Here it went into position while the 137th and 320th Regiments went into the line behind the series of streams paralleling the Roer River in the vicinity of the thoroughly destroyed city of Heinsberg. This was the northern flank of American forces in Europe.

Hardly had the Regiment established itself in the new area (35th Division was now attached to Major General John B. Anderson’s XVI Corps) when orders came warning of new adjustments. At first this was to involve but one battalion, and the 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of relieving the 1st Battalion, 406th Infantry (102nd Division) in the vicinity of Randerath, Germany, (about five miles southeast of Heinsberg, and a similar distance northeast of Geilenkirchen); but before this relief began on the night of 7 - 8 February, the Regiment itself had been ordered to that area, and the mission was extended to include relief of a part of the 320th Infantry. It was a move executed on short notice. Less than half an hour after Lt. Col. Warren C. Wood issued the 3rd Battalion’s order at Nachbarheide, that unit’s motor column was moving through the soupy mud to Randerath. Regimental C.P. also moved to Randerath, 2nd Battalion and Cannon and Anti-tank Companies moved (8 February), to a neighboring area around Nirm and Hoven, and Service Company - the Regimental Train Bivouac - to Geilenkirchen. In its defensive organization, while the other two battalions remained in the Regimental Reserve, the 1st Battalion had C Company, on the right, in Himmerich, B Company, on the left, in Horst, and A Company, in reserve, in some pillboxes just north of Randerath. Germans still occupied Hilfarth on the near side of the Roer River, but the Teich creek and over 2,000 yards of open, muddy bottomland separated it from Himmerich; a somewhat larger stream, the Wurm River, which flowed through Randerath and between Horst and Himmerich, and then turned north parallel to the course of the Roer before joining that stream at a point several kilometers to the northwest, lay between Horst and Hilfarth. The 320th Infantry remained on the Regiment’s left, and the 84th Division, operating under conditions of secrecy as "Control Peter" was on the right.

For that matter, the 134th Infantry’s movement into the Roer River sector had been effected under strict secrecy orders which had included such measures as removal of unit designations from vehicles, removal of divisional insignia from uniforms, news release blackout. Radio nets of the 406th Infantry, with their own operators, continued transmission in an effort to achieve signal deception. The British 692nd Field Artillery (25 pounders) continued firing the same missions which had been used in the past.

But the 134th Infantry had not come to this region to bolster its defenses. There still was the great offensive to be launched which the Ardennes counter-drive had delayed. This became clear in a command meeting at the division forward C.P. that afternoon (8 February), when plans were made and orders issued for the launching of an attack across the Roer River. It was to be part of the Ninth Army’s Operation GRENADE, an operation complementary to Operation VERITABLE which the Canadian First Army had launched that very day in the north toward Kleve and Goch, and which shared in the common objective of nothing less than elimination of the German Army between the Roer and the Rhine. D-day for the Ninth Army was scheduled for 10 February.

A rise in the waters of the Roer and its tributaries, however, forced repeated postponements of the operation. One factor in the high waters was the thaw, but another was the release of water through the dams at the headwaters of the Roer. The U.S. First Army had received instructions to concentrate on the capture of those dams prior to the launching of GRENADE, and during the first ten days of February, the 78th Division was able to capture the series of seven dams. The last and most important one, however - the Schwammenauel Dam - was not taken until 10 February, and the enemy had opened the sluices. The waters poured down the valley, and brought a rise of about four feet in the level of the Roer.

Postponements probably meant greater resistance in front of the advancing British and Canadian troops, but they did afford more thorough planning and reconnaissance as well as time for further training and consolidation of unit organization. Days in waiting on the Roer were busy days. Vigorous patrolling around Hilfarth - that would be the Regiment’s first objective whenever the attack came - already was underway.

A 12-man patrol - prepared to fight - from Company C filed out of Himmerich at 2200 that night (8 February), bent upon reconnoitering the river in the vicinity of Hilfarth and taking some prisoners if the opportunity presented itself. The men walked quietly forward until they reached the strands of barbed wire - it seemed to be tangled in every way, and was anchored to trees and bushes. The patrol worked its way through three rows of wire, then across a system of trenches, and waded through the knee-deep water of a small stream near the Roer itself at a point about 300 yards west of Hilfarth. Here members of the patrol discovered enemy on three sides - right, left, and rear. The patrol leader ordered the patrol to assemble at the rallying point - at the stream. The men made their way across the stream and were in the trenches when Pfc. Joseph E. Kelsoe of Texas noticed a German coming along the trench from the left; he was calling to someone. Now it was seldom that men of the 134th Infantry, in the scores of attacks in which they had participated, ever experienced very much of the "hand-to-hand fighting" and the bayonet charges which frequented the news accounts. In combat patrols, however, there sometimes was the life-and-death grappling of hand-to-hand struggle. Kelsoe seized the German by the throat, but his grasp was not firm enough to prevent a loud outcry. The patrol leader turned and quickly fired a shot at the German’s head, but it was only sufficient to bring agonizing screams. Out of the desperation of self-preservation someone plunged a trench knife into the prisoner’s throat. But already his comrades were arriving. Most members of the patrol were able to make their escape, but Pfc. Kelsoe lay unconscious among Germans. He awoke to see two enemy soldiers talking over him. They took him over to a small building, and then to the bridge at Hilfarth. They had his rifle, but made no effort to search him. For the benefit of a number of guards at the bridge, they pulled off Kelsoe’s helmet and wool helmet liner and started making fun of him. He was seething within, but was helpless to do anything. His captors escorted him past the bridge, and a short distance up the road to a house. They marched the Texan prisoner into the house where an officer was sitting at a desk. They took him to a small room behind the officer’s desk, and there he remained under guard of a soldier who was guarding him with his (Kelsoe’s) own rifle. There he sat all day. His requests for food were ignored. Late that evening, as darkness approached, the guard escorted Pfc. Kelsoe before the officer at the desk. The officer asked the prisoner’s name, rank, serial number, company, and strength of his company. Following rigidly the discipline of his training and the requirements of the Geneva Convention, Kelsoe answered only his name, rank, and serial number. The Nazi interrogator sprang to his feet and struck the prisoner a backhand blow across the mouth, muttering "I will kill you." Just then the guard leaned Kelsoe’s rifle against the wall and stuck his head in another room. It was a fleeting opportunity, but the Texan jumped at it almost automatically. He grabbed his rifle and felled the guard with a blow against the side of his head. The officer turned around, and Kelsoe shot him through the head, and then jumped out the window where he shot the guard who was standing at the door. That ended immediate activity around the German C.,P., but there remained the problem of finding his way back to his company. He started crawling. Flares were coming up all around, and he hugged the ground to escape detection. He was startled to see flares coming up from a dugout almost beside him. It was a machine gun emplacement. Thankful for the failure of the Germans to search him, he pulled a hand grenade from his field jacket and threw it directly into the hole; there was no more danger from that particular spot. Kelsoe crawled into a hole to rest a while, but he was disturbed when he heard Germans talking in the next hole. After things quieted down a bit, he ventured out across open ground to the barbed wire. Water was nearly knee deep around the wire entanglements, and then he was caught in a barrage of 60mm mortar shells. Concussion, exposure, and fatigue numbed his feelings, but he worked through the wire and sat down in the mud to try to take a compass reading. The compass failed to function, however, and he wandered back and forth across the fields, trying to find Himmerich. He lay down in a weed patch, and exhaustion forced a short sleep. Awakening, he stood up; nobody fired at him, and he began wandering across the fields again - up a hill - through more trenches - to a destroyed building - back across muddy ground. A stream of machine gun bullets started following him. At last he got across the creek, and arrived at the concertina wire before his own lines. Tired and bedraggled, Kelsoe arrived at his company with information highly valued for the Regiment’s attack.

There was little chance of forgetting the proximity of the enemy in any part of the Regiment. Artillery shells - and sometimes of the weirdest functioning - descended repeatedly upon Randerath. A particularly vicious variety, estimated by artillery officers to be of 280mm size, had a duel action in that fragmentation seemed to be obtained by an airburst or by a super-sensitive point detonation, with a secondary explosion like that detonated by a delayed-action fuse. On 18 February, shortly after midnight, an artillery barrage described as "the most severe since the days of St. Lo" hit Randerath, Nirm, and Geilenkirchen. An estimated 300 rounds fell on Randerath alone within 30 minutes.

There was some concern lest such artillery barrages prove to be the prelude of a new German offensive effort. In order to forestall any such eventuality, a detailed defensive plan was prepared: the 2nd Battalion, without changing its location was designated as division reserve; the 3rd Battalion, as regimental reserve, laid out a secondary defense line several kilometers to the rear and prepared counterattack plans; the 161st Field Artillery, reinforced by the 127th Field Artillery (155 how.) and Cannon Company, prepared elaborate defensive fire plans.

There was training in the attack of fortified positions (with engineer teams), in river crossing operations - for which the battalions went back to a site on the Maas River near Sittard - in tank-infantry cooperation - with members of the newly-arrived 784th Tank Battalion. Motion pictures and "Jeep Shows" of radio and screen celebrities broke the long training periods. The 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on the night of 19 February, and the latter battalion had a three-day period of training and recreation before it returned to its former position.

One other development of note during the training period was the conversion of the anti-tank gun squads into bazooka (anti-tank rocket launcher) teams. There long had been a feeling that the 57mm guns had not been playing the important role in the combat in which the Regiment had participated to warrant the men and equipment assigned to them. At the same time, the anti-tank rocket launcher was a new weapon which was assigned to all companies, but for which there was no specially designated personnel. According to the Regiment’s new plan, two men and the driver would be left with the gun and truck, and keep it available for immediate call, while the other members of each squad would be organized into two bazooka teams for the close support of attacking companies in combat in towns or against tanks (one platoon attached to each battalion). Under the direction of Captain Magruder, the men showed a high proficiency in rocket marksmanship at the end of an intensive three-day training period - and 1200 rounds of ammunition. The system was extended then to the three battalion anti-tank platoons. In this manner, the two assault companies in a normal attacking situation could each have a platoon of trained men with rocket launchers.

An order came on 22 February, which called for the Regiment to attack across the Roer the next day. A change in plans, however, held the 134th back for a "delayed buck" while the 320th, on the left, and the 84th Division, on the right, jumped off, after a tremendous artillery preparation, at 0330 on the 23rd, in the general offensive being initiated by the Ninth Army and the First Army. Companies A and B, designated as assault companies for the attack when it should come, sent strong combat patrols forward that night. The B Company patrol was able to occupy a farm about 1000 yards west of Hilfarth, and then the company took advantage of the situation by sending a machine gun section and the remainder of the platoon to hold the position. The other patrol got within about 75 yards of Hilfarth, but then came under heavy small arms and artillery fire; this patrol suffered four casualties before it was able to withdraw under the cover of friendly artillery fire.

Before the attack was launched, a change came in the command of the 134th Infantry. The regimental commander was called to the post of assistant division commander; at first it was to be to the 104th Division, but a change in orders kept him in the 35th Division where he could still keep an eye on his old command. The announcement was made to the assembled battalion and company commanders and regimental and battalion staffs at the Regimental C.P. on 25 February. It was a parting of old friends, but it was one which could be interpreted in no other way than an honor to the Regiment and a tribute to its achievements in combat. It was a separation which could be made with the full confidence that the Regiment’s discipline, skill and esprit would carry it forth under new leadership to other accomplishments no less worthy. Such results would continue to be a source of unceasing satisfaction to the old commander. Responsibility to direct that activity now devolved upon Lt. Col. Alford C. Boatsman.

Men of the 60th Engineers had been working on the night shift in no-man’s land to put in a road bridge over the Teich creek. In another of its well-coordinated night attacks, Lt. Col. Dan E. Craig’s 1st Battalion jumped off at 2000 on 25 February, for Hilfarth. It was another two-directional approach. Company A, on the right, was attacking toward the southern edge of Hilfarth, while B Company, attacking from the farm which it had seized earlier, was attacking from the west. Guiding on the main road from the south, A Company moved swiftly toward the town, and was able to get men into the first buildings before it was stopped by intense automatic weapons fire.

B Company, meanwhile, had encountered a more treacherous obstacle. The thaw had revealed widespread mine fields in this whole area; many had been harmless when the ground was frozen, but with the thaw they had recovered their vicious danger. Now darkness enveloped the landscape, and men of Company B walked into an anti-personnel mine field. Pfc. Robert Pankratz of Wisconsin was advancing with an anti-tank bazooka team. He heard a loud explosion ahead of him, and, almost instinctively, the men hit the ground - but the comrade ahead had been killed instantly when he stepped on a mine; a medic was on his way up to see if he could help the man, but he too stepped on a mine, and was killed within five yards of Pankratz; the mine explosions invited mortar shell explosions, and these killed two of the anti-tankers where they lay. Pfc. Elridge C. Huffman saw a close friend step on a Schu mine; the left leg was blown off just below the hip, and the right foot was blow off just below the ankle, and no efforts could save his life. Wherever the mines exploded, wherever the shells fell, medics defied the same dangers to give first aid. Several, like Pfc. Mike P. Butkovich of Illinois, a litter-bearer attached to the 1st Battalion aid station, gave their lives. T/5 Almon N. Conger, Jr., of Washington, a surgical technician, left the comparative safety of the aid station to go out to give first aid to the wounded; he was hit in the back while doing so, but, in order to protect the other wounded, he lay between them and the continuing grazing fire. When a B Company aid man was killed, Pfc. James T. Lawton of D Company, went into the mine field repeatedly, and remained at his duties in spite of the concussion of near mine explosions. An Associated Press dispatch described it as "the worst nest of mines the Americans have had to cross on the western front in two months." Disorganization threatened to stop the attack as casualties mounted, and the leading platoon leader was hit, but Captain George Melocheck hurried forward to restore control - when his radio was destroyed he personally returned for another - and led his company forward; a near burst of a mortar shell knocked him unconscious, but when he came to, he refused evacuation, and led his company on to the objective.

C Company was committed on the left of A, and both companies then continued through Hilfarth. In the course of Company A’s attack, Pfc. Halbert E. Olson of Minnesota was in a room with two other soldiers preparing to clear out the enemy. The pin pulled from a hand grenade, and the mechanism beginning to function, Olson found that it was entangled in his clothing, and he could not get rid of it; he ran to the other side of the room and fell upon the deadly explosive; in thus giving his life, he saved those of his comrades.

Scheduled to make the river crossing, Colonel Wood’s 3rd Battalion kept close contact with the 1st, and, when a path to the river was clear, the 3rd Battalion began its crossing. A few men of L Company went across by assault boat to cover men of the 60th Engineers as they constructed a footbridge across the narrow, but deep and swift stream. By 0700, the 3rd Battalion was striking out for the coal-mining city of Huckelhoven. Company L swung around to the right and seized the approaches to the main stone arch bridge at the northern tip of Hilfarth. With the 1st Battalion’s seizure of the near side, this gave a bridge to the Regiment whose demolition charges had not been set off, and whose only damage was that resulting from Allied artillery fire.

Lt. Col. Carlyle McDannel’s 2nd Battalion followed the 3rd across the footbridge, and then turned to the left to attack to the northwest. Later, that same day, tanks from the 784th Tank Battalion, and TD’s (from the 654th Battalion) were able to cross the stone bridge and go to the assistance of the attacking battalions. From this point the defenses of the German 343rd Infantry Regiment (183rd VG Division) deteriorated rapidly.

Spots of resistance would develop now and then as the battalions continued their advance the next day - a company in a mineshaft, or around a factory building, or in the shops of a town, or in a camouflaged pill box (fortifications with concrete walls six feet thick were found beneath the innocent facade of a brick fruit cellar) - but there was no coordinated defense. Picking up prisoners after short skirmishes as it went, the 3rd Battalion, on the right (now attacking northwest), pushed on through Siedlung, Schaufenberg, Busch, and Gendorf. After removal of anti-tank rails in the streets of the latter town, men of Company I climbed aboard the tanks of Company A, 784th Tank Battalion, and the colored tankers, full of "vim and vinegar" drove their "iron horses" up the highway toward Wassenberg. When a group of enemy dared fire upon the tanks, it brought on the fire of all the tanks in the column (and in the process they pinned down Company L which was marching along a parallel railway to the right). An anti-tank gun did knock out one of the tanks, but that was the extent of the defense of Wassenberg.

The 2nd Battalion was keeping pace on the left, though road conditions would not permit the use of its tanks, and it cleaned out Doverack, Ratheim, Krickelberg, Vogelsand, Garsbeck, Luchtenberg, Orsbeck, Pletsch. Regimental C.P. advanced to Huckelhoven, and the 1st Battalion, now in reserve, remained in Hilfarth until 1345, when it moved up to Gendorf. A total of 213 prisoners was added to the previous day’s 68.

Elements of the German 1218th and 1219th Regiments (176th Infantry Division) appeared in the zone of the 134th Infantry the next day (28 February), but it made little difference. The 3rd Battalion’s K and L Companies marched into Birgelen, and then I Company mounted tanks again. The 2nd Battalion headed through Chewylack, Eulenbusch, Kraffeld, Ophoven, Steinkirchen, Effeld, while the 1st Battalion and the C.P. moved to Wassenberg.

Resistance was breaking all along the line. In turning the main force of its attack to the north and northwest, while the First Army drove across the Cologne plain to protect the right flank, the Ninth Army had caught the enemy off balance. It had developed into break-through warfare, and already it was evident that Operation GRENADE was one of the most skillful tactical operations of the war. Out of the 35th Division Task Force Byrne was formed, basically of the 320th Infantry and the 784th Tank Battalion, and it was racing northward toward Venlo. On 1 March, the Regiment, plus its attachments of armor, artillery, and engineers, received orders to follow Task Force Byrne to Venlo. That Dutch city welcomed its liberators in a manner reminiscent of the race across France. The Regiment moved the next day by shuttling with organic transportation (and the use of armored transportation again).

Men of the 134th picked up hundreds of propaganda leaflets in the area beyond the Roer, and they became much sought-after as souvenirs. One of the leaflets, to the dismay of intelligence officers, pictured a Santa Fe division insignia and said:
WELCOME MEN OF THE 35th DIVISION!

Considering the fact that you are newcomers, we would like to do everything to make you feel at home. We extend to you a cordial greeting and a hearty welcome to the Rur Valley!

***

You have tried to veil your arrival here by doing such things as removing your divisional insignias. Nevertheless, a little bird told us all about it.

Before you arrived, there were other divisions here who didn’t fare so well; namely, the 84th, the 102nd, the 29th, and, not to be forgotten, the British. They all got knocked about a bit. You can see that you won’t have any easy time of it against the Rur defense lines.

As we said before, we shall try to make you feel at home. We hope to make every day here seem like "the glorious Fourth" - there’ll be plenty of fireworks.

Troops of the First Canadian Army were known to be approaching from the north, and when the 35th Division’s attack turned generally northeast, it fell on the 134th Infantry to seek contact with the "friends to the north." Colonel Boatsman sent the 1st Battalion, with the tanks, to launch an attack on Gelden, Germany (about 5 miles north of the division’s main route of advance), in the vicinity of which it was thought contact ultimately would be made. Tanks bearing men of C Company stopped at the edge of the town because there was only a narrow footbridge over a creek which cut the road there. But already they were drawing fire. A round from a big German bazooka knocked Sergeant Horace E. Gunningham of Alabama and Alfred B. Poppy of Arkansas to the ground. Captain Wallace P. Chappell of North Carolina leaped from a tank, a shell fragment in his hip pocket which had cut his pistol holster and two plugs of tobacco. Second Lieutenant Robert E. Biever of Chicago used bazooka, machine gun, and rifle against suspected enemy strong points - and knocked out a mortar. Germans blew up an ammunition dump in the town. Tanks opened fire. A very British voice called out from the northwest, "Point those bloody guns the other way!"

Lt. William P. Clark of Illinois walked out and shook hands with Lt. Andrew Burnaby-Atkins of the British 8th Armored Brigade.

At about the same time, Ned Nordness, an Associated Press correspondent accompanying the British troops went out with a group of British officers toward the American positions; a tank fired a round near them and emphasized the urgency of their mission. They finally found Major John E. Davis of North Dakota, who had just recently returned to the 1st Battalion from the hospital. As though demanding continuing attention amidst all this, the Germans kept up their sporadic small arms fire, and threw in some nebelwurfer ("screaming meemies") as well. Colonel Craig had been moving about giving his attention both to the capture of the town and to the coordination with the British. Scarcely five minutes after the contact mission had been accomplished, a rocket demolished the radio vehicle, and a fragment hit the 1st Battalion commander, and he had to be evacuated. Colonel Boatsman was present at the time and took command until Major Davis arrived to take over the battalion. The British forces took over the attack against Geldern, and the 1st Battalion returned to the Regiment.

In division reserve, the Regiment moved successively through Straelen and Nieukirk to assembly positions in Sevelen and Horstgen and Oermten to await developments in front of the attacking 137th (on the right) and the 320th. As resistance increased in the contracting enemy pocket on the Rhine before Wesel, members of the 134th wondered if they soon would be called upon again.

An affirmative answer to that question came on 8 March, when a warning order arrived for relief of the 320th Infantry. After reconnaissance already had been initiated, however, division ordered a 24-hour delay in the relief while the 320th continued the attack. New orders came at 1300 the next day and the 1st Battalion moved out at once to relieve the reserve battalion of the 320th Infantry. British searchlights were reflecting against the clouds that night to distribute an eerie "artificial moonlight" over the area as men of the 3rd Battalion mounted trucks whose heavy tires then began to hum over the wet pavement as they moved toward the front.

The 1st Battalion, 320th, still was fighting for Drupt, which was supposed to be the 3rd Battalion’s area of departure, when this battalion arrived in the area; indeed, that attack continued until about 0200. It must have caused some wonder among German ranks to have that kind of an attack continue all day, and through much of the night, and then within four hours to see a new attack coming against them. Lt. Tom Parris (of Georgia, this is) led his Company L through Huck, picked up a 320th guide, and arrived in Drupt on time (before 0530); the attack was scheduled for 0545 (but Parris had trouble finding anyone in Drupt to show him the route; obviously there had been no opportunity for reconnaissance of an area whose capture had just been completed in the darkness) toward Borth, his company objective. It still was dark, however, when L Company jumped off at 0615. While K and I Companies followed by bounds, L had only a brief fire fight as it moved into Borth. K Company, under Lt. Lawrence P. Langdon of Nebraska, moved in to mop up that town while L Company hurried on to a second objective at a factory a mile north.

On the right, the 1st Battalion attacked at 0945 from the town of Millingen, and before 1300 it was on its objective and sending patrols to establish contact on the flanks.

Now Company I, under Lt. Warren ("Courtney") Hodges, mounted tanks once again - this time tanks of Company C, 18th Tank Battalion (8th Armored Division) - and rolled toward the final objective - Buderich, on the Rhine. An anti-tank ditch stopped the tanks at the edge of the city, but Company I swept in to complete the capture. Its prisoners brought the day’s total to 155, and those troops represented the remnants of no less than 31 regiments and separate units - including units from the 6th, 7th, and 8th Parachute Divisions. Artillery fire continued to come in on Buderich, but enemy resistance in the Wesel Pocket had collapsed. All that remained was for a platoon of Company I to move up the next morning and occupy Fort Blucher near the destroyed highway bridge to Wesel - and pick up a company of Nazi home guard (Landespionier) which defended it.

Upon its relief on 12 March - the 157th British Brigade relieved the 3rd Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 290th Infantry (75th Division) relieved the 1st Battalion - the Regiment moved back to the area around Birlholz (south of Kaldenkirchen), a distance of about 35 miles. For the first time since landing in France, the entire division was going to a rest area.

Battalion commanders took detailed notes at a meeting held at the Regimental C.P. a couple of days after arrival in the new area - mission: maximum rest, cleaning up, rehabilitation . . . cleanup: billets, clothing, equipment, motors, (civilians permitted to be used for area clean up) . . . daily inspections of quarters, kitchens, latrines; two "Saturday morning" inspections . . . shoulder insignia to be on all uniforms . . . laundry and pressing of all clothing (civilian employment authorized) . . . seating arrangements to be made for messing . . . all messes to be improved . . . emphasis on discipline and saluting . . . instructions on calling attention and reporting to inspecting officers . . . helmet and weapons to be worn at all times while out of doors . . . discipline against looting . . . any report of rape to be investigated within six hours, charges, where warranted, preferred within 24 hours, and trial within 48 hours . . .$65 fine for fraternizing with the enemy population . . . no soldier to be quartered in the same house with civilians . . . headlights permissible, but maintain complete blackout of buildings . . .letters of request required for retaining captured vehicles . . .anyone riding bicycle, motorcycle, or driving unauthorized vehicle to be tried by summary court . . . duffle bags on the way to this area . . . turn in all shoepacs . . .

A visitor in the Regimental C.P. would have seen the men of the various staff sections busy at jobs which came to them whether in combat or reserve, and at which they had worked with a skill and a competence growing out of continuity of service from the beginning of combat. Chief Warrant Officer Homer F. Barth, assistant S-1, might have been seen at work on the "Daily Log," or Sergeant Clinton S. Nagel, regimental sergeant major, might have been arranging for a first sergeant’s meeting, or for some special details of men, or for a quartering party to go with Captain Abbott on the next move. Over in the S-3 section, Master Sergeant Elmer L. Shearer, operations sergeant, might have been plotting the "big picture" on a large wall map, and T/4 John W. Hrnicek might have been preparing an overlay or typing a training memorandum, or T/4 Charles W. Duffy might have been making an entry in the S-2 Journal. And, in another corner, members of the S-2 section would be at work - perhaps Pfc. Douglas W. Patton would be telephoning an intelligence report to the battalions, or Pfc. Robert C. Douglas would be adding items to a voluminous intelligence journal, or distributing maps to the battalions and special units to cover the next operation.

That next operation would be across the Rhine.

List of Illustrations:

The three photos above were taken by Mr. Joseph D. Karr, who was a combat photographer with the 167th Signal Photo Company operating with the 35th Division at the time the photos were taken on February 20, 1945. The bottom two pictures appear in Chapter X of the 134th Infantry Regiment Combat History of WWII. While browsing this website, Mr. Karr saw these two photos and was kind enough to send the top photograph to be posted. The photographs show men of the 1st Battalion, 134th Infantry Regiment, 35th Infantry Division, 9th U.S. Army practicing for a river crossing. Mr. Karr also kindly provide the following information about these photographs: ETO HQ 45 14436 20 FEB CREDIT…..U.S.ARMY SIGNAL CORPS PHOTOG….CPL. J.D. KARR………….167 RIVER CROSSING TRAINING GIVEN TO MEN OF THE 1ST BN.,,134TH INF. REGT., 35TH INF. DIV., 9TH U.S.ARMY, ON THE MEUSE RIVER NEAR OBBICHT, HOLLAND. 202 COMBAT ENGINEER CORPSMEN ALSO TAKE PART IN TRAINING , AS THERE ARE THREE ENGINEERS WITH A SQUAD OF INFANTRYMEN IN EACH ASSAULT BOAT, TWO IN FRONT TO GUIDE IT AND ONE IN THE STERN WHO IS IN CHARGE OF BOAT [REGARDLESS OF OTHER RANKING MEN] AND STEERS IT WITH OAR. THESE MEN STAY WITH THE BOAT TO MAKE RETURN TRIPS FOR OTHER SQUADS OF INFANTRYMEN. MEN RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON HANDLING BOATS
There was training in river crossing operations . . .

The assembled regimental and battalion staffs at Randerath . . . a parting of old friends.

Prisoners out of Hilfarth.

.50 caliber machine guns . . .

. . . and heavy machine guns covered the crossing of the Roer.

Over ruins of a bridge at Hilfarth.

Medics brought wounded back across the foot bridge.

They advanced through Hilfarth.

Map of Roer River Crossing

The 134th attacked . . .

. . . against the Wesel pocket.

ChapterXI

East of the Rhine

. . . attacked through a factory area toward Buer.

So long as blood shall warm our veins,

While for the sword one hand remains,

One arm to bear a gun - no more

Shall foot of foeman tread thy shore!

Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine,

Firm stands thy guard along the Rhine.

- Max Schneckenburger,

The Watch on the Rhine.

(Trans. by John R. Thompson)

The magnitude of the offensive smothered resistance all along the Western Front. The shattered condition of the German transport system and the sustained speed of Allied advance prevented the enemy from coordinating a defensive line in any sector. He did offer bitter resistance at isolated points but these were by-passed by the armored columns, leaving pockets to be mopped up later.

- General George C. Marshall,

Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, 1943 - 1945.

With the hope of achieving a break-out on the plains of northern Germany, General Eisenhower had decided that the main effort in crossing the Rhine should be made north of the Ruhr, that is, in the area of Field Marshall Sir Bernard L. Montgomery’s Northern (21st) Group of Armies. In a great windfall of the war, however, troops of General Courtney Hodges’ First Army (the 9th Armored Division) had seized intact the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, and before the main effort could be mounted in the north, First Army already had developed a bridgehead 25 miles long and 10 miles deep, and its three corps were ready to strike out. This major threat to the Germans in that region south of the Ruhr lent a considerable assurance of success to the big attack of the British, Canadian, and U.S. Ninth Armies in the north (in Operation PLUNDER) when the great air fleets of the First Allied Airborne Army and the waves of boats - op4erated mostly by naval personnel - began crossing the great barrier early on 24 March, 1945. (General Patton had about stolen the show again when, without air or artillery preparation, the XII Corps of his Third Army had made a surprise crossing of the Rhine the night before - 22, 23 March - in the vicinity of Oppenheim, south of Mainz.)

At a meeting at the Regimental C.P. that morning Colonel Boatsman reported the progress of the operation and announced plans for the Regiment’s participation in it. Two British corps had attacked at midnight, and Commandos were now taking Wesel. At 0200 the 30th (U.S.) Division had begun crossing at three sites in the area south of Wesel, and by 0400 six battalions were across, and now they had penetrated to a depth of 2,000 yards. An hour later troops of the 79th Division had begun crossing some distance to the right (south) of the 30th, and by 0400 it had three battalions across and likewise had achieved a penetration of 2,000 yards. Opposition had been surprisingly light.

A quartering party left with Captain Lysle Abbott in mid-morning to reconnoiter an assembly area near Rheinberg, and the Regiment was alerted to be prepared to move on 30 minutes notice after 1700. (Earlier plans had contemplated use of the 35th Division to exploit a breakthrough no earlier than D plus 4.) Later orders indicated that there would be no movement toward the bridgehead until the next day.

With the formation of Task Force Miltonberger that next afternoon (25 March), the former regimental commander had one further opportunity to direct the combat of his old command. (His S-3 was Major Harlan B. Heffelfinger.) Attached to the 79th Division for the operation, the task force included, in addition to the 134th Infantry, the 161st and 127th Field Artillery Battalions; Company A, 784th Tank Battalion; Company A, 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company A, 60th Engineer Battalion, and Company A, 110th Medical Battalion.

The crossing site (near Rheinberg) had the appearance of Omaha Beach. There were barrage balloons, and busy aircraft, and engineers at work maintaining roadways, and supply trucks moving about. Soon after arrival of the Regiment in the Rheinberg area, where the line companies detrucked, orders came for an immediate crossing of the river. Night was falling as the 3rd, 1st, 2nd Battalions marched across the great pontoon "Love" bridge at "Blue" beach (commanders had preceded the foot troops in order to make reconnaissance), and even the night sky assumed a look similar to that of the first night in Normandy when airplanes of the Luftwaffe exchanged colorful streams of tracers with anti-aircraft guns near the bridge.

Completion of plans, coordination with units of 153rd Infantry (79th Division), issuance of orders in all echelons, movement into position - all these consumed most of the night, but the battalions, the 3rd on the right and the 2nd on the left, jumped off on time at 0800. Line of departure was the front of the 315th Infantry, and after that area had been cleared, the 79th Division turned generally southeast to protect the right flank of the XVI Corps. Although the Regiment was going into the industrial Ruhr region, this first day’s attack was mainly through patches of woods. Opposition - primarily from direct fire of 20mm and larger caliber SP guns - was somewhat more pronounced in front of the 3rd Battalion, and these same centers of resistance held up to a similar pace the 2nd Battalion’s right - G Company. Company E, however, advanced rapidly from the first. Further delay came to the 3rd Battalion when its attached tanks bogged down in the mud of an autobahn roadbed which was under construction. (Tanks attached to the 1st Battalion, in reserve, were sent forward to the 3rd.) By 1430, both battalions were on the task force objective, and the 3rd Battalion had seized a bridge intact over the Schwartzer creek. A total of 98 prisoners, mostly from the German 116th Panzer Grenadier Division and 180th Infantry Division, were taken during the day. As a warning against desertion they had an order from Hitler: "Whoever becomes separated from his unit and does not report to the nearest officer will be shot."

With arrival of the remainder of the 35th Division east of the river, Task Force Miltonberger was dissolved at 1800, and CT 134 reverted to division control. The 137th Infantry came into the line on the right, and the two regiments prepared to launch a coordinated attack at 0600 on the 27th.

As far as the 134th was concerned, there was something of a shift in emphasis in enemy opposition. Woods were even more prominent in the terrain now, and it was deep within the timberland that the 3rd Battalion met its first center of resistance. A vigorous fire fight on the part of Company I eliminated that, and by 0900 the battalion, after an advance of about 3,500 yards from the line of departure, had debauched from the woods (Forst Wesel) to arrive at the first phase line, designated "Able." A major problem here was the resupply of ammunition to replace that expended in the woods. Spring had come to the Ruhr on time, and winter’s snows were gone, but thaw and spring rains had made the trails through the woods impassable for any wheeled vehicles. Once again M-29 carriers (weasels) provided the solution until an alternate route could be found. This done, Company K moved up abreast of Company I to follow a parallel route on the left toward new objectives - another 3,000 yards to the east - by 1450.

It was in front of the 2nd Battalion that opposition - still characterized by direct-fire cannon and anti-aircraft guns - developed strongest. When the 3rd Battalion forged ahead on the right, the possibility of an enveloping action against the right flank suggested itself. Men of E Company mounted attached tanks and TD’s, and, swinging down through the zone of the 3rd Battalion, hit the rear of the enemy positions. This assisted toward some advance, but in the afternoon new troubles appeared. First there were a pair of German tanks camouflaged as haystacks, and when they withdrew, assault guns, supplemented by mortars and small arms, took their place. Now that battalion was deployed on a two-company front, with F on the right and E on the left, and G closely following E.

Visiting the regimental C.P. at 1500, the division commander ordered the Regiment to reach phase line "Uncle" (a railway cutting across the front) by night. At this point the 3rd Battalion was at least 1,200 yards from that goal - with some threat of counterattack, and the 2nd was nearer 4,000 yards away. To accomplish this mission it would mean for the 2nd Battalion a greater advance in two hours (and there were no immediate signs of any diminishing trend in opposition) than had been battered out the whole day. Colonel McDannel committed his reserve company (G) on the left and shifted E somewhat to the right in order to bring all possible firepower against the enemy.

A new potential threat appeared shortly after General Baade issued his order for continuation of the attack. The 137th Infantry had been having considerable difficulty advancing along the autobahn (Hitler’s super highway) on the right, and, as a result of the 3rd Battalion’s rapid advance, an important gap in depth now existed between the forward elements of the two regiments. A call from the 137th at 1520 warned that a group of about 75 enemy infantrymen had been flushed out, and were withdrawing to the northeast - toward the rear of the 3rd Battalion.

As darkness threatened to overtake the whole operation, Colonel Boatsman decided to shift his troops in a final effort to reach the objective. He committed Major Davis’ 1st Battalion, in reserve so far, on the right, with a mission of maintaining contact with the 137th - which required a considerable extension of that battalion; and he directed Colonel Wood to renew the attack to the northeast with the 3rd Battalion - into the zone of the 2nd. The 2nd Battalion had gained another kilometer by 1700, and then orders came to halt the attack at 1800. Confidant that, with these dispositions, the Regiment could reach the objective, and convinced that it would be an easier task to accomplish now than after the enemy had been given further opportunity for consolidation, the regimental commander asked permission to continue the attack after dark. On resumption of the attack at 2000, one of the Tanks of Company E was knocked out, and there still was 20mm and SP gun fire. But a platoon of Company K attained a patch of woods near the railway, and then other elements of the 3rd Battalion moved up to occupy the objective before midnight.

Attacks during the next day (28 March) were aimed at clearing pockets of resistance which remained in front of the 2nd and 1st Battalions. With the 2nd advancing again on the left, the 3rd now turned back toward the southeast as Company I attempted to neutralize some of the serious opposition which had developed in front of the 1st, but it was unable to cross the railroad. Areas of opposition which were proving so troublesome for the 137th were becoming thorns in the side of the 134th, and it was fire from that area (around Bottrop) that was giving the 1st Battalion much of its difficulty.

It doubtless would be hard for most infantrymen to say which was the more eerie experience, an attack at night through enemy-infested woods, or an attack at night through the streets of a large enemy city. Men of the 134th Infantry had an opportunity to make such a comparison in the Ruhr. First major urban objective for the Regiment in the urban Ruhr area was the city of Gladbeck (peace time population: 61,000), and at 2100 that same night long columns of the 3rd and 2nd Battalions moved down through a railway overpass, and then out into "no-man’s" land over the blacktop highway. A few aroused Germans delayed the advance with some small arms fire, and the difficulty of restoring control in the leading companies after a night fire fight delayed it some more, but well before morning both battalions were in good positions in the smaller section of the city which lay to the west of the first main railway. With renewal of the attack at 1530 the following afternoon (29 March) groups of enemy defenders - mostly from the German 190th Division - still tried to delay advance into the heart of the city. Automatic weapons fire from a group of buildings halted Company I, and pinned down the support platoon, and then, following the old pattern, mortars began to work over the pinned-down men. Pfc. Joe M. Kelley of Arizona, with Virgle E. Lockwood of Missouri and Gene F. Fletcher of Oklahoma following to cover him, moved out toward the strong point. Using the partial cover of a ditch, Kelley got within less than 25 yards of the enemy-occupied house and then began throwing hand grenades. All three men charged the house and brought out three enemy soldiers in addition to two who were wounded. Some fanatical old men and young boys, members of a Volksturm unit, put up some vigorous, but ineffective fighting, as the battalion marched on through the heart of the bomb-damaged city.

About three kilometers to the east of Gladbeck lay Buer, a city of about 100,000, and it was next for the 134th Infantry - with an attacking force of about 1,200. Again with the 3rd Battalion on the right, and the 2nd on the left, the Regiment jumped off at 0700 (30 March). Defenses were of the same nature as those which had been encountered previously - islands of resistance, but no well-coordinated defensive line. Here at least units could apply the technique of maneuver against flanks, and employment of bases of fire to cover movement in the manner with which they had familiarized themselves in pre-combat training. In the 3rd Battalion Lt. Warren Hodges’ I Company made a wide swing to the right, through a factory area, while L Company, with K close behind, advanced generally along the main road. At 0820, with the battalion half way to its goal, small arms fire held up Company L, but, once that was overcome, it continued rapidly to the outskirts of Buer, overrunning five emplaced 128mm anti-aircraft guns (and capturing their crews - members of the 4th and 7th Flak Divisions) in the process. But then there was further small arms fire. A strong point in the vicinity of the town hall was reduced with the assistance of fire from supporting tanks and TD’s, but advance could continue only with the greatest difficulty. At about this time, as Colonel Wood was going forward to confer with Captain Brigandi of Company L on what measures might contribute to an early completion of the task at hand, Pfc. Henry Alonzo of the L Company light machine gun section, come running up to the company commander.

"I wanna get outa this rear echelon outfit," he said.

With some hesitation and a great deal of reluctance, Captain Brigandi consented to a change. "All right, you are now a member of 1st Platoon; that’s your platoon sergeant right over there."

But already Alonzo was racing up the streets of Buer completely unmindful of shooting about him. He dashed into a building which seemed to be a center of activity, and mounting a stairway, he found himself at the doorway of a room where three Germans were near the window firing into the streets. He made short work of them - he got two with rifle shots, and the third with his bayonet. He emerged shortly with seven prisoners, returned them to his company, and then was on his way through the streets again.

Company I, after a lightning advance on the right, already was sitting on its objective in the southwest section of the city. Company L now moved on to the east side (and found Alonzo sleeping peacefully near some dead German officers beside a bullet-riddled Nazi command car!), and Company K began mopping up the south-central districts. One platoon almost found itself ambushed, but the sergeant, Walter E. Janken of Illinois, sensed something strange in the quiet situation, and he called for his men to halt just before the enemy opened up with bazooka, burp guns, and rifles. This brought on a prolonged fight for K Company when a group of Nazis, defending themselves in a building by the Hugo Mine, refused to give it up. Lt. Tom Parris, company commander, mounted a German motorcycle and led a platoon of tanks to the scene, and that resolved the conflict.

In its advance the 2nd Battalion still was meeting considerable resistance, and the opposing fire became more intense in the afternoon as the battalion approached Buer and began to clear out the northern half of the city. It was 2000 before it could reach the east side, and even then gun fire and small arms fire continued. Total prisoners for the day was approaching the 200 mark.

At 1830 the 1st Battalion, relieved of its mission of protecting the right flank, passed through the 3rd Battalion to seize a suburb about a kilometer to the east of Buer. Activity within Buer continued sporadically throughout the night. At 2245 newly commissioned Lt. Thomas Patrick Ryan of Company L and his platoon were reported missing. Capt. Brigandi sent out small patrols all during the night with no results. At 0747 Lieutenant Ryan, a bullet hole through his helmet (and a minor wound in his scalp), reported to his company commander with his platoon intact, and with 15 German prisoners. A skirmish broke out at 0145 near a hospital in I Company’s area, and its principal result was the surrender of 15 more Nazis.

Continuing its position as the right assault battalion when the Regiment renewed its attack at 0700 (31 March), the 1st Battalion advanced through a small settlement to the east of Buer at 0900, and then through the sizeable town of Buer-Resse at 1100. As one looked across the landscape here, he could see a general similarity to the great Gary-Chicago industrial districts. Results of the heavy bomber attacks for which the Ruhr had been a favorite target were strikingly evident here and there, but the destruction had been far from complete. Indeed, men could see factory chimneys smoking to the south even as they advanced. But, in spite of the industrial character of the region, green meadows, attractive gardens, and trim woods broke the pattern of factories and collieries and contiguous buildings. This contrast impressed the men of the 1st Battalion as they left Buer-Resse. Company C took a large castle (complete with moat and lagoon) and its attractive grounds, while Companies A and B were advancing through the great wooded Ewald estate. But as they went into the city again, now Herten, direct fire from self-propelled guns and small arms stopped the advance through the streets. As the first of the supporting tanks entered the town, it was hit by bazooka fire and disabled, and when members of the crew left the tank, all except the platoon leader, Lt. Stanley V. Trick, were hit. Disregarding the heavy fire, Lt. Trick applied first aid to his men and dragged them, one by one, to a place of comparative safety. This done, he noticed an infantryman who had suffered the loss of a leg lying in the open. The tank lieutenant went to him, made a tourniquet from his belt, and dragged him to safety.

The 2nd Battalion likewise had a stretch of woods to cross in reaching Westerholt, but it did so rapidly, and, without the disadvantage of any strong resistance, arrived in the vicinity of Disteln. Here there was something of an impediment to progress as elements of the 8th Armored Division passed across the front and then continued to the northeast, but there was some comfort in knowing that an armored division was moving out in that direction. At 1700 the 2nd Battalion turned to the southeast to advance along the road designated as phase line "Dothan" (the division operations memorandum had designated other phase lines in this operation with such familiar names to the 35th Division as "Omaha," "Topeka," "Pasadena," and "St. Louis"), to Backum, and, continuing the attack after night fall, cleared the area around the Schlagel U. Eisen Mine shafts 1 and 2 and the town of Stuckenbusch. Once more direct gunfire greeted the arrival to a new position. The 3rd Battalion had remained in reserve at Buer, but late in the day moved to Westerholt preparatory to passing through the 2nd.

Easter morning seemed an inappropriate time for warfare, but was there such a time as could be called appropriate? At an hour when, in time of peace, many men now soldiers had attended Easter sunrise church services, men of the 134th Infantry prepared for a new attack. (The 75th Division, having relieved the 8th Armored, now was attacking on the left.) After moving out at 0700, the 1st Battalion concerned itself immediately with further wooded areas (east of Herten), and then the Ewald Mine, shaft 5. Here Colonel Boatsman ordered the 1st Battalion to swing to the north, into the zone of the 3rd. There was a strong defensive position in the vicinity of the main road, Stuckenbusch Strasse, southwest of Recklinghausen, but, that broken, the 1st Battalion moved rapidly through the area of General Blumenthal Mine, shaft 5 and the big slag pile around shafts 2, 6, and 7, then past a slaughter-house, through sports grounds and the great railway repair shops, and through Berghausen, by 1720, and Rollinghausen, 35 minutes later.

In order to take advantage of the early morning haze in launching an attack against the positions which had been so troublesome for the 2nd Battalion, Colonel Wood asked permission to move up the time of attack for 3rd Battalion to 0630. That granted, the men of 3rd Battalion marched out of Westerholt at 0445 in order to get to the area of departure at Stuckenbusch in time for the attack. Jeeps carried the heavy weapons as far as Backum. First objective for the battalion was Hochlar, but it was to be prepared to continue the attack to the northeast toward the major city of Recklinghausen. In the face of intense machine gun and mortar fire from the vicinity of the railroad just east of Stuckenbusch, Companies I and K fought their way forward. They were well through Hochlar at 0830, and, with a regimental order to go for Recklinghausen, the sizable task of mopping up Hochlar was left to L Company while the others moved out to the open, gently sloping ground toward Recklinghausen. A city of about 87,000, Recklinghausen was an important communication center and a center of Nazi activity. But, as the 3rd Battalion troops fought toward it, they encountered for the first time what seemed to be a coordinated defense line. (Actually it was a part of the same line of resistance which was holding up the 1st Battalion’s attack on the right.) Heavy concentrations of fire - including at least 500 rounds of time, percussion, and white phosphorous fired in successive volleys of battalion strength by the 161st Field Artillery - and determined movement forward - broke the defense line. Observers reported the withdrawal of enemy troops and two horse-drawn guns. Colonel Schuster, commander of the 161st, happened to be at the 3rd Battalion O.P. at the time, and he called for heavy artillery concentrations which practically turned the withdrawal into a rout. During the preceding night, the artillery had poured over 4,000 rounds into the Recklinghausen area, and, since H-hour, time on target fires of three to four battalions had been falling on the city every 15 minutes. Supporting tanks and tank destroyers moved up, and Company I made a wide swing to the right to go into the city from the south (along Herner Strasse), while K, with L following, moved in from the southwest. Before 1300 the companies had reached the streets following the course of the wall which once had surrounded the old city. A Mark IV tank still was burning in the square. A captured German officer attributed the fall of the city to "an excellent executed attack; artillery followed closely by infantry and tanks."

There yet remained large built-up areas along the right of the zone. Colonel Boatsman called upon Lt. John F. Tracy’s Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon to clear out Aufder-Haide. There was some harassing mortar and artillery fire, but the civilians were far from uncooperative; children even collected and turned over abandoned German weapons.

At 1540 the 2nd Battalion was committed on the right of the 1st with the mission of establishing contact with the 137th Infantry. Further pockets of resistance denied this contact, however, until later in the operation.

In addition to the score of wounded Germans which had been found in hospitals, 147 prisoners were added to the previous day’s total of 137.

That same day the Regiment received the news that units of the First and Ninth Armies had linked up near Lippstadt to complete what General Marshall called "the largest pocket of envelopment in the history of warfare." Now cut off from the outside, there remained within the Ruhr 300,000 soldiers of German Army Groups B and H.

While the 3rd Battalion remained in reserve at Recklinghausen the next day (and the chaplain had an opportunity to hold church services a day late), the main direction of the Regiment’s attack turned generally south-southeast toward the Rhine-Herne Canal. Actually the objective included two parallel canals. The smaller Emscher Canal (the northern one in the Regiment’s zone) crossed the Rhine-Herne near the left boundary of the left (1st) battalion. The Reichs Autobahn also crossed the major canal near the left boundary. Company F came under heavy fire as it went into Poppinghausen, and it soon discovered that any movement was the signal for another enemy barrage. Company E deployed on the left of F to contain a woods in the center of the zone, and G advanced along the left. After the artillery forward observer got into position where he could adjust accurately on the intervening enemy emplacements, he was able to silence four enemy guns with time fire and white phosphorous. Thereafter the battalion, and , concurrently, the 1st Battalion, moved to the objective along the main canal.

Relieved that night by elements of the 75th Division, the Regiment assembled 3 April, in Herten and Buer-Resse, as division reserve - only to go back into the line the next day when the 3rd Battalion relieved a battalion of the 320th (in Buer Erle and the Emscher Bruch woods east thereof) and the 2nd Battalion relieved a battalion of the 137th (on the left or east, of the 3rd) to give the Regiment a defensive role in the center of the division’s sector along the canal.

Tactically, these days in the defensive were confined pretty largely to coordination of fires, night reconnaissance patrols across the canal, and motorized security patrols through the rear areas. But problems arose in this great center of population which only had been suggested before. Some 6,000 displaced persons - French, Italian, Belgian, Dutch . . . - had been found in Moeller coal mine near Gladbeck; another 5,000 had been found in another mine; and most of the DP’s - they had been brought into Germany as forced laborers - were suffering from malnutrition. There were problems of keeping civil activities going, of screening Nazi officials, of investigating information concerning enemy activity - problems which could not await the arrival of military government teams because of their bearing on the requirements of maintaining a military organization in a sea of a dense enemy population. Fortunately, the civilian population showed little inclination toward resistance, but the magnitude of its numbers made more pressing the other problems. This meant much work for the civil affairs officer attached to the Regiment, Captain Martin, in trying to keep the most basic municipal machinery operating until such times as regular teams could arrive. It meant busy days for Lt. Theodore Teimer and his attached IPW team in interrogating groups of prisoners being captured in numbers approaching those of August in France, and busy times for the S-2 in trying to coordinate intelligence activities and make something of the mass of reports. A typical day for Joseph P. Tolli, a special agent of the Counter-intelligence Corps, included conferences with Major Godwin (S-2), clearing two curfew violators at the prisoner of war enclosure, arresting a local Volksturm commander, interrogating four line crossers from Buer-Resse, arresting one Hilmut Romberg of Essen as a security threat, searching for a Gestapo agent from Buer Erle, investigating the mayor of Westerholt and recommending a change there. But these staffs of specialists could not begin to meet, alone, all the problems demanding immediate attention. Provisional groups were formed to work with the battalion S-2 sections. A notable example of the activities of some of these people is to be found in the work of Pfc. George T. Mertens, a man who had gone to Battalion Headquarters from M Company. In Buer, Mertens had gone out on his own, late at night, while skirmishes still were going on, to investigate the house of a high ranking Nazi official; he had returned with valuable rosters and documents as well as a number of small arms. Again in Recklinghausen he had undertaken a night mission following the capture of the city - he had gone with a civilian to a bunker a thousand yards east of his battalion’s position, and there he had found 15 soldiers and 50 civilians in hiding. In Buer Erle, Mertens discovered a secret underground passage in a mine which led to a large cache of weapons and ammunition; he was responsible for the capture of the Nazi official formerly in charge of the area concentration camp, together with complete rosters of storm troopers and Volksturm in the area; his inquiries led to the discovery of a large stock of foodstuffs which was turned over to the food control commission.

With the 1st Battalion’s relief of the 1st Battalion, 320th Infantry, on 6 April, the Regiment had all three battalions on the line (right to left: 1st, 3rd, 2nd). The 1st Battalion lost one company temporarily, however, when C Company went to Letkampshof to guard the corps C.P.

The Ruhr pocket now completely encircled, units of the First Army, to the south, and of the Ninth Army, to the north (and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s Fifteenth Army had become operational to hold the west of the pocket), had begun attacking toward the Ruhr River, and toward each other. The 79th Division (on the right, or west, of the 35th) launched an attack across the canal on 7 April, while the 134th held its position and "attacked by fire." The 35th Division’s turn came two days later.

Heavy machine gun and tank destroyer fire preceded the 3rd Battalion’s attack for canal crossings, but K Company, on the right, was unable to cross the debris of a fallen railway bridge in its sector when it developed that improvised materials would not span the gap, and intense fire broke out from the buildings opposite. Company L was crossing near a destroyed road bridge. Leading squads were able to make their way across the debris in the first, minor, canal in the darkness, and then Sergeant Keith B. Dowell of California, squad leader, swam across the major canal, overcame two German guards on the other side, and seized a boat which his squad used to cross and which later the platoon used to improvise a foot bridge. Colonel Wood shifted K Company to follow L across at that site.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion was executing a brilliant enveloping maneuver. Crossing a bridge in the zone of the 79th Division, far to the right, the 1st Battalion advanced rapidly to the east-northeast, and before 1000 hours Company A came into the rear of the enemy facing Company K and captured the whole lot.

Orders at 1115 to continue the attack brought a renewal of the advance against scattered opposition, and the completion of an advance of five kilometers which netted another 134 prisoners. After being relieved by the 35th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, the 2nd Battalion crossed the canal and assembled as reserve north of Gelsenkirchen.

Little serious opposition developed the next day as the 2nd Battalion cleared Gelsenkirchen (population 313,000) and guarded the rear areas, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their advance through Rottbruch, Riemke, Hofstede, Eickel, Rohlinghausen, Ecelbruch. Nor was there anything more than scattered resistance as those battalions passed through the 313th Infantry (79th Division) and advanced south from Bochum (population 303,000) 11 April, and continued southward through Weitmar, Weitmar-Mark, Neuling Haarl, Weitmar Holz, Sundern, Brockhausen, Stiepel, and reached positions on the scenic, garden-spotted heights overlooking the Ruhr River. Artillery observers had another "field day" late in the afternoon against widespread enemy activity south of the river - and there were some German replies in kind.

There did remain, however, one very irksome pocket of resistance north of the river - in a pocket formed by a bend in the stream along the right boundary of the zone. Its elimination became the 1st Battalion’s task as it attacked at 0700 (12 April), against a group of fanatical paratroopers. A daylong attack - and after darkness until 2300 - made little gain. On the contrary, the stubborn Nazis launched a counterattack at 0300.

After a sudden concentration of bazooka fire, German riflemen, with the support of their inevitable machine guns, began moving toward a house occupied by men of A Company. Corporal Russel H. Pedigo of Michigan and Pfc. William H. Bean of Illinois, on guard near the door, stood their ground, and returned the fire. But, in the determined action to gain time for the men inside, both were killed. Lt. Vernon L. Rottman of Colorado, platoon leader, saw the silhouettes of about 30 approaching enemy. He dispersed the men, armed only with rifles, throughout the first floor. Germans would fire a rocket to tear a hole through the wall, and then pour machine gun fire through the opening. Privates First Class Ralph Porter and Tony Anton, both of Ohio, were knocked unconscious by the concussion, but came to and resumed their firing positions. Falling plaster clogged the M-1 rifles so badly that they had to be operated by hand. Nevertheless, the defenders turned the bazooka holes into loopholes and kept up their fire. With the coming of daylight they called for artillery fire, and that broke up the attack. The 1st Battalion followed up with another attack of its own at 0530, B on the right, and A on the left. A platoon of C Company cleared the Dahlhauser Tiefbau Mine. After another all-day effort, the battalion finally was able to clear out the pocket. Already, during the afternoon, the 3rd Battalion had been relieved by the 315th Infantry (79th Division), and the 2nd Battalion - with Anti-tank Company attached - had been relieved of its security mission by other elements of the 79th Division (the Regiment was attached to that division for the day’s operations while the remainder of the 35th was moving to the east) and of the 17th Airborne Division. Now, its mission in the Ruhr accomplished, the 134th Combat Team prepared to move by motor to catch up with the war which had moved far to the east during these operations in the pocket.

Leading vehicles of the first serial (3rd Battalion, with Anti-tank Company attached) crossed the IP north of Bochum at 0600 (14 April). Other units followed in the order: 2nd Battalion, with Cannon Company and one platoon of Company A, 60th Engineers attached; 1st Battalion, with Service Company attached; 161st Field Artillery, with Company A, 110th Medical Battalion attached. It was after 0800 hours when the tail of the column passed the IP. The trucks moved along the broad express highway, the Autobahn, for a short distance, but then followed a route which generally paralleled it on the south. Across the Weser River on the crowded pontoon bridge at Hameln, on through the once beautiful but now ruined city of Hildesheim, the column was approaching the area, south of Peine, where it was supposed to meet its advance billeting party. Guides, however, directed the Regiment farther to the east. "We have run off the map, sir," Sergeant Shearer reported to the commander, but at each important road junction there would be a new guide - from Division Headquarters Company, or the cavalry troop, or the TD battalion. Finally, well beyond Braunschweig, the Combat Team arrived at its assigned assembly area east of Oebisfelde Kaltendorf (the Regimental C.P. opened at Bosdorf). A distance of 231 miles from Bochum, it was a new record for the Regiment for a one-day move (actually it was 0400 before some elements - notably two kitchens of the 3rd Battalion which had turned over - arrived in the new area). The Elbe River was hardly 30 miles away. Even that distance was to be overcome shortly.

Another new Chapterin military operations was added to the annals of the 134th Infantry the next day when it made a tactical move by motor to the Elbe. Already the 30th Division, on the right, had reached the river north of Magdeburg (it seemed that the 35th Division might be ending combat as it had begun it at St. Lo - in the XIX Corps, with the 30th Division on the right), and, south of Magdeburg, the 2nd and 5th Armored Divisions had established bridgeheads across the river, only to lose them, but the 83rd Division still held to one (and the 320th Infantry was sent down to reinforce it). Moreover, the 137th Infantry, on the left, had been able to reach the Elbe with little difficulty. But a major potential trouble spot in the zone of the 134th was a large forest area.

At 0800 the Combat Team began advancing in three motorized columns - the 3rd Battalion on the right, the 1st in the center, the 2nd on the left. Only scattered groups of enemy were encountered, and these could be handled by the points of the columns, and busy jeep patrols rounded up scores of prisoners on the flanks (a total of 132 were taken during the day). There was a little delay when the right and center columns came out to a good highway and a large artillery range and ordnance proving grounds which were not shown on the map (at one point here, leading elements of the 1st Battalion noticed a strange motor column crossing its route, and proceeded with caution to discover that it was the tail of its own column; - it was a turn-around dictated by the terrain.)

Colonel McDannel’s 2nd Battalion motored directly to its objective in the vicinity of Ringfurth. Then the 3rd Battalion moved into the area on the right with K and L, at Kehnert and Sandfurth respectively, on the river, I, in depth at Bertingen, and Headquarters at Utz. The 1st Battalion occupied Zibberick and Mahlwinkel (where Regimental C.P. opened at 1600), and reverted to reserve.

In the advance to the river the Regiment had overrun a German motor park and captured large amounts of enemy equipment. Added to that captured or destroyed during the subsequent days, this included such items, for example, as 145 trucks, 35 automobiles, 26 motorcycles, 4 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 9 half-tracks, 16 anti-aircraft guns, 5 artillery pieces, 300 machine guns, 8 searchlights, 3 range finders, 30 electric generators, 80 field radios.

Originally there was no corps restraining line, and, in view of the bridgeheads which had been effected to the south, it appeared that the Regiment might be scheduled for a role in the final drive for Berlin (G Company now was within 12 miles of the Reich capital). But, to the disappointment of practically no one in the Regiment, that was not to be; there was to be no advance beyond the Elbe in this sector.

A boundary change gave the Regiment responsibility for a four-kilometer addition in frontage, and I Company moved to a sizable town of Rogatz on the 16th. (This same day the division passed to control of the XIII Corps.) Later the 2nd Battalion, relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 137th, moved by shuttling down to the sector on the right of the 3rd Battalion. Companies E and G relieved I at Rogatz (and I returned to Bertingen), and the remainder of the battalion went to Angern.

Even at this late stage, the Germans had not abandoned their aggressiveness. All kinds of bands were roaming through the woods in the rear area (by 16 April, 73 different units were represented in the prisoners taken). The 1st Battalion and special units sent patrols through the area almost daily. Pfc. John R. Connelly, Jr., of the I and R Platoon, was killed less than 200 yards from the Regimental C.P. (now at an estate a mile and one-half southwest of Angern) when he moved out from his guard post one night to investigate strange footsteps. Movements of "Task Force Clausewitz," a collection of German soldiers with German and American vehicles, across the rear toward the Harz Mountains had many people worried until the force disintegrated under constant pursuit.

But aside from these disorganized activities, the enemy even mounted some attacks from across the Elbe River. One hit K Company, at Kehnert, before daylight on 17 April. Pvt. Richard W. Stoll of New York was on outpost duty at the time, and remained at his post, firing his rifle, until his last round of ammunition was gone. He started moving toward his platoon C.P., and though wounded en route, he was able to get there. Germans got into the town and surrounded a squad. Staff Sergeant Bertice F. Womak of Kentucky ran through the fire to reach a building near the squad. A round from a bazooka knocked him down, but he got up and went into a building and began throwing hand grenades. This gave the squad a chance to deploy and drive out the enemy.

Some further personnel changes occurred in the Regiment: Lt. Col. Frederick C. Roecker had returned, and, after acting as executive officer for a while, he now took command of the 3rd Battalion when Colonel Wood returned to the States; Captain Mason had returned, and now was executive officer of the 1st Battalion; Colonel Craig had returned, and now he was regimental executive officer; and 1st Lt. Don Craig (cut from the same piece of cloth), his younger brother, had joined the Regiment and was assigned to D Company as executive officer.

A second, and more determined, enemy attack came against K Company at 0530 on 23 April. This time the enemy, with a force of about 50 men, attacked Kehnert from two directions. After bazooka and machine gun fire had created a major disturbance in the center, larger groups of enemy began moving across the open ground toward the north edge (i.e., left flank) of the town. Sergeant Joseph J. Pogonowski of Ohio was on duty at his well-located light machine gun which covered that flank. He opened fire with deadly effect. An SS lieutenant approached the machine gunner from the flank, and when Pogonowski noticed him, the officer tried to lure him from his position by faking surrender - he walked up to within three feet of the foxhole and dropped a grenade; but it was ineffective. He, and his orderly as well, fell from a burst of machine gun fire. When machine gun ammunition began to run low the section leader, Sergeant Robert E. Ovitt of Illinois, braved the enemy fire to get a new supply. Meanwhile the 60mm mortars, shortening their range to within 50 yards of the front positions, were keeping up a continuous barrage. The final result was 17 enemy killed - by count after daylight - 7 wounded, and 12 others captured. That was the last combat for the 134th Infantry; that day’s were the last battle casualties.

Patrols - in every direction - continued, but principal interest turned now to "watching for the Russians." Tardy arrangements for recognition signals finally had been made, and almost as soon as units were notified that the Russian signal would be two red flares, and the American reply was to be three green, the companies began to report red flares all along the front. Russian soldiers failed to arrive in this sector, however, while the Regiment was there.

Lieutenant Haugen arrived at 1730 on 24 April with a warning order. The whole division was to move back to the vicinity of Hanover on 27 April, with the mission to "clear any enemy from the area, occupy, and govern . . . Duration of occupation???"

It appeared that the shooting war in Europe was over for the 134th Infantry.

List of Illustrations:

The Regiment crossed on "Love" bridge at "Blue" beach.

Company L overran some flak guns near Buer.

Mertens and Belbke of the 3rd Battalion found documents and money in police headquarters at Reckinghausen.

On the Autobahn.

Map of the Ruhr pocket.

The 2nd Battalion cleared Gelsenkirchen.

Along the streets of Herne.

A Company advanced south of Bochum toward the Ruhr.

The Russians were coming from the east: Gen. Simpson and Gen. Tsvetaiev join in cerimonies celebrating the link-up.

Map Ruhr to Elbe.

Chapter XII

The War's End

City Hall at Hannover

General Miltonberger called with the following message:

"A representative of the German High Command signed the unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces in Europe to the AEF and simultaneously to the USSR at 0141 B. C. E. time, 7 May, 1945, under which all forces under the German command cease operations at 0001, 9 May, 1945. Effective immediately all offensive operations by AEF cease and all troops will remain in present locations. Troops on occupation duty continue mission. Due to communication difficulties, there may be some delay in similar announcement reaching enemy troops so full offensive resource will be taken. No release will be made to press, pending, an announcement by England, the United States, and USSR."

- C. G. XIII Corps,

134th Infantry S-3 Journal, 070815 May 1945

Upon being relieved along the Elbe River on 26 April by the 407th Infantry (102nd Division), units of the 134th Infantry assembled in the rear areas. Following a route marked by signs as the "Santa Fe Trail," the Regiment moved to its assigned area south of Hannover where it assumed responsibility for a sector containing some 125 towns. Battalion C. P.’s - the 1st at Ludersen, the 2nd at Elze, the 3rd at Hehlen - were 10 to 50 miles away from the Regimental C. P. at Eldagsen. A change in boundaries on the 29th gave the 3rd Battalion (L Company) responsibility for Bad Pyrmont, a town with some 68 hospitals and convalescent camps filled with German wounded.

On 6 May, the Regiment (less the 1st Battalion) moved to the city of Hannover itself (population 472,000). There were stragglers to be rounded up, SHAEF Targets (e.g. industrial plants, warehouses) to be investigated, curfews to be enforced against civilians, displaced persons to be cared for, soldiers and officials to be screened. French, Belgian, and Dutch DP’s were being moved out by railway trains at the rate of 1400 a day; approximately 30,000 were evacuated from the Hannover area. Two Russian officers were assigned to the division military government team to locate camps where Russian DP’s could be assembled; seven Polish officers were working in the area to handle DP’s from their country. V-E Day came as something of an anti-climax in Hannover, but men began to figure their points for separation and speculate on the Japanese War.

After an intermediate stop with XVI Corp in the vicinity of Bechum (18 - 26 May), and G Company had a special assignment at Bielefeld as security detail for the staging area of the Berlin District Headquarters, and K a mission at Eselheide at a PW camp, the Regiment undertook a longer move (185 miles) to the southwest. This time troops other than those with the organic transportation went by rail - in box cars of the noted "40 and 8" caliber. Proceeding on a circuitous route through the Ruhr area, Roermond, Maastricht, Aachen, Duren, and Bonn, the long, slow trains arrived at Niedermendig (20 miles west of Coblenz) at 0500 on 29 May. Attached to the 66th Division, XXIII Corps, Fifteenth Army, the Regiment had a mission to occupy, organize, secure, and govern Landkreis (county) Mayen and Landkreis Ahrweiller and to patrol the west bank of the Rhine in the sector to prevent the crossing of unauthorized persons. The Regimental C.P. was established at Bassenheim, the 1st Battalion at Niedermendig, the 2nd at Adenau, the 3rd, Kottenheim, Service Company, Kruft. (The former regimental commander - now assistant division commander - was in the same area where he had been 26 years earlier as a first sergeant with the 4th Division on occupation duty; he returned to the scene of his old headquarters, and visited the aging Countess Bethmann-Hollweg - wife of Germany’s chancellor during World War I - in the old family castle.)

The 1st Battalion was held in a central area as division reserve. The other battalions set up systems of motor patrols which visited every town in their respective areas at least every other day in order to keep a record of friendly units which moved in and out. In compliance with a division directive, Anti-tank Company was formed into a provisional military police company to control traffic. Regular military government detachments were in the area, and the Regiment worked in close coordination with them.

There was a broad program of recreation and athletics and special schools and ceremonies. There were movies and USO Shows. In a Regimental Platoon Drill contest held 30 June, at Kottenheim, a platoon of M Company won top honors, while a platoon of I Company was a very close second. On 1 July, the Regiment participated in dedication ceremonies of the Santa Fe Stadium in Coblenz where Presidential Unit Citations were presented to the 1st Battalion, to Company C, and to the 2nd Platoon of Company D by General Gerow, the army commander (click here to read the Unit Citations). In the baseball game which followed, the 35th Division’s team, coached by Lt. Warren Hodges of I Company, defeated the 106th Division 5 to 3. The 134th Infantry on 5 July dedicated its own baseball park near Niedermendig, Romanowski Field, in honor of Pfc. Chester J. Romanowski of Detroit, first soldier of the 134th to die in France (9 July, 1944), and for two years a star on the Regiment’s division championship baseball team. In the baseball game, Manager E. C. Reischel’s 134th team beat the Division Special Troops 12 to 3.

Soon it became clear that the 35th Division was earmarked for service in the war against Japan. The readjustment program brought a widespread change in personnel, but with a core of the old volunteers yet remaining, the Regiment (after relief by the 5th French Infantry Regiment) moved - again by rail and motor - 11-13 July, back into France. Exactly a year after it had moved up to the lines at St. Lo - on the eve of Bastille Day, the Regiment closed into the tent city of Camp Norfolk - about 18 miles south of Chalons - in the Reims Assembly Area Command to prepare for return to the United States. Just before the Regiment left Camp Norfolk, and just in time to make the homeward voyage hold a completely joyful attraction, news came of the surrender of Japan.

The four trains (with passenger cars!) of the 134th Infantry departed from the Sommesous station 16 August, for the port of LeHavre. There were a few more anxious - but not uninteresting - days of waiting south of London, and the Regiment boarded the giant liner Queen Mary for a five-day voyage to New York. It completed its great, tremendous circle when it arrived at Camp Kilmer that 10 September, and the men scattered for 30 and 45 day furloughs. There was a brief reassembly at Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky, but the men quickly were discharged or transferred to go their separate ways.

On 21 November 1945, the 134th Infantry Regiment was inactivated. Its colors were returned to the State of Nebraska in ceremonies at the reunion of the 35th Division (whose chief speakers were President Truman and General Eisenhower) on 6 June 1946, in the Kansas City Convention Hall, where Brig. Gen. Guy N. Henniger, State Adjutant General, accepted on behalf of the Governor.

A reorganized 134th Infantry, Nebraska National Guard, with Colonel Warren C. Wood of Gering, commanding, picked up the heritage of "Nebraska’s Own."

Already a grateful State Legislature had adopted a resolution even before termination of hostilities:

WHEREAS, The 134th Infantry Regiment, Nebraska National Guard, 35th Division, United States Army, has repeatedly distinguished itself on the field of battle, and

WHEREAS, The officers and men of the regiment were drawn from the pursuits of peace to vindicate the right of peaceful men to live in peace, and

WHEREAS, They have valiantly sustained the highest military traditions of their state and their nation, and

WHEREAS, They have buried their dead and tended their wounded from the beaches of Normandy to the banks of the Rhine, and

WHEREAS, By their heroism at Saint Lo, and the Vire River, at Mortain, at Nancy and in the Siegfried Line - names to be forever emblazoned in their battle flags - they have made notable contributions to the ultimate victory of the cause which they were called to defend, and

WHEREAS, The people of Nebraska desire to extend grateful recognition of the services of their sons in this titanic struggle,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE FIFTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE:

- That all officers and men, living or dead, who are serving or have served in the 134th Infantry Regiment in the course of the present war be most highly commended for their patriotism, the courage, the fortitude, and the devotion with which they have served their country, and

- That they be assured of the complete confidence of our people that they will continue to distinguish themselves so long as the continuation of the war require their services, and

- That they be further assured of the unceasing prayers of our people that their lives may be spared and that they may soon resume their peaceful places in a world of peace, and

- That this resolution be spread at large upon the journals of the legislature and that a copy, suitably engrossed, be prepared and sent by the Clerk of the Legislature to Col. Butler B. Miltonberger, commanding officer of the Regiment, and to each of his battalion commanders, and

- That printed copies of this resolution be made available, upon request, to men of the regiment and their families.

- ROY W. JOHNSON,

President of the Legislature.

List of Illustrations:

Time for recreation South of Hannover.

Col. Boatsman on a tour of inspection in the area west of Coblenz with Capt. Jardine of D Company.

At Munstermaifield D Company had a PX complete.

D Company on parade.

They had won battlefield commissions.

A platoon of M Company won the contest.

At dedication of stadium at Coblenz.

Further honors to the liberators of Nancy.

Citations to the 2nd Platoon of D Company.

Citations to C Company

At Bastille Day ceremony in place Stanislas.

Readjustment program sent these original Nebraskans homeward.

Advance detachment prepares the way home.

Back to Camp Ashland (1947) Gov. Val Peterson of Nebraska pins the streamer for the Ardennes Unit Citation onto the Regimental Colors. With the Gov. are (left to right) Col. Wood, the C.O.; Brig. Gen. Guy N. Henninger, Nebraska adjutant general, and Capt. Ivar Peterson, his aide.

It is the beginning of a new era. Now it is Major General Butler B. Miltonberger, chief of the National Guard Bureau of the United States, talking with Col. Warren C. Wood, the new commander.